IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA No. 15–0547
Filed December 2, 2016
Amended February 10, 2017
Upon the Petition of KENT D. LANGHOLZ,
Appellant,
And Concerning, HAROLD E. BRUMBAUGH,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Mary E.
Chicchelly, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals the district court order prohibiting the
redissemination of its ruling granting permanent injunctive relief and
denying the expansion of the terms of a permanent injunction.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Jacob R. Koller of Simmons Perrine Moyer Bergman PLC, Cedar
Rapids, for appellant.
Laura A. Kamienski of Ackley, Kopecky & Kingery, L.L.P., Cedar
Rapids, for appellee. 2
ZAGER, Justice.
A father filed for an injunction precluding communication and
contact between his minor child and her former softball coach. After a
trial, the district court granted a permanent injunction against the
former coach that prevented him from contacting or communicating with
the child, but allowed him to attend certain extracurricular activities and
to be present in the home of the child’s mother. The district court also
sealed all records and its ruling granting permanent injunctive relief.
The father filed a motion requesting that the district court allow for the
redissemination of the ruling granting permanent injunctive relief. The
father also requested that the district court expand the terms of the
permanent injunction. The district court denied the motion, but allowed
redissemination of the terms of the permanent injunction. The father
appeals. For the reasons set forth below, we remand the case for a
hearing consistent with the Iowa Open Records Act to determine whether
the ruling on permanent injunctive relief should be sealed and its
breadth. We also conclude the district court did not err in denying the
motion to expand the terms of the permanent injunction.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Because the ruling in this case has been sealed by the district
court and we must determine whether this ruling was correct, we omit
the underlying factual findings and concentrate on the procedural
history.
Kent Langholz (Kent) is the father and Angela Hagedorn (f/k/a
Angela Langholz) (Angela) is the mother of K.M.L. and S.E.L. Harold
Brumbaugh (Harold) is the former softball coach of K.M.L. In October
2013, Kent filed an ex parte application for injunctive relief, which the 3
district court granted on October 2. The terms of the temporary
injunction were as follows:
[T]hat the Respondent, Harold E. Brumbaugh, is enjoined and restrained from communicating and/or otherwise contacting K.M.L. and S.E.L. in any matter, including but not limited to, visiting any residence in which K.M.L. and S.E.L. reside and attending the sporting or other extracurricular events of either child.
As part of the temporary injunction, the district court also ordered “that
the Petitioner’s Exhibits 1-9 are received under seal and shall not be
available to the public.”
The district court held a hearing on January 8, 2014, to determine
whether the ex parte temporary injunction would remain in effect during
the proceedings. During the hearing, the parties agreed on the following
terms for the temporary injunction:
[A] temporary injunction is entered against Respondent, Harold E. Brumbaugh, and he shall be enjoined and restrained from communication with and/or otherwise contacting K.M.L. and S.E.L. in any matter whatsoever, including but not limited to, contact or communications through a third party, passing gifts, or attending the sporting or other extracurricular events of either child; provided, however, that the Respondent may attend the extracurricular events of his step-grandchildren, which may also involve K.M.L. or S.E.L. as a participant, and he may attend any game or event at any sports complex, provided that neither child is participating in the game or event which he is attending and he makes every effort to avoid visual contact with K.M.L. and S.E.L. at all times.
Notably, the stipulated temporary injunction did not prevent Harold from
being present at the children’s residence so long as neither child was
present. The parties also agreed that the clerk of court would seal all
documents except for court orders, decrees, and judgments.
Harold was mostly compliant with the terms of the injunction.
However, during one of K.M.L.’s softball tournaments in September 4
2014, Harold was present to coach another team. During the game,
Harold stood behind her dugout, walked by the dugout multiple times,
and did not make any effort to stay out of K.M.L.’s sight. Kent reported
that after the tournament, K.M.L. was not acting like herself and became
withdrawn, moody, and quiet.
The trial on Kent’s petition seeking permanent injunctive relief was
held on January 27 and 28, 2015. On February 4, the district court
entered its ruling granting Kent’s request for a permanent injunction.
