NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 18 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHELLE REGINA ALVES PEREIRA; No. 24-6388 L.M.A.C.; I.C.A.P., Agency Nos. A220-216-899 Petitioners, A220-216-900 A220-216-901 v.
TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney MEMORANDUM* General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 12, 2026** Seattle, Washington
Before: W. FLETCHER and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and HINDERAKER, District Judge.***
Michelle Regina Alves Pereira (Petitioner) and her children, L.M.A.C. and
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable John Charles Hinderaker, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation. I.C.A.P. (collectively, Petitioners), are native citizens of Brazil and petition for
review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming an order
of an Immigration Judge (IJ) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under
8 U.S.C. § 1252. “Where, as here, the BIA cites Burbano and also provides its own
review of the evidence and law, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions.”
Rudnitskyy v. Garland, 82 F.4th 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation modified); see
also Matter of Burbano, 20 I & N Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994). We review “questions
of law de novo and the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence.” Ruiz-
Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation modified).
“Under the substantial evidence standard, ‘administrative findings of fact are
conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary.’” Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). We deny the petition.
1. To qualify for asylum or withholding of removal, Petitioners must establish
past persecution or an objectively reasonable fear of future harm. See Diaz v. Bondi,
129 F.4th 546, 553 (9th Cir. 2025); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i)(A)-(C). Petitioners
claimed past persecution on the basis of anonymous threats received by Petitioner in
connection with her work as a legal aide in a case representing a controversial
criminal defendant. The agency considered the threats against Petitioner
2 24-6388 cumulatively and determined that they did not rise to the level of persecution. The
record does not compel a contrary conclusion.
The IJ explained that none of the threats resulted in a confrontation or physical
harm to Petitioner, and each threat was made anonymously. “Unfulfilled threats are
very rarely sufficient to rise to the level of persecution, and [Petitioner] has not made
that showing here.” Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 647 (9th Cir. 2021); see also
Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019) (death threats
“constitute persecution in only a small category of cases, and only when the threats
are so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm” (citation
modified)). The record does not otherwise indicate harm to Petitioner or her children
in Brazil on account of a protected ground.
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that Petitioners
failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a
protected ground. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(a),
1208.16(b)(2). As the IJ noted, Petitioner no longer works with nor has any
connection to the law firm or to the criminal defendant the firm represented. Given
that the controversial criminal case ended in a conviction and sentence of greater
than thirty years, the record does not indicate that Petitioners are likely to be targeted
with intimidation or continued threats related to the criminal case if removed to
Brazil.
3 24-6388 2. Petitioners forfeited any challenge to the denial of CAT relief by failing to
raise the issue in their opening brief. Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr, 976 F.3d 1062,
1065 (9th Cir. 2020).
3. Petitioners do not establish a due process violation. We review due process
claims de novo. Olea-Serefina v. Garland, 34 F.4th 856, 866 (9th Cir. 2022). “A
complete and accurate transcript is . . . essential for the Board to adjudicate an appeal
that turns on witness testimony.” Matter of Kagumbas, 28 I & N Dec. 400, 406 (BIA
2021). However, “[t]his does not mean that the transcript has to be perfect.” Id. If
the transcript is “complete enough for the Board to meaningfully review an appeal,”
id., “a mere failure of transcription . . . does not rise to the level of a due process
violation,” Zia v. Garland, 112 F.4th 1194, 1203 (9th Cir. 2024).
Petitioners do not demonstrate that the indiscernible or untranslated portions
of their hearing transcript rendered the transcript so incomplete that it violated their
right to a full and fair hearing, nor that they were substantially prejudiced. Hussain,
985 F.3d at 642; Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000). The transcript
indicates that the errors Petitioners attribute to their interpreter resulted from
clarification requests by the interpreter, each of which was immediately resolved.
The transcript further indicates that the other “untranslated” and “indiscernible”
statements at issue did not prevent Petitioner from thoroughly answering the
questions she was asked related to the line of testimony her counsel sought to
4 24-6388 develop. See Matter of Kagumbas, 28 I & N at 406 (explaining that “if there are
only a few words that are indiscernible or the indiscernible testimony is not critical
to the outcome of the case, then remand is not necessary”). Relatedly, Petitioners
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 18 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHELLE REGINA ALVES PEREIRA; No. 24-6388 L.M.A.C.; I.C.A.P., Agency Nos. A220-216-899 Petitioners, A220-216-900 A220-216-901 v.
TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney MEMORANDUM* General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 12, 2026** Seattle, Washington
Before: W. FLETCHER and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and HINDERAKER, District Judge.***
Michelle Regina Alves Pereira (Petitioner) and her children, L.M.A.C. and
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable John Charles Hinderaker, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation. I.C.A.P. (collectively, Petitioners), are native citizens of Brazil and petition for
review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming an order
of an Immigration Judge (IJ) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under
8 U.S.C. § 1252. “Where, as here, the BIA cites Burbano and also provides its own
review of the evidence and law, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions.”
Rudnitskyy v. Garland, 82 F.4th 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation modified); see
also Matter of Burbano, 20 I & N Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994). We review “questions
of law de novo and the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence.” Ruiz-
Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation modified).
“Under the substantial evidence standard, ‘administrative findings of fact are
conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary.’” Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). We deny the petition.
1. To qualify for asylum or withholding of removal, Petitioners must establish
past persecution or an objectively reasonable fear of future harm. See Diaz v. Bondi,
129 F.4th 546, 553 (9th Cir. 2025); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i)(A)-(C). Petitioners
claimed past persecution on the basis of anonymous threats received by Petitioner in
connection with her work as a legal aide in a case representing a controversial
criminal defendant. The agency considered the threats against Petitioner
2 24-6388 cumulatively and determined that they did not rise to the level of persecution. The
record does not compel a contrary conclusion.
The IJ explained that none of the threats resulted in a confrontation or physical
harm to Petitioner, and each threat was made anonymously. “Unfulfilled threats are
very rarely sufficient to rise to the level of persecution, and [Petitioner] has not made
that showing here.” Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 647 (9th Cir. 2021); see also
Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019) (death threats
“constitute persecution in only a small category of cases, and only when the threats
are so menacing as to cause significant actual suffering or harm” (citation
modified)). The record does not otherwise indicate harm to Petitioner or her children
in Brazil on account of a protected ground.
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that Petitioners
failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a
protected ground. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(a),
1208.16(b)(2). As the IJ noted, Petitioner no longer works with nor has any
connection to the law firm or to the criminal defendant the firm represented. Given
that the controversial criminal case ended in a conviction and sentence of greater
than thirty years, the record does not indicate that Petitioners are likely to be targeted
with intimidation or continued threats related to the criminal case if removed to
Brazil.
3 24-6388 2. Petitioners forfeited any challenge to the denial of CAT relief by failing to
raise the issue in their opening brief. Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr, 976 F.3d 1062,
1065 (9th Cir. 2020).
3. Petitioners do not establish a due process violation. We review due process
claims de novo. Olea-Serefina v. Garland, 34 F.4th 856, 866 (9th Cir. 2022). “A
complete and accurate transcript is . . . essential for the Board to adjudicate an appeal
that turns on witness testimony.” Matter of Kagumbas, 28 I & N Dec. 400, 406 (BIA
2021). However, “[t]his does not mean that the transcript has to be perfect.” Id. If
the transcript is “complete enough for the Board to meaningfully review an appeal,”
id., “a mere failure of transcription . . . does not rise to the level of a due process
violation,” Zia v. Garland, 112 F.4th 1194, 1203 (9th Cir. 2024).
Petitioners do not demonstrate that the indiscernible or untranslated portions
of their hearing transcript rendered the transcript so incomplete that it violated their
right to a full and fair hearing, nor that they were substantially prejudiced. Hussain,
985 F.3d at 642; Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000). The transcript
indicates that the errors Petitioners attribute to their interpreter resulted from
clarification requests by the interpreter, each of which was immediately resolved.
The transcript further indicates that the other “untranslated” and “indiscernible”
statements at issue did not prevent Petitioner from thoroughly answering the
questions she was asked related to the line of testimony her counsel sought to
4 24-6388 develop. See Matter of Kagumbas, 28 I & N at 406 (explaining that “if there are
only a few words that are indiscernible or the indiscernible testimony is not critical
to the outcome of the case, then remand is not necessary”). Relatedly, Petitioners
do not demonstrate any prejudice or identify any “missing facts” or arguments they
were “unable to raise before the BIA due to the missing entries in the hearing
transcript.” Zia, 112 F.4th at 1203; see also Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336, 340 (9th
Cir. 1994) (no prejudice where petitioner “ha[d] not indicated what, if anything, she
would have said differently if given a chance,” even assuming “the interpretation
was incompetent”). Accordingly, Petitioners have not established a due process
violation.
PETITION DENIED.
5 24-6388