UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION
ALI MUSAID AHMED Case No. 23-12869 MUTHANA, Jonathan J.C. Grey Plaintiff, United States District Judge v. Curtis Ivy, Jr. ELIZABETH POPIEL, United States Magistrate Judge
Defendant. ____________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANT POPIEL’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF No. 32)
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Pending before the Court is Defendant Elizabeth Popiel’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 32). Pro se Plaintiff Ali Musaid Ahmed Muthana, proceeding in forma pauperis, is in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”), has sued two Woodland Center Correctional Facility (“WCC”) employees for retaliation and denial of access to the courts. The only remaining defendant, Elizabeth Popiel, moves for summary judgment on the retaliation claim, the remaining claim against her.1 (ECF No. 32). This case was
1 Plaintiff named a violation of due process among his claims, but no allegations concern a violation of due process. Thus, the undersigned will screen this claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e below. referred to the undersigned for all pretrial matters. (ECF No. 11). Defendant’s motion is fully briefed and ready for report and recommendation.
For the reasons below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED. II. DISPUTED AND UNDISPUTED FACTS
Plaintiff alleged three forms of retaliation in his unverified complaint: the denial of access to legal writer assistance, destruction of his documents, and refusal to make copies for him.2 Defendant was a librarian at WCC between January 3, 2023, and October 3, 2023, the period of the alleged events.
Plaintiff states that he required assistance from the legal writer because he is mentally ill, English is his second language, and he has no schooling in the United States. (ECF No. 1, PageID.7, Plaintiff’s Complaint). Plaintiff says that
Defendant fired the legal writer at WCC, so when he asked to see the legal writer, Defendant told him he needed to use a legal writer at a different prison. He asserts that it is against prison policy to use a legal writer from a different prison. Even so, he used the outside help. Plaintiff now alleges that the legal writer refused to
help him because Defendant would not allow Plaintiff to have assistance.
2 The Court can only rely on admissible evidence when evaluating a motion for summary judgment. An unverified complaint is not admissible. Thus, the undersigned relies on the complaint only as a source of background information for the claims addressed in the motion, not as evidence. Plaintiff alleged that on June 5, July 16, July 18, and August 8, 2023, he gave Defendant legal documents, but she “hijack[ed]” or destroyed them in
retaliation for filing lawsuits. (Id. at PageID.8). And on various dates between May and August 2023, he gave Defendant legal photocopy disbursement forms, but she inappropriately refused to make the
requested photocopies. (Id.). She allegedly told Plaintiff that the facility’s budget was “not quite well.” (Id.). She also allegedly told him that she would not make copies for him because he had filed many lawsuits against MDOC staff and “we need to stop that.” (Id. at PageID.9).
Plaintiff attached a few documents to his response brief in support of his allegations. Six documents are purportedly signed by Defendant acknowledging that she received the listed documents from Plaintiff (these include legal
documents and grievances) to be either copied or sent to a legal writer, it is unclear which. (ECF No. 34, PageID.333–38). Two documents are copies of letters from a legal writer explaining to Plaintiff why the writer was unable to assist him. (Id. at PageID.340–43). These letters are dated July 3, 2023, and January 5, 2024.
(Id.). Both letters were sent in response to Defendant’s requests for assistance. (Id.). The last document is MDOC’s “Access to the Courts” policy directive. (Id. at PageID.345–48). Plaintiff’s deposition testimony largely reiterates what is in his complaint. He said that Defendant fired the legal writer at WCC, so he was forced to use a
legal writer elsewhere even though prisoners are not permitted to do so. (ECF No. 32-5, PageID.294–95). Thus, Plaintiff says that Defendant denied him legal writer assistance.
As for not making copies of documents, Plaintiff testified that Defendant was not forthcoming about the facility’s budget because it was not an issue until Defendant started working there and his copy requests were denied. (ECF No. 32- 5, pageID.296). And he insisted that Defendant refused to accept the forms to
make those photocopies in retaliation for filing lawsuits against MDOC and its staff. (Id. at PageID.297). Plaintiff confirmed the four dates he gave Defendant documents to be copied
that Defendant did not return. (Id. at PageID.299) (confirming June 5, July 16, July 18, and August 8, 2023). Plaintiff said he was unaware of what she did with the documents, and he could not say whether she destroyed them. (Id. at PageID.300).
In short, his deposition testimony confirmed his allegations except for the contention that the outside legal writer refused to help Plaintiff at Defendant’s direction—the transcript excerpts do not include testimony about the legal writer
declining to assist Plaintiff. Defendant refutes much of Plaintiff’s testimony in her declaration. She says she did not deny any requests for legal writer assistance. During January 2023,
Plaintiff’s request for assistance from the outside legal writer was granted. (ECF No. 32-2, PageID.267, ¶ 5). She recalled three occasions when she met with Plaintiff about his requests for photocopies. Because he did not have the correct
documentation and could not afford to pay for the copies himself (with the correct documentation he would have been eligible for a loan), she could not make the copies. She gave him other options to attempt to assist him, but he refused those options. (Id. at ¶ 6).