The terms of the permanent injunction are as follows:
Defendant Harold Brumbaugh shall be enjoined and restrained from communicating with and/or otherwise contacting K.M.L. and S.E.L. in any matter whatsoever, including but not limited to, all written and in person contact or communications, all contact or communications through a third party, passing notes or gifts, or attending the sporting or other extracurricular events of either child; provided, however, that Defendant Harold Brumbaugh may attend the extracurricular events of his step-grandchildren, which may also involve K.M.L. or S.E.L. as a participant, and he may attend any game or event at any sports complex, provided that neither child is participating in the game or event which he is attending and he make every effort to avoid visual contact with K.M.L. and S.E.L. at all times, and shall be no closer in proximity to them than 100 feet. This injunction shall remain in place until K.M.L. and S.E.L. each reach the age of majority.
The district court ruling also ordered that the “ruling shall be sealed and
shall be accessible only by the parties and their counsel.”
On February 13, Harold filed a motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.904(2). In his motion, Harold requested the district
court prevent redissemination of the ruling granting injunctive relief. He
also asked the district court to eliminate the portion of its ruling that
provides he “shall be no closer in proximity to [K.M.L. and S.E.L.] than
100 feet.” In response, Kent filed a motion pursuant to rule 1.904(2)
asking the district court to expand its ruling to prevent Harold from 5
being present at Angela’s home and to prevent him from attending any
games that either K.M.L. or S.E.L. were participating in. Kent also
resisted Harold’s request to prohibit redissemination of the district court
ruling granting permanent injunctive relief.
On February 27, the district court issued its ruling on the 1.904(2)
motions. The district court denied the request to modify any of the
provisions of the permanent injunction, noting that the terms of the
permanent injunction were “carefully drawn . . . to address the dangers
and potential for injury found by the Court throughout the record as a
whole.” The district court found that the terms of the permanent
injunction already provided the necessary protection for the children,
and that Kent’s proposed terms would be overly burdensome and would
exceed what was necessary to protect the children.
The district court did, however, order that the ruling granting
permanent injunctive relief shall be sealed and “shall not be
disseminated in any manner by the parties and their counsel. The
parties and their counsel shall, however, be allowed to communicate only
the fact that an injunction is in place.” Specifically, the parties are
allowed to communicate that an injunction is in place that prevents
Harold from having contact with the children, including the 100-foot
distance rule at extracurricular activities. The district court noted in its
ruling that the purpose for sealing the file was to protect the privacy and
best interests of K.M.L. and S.E.L. The district court subsequently
amended its February 4 ruling to read,
[T]his ruling shall be sealed and shall be accessible only by the parties and their counsel, and shall not be re- disseminated in any manner by the parties and their counsel. The parties and their counsel, shall, however, be allowed to communicate only the fact that an injunction is in place which prohibits Defendant from having any contact 6 with the minor children at issue herein, including the 100 foot rule at games and tournaments, in order to effectuate enforcement of the terms of the injunction.
On March 10, Kent filed a second motion pursuant to rule 1.904(2)
and asked the district court to amend its ruling to allow redissemination
of the ruling for permanent injunctive relief, which Harold resisted. The
district court issued a ruling on March 25 that denied Kent’s motion.
The district court directed the clerk of court to execute a writ of
injunction that stated,
Defendant Harold Brumbaugh shall be enjoined and restrained from communicating with and/or otherwise contacting K.M.L. and S.E.L. in any matter whatsoever, including but not limited to, all written and in person contact or communications, all contact or communications through a third party, passing notes or gifts, or attending the sporting or other extracurricular events of either child; provided, however, that Defendant Harold Brumbaugh may attend the extracurricular events of his step-grandchildren, which may also involve K.M.L. or S.E.L. as a participant, and he may attend any game or event at any sports complex, provided that neither child is participating in the game or event which he is attending and he make every effort to avoid visual contact with K.M.L. and S.E.L. at all times, and shall be no closer in proximity to them than 100 feet. This injunction shall remain in place until K.M.L. and S.E.L. each reach the age of majority.
