MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Mar 12 2018, 8:59 am regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Brian A. Karle Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Lafayette, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
J.T. Whitehead Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Amanda L. Brummett, March 12, 2018 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 79A02-1710-CR-2284 v. Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Steven P. Meyer, Appellee-Plaintiff Judge Trial Court Cause No. 79D02-1608-FC-6
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1710-CR-2284 | March 12, 2018 Page 1 of 8 [1] After pleading guilty to welfare fraud as a Class D felony and Medicaid fraud as
a Class D felony, Amanda L. Brummett was sentenced to an aggregate four-
year sentence. On appeal, Brummett argues that her sentence is inappropriate.
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] An investigation revealed that Brummett had provided false and misleading
information in her application to obtain certain benefits from government
agencies. On August 4, 2016, the State charged Brummett with three counts of
welfare fraud, one as a Class C felony (Count I) and two as Level 6 felonies
(Counts II and III). The State also alleged that Brummett was a habitual
offender.1 On May 16, 2017, the State filed an amended charging information,
charging Brummett with Medicaid fraud as a Class D felony (Count V) and
amending Count I to a charge of welfare fraud as a Class D felony. That same
day, Brummett pled guilty to amended Count I and Count V. Pursuant to a
plea agreement, the remaining charges as well as a petition to revoke probation
in another action were dismissed.
[4] The trial court held a sentencing hearing on August 31, 2016, and issued its
sentencing order that same day. The court found the following aggravating
factors: Brummett’s criminal history; failed probation; failed community
1 The trial court granted the State’s subsequent motion to dismiss the habitual offender allegation.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1710-CR-2284 | March 12, 2018 Page 2 of 8 corrections; eight alleged violations of probation, three of which were found
true; Brummett was on probation at the time of the offenses; and prior efforts at
rehabilitation had failed. In mitigation, the trial court noted Brummett’s guilty
plea, health issues, family support, and her recent employment. The trial court
found that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and sentenced Brummett
to consecutive terms of two years on each count, for an aggregate sentence of
four years. Brummett now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as
necessary.
Discussion & Decision
[5] Article 7, section 4 of the Indiana Constitution grants our Supreme Court the
power to review and revise criminal sentences. See Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d
1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 978 (2015). Pursuant to Ind.
Appellate Rule 7, the Supreme Court authorized this court to perform the same
task. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). Per App. R. 7(B),
we may revise a sentence “if after due consideration of the trial court’s decision,
the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender.” Inman v. State, 4 N.E.3d 190, 203
(Ind. 2014) (quoting App. R. 7). “Sentencing review under Appellate Rule 7(B)
is very deferential to the trial court.” Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind.
2012). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence
portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by
restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant’s character (such as
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1710-CR-2284 | March 12, 2018 Page 3 of 8 substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson
v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).
[6] The determination of whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate “turns on
our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the
damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given
case.” Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1145 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Cardwell, 895
N.E.2d at 1224). Moreover, “[t]he principal role of such review is to attempt to
leaven the outliers.” Chambers v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 2013). It is
not our goal in this endeavor to achieve the perceived “correct” sentence in
each case. Knapp, 9 N.E.3d at 1292. Accordingly, “the question under
Appellate Rule 7(B) is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather,
the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” King v. State,
894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis in original).
[7] In order to assess the appropriateness of a sentence, we first look to the
statutory range established for the classification of the relevant offense.
Brummett was convicted of two Class D felonies, the sentencing range for
which is six months to three years, with an advisory sentence of one and a half
years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7. Brummett was sentenced to two years on each
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1710-CR-2284 | March 12, 2018 Page 4 of 8 Class D felony conviction and the sentences were ordered to be served
consecutively, for an aggregate four-year sentence.2
[8] With regard to the nature of the offenses. Brummett’s welfare fraud involved
obtaining aid from the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration’s
(FSSA) Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) by providing
FSSA with false and misleading information. As a result of her application,
Brummett received more than $250.00 but less than $2,500.00 in aid. During
this same time frame, Brummett also sought and received benefits from the
Medicaid program by providing false and misleading information. Specifically,
she claimed that she was pregnant when she was not. But for Brummett’s false
and misleading claims, she would not have received Medicaid coverage
according to the rules and regulations governing the Medicaid process. In total,
Brummett received aid in the amount of $16,422.39, to which she was not
entitled. The trial court appropriately summed up the nature of the offense as
follows:
[Y]ou are the epitome of people who come in and play the system.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Mar 12 2018, 8:59 am regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Brian A. Karle Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Lafayette, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
J.T. Whitehead Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Amanda L. Brummett, March 12, 2018 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 79A02-1710-CR-2284 v. Appeal from the Tippecanoe Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Steven P. Meyer, Appellee-Plaintiff Judge Trial Court Cause No. 79D02-1608-FC-6
Altice, Judge.
