American Fork City v. Pena-Flores

2002 UT 131, 63 P.3d 675, 463 Utah Adv. Rep. 50, 2002 Utah LEXIS 223, 2002 WL 31875585

• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Decided: December 27, 2002
• Docket: 20010056
• Status: Published

Opinions

RUSSON, Justice:

¶ 1 Luis Pena-Flores (“Pena-Flores”) was convicted in October 1999 of interfering with a peace officer seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention, a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1999). His conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals in American Fork City v. Penar-Flores, 2000 UT App 323, 14 P.3d 698. On certiorari to this court, Pena-Flores reasserts his claim that his conviction should be overturned because the detention with which he interfered was not lawful. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 The facts and procedural history are not in dispute. On July 10, 1999, police officers, members of a special gang interdiction task force, were patrolling the Steel Days carnival in American Fork. The carnival in previous years had been the scene of many fights, and the week befoi’e there had been a fight between two rival gangs, the “Sureños” of American Fork and “VML” of Payson. The task force had received information from street contacts and anonymous phone calls that another fight was brewing. Members of VML were reported to be coming from Payson that evening, possibly with a gun, to retaliate against the Sureños in American Fork. The task force had been tracking the activity of these groups for some time as the result of a gang-related homicide seven months earlier. There had also been violence between these two gangs just the previous day.

¶ 3 The gang interdiction unit patrolling the carnival was composed of about ten officers, each wearing a uniform shirt with “Police” printed in large letters on the front and back. In addition, each officer wore a police badge on the front of the shirt and a hat also clearly marked “Police.” The unit’s purpose was to monitor potential gang violence and update intelligence files, a standard gang investigation procedure the unit follows at all carnivals in the Utah County and Juab County areas. This procedure consists of detaining gang members, photographing them, and having them fill out information cards. At the carnival that evening, officers observed members of the Provo “Sureños” and the “Lay-Low Crips,” in addition to members of the Payson VML and the American Fork Sureños.

¶ 4 At around 8:00 p.m., the task force was detaining members of these gangs, identified by tattoos and monikers on their hands. The gangs had congregated at the back corner of the carnival, and the officers were taking them individually to the front to update photographs and information cards. Pena-Flores, who was not known to the officers, stepped forward and told the detainees they did not have to go with the police, answer questions, or have their pictures taken. Officer Andre Leavitt (“Leavitt”), a nine-year veteran of the task force, told Pena-Flores to keep quiet and to step back out of the situation. Pena-Flores was also agitating the other people who were with him, and the officers at the scene had to instruct these people to step back as well. Despite these warnings, Pena-Flores stepped forward again and continued to encourage noncompliance with the police. At that point, Leavitt escorted Pena-Flores to the front of the carnival and arrested him for interfering with a peace officer seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention.

RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

¶ 5 Pena-Flores appealed his subsequent conviction for interfering, claiming that the trial court had misinterpreted the interfering statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305. See American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323, 14 P.3d 698. Pena-Flores argued that the statutory “seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention” language applies only if the arrest or detention is ultimately found to be lawful. Pena-Flores claimed that the detentions of the gang members were unlawful because they were not supported by reasonable suspicion and that his conviction should be accordingly overturned.

¶ 6 The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that

[s]o long as a police officer is acting within the scope of his or her authority and the detention or arrest has the indicia of being lawful, a person can be guilty of interfering with a peace officer even when the arrest or detention is later determined to be unlawful.

Id. at ¶ 11. The court of appeals determined, based on our ruling in State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991), and the plain language of section 76-8-305, that Pena-Flores’ interpretation requiring that the underlying arrest or detention be lawful “reads out of the statute the phrase ‘seeking to effect.’ ” Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323 at ¶ 16,14 P.3d 698. The court of appeals concluded that “the statute is intended to protect law enforcement officers who are either making a lawful detention or arrest, or who are seeking to effect a lawful detention or arrest.” Id.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7 “ ‘When exercising our certiora-ri jurisdiction, we review the decision of the court of appeals and not that of the trial court.’ ” Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 2002 UT 77, ¶ 11, 52 P.3d 1267 (quoting Longley v. Leucadia Fin. Corp., 2000 UT 69, ¶ 13, 9 P.3d 762), “ ‘On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals for correctness.’ ” Collins, 2002 UT 77 at ¶ 11, 52 P.3d 1267 (quoting Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, ¶ 11, 48 P.3d 968). Also, “[w]e may affirm the court of appeals’ decision on any ground supported in the record.” Collins, 2002 UT 77 at ¶ 11, 52 P.3d 1267; see also Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 1158.