The writ was ordered not to be sealed and to be subject to
redissemination by the parties as necessary to enforce the district court’s
February 4 ruling granting permanent injunctive relief. The ruling itself
containing the terms of the permanent injunction was to remain sealed.
Kent filed an appeal on March 27, which we retained.
II. Standard of Review.
Generally, our review of an equitable proceeding is de novo. Bank
of Am., N.A. v. Schulte, 843 N.W.2d 876, 880 (Iowa 2014). To the extent
we are asked to engage in statutory interpretation, our review is for
correction of errors at law. Id.; Iowa Film Prod. Servs. v. Iowa Dep’t of 7
Econ. Dev., 818 N.W.2d 207, 217 (Iowa 2012). In equity cases, although
the trial court’s factual findings are not binding, we give weight to the
court’s assessment of witness credibility. Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g); see
also Wellmark, Inc. v. Polk Cty. Bd. of Review, 875 N.W.2d 667, 672 (Iowa
2016).
“An injunction may be obtained as an independent remedy [in] an
action in equity, or as an auxiliary remedy in any action.” State ex rel.
Dobbs v. Burche, 729 N.W.2d 431, 435 (Iowa 2007) (quoting Lewis Invs.,
Inc. v. City of Iowa City, 703 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Iowa 2005)). When the
injunction is sought as an independent remedy, our review is de novo.
Id. When it is obtained as an auxiliary remedy, our review is for
correction of errors at law. Id. This case was filed and tried as an
equitable action, and therefore our review is de novo. See id.
III. Analysis.
A. Sealing the Ruling on Permanent Injunction. At the time
the temporary injunction was ordered, the parties agreed that the clerk
would “seal all documents except for court orders, decrees, and
judgments.” When the district court issued the permanent injunction on
February 4, 2015, it ordered the ruling to be sealed and only accessible
by the parties and their counsel.
On March 10, Kent filed a motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil
Procedure 1.904(2) asking the district court to amend its ruling to allow
redissemination of the ruling on permanent injunction. Kent’s motion
was denied. The district court, noting its inherent authority, stated that
the reason for sealing the record was to protect the privacy and best
interests of the Langholz children. The district court also clarified that,
although the terms of the injunction are sealed, the parties are able to
communicate the fact that an injunction is in place which prohibits 8
Harold from having any contact with K.M.L. or S.E.L. The district court
further noted that communicating the underlying reasons for the
injunction was not necessary for its enforcement.
Kent alleges that he agreed to seal the court file with the exception
of any court orders, decrees, and judgments, but he did not agree to seal
the ruling granting permanent injunctive relief itself. He argues that
there is no statutory support for sealing the ruling granting the
injunction under the Iowa Open Records Act. Kent further argues that
Harold did not properly request an order sealing the contents of the
ruling on permanent injunction under the Iowa Open Records Act, but
rather requested a limitation in a posttrial motion. Because Harold did
not request an order under the Act, the district court did not hold a
hearing or make the necessary findings to authorize sealing the district
court’s ruling granting permanent injunctive relief.
Harold responds that there are several provisions under the Iowa
Open Records Act that protect information relating to minors and these
provisions are consistent with the stated reason given by the district
court for not allowing redissemination of the ruling granting the
permanent injunction. Harold also argues that the ruling references an
interview between K.M.L. and an employee of the Child Protection Center
(CPC), which constitutes child abuse information that is statutorily
protected from redissemination under Iowa Code chapter 235A (2015). 1
The general purpose of the Iowa Open Records Act is to “open the
doors of government to public scrutiny [and] to prevent government from
1In the alternative, we are asked to define the parameters of the inherent authority of the district court to seal records of court proceedings. However, it is not necessary to address the issue of inherent authority in order to resolve this case. The legislature has provided a mechanism to resolve disputes involving the sealing of public records in chapter 22. 9
secreting its decision-making activities from the public, on whose behalf
it is its duty to act.” Iowa Film Prods. Servs., 818 N.W.2d at 217
(alteration in original) (quoting City of Riverdale v. Diercks, 806 N.W.2d
643, 652 (Iowa 2011)). The Act carries with it “a presumption of
openness and disclosure.” Id. (quoting Gabrilson v. Flynn, 554 N.W.2d
267, 271 (Iowa 1996)).