Case Summary
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1710-CR-2284 | March 12, 2018 Page 1 of 8 [1] After pleading guilty to welfare fraud as a Class D felony and Medicaid fraud as
a Class D felony, Amanda L. Brummett was sentenced to an aggregate four-
year sentence. On appeal, Brummett argues that her sentence is inappropriate.
[2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[3] An investigation revealed that Brummett had provided false and misleading
information in her application to obtain certain benefits from government
agencies. On August 4, 2016, the State charged Brummett with three counts of
welfare fraud, one as a Class C felony (Count I) and two as Level 6 felonies
(Counts II and III). The State also alleged that Brummett was a habitual
offender.1 On May 16, 2017, the State filed an amended charging information,
charging Brummett with Medicaid fraud as a Class D felony (Count V) and
amending Count I to a charge of welfare fraud as a Class D felony. That same
day, Brummett pled guilty to amended Count I and Count V. Pursuant to a
plea agreement, the remaining charges as well as a petition to revoke probation
in another action were dismissed.
[4] The trial court held a sentencing hearing on August 31, 2016, and issued its
sentencing order that same day. The court found the following aggravating
factors: Brummett’s criminal history; failed probation; failed community
1 The trial court granted the State’s subsequent motion to dismiss the habitual offender allegation.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1710-CR-2284 | March 12, 2018 Page 2 of 8 corrections; eight alleged violations of probation, three of which were found
true; Brummett was on probation at the time of the offenses; and prior efforts at
rehabilitation had failed. In mitigation, the trial court noted Brummett’s guilty
plea, health issues, family support, and her recent employment. The trial court
found that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and sentenced Brummett
to consecutive terms of two years on each count, for an aggregate sentence of
four years. Brummett now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as
necessary.
Discussion & Decision
[5] Article 7, section 4 of the Indiana Constitution grants our Supreme Court the
power to review and revise criminal sentences. See Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d
1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 978 (2015). Pursuant to Ind.
Appellate Rule 7, the Supreme Court authorized this court to perform the same
task. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). Per App. R. 7(B),
we may revise a sentence “if after due consideration of the trial court’s decision,
the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender.” Inman v. State, 4 N.E.3d 190, 203
(Ind. 2014) (quoting App. R. 7). “Sentencing review under Appellate Rule 7(B)
is very deferential to the trial court.” Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind.
2012). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence
portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by
restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant’s character (such as
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1710-CR-2284 | March 12, 2018 Page 3 of 8 substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson
v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).
[6] The determination of whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate “turns on
our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the
damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given
case.” Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1145 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Cardwell, 895
N.E.2d at 1224). Moreover, “[t]he principal role of such review is to attempt to
leaven the outliers.” Chambers v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1257, 1259 (Ind. 2013). It is
not our goal in this endeavor to achieve the perceived “correct” sentence in
each case. Knapp, 9 N.E.3d at 1292. Accordingly, “the question under
Appellate Rule 7(B) is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather,
the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” King v. State,
894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis in original).
[7] In order to assess the appropriateness of a sentence, we first look to the
statutory range established for the classification of the relevant offense.