Of the four dates on which she is accused of keeping or destroying documents, she says that on July 18, 2023, she scanned Plaintiff’s documents and gave them all back to him. (Id. at PageID.268, ¶ 7). She did not interact with
Plaintiff on June 5 or July 16, 2023. (Id. at ¶ 9). She says she could not have signed the receipt of Plaintiff’s documents on June 5 or July 16, 2023, because she was not in the building those days. (Id.) She does not recall signing a receipt on August 8, 2023, and for both of the last two dates the signature is not hers. (Id. at ¶
8). Lastly, Defendant denies telling Plaintiff she would not make copies for him because he has filed too many lawsuits, or that she told any legal writer to stop assisting Plaintiff. She denies ever retaliating against Plaintiff. (Id. at
PageID.269). Defendant emailed other prison staff after her encounters with Plaintiff about legal writing materials and his photocopy requests. (ECF No. 32-7). For
example, she sent an email on July 19, 2023, about an encounter the day before. She wrote that she met with Plaintiff on July 18th and picked up a few documents. She scanned the documents and returned them to Plaintiff; Plaintiff signed for both
pickup and receipt of the documents. (Id. at PageID.317). July 18, 2023, is one of the days Plaintiff says Defendant took his documents and never returned them. That said, there is no document in the record bearing Plaintiff’s signature confirming receipt of these documents, but the facility’s logbook indicates that the
documents were returned. (ECF No. 32-8, PageID.319–20). Brian Smith, the Librarian Manager at the Chippewa Correctional Facility (“URF”), submitted a declaration. He said that between January and October
2023, the Chippewa Facility’s legal writer program was assisting WCC’s prisoners because WCC did not have a legal writer. (ECF No. 32-4, PageID.284, ¶ 4). He said that Defendant Popiel did not have supervisory authority over the legal writers at Chippewa. (Id. at ¶ 5). Prisoner Willis, an assigned legal writer, signed one of
the two letters denying Plaintiff legal writer services that Plaintiff attached to his response. (ECF No. 34, PageID.342). Brian Smith said that Willis would only stop working with a “client” if the client failed to meet the criteria for assistance and that Willis does not take direction from WCC staff. (ECF No. 32-4, PageID.284, ¶¶ 5–7).
III. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS A. Governing Standards Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court “views the
evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Pure Tech Sys., Inc. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 95 F. App’x 132, 135 (6th Cir. 2004).
“The moving party has the initial burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists. . . .” Stansberry v. Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) (providing if a party “fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact,”
then the court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion”). “Once the moving party satisfies its burden, ‘the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts showing a triable issue.’” Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell
Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). The nonmoving party must “make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion.”
Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Lee v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 432 F. App’x 435, 441 (6th Cir. 2011) (“The nonmovant must, however, do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, there must be evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party to create a genuine dispute.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, summary judgment is appropriate when “a motion for summary judgment is
properly made and supported and the nonmoving party fails to respond with a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of its case. . . .” Stansberry, 651 F.3d at 486 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)).
That Plaintiff is pro se does not reduce the obligations under Rule 56. Rather, “liberal treatment of pro se pleadings does not require lenient treatment of substantive law.” Durante v. Fairlane Town Ctr., 201 F. App’x 338, 344 (6th Cir. 2006). “Once a case has progressed to the summary judgment stage, . . . ‘the
liberal pleading standards under Swierkiewicz [v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512–13 (2002)] and [the Federal Rules] are inapplicable.’” Tucker v. Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Emps., 407 F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004)). B. Discussion 1. Due Process
At the beginning of Plaintiff’s complaint, he needed to explain the basis for this Court’s jurisdiction. He wrote that Defendants violated the First Amendment and that both Defendants deprived him of due process in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4). This appears to be the only time Plaintiff mentions the Fourteenth Amendment or due process in his complaint. The Court must consider the viability of the claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. These statutes require courts to dismiss actions
filed by prisoners and persons proceeding in forma pauperis that fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The dismissal standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) described in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007), governs whether Plaintiff states a plausible claim for relief under § 1915(e)(2). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal
quotation omitted); see also Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 (concluding that a plausible claim need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action”). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
It is unclear whether Plaintiff’s cursory mention of a due process violation is meant to be procedural or substantive due process. Either way, the allegations that came after the “basis of jurisdiction” section concern only First Amendment
retaliation and access to the courts. The allegations do not suggest, for instance, that Plaintiff’s life, liberty, or property interests were deprived of without adequate procedural safeguards, see Cooperrider v. Woods, 127 F.4th 1019, 1042 (6th Cir. 2025), or that a fundamental right was violated or Defendants’ conduct “shocks the
conscience of the court.” Doe v. Ohio State Univ., 239 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1077 (S.D. Ohio 2017) (citation omitted). As plead, the due process claim fails to satisfy pleading standards under Rule 8, e.g., Plaintiff fails to provide a short and
