NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 19-3613 __________
ALIREZA BAKHTIARI, Appellant
v.
JASON MADRIGAL; PAUL POSLUZNY; JENNIFER RITCHEY; THOMAS R. DECKER; FREDERICK J. KENT; JOHN F. KELLY, DHS Secretary; JOHN FRAWLEY, Corr. Sergeant; FORSHE, Corr. Sergeant; MARTIN, Corr. Sergeant; ELISE WENZEL, Corr. Administrator; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 3-18-cv-00038) District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) June 16, 2020 Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 2, 2021) ___________
OPINION * ___________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Pro se appellant Alireza Bakhtiari appeals from the judgment entered against him
by the District Court after a jury trial. For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we will recite only the facts necessary
for our discussion. In January 2018, Bakhtiari filed a complaint in the District Court,
raising numerous claims stemming from his immigration detention at the Pike County
Correctional Facility (“PCCF”) in 2017. Bakhtiari named various PCCF employees and
federal officials, and the United States, as defendants. Among other things, Bakhtiari
alleged that his constitutional rights were violated when he was placed in solitary
confinement and when he was served food by an inmate who had Hepatitis C.
The District Court dismissed the claims against the federal officials and the United
States. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the PCCF employees
on many claims. Following a trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the remaining
defendants on the remaining claims.
In this appeal, Bakhtiari challenges only the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment on: (1) his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against defendant Wenzel based on his
placement in solitary confinement; and (2) certain § 1983 claims against the PCCF
defendants based on his being served food by the inmate who had Hepatitis C.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over
the District Court’s order granting summary judgment. See Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 2 455 F.3d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in
favor of that party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher, 455
F.3d at 422–23. A genuine dispute of material fact exists if the evidence is sufficient for
a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for the non-moving party. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We may affirm on any basis supported
by the record. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
III.
We analyze Bakhtiari’s § 1983 claims challenging the conditions of his
confinement under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See E. D. v.
Sharkey, 928 F.3d 299, 306–07 (3d Cir. 2019) (determining that “the legal rights of an
immigration detainee [are] analogous to those of a pretrial detainee,” and explaining that
“[w]hen pretrial detainees challenge their conditions of confinement, we must consider
whether there has been a violation of the Due Process Clause”) (quotation marks and
citation omitted); see also Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 222 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[T]he
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides pre-trial detainees at least as
much protection for personal security as the level guaranteed to prisoners by the Eighth
Amendment.”). To determine whether a challenged condition violates a detainee’s
constitutional rights, we assess whether the condition is imposed for the purpose of
punishment or whether it is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective. 3 See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 2005); Sharkey, 928 F.3d at 307. A
defendant may be liable if he is aware of a condition that poses an excessive risk and he
fails to “adequately respond to that risk.” Sharkey, 928 F.3d at 307 (quotation marks and
citation omitted); see also Bistrian v. Levi, 912 F.3d 79, 91 (3d Cir. 2018).
Here, Wenzel was entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claims related to
Bakhtiari’s placement in solitary confinement. The evidence of Wenzel’s involvement in
that placement was limited, essentially, to Wenzel’s response to a grievance. Wenzel
explained that Bakhtiari was segregated from the general PCCF population because he
had engaged in conduct that violated PCCF rules. That evidence is insufficient for a
reasonable factfinder to conclude that Wenzel was personally involved in the decision to
place Bakhtiari in solitary confinement, see Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207
(3rd Cir. 1988), let alone that Wenzel made the placement without a legitimate
governmental interest or that she otherwise violated Bakhtiari’s constitutional rights with
the placement, see Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 159; Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d
Cir. 2003).
The PCCF defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claims
based on Bakhtiari’s exposure to an inmate with Hepatitis C. The undisputed facts in the
record showed that, after Bakhtiari learned that an inmate with Hepatitis C was serving
food, Bakhtiari experienced anxiety and fear that he would contract Hepatitis C. He
complained to defendants Martin and Frawley, and he filed a grievance. A shift
commander responded to the grievance, explaining that the inmate in question was 4 cleared by the medical department to work as a unit orderly and to serve food, and that
Martin and Frawley had conferred with the medical department and were told that
Bakhtiari’s concerns were unfounded. In any event, after Bakhtiari complained, officials
at PCCF reconsidered the situation and removed the inmate from his position. Bakhtiari
tested negative for Hepatitis C when he was released from PCCF.
That evidence is insufficient for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 19-3613 __________
ALIREZA BAKHTIARI, Appellant
v.