The Iowa Open Records Act generally requires every person to
“have the right to examine and copy a public record and to publish or
otherwise disseminate a public record or the information contained in a
public record.” Iowa Code § 22.2(1). However, it also states “[t]he
following records shall be kept confidential, unless ordered by a court, by
the lawful custodian of the records, or by another person duly authorized
to release such information.” Id. § 22.7. The legislature has amended
the list in section 22.7 several times since the original enactment, and
there are currently over sixty types of records that are exempted from
disclosure. ACLU of Iowa, Inc. v. Records Custodian, 818 N.W.2d 231,
233 (Iowa 2012).
If a public record does not fall under one of the stated exemptions,
the district court may still grant an injunction to restrain the
examination of the record. Iowa Code § 22.8(1). This injunction is an
equitable remedy that is independent of the section 22.7 listed
exceptions. Burton v. Univ. of Iowa Hosps. & Clinics, 566 N.W.2d 182,
189 (Iowa 1997). However, a district court may only issue this injunction
if it finds that “the examination would clearly not be in the public
interest” and that “the examination would substantially and irreparably
injure any person or persons.” Id. (quoting Iowa Code § 22.8(1)). The
petition requesting the injunction should support these findings, and the
district court should hold a hearing to determine whether the burden has 10
been met. See id.; see also Hall v. Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 811 N.W.2d
478, 487 (Iowa 2012) (establishing that the burden of demonstrating the
elements is on the person resisting disclosure). The party opposing
disclosure must establish the elements by clear and convincing evidence.
Iowa Code § 22.8(3). In addition to the statutory exemptions contained
in section 22.7, there are also separate laws requiring documents to be
kept confidential. See Burton, 566 N.W.2d at 189 (holding that, in
addition to 22.7 exemptions, effect should be given to any statute outside
chapter 22 that requires otherwise public records to be kept
confidential). Therefore, there may be other legal grounds for sealing all
or part of a court order.
When determining whether the injunction should be issued, the
district court “shall take into account the policy of this chapter that free
and open examination of public records is generally in the public
interest.” Iowa Code § 22.8(3). This is true even when allowing access to
the records “may cause inconvenience or embarrassment to public
officials or others.” Id. In addition to the statutory limitations, we have
also adopted a five-factor test that balances privacy with the benefits of
public disclosure:
(1) the public purpose of the party requesting the information; (2) whether the purpose could be accomplished without the disclosure of personal information; (3) the scope of the request; (4) whether alternative sources for obtaining the information exist; and (5) the gravity of the invasion of personal privacy.
Clymer v. City of Cedar Rapids, 601 N.W.2d 42, 45 (Iowa 1999) (quoting
DeLaMater v. Marion Civil Serv. Comm’n, 554 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Iowa
1996)).
In Gabrilson, we addressed the question of whether the district
court could grant injunctive relief under section 22.8 when it had not 11
been specifically pled. 554 N.W.2d at 274. The plaintiff filed a two-count
petition that included a count for injunctive relief pursuant to chapter
22. Id. at 270. The district court then dismissed the count of the
petition including the chapter 22 claim, therefore never determining
whether injunctive relief was required. Id. Both parties later filed
competing rule 179(b) motions to enlarge the district court findings. 2 Id.
The district court granted the motions and held that certain documents
were confidential as statutorily excluded documents under Iowa Code
section 22.7(19). Id. The district court issued an injunction pursuant to
section 22.8 as an independent avenue of relief, finding that the
requirements of the section had been met as a matter of law. Id.