plain statement showing that he is entitled to relief on such a claim. Since there are no allegations to state a claim for violation of either procedural or substantive due process, this claim (if Plaintiff truly intended to raise it) should be dismissed. 2. Retaliation
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims fail because there was no adverse action and because she had a non-retaliatory reason for the challenged conduct. Before addressing the merits of his claims, Plaintiff’s response begins with two evidentiary quarrels. Plaintiff first asserts that Defendant used his deposition
transcript against him yet only provided the Court excerpts of the transcript. He says that Defendant provided what she could use against him but did not produce all the questions and answers. Plaintiff contacted the reporting agency to get a
copy of the transcript, but his request went unanswered. (ECF No. 34, PageID.324). No rule requires parties to submit a complete transcript. It was not inappropriate for Defendant to provide only the excerpts of Plaintiff’s deposition
she relied on in her argument. While Plaintiff notes that only part of the transcript was submitted, he does not suggest that Defendant mischaracterized his testimony. Plaintiff also requested that the Court obtain a copy of the transcript. (Id.).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(f)(3), “[w]hen paid reasonable charges, the [court reporter before whom the deposition was taken] must furnish a copy of the transcript or recording to any party or the deponent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(f)(3). Thus, the “general rule, established expressly by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, is that a party must obtain copies of deposition transcripts directly from the court reporter upon the payment of a reasonable charge, and not from opposing counsel or the court.” Watson v. Ohio Ambulance Sols., LLC, No. 1:20-
CV-802, 2022 WL 2133739, at *3 (S.D. Ohio June 14, 2022) (quoting Schroer v. United States, 250 F.R.D. 531, 537 (D. Colo. 2008)). Plaintiff was provided the information to obtain his deposition transcripts, and the fact that Plaintiff did not
get a copy of his transcript was not an issue he raised before the Court. (See ECF No. 32-5, PageID.302). Plaintiff next asserts that Defendant was untruthful in her declaration. (ECF
No. 34, PageID.325). In her declaration, she says that she could not have signed the document receipt attached to Plaintiff’s complaint at Exhibit L-1 on July 16, 2023, because she was not in the facility on that date. (ECF No. 32-2, PageID.268, ¶ 8). But the document at Exhibit L-1 appears to be dated February 16, 2023, not
July 16th. (ECF No. 1, PageID.61). And the signature on the three receipts at Exhibit L are all different. (ECF No. 34, PageID.325). So he suggests that Defendant signed all three receipts contrary to what she says in her declaration.
The undersigned agrees that there is a discrepancy between Defendant’s declaration and the receipt at Exhibit L-1—it appears to be dated February 16, not July 16. This dispute is not material to the outcome here. Even if Defendant had signed that February 16, 2023, receipt for documents, that receipt is immaterial to
Plaintiff’s claims because he alleged and confirmed at his deposition that Defendant failed to return his documents four times, and February 2023 is not near any of those four dates. (See ECF No. 32-5, PageID.298). Plaintiff cannot claim
additional instances of retaliatory conduct in response to a motion for summary judgment. Nor does the undersigned view the discrepancy in Defendant’s declaration to mean that the rest of the declaration must be disregarded.
Neither of Plaintiff’s evidentiary issues impact the merits of Defendant’s motion or this Court’s ability to rule on that motion. As for the merits, Plaintiff’s response brief recites the facts and positions he
took in his complaint, i.e., Defendant denied him access to a legal writer, kept or destroyed his documents, and refused to make copies in retaliation for his lawsuits. (ECF No. 34, PageID.325–28). A retaliation claim has three elements:
(1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between elements one and two—that is, the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the plaintiff’s protected conduct.
Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). Defendant does not contest the first element. An adverse action is one that would “deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in protected conduct.” Siggers-El v. Barlow, 412 F.3d 693, 701 (6th Cir. 2005). “Actual deterrence need not be shown.” Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 579 (6th Cir. 2005) (emphasis original) (citing Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 606 (6th Cir.2002)). “[T]his element is not an overly difficult one for the plaintiff to meet.” Hill, 630 F.3d at 472. Consequently, “unless the claimed retaliatory action is truly inconsequential, the plaintiff’s claim should go to the jury.” Bell, 308 F.3d at 603 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). “Under the third element, the subjective motivation of the defendants is at issue.” Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 262 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). But
if the prison official can show that the action would have occurred even if the plaintiff had not engaged in protected activity, there is an absence of “but for” causation and there is no valid claim of retaliation. See Good v. Walworth, No. 21- 1429, 2023 WL 9320823, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 22, 2023). A plaintiff’s subjective
belief that he has been retaliated against is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Green v. Cent. Ohio Transit Auth., 647 F. App’x 555, 561 (6th Cir. 2016).
a. Legal Writer Assistance Defendant contends that Plaintiff did not suffer adverse action with respect to the legal writer program because the evidence does not support the notion that she denied him access to a legal writer and asserts that there were non-retaliatory
reasons behind any decisions that were made. During his March 15, 2025, deposition, Plaintiff said that he filed his initial grievance in November or December of 2022 because there was no legal writer at
WCC. (ECF No. 32-5, PageID.294). He stated that Defendant is the legal writer’s supervisor, and that she fired the legal writer at WCC and “forced” Plaintiff to use the legal writer in another prison, who he was unable to directly communicate
with. (Id. at PageID.294–95). He claimed it is against MDOC policy to use a legal writer in another prison who is not present to assist him. (Id.). Plaintiff asserted that prisoners have a right to access the courts, the law library, and a legal writer.