Brummett was convicted of two Class D felonies, the sentencing range for
which is six months to three years, with an advisory sentence of one and a half
years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7. Brummett was sentenced to two years on each
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1710-CR-2284 | March 12, 2018 Page 4 of 8 Class D felony conviction and the sentences were ordered to be served
consecutively, for an aggregate four-year sentence.2
[8] With regard to the nature of the offenses. Brummett’s welfare fraud involved
obtaining aid from the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration’s
(FSSA) Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) by providing
FSSA with false and misleading information. As a result of her application,
Brummett received more than $250.00 but less than $2,500.00 in aid. During
this same time frame, Brummett also sought and received benefits from the
Medicaid program by providing false and misleading information. Specifically,
she claimed that she was pregnant when she was not. But for Brummett’s false
and misleading claims, she would not have received Medicaid coverage
according to the rules and regulations governing the Medicaid process. In total,
Brummett received aid in the amount of $16,422.39, to which she was not
entitled. The trial court appropriately summed up the nature of the offense as
follows:
[Y]ou are the epitome of people who come in and play the system. . . . This was an elaborate scheme by you where you falsified records; you lied about pregnancies and births for goodness sakes. You made up fictional children just to cheat the system. And then you presented other additional fraudulent
2 The State concedes that the convictions arose out of a single episode of criminal conduct, and thus, four years is the maximum sentence Brummett could have received. See I.C. § 35-50-1-2(c) (“except for crimes of violence, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment . . . to which the defendant is sentenced for felony convictions arising out of an episode of criminal conduct shall not exceed the advisory sentence for a felony which is one (1) class of felony higher than the most serious of the felonies for which the person has been convicted”). The advisory sentence for a Class C felony is four years. See I.C. § 35-50-2-6.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1710-CR-2284 | March 12, 2018 Page 5 of 8 documents showing you were pregnant or what not. I was struck by your statement here today that you say I made a mistake, I made a mistake. This is not a mistake. This has been an ongoing pattern with you and these crimes in particular were deliberate, were thought out, and were part of your criminal conspiracy, if you will, to defraud the welfare agency at the expense of other legitimate pregnant women or people out there that need the benefits. . . . And I look at your history and there is a repetitive nature here, not only to cheat the welfare system, but you have a problem with honesty.
Transcript Vol. 2 at 70-71.
[9] With regard to Brummett’s character, her criminal history is telling. The record
reveals that Brummett’s juvenile and criminal history dates back to 1995 and
includes four prior misdemeanor convictions and five prior felony convictions,
many of which are similar in nature to the instant offenses.
[10] Brummett’s juvenile history includes adjudications for theft, leaving home
without permission of a parent, curfew violation, and operating a vehicle
without a license. As an adult, Brummett’s history incudes numerous
charges/convictions of check deception and other crimes of dishonesty. In
March 2007, Brummett was charged with two counts of check deception, but
the court withheld judgment contingent upon payment of a diversion program
fee, completion of money management school, and payment of restitution. Six
months later, in September 2007, Brummett was again arrested and convicted
of check deception and she received a suspended sentence. Four years after
that, in September 2011, Brummett was convicted of yet another charge of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1710-CR-2284 | March 12, 2018 Page 6 of 8 check deception following the filing of three counts for the same. Based on
these charges, Brummett’s probation in a previous cause was revoked.
[11] In December 2011, Brummett was charged with check fraud, false informing,
and theft, and was ultimately convicted of the first two. For these convictions,
Brummett received a short period of incarceration and a period of unsupervised
probation. Within the next year, Brummett was convicted of a single count of
check fraud. In October 2012, the State filed a thirteen-count information, of
which Brummett was convicted of three offenses: fraud on a financial
institution, check fraud, and theft. Brummett was sentenced to six years, with
four years executed and two years of supervised probation. Brummett’s history
includes numerous alleged probation violations, three of which were found
true. In fact, she was on probation when she committed the instant offenses.
[12] We also find revealing of Brummett’s character the fact that she made up two
different children and applied for benefits on their behalf, benefits that she then
kept for herself. She also falsified documents and claimed to be pregnant in
order to receive Medicaid benefits.
[13] Brummett’s long history of financial crimes and crimes of dishonesty, as well as
her failures at probation, demonstrate that she has not learned from her
mistakes. Further, she has squandered opportunities for rehabilitation and the
considerable leniency previously afforded her. Given the foregoing, we cannot
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1710-CR-2284 | March 12, 2018 Page 7 of 8 say that the aggregate four-year sentence imposed by the trial court is
inappropriate.3
[14] Judgment affirmed.
May, J. and Vaidik C.J., concur.
3 To the extent Brummett argues that that her convictions would have violated principles of double jeopardy had she gone to trial and that such is relevant to our review of the appropriateness of her sentence, we note that such determination cannot be made on the record before us. Further, as Brummett properly acknowledges, she has waived any claim of double jeopardy by pleading guilty. See Mapp v. State, 770 N.E.,2d 332, 334-35 (Ind. 2002).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1710-CR-2284 | March 12, 2018 Page 8 of 8