The defendant, Flynn, contended that his motion to enlarge was
effectively a petition for injunctive relief pursuant to section 22.8, even
though it was not so labeled. Id. at 274. His motion to enlarge requested
that the district court hold “as a matter of law that Carolyn Gabrilson
cannot publish, disseminate, and distribute the Eleventh Grade
Assessment Test and the scoring rubrics, because [under section 22.7]
these documents are confidential.” Id. He further argued that Gabrilson
had both proper notice and an opportunity to be heard at the hearing on
the motions to enlarge. Id.
While the district court sealed the documents under section 22.8,
the documents also fell under one of the section 22.7 exceptions. Id.
Because a section 22.7 exception applied, we declined to answer the
question and instead held that the district court could issue the
injunction under section 22.5, the section giving force to the exceptions
found in section 22.7. Id. We held that depriving the district court of
2This motion is now a rule 1.904 motion. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.904. 12
injunctive remedies under the particular facts of Gabrilson would
frustrate the purpose of the Iowa Open Records Act. Id. We found that
when a record is granted confidential status under section 22.7 an
injunction is the proper remedy when someone seeks to disclose those
records. Id. In that situation, it made no difference how the injunction
was labelled because the documents are granted confidential status as a
matter of law. Id.
In contrast to Gabrilson, no section 22.7 exception clearly applies
in this case, and therefore the records carry “a presumption of openness
and disclosure.” Iowa Film Prods. Servs., 818 N.W.2d at 217 (quoting
Gabrilson, 554 N.W.2d at 271). We now hold that if no exclusions apply
under section 22.7, and the sole injunctive relief sought is under 22.8,
the district court must conduct a hearing and make factual findings as
provided by the statute. By enacting the Iowa Open Records Act, the
legislature enacted a statutory scheme intended to address when public
records may be sealed. Here, this procedure was not followed by the
district court.
Harold also specifically argues that the ruling contains information
about a child abuse investigation and is therefore prevented from
redissemination under chapter 235A. See Iowa Code §§ 235A.15, .17.
Generally, the purpose of chapter 235A is to maintain the confidentiality
of information in a central child abuse registry and to prevent the
redissemination of information of founded child abuse reports. See, e.g.,
id. § 235A.12. Harold claims that the interview between K.M.L. and the
CPC employee constitutes child abuse information under section 13
235A.17. 3 See id. § 235A.17. While section 235A.17 does prohibit the
redissemination of child abuse information in certain circumstances, it
narrowly defines “subject of a child abuse report” to mean a child named
as a victim of founded abuse; that child’s parent, or legal guardian; or
the individual named as having abused a child. Id. §§ 235A.15, .17.
Further, “child abuse information” is defined by statute as “any or all
data maintained by the department in a manual or automated data
storage system,” in addition to report data, assessment data, and
disposition data. Id. § 235A.13(2)(a)–(c). Again, this definition
encompasses founded reports of child abuse. “Report data” is restricted
to cases where the department has determined the allegation of child
abuse is founded. Id. § 235A.13(10). “Assessment data” includes
information regarding services available to children who are victims of
founded child abuse and their families. Id. § 235A.13(1). “Disposition
data” refers to an opinion or decision “as to the occurrence of child
abuse.” Id. § 235A.13(5).
In this case, the CPC employee determined that the allegation of
child abuse was not founded. This could be considered disposition data
under the applicable statute. See id. However, the district court did not
conduct a hearing on this or make factual findings as to the statute’s
applicability. Therefore, the appropriate remedy in this case is to remand
to the district court so that it can conduct a hearing and make factual
findings consistent with Iowa Code section 22.8 before it can seal a court
document, order, or ruling that is not otherwise required to be kept
3The interview was with a social worker of a CPC at the request of the Department of Human Services. 14
confidential under Iowa Code section 22.7, or another independent
provision of Iowa law.