JASON MADRIGAL; PAUL POSLUZNY; JENNIFER RITCHEY; THOMAS R. DECKER; FREDERICK J. KENT; JOHN F. KELLY, DHS Secretary; JOHN FRAWLEY, Corr. Sergeant; FORSHE, Corr. Sergeant; MARTIN, Corr. Sergeant; ELISE WENZEL, Corr. Administrator; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 3-18-cv-00038) District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo ____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) June 16, 2020 Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 2, 2021) ___________
OPINION * ___________
PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Pro se appellant Alireza Bakhtiari appeals from the judgment entered against him
by the District Court after a jury trial. For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we will recite only the facts necessary
for our discussion. In January 2018, Bakhtiari filed a complaint in the District Court,
raising numerous claims stemming from his immigration detention at the Pike County
Correctional Facility (“PCCF”) in 2017. Bakhtiari named various PCCF employees and
federal officials, and the United States, as defendants. Among other things, Bakhtiari
alleged that his constitutional rights were violated when he was placed in solitary
confinement and when he was served food by an inmate who had Hepatitis C.
The District Court dismissed the claims against the federal officials and the United
States. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the PCCF employees
on many claims. Following a trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the remaining
defendants on the remaining claims.
In this appeal, Bakhtiari challenges only the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment on: (1) his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against defendant Wenzel based on his
placement in solitary confinement; and (2) certain § 1983 claims against the PCCF
defendants based on his being served food by the inmate who had Hepatitis C.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over
the District Court’s order granting summary judgment. See Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 2 455 F.3d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in
favor of that party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher, 455
F.3d at 422–23. A genuine dispute of material fact exists if the evidence is sufficient for
a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for the non-moving party. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We may affirm on any basis supported
by the record. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
III.
We analyze Bakhtiari’s § 1983 claims challenging the conditions of his
confinement under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See E. D. v.
Sharkey, 928 F.3d 299, 306–07 (3d Cir. 2019) (determining that “the legal rights of an
immigration detainee [are] analogous to those of a pretrial detainee,” and explaining that
“[w]hen pretrial detainees challenge their conditions of confinement, we must consider
whether there has been a violation of the Due Process Clause”) (quotation marks and
citation omitted); see also Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 222 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[T]he
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides pre-trial detainees at least as
much protection for personal security as the level guaranteed to prisoners by the Eighth
Amendment.”). To determine whether a challenged condition violates a detainee’s
constitutional rights, we assess whether the condition is imposed for the purpose of
punishment or whether it is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective. 3 See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 2005); Sharkey, 928 F.3d at 307. A
defendant may be liable if he is aware of a condition that poses an excessive risk and he
fails to “adequately respond to that risk.” Sharkey, 928 F.3d at 307 (quotation marks and
citation omitted); see also Bistrian v. Levi, 912 F.3d 79, 91 (3d Cir. 2018).
Here, Wenzel was entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claims related to
Bakhtiari’s placement in solitary confinement. The evidence of Wenzel’s involvement in
that placement was limited, essentially, to Wenzel’s response to a grievance. Wenzel
explained that Bakhtiari was segregated from the general PCCF population because he
had engaged in conduct that violated PCCF rules. That evidence is insufficient for a
reasonable factfinder to conclude that Wenzel was personally involved in the decision to
place Bakhtiari in solitary confinement, see Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207
(3rd Cir. 1988), let alone that Wenzel made the placement without a legitimate
governmental interest or that she otherwise violated Bakhtiari’s constitutional rights with
the placement, see Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 159; Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d
Cir. 2003).
The PCCF defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claims
based on Bakhtiari’s exposure to an inmate with Hepatitis C. The undisputed facts in the
record showed that, after Bakhtiari learned that an inmate with Hepatitis C was serving
food, Bakhtiari experienced anxiety and fear that he would contract Hepatitis C. He
complained to defendants Martin and Frawley, and he filed a grievance. A shift
commander responded to the grievance, explaining that the inmate in question was 4 cleared by the medical department to work as a unit orderly and to serve food, and that
Martin and Frawley had conferred with the medical department and were told that
Bakhtiari’s concerns were unfounded. In any event, after Bakhtiari complained, officials
at PCCF reconsidered the situation and removed the inmate from his position. Bakhtiari
tested negative for Hepatitis C when he was released from PCCF.
That evidence is insufficient for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the
defendants’ purpose was to punish Bakhtiari, rather than to meet legitimate institutional
needs, when they permitted the inmate with Hepatitis C to serve Bakhtiari’s food. Nor is
there sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that the defendants’ response
was deliberately indifferent to Bakhtiari’s serious medical needs, nor that his food fell
below the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. Even assuming that there was
a risk to Bakhtiari’s health (despite the fact that he never contracted Hepatitis C), the
defendants — who are non-medical professionals — responded to the risk by consulting
with the medical department. They reasonably relied on the advice of medical
professionals who determined, for some time, that Bakhtiari’s concerns were unfounded.
Cf. Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 543 (3d Cir. 2017). Thus, the
defendants were entitled to summary judgment on these claims.1
1 For similar reasons, the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Bakhtiari’s substantive due process and state-created danger claims based on his exposure to Hepatitis C, as there is no evidence of conduct that “shocks the conscience.” See Kaucher, 455 F.3d at 425 (3d Cir. 2006); Bright v. Westmoreland County, 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2006). Bakhtiari has waived his remaining claims based on his exposure to Hepatitis C, including his equal protection claims. See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 5 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[A]n appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.”). 6