(Id. PageID.294–95). Thus, Plaintiff asserted that Defendant denied him legal writer assistance. To begin, there is no requirement that every prison facility within the MDOC have a legal writer. Legal writers are prisoners who complete the legal
writer training program and are assigned as legal writers at MDOC facilities. (ECF No. 32-3, PageID.280, Policy Directive 05.03.116 ¶ S). But the Policy Directive concerning legal writers does not say that every MDOC facility must have a legal
writer. Instead, language in the policy expressly contemplates the possibility of a facility not having a legal writer. The Policy Directive provides that, “[i]f the facility does not have an on-site Legal Writer Program, the prisoner may be transferred to a facility that does have an on-site program.” (Id. at PageID.281, ¶
U). Since the prisoner “may be transferred,” transfer is discretionary under this policy. The policy does not prohibit a prisoner housed in a facility without a legal writer from using a legal writer at a different facility. Indeed, Plaintiff mentioned using the legal writer at URF on at least one occasion without issue. (See ECF No. 1, PageID.7).
There is no evidence that Defendant was involved in hiring decisions that resulted in Plaintiff’s prison not having its own legal writer. Thus, the lack of a legal writer at WCC could not be attributed to Defendant or considered to be
adverse action from Defendant. Nor is there evidence showing that Defendant prevented Plaintiff from using the services of an outside legal writer, told a legal writer not to help him, or had authority to direct such action. Plaintiff has submitted no evidence to support his conclusory claim that
Defendant told the outside legal writer to stop assisting Plaintiff with his filings or that Defendant sat in a supervisory or authority position over the legal writer to direct such action. MDOC policy reflects that the Legal Writer Program is
“provided through prisoners at the institution who have successfully completed the legal writer training program and are assigned by the facility as legal writers.” (See ECF No. 32-3, PageID.280). MDOC policy also states that eligibility for use of the Legal Writer Program shall be screened by a staff member selected by the
Warden, but the record does not reflect that Defendant served in this capacity. (Id. at PageID.281). The evidence only reflects that Defendant has served as a liaison with the legal writer at URF to transfer necessary documents from WCC prisoners
to the legal writer at the outside facility. Defendant submitted a sworn declaration that states that Plaintiff requested and was approved for legal writer assistance in January 2023, and that as part of
her duties as a law librarian at WCC, she scanned legal documents for Plaintiff and sent them to the Legal Writer Program at URF. (ECF No. 32-2, PageID.267). Defendant also stated that she never forced Plaintiff to use the URF Legal Writer
Program, she did not have any supervisory capacity over the legal writers at URF, and at no time did she direct the legal writers to stop assisting Plaintiff. (Id. at PageID.269). Similarly, Brian R. Smith, the Librarian Manager at URF, submitted an
affidavit reflecting that he supervised the legal writers in URF’s Legal Writer Program. (ECF No. 32-4, PageID.283–84). Mr. Smith stated that URF assisted WCC at the time because WCC did not have a legal writer, but WCC librarians
and staff did not have supervisory capacity over the URF legal writers, including those who assisted Plaintiff. (Id. at PageID.284). Mr. Smith further noted that he never observed Defendant tell a URF legal writer to stop assisting Plaintiff, nor do the URF legal writers take directions from WCC staff. (Id.). Mr. Smith stated that
the legal writers would only stop working with a “client” if the client failed to meet the criteria for assistance. (Id.). In fact, the record contains three letters from the outside legal writers
regarding Plaintiff’s claim(s). On January 20, 2023, the Legal Writer Program at URF, sent Plaintiff a letter confirming its receipt of Plaintiff’s file and request for assistance with a motion and a previously filed 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. (ECF
No. 32-2, PageID.272). The letter indicated that assistance will be offered and requested additional details and evidence from Plaintiff to substantiate his claim and support his motion, such as a clear statement of his issues, any transcripts or
documents to support the issues raised, any recent orders of the court, and the briefing schedule. (Id.) On July 3, 2023, one of the outside legal writers responded to an unknown correspondence from Plaintiff and stated: “Mr. Muthana, yes you are eligible for
legal writer assistance, however, there seems to be some misunderstanding on exactly what that means.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.58) (emphasis added). The outside legal writer emphasized that all WCC prisoners are eligible for legal writer
assistance, but all have not been approved, and cited MDOC policy that states “[o]nly prisoners not represented by counsel who are unable to effectively help themselves by using the law library or other available legal resources are eligible to receive Legal Writer Program services.” (Id.) (emphasis in original). The
outside legal writer emphasized the MDOC policy that states that “[t]he Legal Writer Program does not operate as a ‘typing service.’” (Id.) After review of the materials Plaintiff submitted, the outside legal writer determined that Plaintiff’s
hand-written 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint was “very detailed, extensive, and complete”, thus, due to the depth of Plaintiff’s submissions he was “more than able to effectively help [him]self,” and apologized that he was unable to provide the
service, i.e. typing, that Plaintiff requested. (Id.) (emphasis in original). On January 5, 2024, another outside legal writer sent Plaintiff a correspondence indicating that they could not assist Plaintiff any further with one
of his cases due to his refusal to provide evidence of the defendant’s culpability. (ECF No. 34, PageID.340). The legal writer noted that the Legal Writer Program is not a typewriting service, and Plaintiff was “demanding that the legal writer type all of the kites” that he had sent to the service. (Id.). The legal writer further
explained that they have reviewed all documents provided by Plaintiff, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the defendant’s responses to Plaintiff’s motions, and found that Plaintiff had “a problem with material factual disputes.