B. Scope of Injunction. The scope of the permanent injunction
issued by the district court restrains Harold from
communicating with and/or otherwise contacting K.M.L. and S.E.L. in any matter whatsoever, including but not limited to, all written and in person contact or communications, all contact or communications through a third party, passing notes or gifts, or attending the sporting or other extracurricular events of either child; provided, however, that Defendant Harold Brumbaugh may attend the extracurricular events of his step-grandchildren, which may also involve K.M.L. or S.E.L. as a participant, and he may attend any game or event at any sports complex, provided that neither child is participating in the game or event which he is attending and he make every effort to avoid visual contact with K.M.L. and S.E.L. at all times, and shall be no closer in proximity to them than 100 feet. This injunction shall remain in place until K.M.L. and S.E.L. each reach the age of majority.
The scope of the injunction as issued still allows Harold access to
Angela’s residence so long as the children are not present. It also allows
Harold to attend certain events the girls participate in if his step- grandchildren are also participants. Even if Harold attends his step-
grandchildren’s extracurricular activities, he is still required to avoid eye
contact with K.M.L. and S.E.L. and remain at least 100 feet away during
the events.
Kent requests that the scope of the permanent injunction be
modified to prevent Harold from having access to Angela’s home, even
when the children are not there. He is concerned that Harold will leave
notes for K.M.L. at Angela’s home. He is also worried that once K.M.L.
receives her driver’s license in January, she will be able to stop by
Angela’s home while Harold is visiting. Kent also requests that the scope
of the injunction be expanded to prevent Harold from attending any 15
extracurricular activity of either child, regardless of whether his step-
grandchildren are participants. After the temporary injunction was
entered, Harold attended a softball tournament and stood directly behind
K.M.L.’s dugout or in K.M.L.’s line of sight. After being in Harold’s
presence at the game, K.M.L. acted like she was “in a funk” or not herself
for a few days. She was withdrawn and moody, and was affected by
Harold’s presence at her game.
Harold argues that the scope of the permanent injunction should
not be expanded because it would do nothing to further protect K.M.L. or
S.E.L. He also argues there is no evidence that Angela would not protect
K.M.L. in the absence of Kent’s suggested provisions. Harold claims that
limiting his ability to attend the games of his step-grandchildren would
harm his familial relationships. Harold asserts that expanding the scope
of the injunction would only serve to punish him, rather than to protect
K.M.L.
While we emphasize that a permanent injunction is a remedy that
should be granted only with caution, an injunction is warranted when it
is necessary to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff and when there
is no other adequate remedy at law. In re Estate of Hurt, 681 N.W.2d
591, 595 (Iowa 2004); Opat v. Ludeking, 666 N.W.2d 597, 603 (Iowa
2003).
A plaintiff who seeks a permanent injunction must establish
“(1) an invasion or threatened invasion of a right; (2) that substantial
injury or damages will result unless the request for an injunction is
granted; and (3) that there is no adequate legal remedy available.” City of
Okoboji v. Parks, 830 N.W.2d 300, 309 (Iowa 2013) (quoting Sear v.
Clayton Cty. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 590 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Iowa
1999)). When determining whether an injunction is the proper remedy, 16
the court must weigh the relative hardship to each party. Opat, 666
N.W.2d at 604. A permanent injunction should be structured so it
affords relief to the complainant but does not interfere with the legitimate
and proper actions of the person against whom it is granted. 42 Am.
Jur. 2d Injunctions § 11, at 606 (2010). A permanent injunction should
only be ordered to prevent damage likely to occur in the future; it is not
meant to punish for past damage. Id.
Generally, the scope of the violation determines the scope of the
remedy provided in the permanent injunction. Dobbs, 729 N.W.2d at
436. The scope “should be set forth with certainty and clearness so that
persons bound by the decree may readily know what they must refrain
from doing without speculation or conjecture.” Opat, 666 N.W.2d at 605
(quoting 205 Corp. v. Brandow, 517 N.W.2d 548, 552 (Iowa 1994)). It
should be “drawn narrowly enough to address the harm sought to be
redressed.” Matlock v. Weets, 531 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Iowa 1995). 4
On appeal, Kent argues that the permanent injunction should be
expanded to prevent Harold from visiting Angela’s home and from
attending any of the children’s games. The question we must answer is
whether, absent the additional requested provisions, Kent’s right to manage and care for his children is invaded or threatened to be invaded.
