Allender v. Raytheon Aircraft Co.

339 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 10 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 34, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20962, 2004 WL 2347791
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Allender v. Raytheon Aircraft Co.. Read the opinion of the Court — 220 F.R.D. 661
District Court, D. Kansas·Decided October 15, 2004·No. 03-1396-JTM·Published

Opinion

*1197 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MARTEN, District Judge.

This is an action by plaintiff Peggy Al-lender against her former employer, Ray-theon Aircraft Company, alleging Ray-theon violated her rights under the Family Medical Leave Act. Raytheon has moved for summary judgment; Allender has moved for partial summary judgment. Based upon the evidence submitted, the court will grant Raytheon’s motion, and deny the motion of the plaintiff.

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must examine all evidence in a light most favorable to the opposing party. McKenzie v. Mercy Hospital, 854 F.2d 365, 367 (10th Cir.1988). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment beyond a reasonable doubt. Ellis v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 754 F.2d 884, 885 (10th Cir.1985). The moving party need not disprove plaintiffs claim; it need only establish that the factual allegations have no legal significance. Dayton Hudson Corp. v. Macerich Real Estate Co., 812 F.2d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir.1987).

In resisting a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party may not rely upon mere allegations or denials contained in its pleadings or briefs. Rather, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing the presence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial and significant probative evidence supporting the allegation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Once the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the party opposing summary judgment must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. “In the language of the Rule, the nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e)) (emphasis in Matsushita). One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and the rule should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Findings of Fact

Defendant Raytheon is a manufacturer of aircraft for general aviation and military use. Plaintiff Allender worked for Ray-theon between June 22, 1987, and September 17, 1999, when she was involuntarily terminated due to violation of the company’s attendance policy. Allender was hired by Raytheon on June 22, 1987, and was classified as a Radio and Electrical Assembler, Job Code 020, Labor Grade 8. Throughout her employment, Allender worked in hourly-compensated positions which were governed by the collective bargaining agreement between Raytheon and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (“IAM”).

As a full-time hourly employee of defendant, Allender was given a specified amount of sick leave each year, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. After the first year of employment, an employee had three -days of sick leave. With increasing length of service, the amount of sick leave increased, so that an *1198 employee with 10 or more years of service was given 80 hours of sick leave per year. The sick leave for the year is advanced on the employee’s anniversary date. If an employee does not use all of his or her sick leave in a given year, it can be banked and carried forward. If an employee takes a leave of absence in excess of 30 days, the employee’s anniversary date is extended by an amount equal to the length of the leave of absence.

Raytheon has, for many years, utilized an attendance policy that is geared to a series of warnings regarding poor attendance. Before an employee has any attendance infractions counted, she is first permitted to utilize any unused sick leave. After all available sick leave is used, attendance infractions are counted. If an employee has more than four infractions in a 16-week period, she is given a Step 1 warning. If an employee has a Step 1 disciplinary warning and continues to have unsatisfactory attendance, she is given a Step 2 disciplinary warning. A Step 2 warning remains on an employee’s record for one year. During that year, if the attendance continues to be unsatisfactory, the employee is given a Step 3 action, which is termination. Supervisors generally counsel employees regarding poor attendance prior to giving any step warnings.

Peggy Allender was a probationary employee for the first 76 days of her employment. After the successful completion of the probationary period, however, Allender began to demonstrate attendance problems. These attendance problems were noted on performance reviews given to Allender at various intervals. The best attendance rating ever gained by Allender was “marginal.” Far more often, her attendance was rated as “unacceptable,” beginning shortly after the completion of her probationary period, and continuing throughout her employment.

Allender was issued several Step 1 and Step 2 attendance warnings during her employment, including the following: June 6, 1991 — Step 1; August 7, 1992 — Step 1; February 26, 1993 — Step 2; July 28, 1994 — Step 1; September 30, 1994 — Step 2; March 7, 1997 — Step 1; July 15, 1997— Step 2; September 9, 1998 — Step 1; October 26, 1998 — Step 2; September 16, 1999 — Step 3 (Termination).

Allender took several medical leaves of absence in the early part of her employment. For example, she was on leave of absence from December 21, 1988, through May 1, 1989, due to a pregnancy and delivery. She was on medical leave of absence from February 27 to March 29, 1990. And she was on leave of absence from June 26 to July 26,1990.

The FMLA did not apply to Raytheon until February 5,1994. The company published a flyer regarding the FMLA, and gave it to all employees.

Allender began using FMLA leave in 1994, and continued to use it in 1995 and 1996, successfully completing the paperwork necessary to have leave approved. Allender had experienced recurring urinary tract infections since at least 1990, and she had an outpatient surgical procedure on October 21, 1996. Raytheon approved FMLA leave for that three-day absence.

In 1997, Allender had used all of her available sick leave before the end of February.

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Allender v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 339 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 10 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 34, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20962, 2004 WL 2347791 (D. Kan. 2004).

339 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (Allender v. Raytheon Aircraft Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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