Alliance of Small Emitters/Metals Industry v. S. COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DIST.

60 Cal. App. 4th 55, 60 Cal. App. 2d 55, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 54, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9495, 97 Daily Journal DAR 15233, 1997 Cal. App. LEXIS 1058
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 18, 1997
DocketB091493
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 60 Cal. App. 4th 55 (Alliance of Small Emitters/Metals Industry v. S. COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DIST.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Alliance of Small Emitters/Metals Industry v. S. COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DIST., 60 Cal. App. 4th 55, 60 Cal. App. 2d 55, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 54, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9495, 97 Daily Journal DAR 15233, 1997 Cal. App. LEXIS 1058 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).

Opinion

Opinion

JOHNSON, Acting P.J.

In this appeal we consider the new market-based program for reducing certain pollutants and a challenge claiming the rules establishing the program are invalid because the underlying studies failed to project the program’s socioeconomic and environmental impacts for the year 2000 and beyond. We find the law requires estimates of socioeconomic *57 effects only to the extent data are available and does not require estimates of environmental impacts which are speculative. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s summary judgment denying the challengers’ writ petition.

Facts and Proceedings Below

According to the federal government the greater Los Angeles basin has the most polluted air in the entire nation, indeed the only area rated as experiencing “extreme air pollution.” Since 1970 federal, state, and local governments have been attempting to address this problem through regulations and other measures designed to reduce emissions of substances which pollute the air we breathe. The federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets overall national standards of air quality and the state Air Resources Board (ARB) sets more stringent California standards, both of which the local South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) is charged with attaining. The SCAQMD’s plans for doing so must pass muster with both the EPA and the ARB. If they fail, then either or both of these agencies is empowered to impose its own plan on this region. (42 U.S.C. 7410(c)(1); Health & Saf. Code, § 41503.2, subd. (c); Coalition for Clean Air v. Southern Cal. Edison (9th Cir. 1992) 971 F.2d 219, cert. den. (1993) 507 U.S. 950 [113 S.Ct. 1361, 122 L.Ed.2d 740].)

Until 1991, the SCAQMD used a “command and control” system as its primary strategy for dealing with refineries, factories, and similar stationary sources of pollution. This strategy commands specific polluters to reduce emissions of defined substances to specified levels by installing specific control systems on the individual pieces of equipment and processes which generate the polluting substances. Thus, the agency might command a power plant to reduce the amount of one pollutant emitted from its smoke stack to x parts per million by installing a converter or other device designed to meet that standard. Simultaneously, it might require the same power plant to reduce the amount of another pollutant by installing other pollution control equipment on a couple of small machines in its workshop.

Beginning in 1994, however, after years of study, the agency embarked on a new basic strategy of pollution control by establishing the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM). The purpose is to encourage pollution sources to adopt the most cost-effective and innovative pollution control measures. RECLAIM seeks to accomplish this by creating a market in pollution “rights” (that is, rights to add a certain amount of pollutants to the basin’s atmosphere). Sources acquire these pollution “rights” by reducing their own emissions below the annual cap the SCAQMD establishes for that *58 particular factory, refinery, or other firm at the beginning of the RECLAIM program. Thus, if a power plant installs a new sophisticated converter in its smokestack and thereby reduces its emissions to 25 percent below the maximum allowed under the SCAQMD cap, it can sell its “rights” to emit more pollutants than it currently does to another power plant or a refinery or some other pollution source which is exceeding its cap. Indeed if some source is far over its cap it may have to enter the market and buy pollution rights from several other sources in order to continue operating at current levels of production and pollution generation. 1

The SCAQMD can only make progress toward better air quality, however, by steadily diminishing the overall annual caps on allowable emissions for each site. Thus, our hypothetical power plant’s new pollution control equipment may reduce its emissions to a level 10 percent below the cap established in the first period of the plan’s implementation, but during the second period find itself only 3 percent below that period’s reduced cap and with a corresponding reduction in the pollution credits it can sell, and in the third period find itself producing emissions which exceed the latest cap by 5 percent. In that year, it would have to choose between installing a new generation of more sophisticated pollution control devices or reducing the scale of its operations to remain under the cap or going to the market where it formerly was selling pollution credits and buying them from other sources which were still under the third period’s reduced cap.

The SCAQMD established its initial caps for RECLAIM using historical data from the “command and control” era about each pollution source. Because RECLAIM started in the midst of a recession, the agency allowed firms to choose their peak year of operations (and pollution generation) from *59 1989-1992 as their cap. These caps are “mass emissions caps” for each factory or other site, however, rather than caps on every piece of individual equipment in that factory or site as required by the “command and control” system. As a result, the factory or other site can allocate its pollution reduction resources most cost effectively, perhaps reducing to near zero the pollution generated by one machine because that can be done cheaply while not putting any pollution control equipment at all on another where the costs of such equipment would be very expensive.

The state required the RECLAIM program to reduce emissions by at least the same rate as the “command and control” system previously in place. (Health & Saf. Code, § 39616, subd. (c)(1).) The “command and control” system the EPA and ARB approved in 1991 envisioned a succession of new and improved pollution control technologies over future years and set its interim and final pollution reduction targets on that basis. This plan described these as tier I, tier II, and tier III technologies, with tier I consisting of existing equipment, and tiers II and III which anticipated significant improvements in existing technologies or completely new approaches.

The initial RECLAIM period spans the time frame of the tier I and tier II technologies. In order to match the pollution reduction the “command and control” system would have achieved during that period, the RECLAIM program reduces the mass emissions cap for facilities emitting SOx by 6.8 percent annually and for those emitting NOx by 8.3 percent annually. These annual cap reductions extend through the full term of the current RECLAIM program, that is, to the year 2004.

Before instituting the RECLAIM program, SCAQMD engaged in a three-year process of study and hearings. The full process is reflected in the 112-volume administrative record before this court. Among other things, the SCAQMD appointed a 13-member steering committee with representatives from government, business, and environmental organizations. It also formed a 50-member public advisory group and a dozen working groups.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Friends of Outlet Creek v. Mendocino County
California Court of Appeal, 2017
California Chamber of Commerce v. State Air Resources Board
10 Cal. App. 5th 604 (California Court of Appeal, 2017)
Friends of Outlet Creek v. Mendocino County Air Quality Management District
11 Cal. App. 5th 1235 (California Court of Appeal, 2017)
Rialto Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rialto
208 Cal. App. 4th 899 (California Court of Appeal, 2012)
Communities for Better Env. v. Scaqmd
71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 7 (California Court of Appeal, 2008)
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist.
104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288 (California Court of Appeal, 2001)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
60 Cal. App. 4th 55, 60 Cal. App. 2d 55, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 54, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9495, 97 Daily Journal DAR 15233, 1997 Cal. App. LEXIS 1058, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alliance-of-small-emittersmetals-industry-v-s-coast-air-quality-calctapp-1997.