Without factual evidence to back up [Plaintiff’s] claims, [his] claims become frivolous, and [the Legal Writer Program] cannot assist with frivolous claims.” (Id.). Based upon the materials Plaintiff had submitted and the depth of his requests, the legal writer also found that Plaintiff was “more than able to
effectively help [himself], and we cannot assist you.” (Id. at PageID.341) (emphasis in original). Defendant submitted a July 13, 2023, email indicating that on July 11, 2023,
Plaintiff declined to provide evidence needed for the legal writer to be able to accept his case, but she had the legal writer draft a memorandum requesting the evidence from Plaintiff so that it was communicated both orally and in writing.
(ECF No. 32-7, PageID.314). On July 13, 2023, Defendant indicates that, while returning the written statements to Plaintiff, she also delivered the memorandum from the legal writer. (Id.) Plaintiff declined to send the documents requested by
the legal writer, so she left him a document receipt to complete when he was ready. (Id.) Plaintiff attempts to rebut this by stating that he had used the Legal Writer Program in the past and that the first time he was “denied,” despite still meeting
the eligibility requirements, was after Defendant began working at WCC. (See ECF No. 34, PageID.326–27). He further stated that he was “forced” to file his complaint to the court on his own despite not knowing anything about the law. (Id.
at PageID.328). Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant and defense counsel lied in the brief and declaration in support of the motion for summary judgment and re- alleges that Defendant denied him legal writer assistance and cited to the letters discussed above. (Id. at PageID.323–24, 326).
Plaintiff cannot meet the third element of his retaliation claim.3 To succeed on this element, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to infer that he would not have been denied assistance from the Legal Writing Program had he not filed his
3 The undersigned will not address whether the second element was established. previous grievances and/or lawsuits against MDOC and its employees. Plaintiff’s allegations are far too conclusory to meet this requirement. Plaintiff has not
alleged or provided evidence to show that Defendant participated in the hiring or firing decisions that resulted in WCC not having its own legal writer, or that Defendant sat in a supervisory or authoritative position over the Legal Writer
Program at URF to direct or influence the outside legal writers to refuse to assist Plaintiff. In fact, the record contains three letters that indicate the outside legal writers received Plaintiff’s requests for assistances and provided a non-retaliatory reason as to why they could not assist Plaintiff in those particular instances. In
these letters, the legal writers—in accordance with MDOC policy—clarified that Plaintiff, while eligible for the Legal Writer Program, was not approved for the Program since a review of Plaintiff’s submissions reflected his ability to effectively
help himself with the resources available in the law library without further assistance. Specifically, in July 2023 and January 2024, the legal writer reviewed Plaintiff’s submissions and found that his hand-written submissions were very detailed, extensive, and complete, showing that Plaintiff was effectively able to
help himself with the assistance of the legal resources available in the law library, and they denied Plaintiff’s request that the Legal Writer Program in essence serves as a typing service. The evidence reflects non-retaliatory reasons why Plaintiff was denied assistance from the Legal Writer Program, and Plaintiff is unable to show that
Defendant directed the legal writers’ findings or that Plaintiff was denied assistance because of his filed grievances and/or lawsuits. “[C]onclusory allegations of retaliatory motive ‘unsupported by material facts’” are not
enough. Newsome v. Streeter, No. 18-3927, 2019 WL 4842955, at *3 (6th Cir. July 3, 2019) (quoting Harbin-Bey, 420 F.3d at 580); see also Alexander, 576 F.3d at 560 (“Conclusory statements unadorned with supporting facts are insufficient to establish a factual dispute that will defeat summary judgment.”). While pro se
pleadings are entitled to liberal construction, that does not extend to creating factual allegations where none exist. In this case, Plaintiff has not come forward with any persuasive proof of a
causal connection between his filed grievances and/or lawsuits and him being denied assistance by the Legal Writer Program. Rather, Plaintiff relies solely on his speculation and his own subjective belief that such a causal connection exists. This is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Accordingly, summary
judgment for Defendant on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is appropriate. b. Destroying Documents Defendant contends that Plaintiff did not suffer adverse action with respect
to his legal documents because the evidence does not support the notion that Defendant destroyed any of Plaintiff’s documents or did so in retaliation for filing grievances and/or lawsuits.
