Amboh v. Haney

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: January 8, 2026
• Docket: 25-4095
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-4095 Document: 29 Date Filed: 01/08/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 8, 2026 _______________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court KANDRA AMBOH,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 25-4095 (Case No. 2:24-CV-00868-RJS) NICHOLAS HANEY; JEFFRY (D.C. Utah) ROSS; ERIN RAWLINGS,

Defendants - Appellees. _______________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _______________________________________

Before BACHARACH, MORITZ, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges . _______________________________________

This case arose out of proceedings in Utah state court, where

Mr. Nicholas Haney petitioned for

• a decree to get sole custody of his minor children and

• an order of protection for these children against Ms. Kandra Amboh.

* The parties do not request oral argument, and it would not help us decide the appeal. So we have decided the appeal based on the record and the parties’ briefs. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).

This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). Appellate Case: 25-4095 Document: 29 Date Filed: 01/08/2026 Page: 2

Mr. Haney obtained custody and a protection order for the children

against Ms. Amboh, who responded by seeking return of the children

through a federal habeas petition. In federal district court, a magistrate

judge recommended dismissal of the habeas petition for lack of

jurisdiction; and Ms. Amboh did not object. The district judge adopted the

recommendation and dismissed the case. 1

The underlying appeal. Ms. Amboh appeals the dismissal, arguing

that the federal district court should have required the state court to order

return of her children. In this appeal, however, Ms. Amboh raises

arguments that are procedurally improper based on the firm-waiver rule

and forfeiture.

The firm-waiver rule prevents a party from obtaining appellate

review after failing to object to a magistrate judge’s recommendation.

Morales-Fernandez v. I.N.S., 418 F.3d 1116, 1119 (10th Cir. 2005). For the

firm-waiver rule, two exceptions exist. The first is when the district court

fails to tell a pro se litigant what the deadline is for an objection or what

the consequences are for a failure to object; the second is when appellate

review is required in the interests of justice. Id.

1 Ms. Amboh unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration.

2 Appellate Case: 25-4095 Document: 29 Date Filed: 01/08/2026 Page: 3

The first objection doesn’t apply because the district court told

Ms. Amboh what the deadline was and what the consequences would be if

she failed to timely object.

Nor does the second exception apply. For this exception, we consider

“factors such as ‘a pro se litigant’s effort to comply, the force and

plausibility of the explanation for his failure to comply, and the

importance of the issues raised.’” Duffield v. Jackson, 545 F.3d 1234, 1238

(10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Morales–Fernandez, 418 F.3d at 1120).

Ms. Amboh has not explained her failure to object or said why the issues

are important enough to satisfy the exception under the firm-waiver rule.

Apart from the firm-waiver rule, however, Ms. Amboh has raised

entirely new arguments that she didn’t present to either the magistrate

judge or district judge. To the magistrate judge, Ms. Amboh argued that

the state court shouldn’t have given custody to her husband. The magistrate

judge concluded that the federal district court lacked jurisdiction to

consider this argument under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This “doctrine

establishes, as a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction, that only the United

States Supreme Court has appellate authority to review a state-court

decision.” Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nudell, 363 F.3d 1072,

1074–75 (10th Cir. 2004) (footnote omitted).

On appeal, Ms. Amboh jettisons her prior reliance on the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine. She instead invokes 25 U.S.C. § 1914, which addresses

3 Appellate Case: 25-4095 Document: 29 Date Filed: 01/08/2026 Page: 4

the availability of a court action involving termination of parental rights or

placement of Indian children in foster care. But Ms. Amboh did not invoke

§ 1914 in federal district court. She thus forfeited this argument. Havens v.

Colo. Dep’t of Corrs., 897 F.3d 1250, 1259–60 (10th Cir. 2018).

In a reply brief, Ms. Amboh invokes another federal statute: 25

U.S.C. § 1922. But she didn’t raise § 1922 either in district court or in the

opening brief; the reply brief was too late to raise a new argument.

Anderson v. Spirit Aerosystems Holdings, Inc., 827 F.3d 1229, 1236 n.2

(10th Cir. 2016).

Given the forfeiture and applicability of the firm-waiver rule, we

affirm the dismissal.

Other filings. Ms. Amboh has also moved for a preliminary

injunction, to enter appropriate remedies involving a state-court order on a

false charge of stalking, and an order compelling the tribal court to order

discovery.

A motion for preliminary injunction must be filed in district court,

not here. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a). An appellant can seek a stay pending

appeal in our court, but the stay would be moot with the filing today of our

judgment. See In re Sunset Sales, Inc., 195 F.3d 568, 573 (10th Cir. 1999)

(stating that a stay pending appeal became moot with our decision on the

merits of the appeal).

4 Appellate Case: 25-4095 Document: 29 Date Filed: 01/08/2026 Page: 5

Ms. Amboh has also requested discovery in tribal court and to

address a false charge of stalking. But before we can address these

requests, we must have power to act. (We call this power jurisdiction.) We

lack power (jurisdiction) over these requests because Ms. Amboh has not

identified any pertinent rulings in federal district court. See Anderson v.

Colo., 793 F.2d 262, 264 (10th Cir. 1987). 2

Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge

2 A claimant must sometimes exhaust the claim by presenting it first in tribal court or state court. Because we lack jurisdiction, we don’t express any opinion on whether Ms. Amboh would need to exhaust her new claims before going to federal district court. 5