ANALYSIS

¶ 8 Section 76-8-305 of the Utah Code reads as follows:

A person is guilty of a class B misdemean- or if he has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and interferes with the arrest or detention by:

(1) use of force or any weapon;

(2) the arrested person’s refusal to perform any act required by lawful order:

(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and

(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or

(3)the arrested person’s or another person’s refusal to refrain from performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1999).

¶ 9 “ ‘When interpreting statutes, we determine the statute’s meaning by first looking to the statute’s plain language, and give effect to the plain language unless the language is ambiguous.’ ” Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, ¶ 14, 54 P.3d 1177 (quoting Blackner v. State Dep’t of Transp., 2002 UT 44, ¶ 12, 48 P.3d 949); see also State Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 75, ¶ 13, 52 P.3d 1257. Also, “ ‘[t]he best evidence of the true intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting the Act is the plain language of the Act.’ ” State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995) (quoting Jensen v. Intemountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984)). Furthermore, “this court has a ‘duty to construe a statute whenever possible so as to ... save it from constitutional infirmities.’ ” State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73, ¶ 12, 31 P.3d 547 (quoting In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ¶ 23, 1 P.3d 1074 (further quotation omitted)).

¶ 10 A reading of the plain language of the statute in question as applied to the facts of this case shows that Pena-Flores was properly arrested and convicted for violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305(3). The statute clearly states that a person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention and interferes with that arrest or detention by, among other things, refusing to refrain from performing any act that would impede that arrest or detention.

¶ 11 In the present case, clearly identified police officers were seeking to effect the lawful detention of gang members at a carnival. Pena-Flores apparently did not agree with what the police were doing and told the detainees that they did not have to cooperate. Pena-Flores was also agitating the other people who were with him. As a result, an officer told Pena-Flores to keep quiet and to step back out of the situation. Police officers had to instruct the people who were with Pena-Flores to step back as well. Despite these warnings, Pena-Flores stepped forward again and continued to encourage noncompliance with the police. It was only then that an officer escorted Pena-Flores to the front of the carnival and arrested him for interfering.

¶ 12 It is clear that Pena-Flores’ acts were impeding the detention in question. It is also clear that he had knowledge that police officers were involved and that after repeated requests from these officers he refused to refrain from his acts. Pena-Flores violated the plain language provisions of subsection (3) of the statute. Accordingly, his arrest and subsequent conviction were proper.¹

¶ 13 It is irrelevant to the plain language of the statute whether the detentions of gang members were lawful or unlawful. As we have previously stated, “the fact that [a peace officer’s] attempted [arrest or detention] was later found to be unlawful does not divest [the officer] of his authority.” Gard-iner, 814 P.2d at 575. The plain meaning of the “seeking to effect” language makes it clear that the reach of the statute is not contingent on the lawfulness of the underlying arrest or detention, but rather, as the court of appeals correctly concluded, the “officer ... acting within the scope of his or her authority and the detention or arrest ... [having] the indicia of being lawful.” Pena-Flores, 2000 UT App 323 at ¶ 16,14 P.3d 698.

¶ 14 Pena-Flores contends, however, that this “scope of authority” reading of the “seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention” language of the statute sanctions unreasonable searches and seizures prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. We disagree. The plain language of section 76-8-305 does not sanction an illegal arrest or detention as Pena-Flores claims. Rather, it provides for an orderly resolution of disputes about the lawfulness of an arrest or detention. As we previously held in Gardiner, if a person has an objection to the legality of an arrest or detention, “[t]he fine question of legality must be determined in subsequent judicial proceedings, not in the street.” Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574; see also State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800, 805 (Utah 1975) (Ellett, J., dissenting) (stating that the statute “merely transfers the right of redress ... to the orderly procedure of a court trial instead of a brawl in the streets”).