Plaintiff alleges that on June 5, July 16, July 18, and August 8, 2023, he gave Defendant legal documents, but she never returned them; Plaintiff also stated she “hijacked” or destroyed them in retaliation for filing lawsuits. (ECF No. 1,
PageID.8). During his May 15, 2025, deposition, Plaintiff reiterated that he gave Defendant documents on those four dates to be copied and returned, but they were not returned. (ECF No. 32-5, PageID.298–99) (confirming June 5, July 16, July 18, and August 8, 2023). He further said he did not know what Defendant did with
the documents; he could not say whether she destroyed them, only that he did not get them back. (Id. at PageID.300). Plaintiff stated that when he confronted Defendant for the return of his documents, she told him they were for the legal
writer, and he protested that the legal writer cannot keep his documents either. (Id. at PageID.301). Defendant submitted a signed declaration indicating that on July 18, 2023, in the performance of her duties as a librarian, she assisted Plaintiff with scanning
legal documents to send to the URF legal writer. (ECF No. 32-2, PageID.268). She said she went to Plaintiff’s cell, picked up documents that he wanted sent to the outside legal writer, scanned the documents, and returned the documents to
Plaintiff. She stated that she sent an email on July 19, 2023, to four MDOC employees summarizing the July 18, 2023, interaction. (Id.) Indeed, Defendant submitted copy of the July 19, 2023, email indicating that she saw Plaintiff, with
CMO Bejarano present, and that she picked up, scanned, and returned documents, and had attached the scans to the email for use by the outside legal writer. (ECF No. 32-7, PageID.317). And Defendant submitted the logbook for July 18, 2023,
which reflects that she received documents from Plaintiff at “1452,” and returned them at “1633.” (ECF No. 32-8, PageID.319–20) (referencing military time). Defendant also stated that she did not have interactions with Plaintiff on June 5, 2023, or July 16, 2023, as she was not at the facility on those dates. (ECF
No. 32-2, PageID.268). Defendant submitted her timesheets for those dates which reflect that she was not scheduled to work on those dates. (Id. at PageID.274–75). Similarly, she noted that she does not recall signing the August 8, 2023, receipt
submitted by Plaintiff, and noted that neither the July 16, 2023, or August 8, 2023, receipts contain her handwriting in either the signature or date lines. (Id. at PageID.268). Defendant reiterated that “[a]t no time, did I ‘hijack,’ destroy, or intentionally throw away Muthana’s documents.” (Id. at 269).
Defendant submitted a July 13, 2023, email indicating that earlier that day she returned Plaintiff’s written statements to him, and he signed for receipt, and that she also delivered a memorandum from the legal writer. (ECF No. 32-7,
PageID.314). Plaintiff attempts to rebut this by accusing Defendant and defense counsel of falsifying or lying in the brief and declaration in support of the motion for
summary judgment; specifically, he claims she did sign the receipt forms and that although her handwriting is different on all three of the forms submitted, they are in fact hers. (ECF No. 34, PageID.323–26).
Plaintiff submitted a June 11, 2023, MDOC Prisoner/Parolee Grievance Form (Grievance Form) against Plaintiff. (ECF No. 1, PageID.36). There, he stated that on May 30, 2023, he provided legal documents to PC Salaam and Defendant to be scanned and sent to the outside legal writer, but his documents
were never returned to him. (Id.). Upon requesting his documents back, Defendant told him they are for the legal writer to use, and he cannot get them back. (Id.). Plaintiff accuses Defendant of “hijacking” his documents. (Id.).
On June 29, 2023, R. Thompsons, a prison counselor, completed a Step I Grievance Response Supplemental Form, following his investigation of Plaintiff’s grievance. (ECF No. 1, PageID.37). Defendant submitted a June 1, 2023, email sent to the deputy warden and the administrative assistant indicating that Plaintiff
refused to return or exchange law library materials, and he refused the return of his materials from the Legal Writer Program. (Id.). Plaintiff was interviewed and complained that the prison counselor conducting the investigation was not
Defendant’s supervisor and should not review the grievance but did ultimately state that he “gave Salaam 12 pages of papers to give to [Defendant]” and he had not gotten them back. (Id.). The Decision Summary reflected that Defendant
sought to exchange materials with Plaintiff and he refused to exchange the legal research materials in his possession for the requested legal research materials and the materials generated by the Legal Writer Program. (Id.). It was decided that
Defendant fulfilled her duties in providing access to the courts pursuant to applicable policies, as she attempted give him the product of the legal writer and research materials, but Plaintiff refused to exchange for them; therefore, the grievance was denied. (Id.) (citing WP OP 05.05.115, “requested items shall be
delivered to the prisoner. . . unless the prisoner does not return all items previously delivered to them [. . .].”). Plaintiff appealed the decision and provided a statement in support of his
Step II appeal that reiterated that he provided 12 pages of documents on May 30, 2023, and Defendant “highjacked” them by refusing to return them and stating they are for the legal writer to use. (ECF No. 1, PageID.38). He also stated that Defendant lied about offering his materials from the legal writer program. (Id. at
PageID.40). He stated Defendant approached him while he was in the “Day Room” and asked if he would return the materials that he currently had, but he declined and told her that he still needed those materials until he filed his grievance, and she walked away. (Id.). The decision was upheld. (Id. at PageID.39).
