AlSariaa v. Tempositions, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJuly 8, 2024
Docket1:24-cv-02451
StatusUnknown

This text of AlSariaa v. Tempositions, Inc. (AlSariaa v. Tempositions, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
AlSariaa v. Tempositions, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK NOORA DHAFIR ALSARIAA, Plaintiff, 24-CV-2451 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND TEMPOSITIONS, INC. “SCHOOL PROFESSIONALS,” Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff Noora Dhafir AlSariaa, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act against TemPositions, Inc. “School Professionals” (“TemPositions”), a temporary employment agency, asserting that the company discriminated against her because of her national origin. By order dated April 2, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those

facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings this action using a court-issued employment discrimination complaint form. The following facts are taken from the complaint and the attachments to the complaint.1 On July 12, 2023, Defendant TemPositions informed Plaintiff that it secured a temporary position for Plaintiff at New York Junior for Tennis & Learning (“NYJTL”), a summer program located at a New York City public school in Brooklyn, New York, to commence on July 13,

1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original. 2023. (See ECF 1, at 24.) Plaintiff started working at NYJTL, but on July 26, 2023, at 3:00 p.m., Plaintiff “was fired . . . before the end of the assignment day after I complained about discrimination and hostil[e] against based on my national origin by school staff in cooperat[ion] with third party led to children abuse.” (Id.) Two days later, on July 28, 2023, “the defendant suspended my teaching contract and I lost my only income.” (Id. at 5.) “TemPositions broke the

agreement between me and them which stated if one school complained and terminated your assig[n]ment, you continue with different schools.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that TemPositions did not “investigate the reason w[hy] NYJTL-S 215” terminated her assignment and “[i]nstead of standing with me, the defendant gave me a long phone call[] over 1.5 hour and half justify NYJTL action.” (Id.) Plaintiff further asserts that Defendant retaliated against her, harassed her and/or created a hostile work environment, and suspended her contract. She seeks money damages, including “[c]ompensation for security threat I faced because the defenda[nt] cooperated with third party which cause me anxiety and life threat.” (Id. at 6.)

DISCUSSION Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.”2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2(a). This discrimination includes “‘not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair

2 Plaintiff sues a temporary employment agency, which might be considered an employer under Title VII, pursuant to the “joint employer doctrine.” “The joint employer doctrine has been applied to temporary employment or staffing agencies and their client entities[.]” Lima v. Addeco, 634 F. Supp.2d 394, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). At this stage, the Court declines to decide whether TemPositions may be considered Plaintiff’s employer under this doctrine. in form, but discriminatory in operation’ – that is, practices that have a ‘disparate impact’” on members of a class of people protected by the statute. Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., 975 F.3d 202, 207 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)). Title VII also prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, or who has made a charge, testified,

assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under the statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). These antidiscrimination provisions prohibit employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual’s protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by that statute, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 555 U.S. 271

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Coppedge v. United States
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Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Chukwuka v. City of New York
513 F. App'x 34 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Patane v. Clark
508 F.3d 106 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Lima v. Addeco
634 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D. New York, 2009)
Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc.
975 F.3d 202 (Second Circuit, 2020)
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Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School District
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Bluebook (online)
AlSariaa v. Tempositions, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alsariaa-v-tempositions-inc-nysd-2024.