See, e.g., City of Okoboji, 830 N.W.2d at 309.
The harm that Kent seeks to avoid by expanding the terms of the
injunction is already prevented by the current terms of the permanent
injunction. Kent expresses concern that the girls could stop by to visit
Angela while Harold is already present. However, the terms of the
4The district court found that Kent had met his burden of demonstrating a permanent injunction was appropriate, and neither party has appealed the underlying grounds for the injunction. 17
injunction imposed by the district court already prohibit Harold from “all
. . . in person contact or communications.” Should this situation occur,
the permanent injunction would already require Harold to leave Angela’s
house.
Kent also believes that Harold will use his opportunity to visit
Angela to leave notes for K.M.L. Again, the terms of the permanent
injunction already prevent Harold from “passing notes or gifts.” If Harold
does pass a note to K.M.L. while present at Angela’s house, the
injunction already provides a remedy. Kent cannot use concern that
Harold will violate a term of the permanent injunction in the future to
justify its expansion. The scope of the injunction already “set[s] forth
with certainty and clearness” that Harold is prohibited from
communicating with the girls in person or through a third person, and
from passing notes or gifts. Opat, 666 N.W.2d at 605 (quoting 205 Corp.,
517 N.W.2d at 552).
Kent also expresses concern that Harold has previously attended a
softball game as the coach for another team and repeatedly walked by or
stood behind K.M.L.’s dugout. Kent described K.M.L. as being “in a
funk” and “not herself” for days after the game. Again, the terms of the
permanent injunction already prevent this type of behavior. The
injunction requires that Harold “make every effort to avoid visual contact
with K.M.L. and S.E.L. at all times” and prevents him from being closer
than 100 feet while the children are participating in extracurricular
activities. The proper remedy for Kent in this situation would be to
enforce the current terms of the permanent injunction rather than seek
to expand it. Kent has failed to establish that not expanding the terms of
the permanent injunction would cause the “invasion or threatened 18
invasion of a right.” City of Okoboji, 830 N.W.2d at 309 (quoting Sear,
590 N.W.2d at 515).
Kent also fails to establish that “substantial injury or damages will
result unless the request for an injunction is granted.” Id. (quoting Sear,
590 N.W.2d at 515). In order to demonstrate injury or damages, Kent
must be able to show that “there is a real and immediate threat the
injury will either continue or be repeated” unless the requested terms are
included in the permanent injunction. 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 2, at
592. As stated above, all of the actions Kent seeks to prevent by
expanding the terms of the permanent injunction are already addressed
in the current terms of the injunction. If Harold does have contact with
the girls at Angela’s house, leave notes, or remain in their line of sight at
softball games, Kent already has a remedy: the enforcement of the
current permanent injunction.
Likewise, Kent is unable to demonstrate that “there is no adequate
legal remedy available” if the terms of the injunction are not expanded.
City of Okoboji, 830 N.W.2d at 309 (quoting Sear, 590 N.W.2d at 515).
His proposed terms do not prevent any harm that is not already
contemplated by and included in the current permanent injunction. The
legal remedy for Kent’s concerns that Harold will communicate with the
girls or loiter nearby during their softball games is to enforce the terms of
the permanent injunction.
We hold that Kent has not demonstrated that the terms of the
permanent injunction should be expanded.
IV. Conclusion.
The district court did not conduct a hearing or otherwise make
factual findings pursuant to Iowa Code section 22.8. While sealing the
ruling granting the permanent injunction and issuing a separate writ of 19
injunction may be an appropriate remedy in this case, no hearing was
conducted pursuant to the Iowa Open Records Act in support of the
district court conclusion. We therefore remand the case for a hearing
regarding redissemination of the district court’s ruling granting
permanent injunctive relief consistent with the requirements of the Iowa
Open Records Act. We also hold the terms of the permanent injunction
should not be expanded. We affirm the decision of the district court with
regard to the terms of the injunction and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.