In his May 15, 2025, deposition, Plaintiff testified that on June 5, 2023, July 16, 2023, July 18, 2023, and August 8, 2023, he gave legal documents, such as grievances and handwritten documents, to Defendant and she never returned his
documents. (ECF No. 32-5, PageID.298–300). Plaintiff testified that he requested his documents be returned and Defendant would tell him that she planned to bring them back or that they were for the legal writer. (Id. at PageID.300–01). Plaintiff stated that he believes Defendant destroyed his documents or “threw them away,”
but then conveyed that “[o]r I don’t know what she done [sic] with them,” just that she never gave the documents back to him. (Id.). Plaintiff has not submitted enough evidence, aside from his suspicion, for a
reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant destroyed Plaintiff’s legal documents, such that Defendant could be liable for retaliation because of Plaintiff’s complaints or grievances. Plaintiff testified during his deposition that he does not know if Defendant actually destroyed his documents, only that they had not been returned
to him. He further testified when he requested that his documents be returned, Defendant indicated that she provided them to the legal writer, which was at the request of Plaintiff, and would return them later. Importantly, Plaintiff’s
deposition testimony does not indicate that Defendant destroyed his document in retaliation for filing complaints or grievances, only that she provided his documents to the legal writer, and she never returned them, so he assumes that she
destroyed his documents. See Green, 647 F. App’x at 561 (finding that a plaintiff’s subjective belief that he has been retaliated against is not sufficient to avoid summary judgment). The record also reflects that Defendant was not at the
facility on June 5, 2023, or July 16, 2023; that neither the July 16, 2023, or August 8, 2023, receipts contain Defendant’s handwriting in either the signature or date lines; and that as to July 18, 2023, the log shows that Defendant picked up documents from Plaintiff at “1452” and returned them at “1633,” and Defendant
sent a July 19, 2023, follow-up email recounting the interaction. (ECF Nos. 32-7, PageID.317; 32-8, PageID.319). Finally, the record reflects that during the investigation into Plaintiff’s grievances, it was found that on at least one date
attempts had been made to exchange materials with Plaintiff, but he refused to exchange the legal research materials in his possession for the requested legal research materials and materials generated by the Legal Writer Program because he still needed the legal research materials in his possession while drafting
additionally grievances. (See ECF No. 1, PageID.38–39). “To survive a summary judgment motion, a plaintiff must put forward more than speculations or intuitions,” and here, Plaintiff has been unable to do so. See Frazier v. USF Holland, Inc., 250 F. App’x 142, 148 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Mulhall v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 543, 552 (6th Cir. 2002)).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not submitted enough evidence, aside from his conclusory allegations, for a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant not returning documents to Plaintiff amounted to an adverse action
that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected conduct or a causal connection between his filed grievances and/or lawsuits and his documents allegedly not being returned. Rather, Plaintiff relies solely on his speculation and his own subjective belief that such a causal
connection exists. This is not sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Accordingly, summary judgment for Defendant on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is appropriate.
c. Refusing to Make Copies Defendant contends that Plaintiff did not suffer adverse action with respect to his requests for copies because the evidence shows that there were legitimate reasons that requested copies could not be made, nor did Defendant refuse to make
copies in retaliation for filing grievances and/or lawsuits. Plaintiff alleges that on multiple dates he provided Defendant with a legal photocopy disbursement form with files he was requesting to be copied, and
Defendant refused to accept the disbursement forms or make copies for him. (ECF No. 1, PageID.8). Plaintiff stated that Defendant has provided various reasons for rejecting his requests for photocopies to include that she was unable to make
copies because the facility’s budget was not doing well, that the legal writer did not request the copies, that he needed a Court order requesting the copies, and that he has filed too many lawsuits against MDOC and its staff and that he needed to stop.
(Id. at PageID.8–9). Defendant submitted a signed declaration indicating that on June 20, July 5, and August 10, 2023, in the performance of her duties as a librarian, she met with Plaintiff at his cell regarding his request for photocopies. (ECF No. 32-2,
PageID.267). She stated that Plaintiff failed to present the correct documentation needed for photocopies, particularly the document needed to request a loan as he lacked sufficient funds to cover his requested photocopies. (Id.). Defendant
discussed all of Plaintiff’s options to properly request photocopies and he declined all options presented; she later emailed MDOC staff outlining the interaction. (Id.; ECF No. 32-7, PageID.313). Defendant reiterated that “[a]t no time, did I say, ‘I am not gonna make for you any copies you have filed many lawsuits against the
MDOC staff and we need to stop that,’ nor do I take issue with Muthana’s, or any prisoner’s right to file lawsuits.” (ECF No. 32-2, PageID.269). In a July 13, 2023, email, Defendant indicated that she conducted law library
rounds with CMOs Martin and Godin present, and Plaintiff “demanded copies of handwritten documents submitted for review to the Legal Writers Program.” (ECF No. 32-7, PageID.314). Defendant stated that she reminded Plaintiff that he must
make a personal copy before sending any documents out to the legal writer as it was not the responsibility of the law librarian or the legal writer to make copies of his handwritten documents without valid proof of requirement per MDOC Policy
Directive 05.03.116. (Id.). In a June 20, 2023, email, Defendant summarized her meeting with Plaintiff regarding photocopies of records he would like to include in his court filings that were not submitted with any of his requests to the Legal Writer Program. (ECF
No. 32-7, PageID.315). Plaintiff did not have funds to purchase legal photocopies and was not eligible for a loan without proper documentation requesting a loan, which she stated that he had been advised of several times. (Id.). Plaintiff refused
to give Defendant his legal documents for review to determine whether they were eligible for copies unless she agreed to photocopy the documents “sight unseen.” (Id.). Defendant instructed Plaintiff that, per MDOC Policy Directive 05.03.116, he must show proof of a required need as none of the documents were previously
labeled as exhibits or cited in the complaint completed by the Legal Writer Program. (ECF No. 32-7, PageID.313–14). She further explained that any Step III Grievances would be eligible for copies per the Office of Legal Affairs, but the
other documents would require additional information to show that they qualify for additional copies. (ECF No. 32-7, PageID.314). Plaintiff refused to show documentation or allow her to escalate the issue. (Id.).
