Amendment to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(2)-(3)

719 So. 2d 873, 23 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 391, 1998 Fla. LEXIS 1333, 1998 WL 394166
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedJuly 16, 1998
DocketNo. 91536
StatusPublished
Cited by31 cases

This text of 719 So. 2d 873 (Amendment to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(2)-(3)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Amendment to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(2)-(3), 719 So. 2d 873, 23 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 391, 1998 Fla. LEXIS 1333, 1998 WL 394166 (Fla. 1998).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The Criminal Procedure Rules Committee, in response to a request from this Court, has filed a petition for expedited review of a proposed amendment to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(2)-(3). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.

In light of the Court’s recent decision in State v. Bowen, 698 So.2d 248 (Fla.1997), which illustrates the apparent difficulty trial courts are having in complying with the dictates of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Faretta1 the Court asked the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee to make suggestions for standardizing the courtroom colloquies that take place when a criminal defendant seeks self-representation and to consider whether Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(h)(1) should be amended. In Bowen, the Court answered the following certified question in the negative:

Once a trial court has determined that a defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his or her right to counsel, may that court nonetheless require the defendant to be represented by counsel because of concern that the defendant might be deprived of a fair trial if tried without such representation?

698 So.2d at 249. The Court explained that once a trial judge determines that a competent defendant has “knowingly and intelligently” waived the right to counsel, the dictates of Faretta are met, the inquiry is over, and the defendant may proceed pro se. The judge may not inquire further into whether the defendant is capable of providing a “substantively qualitative defense.” Id. at 251.

After considering the Court’s request, the rules committee filed the instant petition to amend rule 3.111(d)(2)-(3) and advised the Court that it unanimously agreed that the Conference of Circuit Judges should be asked to develop a model Faretta colloquy to be used by trial judges. The Conference of Circuit Judges has since informed the Court that it has developed a model colloquy which has been made available to trial judges and is contained in Appendix B.

The proposed amendment was published for comment; however, none were filed with the Court. At the Court’s request the Criminal Section of the Conference of Circuit Judges has reviewed the proposed amendment and informed the Court that all but one of the judges are in favor of the proposed amendment and believe the proposed amendment is “unambiguous and will assist the circuit judges in dealing with the issues of waiver of counsel.”

After considering the petition and the comment filed by the circuit judges, we adopt the proposed amendment as reflected in Appendix A to this opinion. New language is indicated by underscoring; deletions are indicated by strike-through type. The amendment shall become effective upon the release of this opinion.

It is so ordered.

HARDING, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN, WELLS, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX A

RULE 3.111. PROVIDING COUNSEL TO INDIGENTS

(a) When Counsel Provided. A person entitled to appointment of counsel as provided herein shall have counsel appointed when the person is formally charged with an offense, or as soon as feasible after custodial restraint, or at the first appearance before a [874]*874committing magistrate, whichever occurs earliest.

(b) Cases Applicable.

(1) Counsel shall be provided to indigent persons in all prosecutions for offenses punishable by imprisonment (or by incarceration in a juvenile corrections institution) including appeals from the conviction thereof. Counsel does not have to be provided to an indigent person in a prosecution for a misdemeanor or violation of a municipal ordinance if the judge, prior to trial, files in the cause a statement in writing that the defendant will not be imprisoned if convicted.

(2) Counsel may be provided to indigent persons in all proceedings arising from the initiation of a criminal action against a defendant, including postconviction proceedings and appeals therefrom, extradition proceedings, mental competency proceedings, and other proceedings that are adversary in nature, regardless of the designation of the court in which they occur or the classification of the proceedings as civil or criminal.

(3) Counsel may be provided to a partially indigent person on request provided that the person shall defray that portion of the cost of such representation and the reasonable costs of investigation as he or she is able without substantial hardship to the person or the person’s family, as directed by the court.

(4) “Indigent” as used herein shall mean a person who is unable to pay for the services of an attorney, including costs of investigation, without substantial hardship to the person or the person’s family; “partially indigent” as used herein shall mean a person unable to pay more than a portion of the fee charged by an attorney, including costs of investigation, without substantial hardship to the person or the person’s family.

(5) The court shall, prior to appointing a public defender:

(A)inform the accused that if the public defender is appointed, a lien for the services rendered by the public defender may be imposed under section 27.56, Florida Statutes;

(B) make inquiry into the financial status of the accused in a manner not inconsistent with the guidelines established by section 27.52, Florida Statutes. The accused shall respond to the inquiry under oath;

(C) require the accused to execute an affidavit of insolvency in the format provided by section 27.52, Florida Statutes.

(c) Duty of Booking Officer. In addition to any other duty, the officer who commits a defendant to custody has the following duties:

(1) The officer shall immediately advise the defendant:

(A) of the right to counsel;

(B) that if the defendant is unable to pay a lawyer, one will be provided immediately at no charge.

(2) If the defendant requests counsel or advises the officer he or she cannot afford counsel, the officer shall immediately and effectively place the defendant in communication with the (office of) public defender of the circuit in which the arrest was made.

(3) If the defendant indicates he or she has an attorney or is able to retain an attorney, the officer shall immediately and effectively place the defendant in communication with the attorney or the Lawyer Referral Service of the local bar association.

(4) The public defender of each judicial circuit may interview a defendant when contacted by, or on behalf of, a defendant who is, or claims to be, indigent as defined by law.

(A) If the defendant is in custody and reasonably appears to be indigent, the public defender shall tender such advice as is indicated by the facts of the case, seek the setting of a reasonable bail, and otherwise represent the defendant pending a formal judicial determination of indigency.

(B) If the defendant is at liberty on bail or otherwise not in custody, the public defender shall elicit only such information from the defendant as may be reasonably relevant to the question of indigency and shall immediately seek a formal judicial determination of indigency. If the court finds the defendant indigent, it shall immediately appoint counsel to represent the defendant.

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Bluebook (online)
719 So. 2d 873, 23 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 391, 1998 Fla. LEXIS 1333, 1998 WL 394166, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/amendment-to-florida-rule-of-criminal-procedure-3111d2-3-fla-1998.