¶ 15 We also recognized in Gardiner that a citizen resorting to self-help when questioning the legality of an arrest or detention is a long-outdated concept. “An arres-tee now has the ‘benefits of liberal bonding policies, appointed counsel in the case of indigency, and the opportunity to be taken before a magistrate for immediate arraignment and preliminary hearing.’ ” Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 572 (quoting State v. Richardson, 95 Idaho 446, 511 P.2d 263, 267 (1973)). The statute does not disregard the Fourth Amendment, but reflects the legislature’s legitimate preference for orderly judicial settlement of disputes over disorderly street brawls. “Indeed, self-help not infrequently causes far graver consequences for both the officer and the suspect than does the [possibly] unlawful arrest itself.” People v. Curtis, 70 Cal.2d 347, 74 Cal.Rptr. 713, 450 P.2d 33, 36 (1969) (en banc).

¶ 16 Finally, this plain language reading of section 76-8-305 is in harmony with the reasonable and rational public policy considerations we also acknowledged in Gardiner. “ ‘The societal interest in the orderly settlement of disputes between citizens and their government outweighs any individual interest in resisting a questionable [arrest or detention]. One can reasonably be asked to submit peaceably and to take recourse in ... legal remedies.’ ” Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 572 (quoting State v. Doe, 92 N.M. 100, 583 P.2d 464, 466-67 (1978)).

¶ 17 Accordingly, we find that the “seeking to effect a lawful detention or arrest” language of the statute does not sanction unreasonable searches and seizures prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.²

CONCLUSION

¶ 18 For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. We also hold that the “seeking to effect a lawful detention or arrest” language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 comports with the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.

¶ 19 Associate Chief Justice DURRANT, Justice HOWE, and Justice WILKINS concur in Justice RUSSON’s opinion.

1 . Chief Justice Durham's discussion in section II of her dissent concerning Pena-Flores’ being convicted under subsection (2) of the interfering statute is entirely irrelevant to the facts of this case. See infra ¶¶ 27-33. The record is abundantly clear that Pena-Flores was convicted of violating subsection (3) of section 76-8-305 of the Utah Code. In pronouncing its verdict, the trial court stated that “[t]he focus here is ... on number three of the statute, the defendant’s refusal to refrain from performing any act that will impede the arrest or detention.”

2 . Chief Justice Durham errs in section III of her dissent wherein she asserts that Pena-Flores' rights to free speech were somehow compromised by his arrest. See infra ¶¶ 37-40. Certain speech is prohibited when such speech "is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969). Pena-Flores was inciting "imminent lawless action” when he told detainees, under the circumstances then existing, that they did not have to cooperate with police seeking to effect a lawful detention. He was also likely to “incite such [imminent lawless] action” when the bystanders became agitated. As a result, the officers at the scene exercised their legal discretion. They took action to defuse what was becoming an escalating situation that was impeding the detention of known gang members, and arrested Pena-Flores for interfering. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) (recognizing that in the "real world” of police operations, officers must make instantaneous and difficult judgment calls).

Chief Justice Durham also errs in asserting that subsection (3) of the interfering statute somehow reaches a substantial amount of protected speech and is therefore unconstitutionally overbroad. The statute does not say that all acts are prohibited, but rather all acts that impede officers seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention. The term "impede” in the statute places a narrow limitation as to when a person is interfering with arresting officers. Black’s Law Dictionary 753 (6th ed.1990) defines "impede” as "to obstruct; hinder; check; delay.” The statute reaches a person’s actions only when those actions interfere with a lawful arrest or detention by impeding the peace officers involved. The statute does not say that citizens cannot express their opinion about the unlawfulness of an arrest or detention. It does say that they cannot interfere by such expression to the point of impeding. If a person has an objection to the legality of an arrest or detention and that objection interferes by impeding police officers, "the fine question of legality [of the underlying arrest or detention] must be determined in subsequent judicial proceedings, not in the street.” Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574; see also Bradshaw, 541 P.2d at 805 (Ellett, J., dissenting) (stating that the statute "merely transfers the right of redress ... to the orderly procedure of a court trial instead of a brawl in the streets”).