American Sales Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.

274 F.R.D. 127, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120177, 2010 WL 4644426
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedNovember 12, 2010
DocketCivil Action No. 08-CV-03149
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 274 F.R.D. 127 (American Sales Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
American Sales Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 274 F.R.D. 127, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120177, 2010 WL 4644426 (E.D. Pa. 2010).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

ANITA B. BRODY, District Judge.

Flonase is the brand-name version of fluticasone propionate (“FP”) — a nasal eorticos[130]*130teroid produced by Defendant SmithKline Beecham Corporation d/b/a GlaxoSmithKline PLC (“GSK”). The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approved Flonase to treat nasal inflammation caused by seasonal and non-seasonal allergies. Until recently, Flonase was one of the nation’s top-selling drugs, generating sales well over $1 billion in its peak years. This case concerns allegations that GSK restrained competition in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, by delaying the entry of generic FP into the market. Plaintiffs, American Sales Company, Inc., Meijer, Inc., and Meijer Distribution, Inc. (collectively, the “Direct Purchasers”), bring suit as direct purchasers of Flonase who were allegedly overcharged for Flonase as a result of GSK’s actions.1 Direct Purchasers now move for class certification under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3), proposing a class of: “all persons or entities in the United States and its territories who purchased and/or paid for Flonase nasal spray directly from Defendant (or any of its predecessors or affiliates) at any time from May 19, 2004 until the anticompetitive effects of Defendant’s conduct ceased” (the “Proposed Class”).

Although Defendant does not contest the Direct Purchasers’ Motion for Class Certification, recent Third Circuit precedent makes clear that I must “consider carefully all relevant evidence and make a definitive determination that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met before certifying a class.” In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 320 (3d Cir.2008). After considering all of the relevant evidence, I conclude that Direct Purchasers have met their burden under Rule 23. I will therefore grant Direct Purchasers’ Motion for Class Certification.2

1. Background3

A. The Hatch-Waxman Act and the Generic Drug Approval Process

In order to market a drug in the United States, a company must file a “New Drug Application” (“NDA”) with the FDA. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301, et seq. (1994). In 1984, Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act (“Hatch-Wax-man”), which amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, and created an expedited approval process for generic drugs. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified in various sections of titles 15, 21, 35, and 42 of the U.S.Code), as amended by Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.L. No. 108-173, tit. XI, subtits. A-B, 117 Stat. 2066, 2448-64 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (Supp. III 2003)). Under Hatch-Waxman, a company applying to make a generic version of a compound listed in the Orange Book need only file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”), requiring a demonstration of a certain level of bioequivalence to a listed drug instead of clinical trials. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j). The FDA issues public bioequivalence guidance for various categories of generic drugs. This guidance informs the public of the bioequivalence standards that ANDAs must meet in order to be approved. The FDA regularly modifies their bioequivalence guidance for specific categories of drugs.

While an ANDA is pending before the FDA, any interested party can file a citizen petition (a “Petition”) with the FDA to register a complaint about the pending application. 21 C.F.R. §§ 10.25(a), 10.30. Until 2007, the FDA was required to consider and respond to every Petition.4 For this reason, [131]*131filing a Petition necessarily delayed the approval of any pending ANDA — only after the FDA responded to all pending Petitions could an ANDA be approved.

B. Flonase

GSK developed Flonase in the early 1980s, filing a patent in the United Kingdom in 1980, and in the United States in 1981. See U.S. Patent No. 4,335,121 (filed Feb. 13, 1981). Flonase was first released in Europe in 1991 under the trade name Flixonase. GSK subsequently filed NDA # 20-121, requesting approval to release the drug in the United States. In October 1994, the FDA approved GSK’s NDA to treat nasal inflammation caused by seasonal and non-seasonal allergies. GSK released Flonase in the United States in 1995, and it quickly became the most prescribed nasal steroid inhalant in the United States. By 2000, Flonase commanded 38% of brand-name inhaled nasal steroid sales in the United States, resulting in over $600 million in sales. By 2005, the peak year for Flonase sales and the last year of GSK’s market exclusivity, Flonase sales exceeded $1.3 billion.

By the time Flonase’s market exclusivity was set to expire, GSK had identified a number of generic pharmaceutical manufacturers intent on filing ANDAs and bringing competitive generic FP nasal sprays to the market. This case concerns GSK’s alleged “brand maturation strategy,” crafted to maintain Flonase’s market dominance in the face of inevitable generic competition.

C. GSK’s Allegedly Anti-Competitive Conduct5

Direct Purchasers offer evidence that GSK’s alleged “brand maturation strategy” included four tactics to delay the entry of generic FP nasal sprays into the market. First, Direct Purchasers allege that GSK improperly influenced the FDA’s bioequivalence guidance process. GSK allegedly encouraged the FDA to refrain from approving any FP ANDAs before it issued final bioequivalence guidance governing FP ANDAs. GSK then sought to slow the issuance of final bioequivalence guidance. GSK also petitioned the FDA to set extremely rigorous bioequivalenee requirements using strict new tests that generic manufacturers would struggle to satisfy.

Second, Direct Purchasers provide evidence that GSK filed several Petitions with the FDA regarding pending FP ANDAs in order to force the FDA to respond and delay approval. Direct Purchasers allege that these Petitions were frivolous and only served to delay ANDA approval, rather than to raise genuine concerns with the applications.

Third, Direct Purchasers allege that GSK drafted an FP monograph for submission to the United States Pharmacopeia (“USP”), an “independent compendium of drug standards whose authority is recognized by reference in federal law.” Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir.2008). USP monographs list tests, procedures, and acceptance criteria in order to set standards for the quality, purity, strength, and consistency of the pharmaceutical ingredients in an approved drug.

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Related

In re Flonase Antitrust Litigation
951 F. Supp. 2d 739 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 2013)

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Bluebook (online)
274 F.R.D. 127, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120177, 2010 WL 4644426, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/american-sales-co-v-smithkline-beecham-corp-paed-2010.