In an August 10, 2023, email, Defendant indicated that she conducted law library rounds earlier that day with CMOs Bejarano and Deroche present and received a call that Plaintiff needed assistance with meeting a deadline in a court
order. (ECF No. 32-7, PageID.313). Upon meeting with Plaintiff, he returned some law library materials and showed Defendant a court order for medical records and requested that a copy of the order to give to the medical records department so he could retain the original. (Id.). Defendant stated that Plaintiff
“did not show any proof of requirement or court document that showed that this order would require the state to make a copy of the order, nor the medical records”; consequently, Plaintiff refused to give her the order or disbursement form until
Defendant agreed in advance to make photocopies for him. (Id.). Defendant provided three options to Plaintiff to obtain photocopies: 1) send the original order to the medical records department and request they make a copy and return the original; 2) she signs for receipt of the order to scan and send it off to request
authorization for a copy from the Office of Legal Affairs, and then return the original to Plaintiff; or 3) request a copy as part of a filing and showing proof of necessity per MDOC Policy Directive 05.03.116. (Id.). Defendant also stated that
Plaintiff did not offer or give a completed CSJ-602 Legal Photocopy Disbursement form to sign, and he declined all three options that were provided to resolve his issue. (Id.).
Plaintiff attempts to rebut this evidence by alleging that Defendant lied in her declaration and simply reiterating the claims made in his Complaint. (ECF No. 34, PageID.327). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant refused to accept the
disbursement forms he tried to provide, and she refused to sign and date the forms that would otherwise provide him proof that his copies were denied. (Id.). During his May 15, 2025, deposition, Plaintiff testified that Defendant claimed he was being denied photocopies because of WCC’s budget, but he
asserted that she was lying because WCC’s budget was “good” as they received federal and state funding. (ECF No. 32-5, PageID.296). He also indicated that he had been incarcerated at WCC for eighteen years and he was not previously denied
photocopies by the previous law librarians or legal assistants because he is an indigent prisoner, but Defendant always has excuses as to why she will not make photocopies for him. (Id.). Plaintiff does not adequately allege that Defendant’s denial of photocopies
amounted to adverse action. The Sixth Circuit has held that isolated incidents of refusing photocopies of a prisoner’s documents is “not likely to deter a person of ordinary firmness from pressing on with his lawsuit.” Smith v. Yarrow, 78 F.
App’x 529, 541 (6th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff alleges three specific dates in which Defendant allegedly refused to make copies of his legal documents, although he alleges generally that there were other incidents that also occurred. This does not
amount to a systemic denial of providing photocopies of his legal documents for filing with the courts. Indeed, Plaintiff stated that Defendant’s denial of assistance “forced me to file all my Complaint [sic] to the Federal Court myself”; thus, not
only would a person of ordinary firmness not be deterred from pursuing their legal action, but Plaintiff was also not deterred. (ECF No. 34, PageID.327). Similarly, Plaintiff has presented no evidence to support his conclusory assertion that Defendant denied the photocopies because Plaintiff had exercised his
First Amendment rights. See Harbin-Bey, 420 F.3d at 580 (quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538–39 (6th Cir. 1987)) (“[C]onclusory allegations of retaliatory motive ‘unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state ... a
claim under § 1983.’”); Lewis v. Jarvie, 20 F. App’x 457, 459 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998)) (“[B]are allegations of malice on the defendants’ parts are not enough to establish retaliation claims.”)). Significantly, the evidence reflects non-retaliatory reasons why Plaintiff was
denied photocopies, and Plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that Defendant’s refusal to provide the copies was motivated by Plaintiff's protected conduct. Defendant submitted multiple emails sent in close proximity to the
corresponding dates of interaction with Plaintiff and his consistent failure to follow MDOC policy related to providing proof of requirement for copies, such as those required by the courts or at the request of the Legal Writer Program; to pay for any
personal copies requested; or to provide proper documentation to request disbursement of a loan for the copies requested. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not submitted enough evidence, aside from his conclusory allegations,
for a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant refused to make photocopies for Plaintiff, such that Defendant could be liable for retaliation because of Plaintiff’s grievances and or lawsuits. In this case, Plaintiff has not come forward with any persuasive proof of a
causal connection between his filed grievances and/or lawsuits and him being denied photocopies. Rather, Plaintiff relies solely on his speculation and his own subjective belief that such a causal connection exists. This is not sufficient to
withstand summary judgment. Accordingly, summary judgment for Defendant on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is appropriate. IV. RECOMMENDATION For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 32) be GRANTED. The parties here may object to and seek review of this Report and Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service,
as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule 72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Sec’y of Health &
Hum. Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991). Filing objections that raise some issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec’y of Health and
Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Tchrs. Loc. 231, Am. Fed’n of Tchrs., AFL-CIO, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(d)(2), any objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge.
Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” “Objection No. 2,” etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an
objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the objections in length and complexity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), Local Rule 72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, in the same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to Objection
No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections lack merit, it may rule without awaiting the response. Date: December 16, 2025. s/Curtis Ivy, Jr. Curtis Ivy, Jr. United States Magistrate Judge CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that this document was served on counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF System or by First Class U.S. mail on December 16, 2025.
s/Sara Krause Case Manager (810) 341-7850