Alfandary v. Nikko Asset Mgmt. Co.
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Opinion
ROBERT W. SWEET, U.S.D.J.
Defendants Nikko Asset Management Co., Ltd. ("Nikko" or the "Company"), Takumi Shibata ("Shibata"), Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Bank, Limited ("SMTB"), and Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Holdings, Inc. ("SMTH") (collectively, the "Defendants") have moved on grounds of forum non conveniens and lack of personal jurisdiction to dismiss the First Amended Complaint ("FAC") of plaintiffs Christina Alfandary ("Alfandary"), Jeffrey Hansen ("Hansen"), Laurie Vicari ("Vicari"), Timothy McCarthy ("McCarthy"), Bill Wilder ("Wilder"), Frederick Reidenbach ("Reidenbach"), and Gregory Atkinson ("Atkinson") (collectively, the "Plaintiffs") seeking to enforce certain stock acquisition rights ("SARs"). Upon the conclusions set forth below, the motion is denied.
*350I. Prior Proceedings
On July 7, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed their Complaint. On September 20, 2017 filed their First Amended Complaint ("FAC") of 81 pages alleging the Defendants' fraudulent scheme, FAC ¶¶ 77-156, and ten causes of action: (1) violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)(5) by Hansen, id. ¶¶ 157-71; (2) by all Plaintiffs, id. ¶¶ 172-85; (3) violations by Shibata of Section 20 of the Securities and Exchange Act ("SEA"), id. ¶¶ 186-89; (4 & 5) violations by SMTB and SMTH of Section 20 of the SEA, id. ¶¶ 190-95; (6) common law fraud id. ¶¶ 212-16; (7) conspiracy to commit common law fraud, id. ¶¶ 217-24; (8) breach of contract, id. ¶ 225; (9) breach of contract against Nikko, id. ¶¶ 263-65; and (10) for declaratory judgment, id. ¶¶ 266-70.
The instant motion was heard and marked fully submitted on April 11, 2018.
II. The Facts
The parties submitted substantial affidavits with exhibits in support of and in opposition to the pending motion from which the following account of relationships and events is drawn, see Kitaru Innovations Inc. v. Chandaria ,
The dispute between these sophisticated, well-advised parties concerns a series of complicated interrelated intra-corporate transactions.
During the relevant time period, Plaintiffs Alfandary, Vicari, and Hansen (collectively, the "NAMA Plaintiffs") were all senior executives of Nikko Asset Management of America, Inc. ("NAMA") in New York, a wholly owned subsidiary of Nikko. FAC ¶¶ 10-12, 20. Specifically, Alfandary was United States Business Head of NAMA, Hansen was NAMA's Senior Fund Manager and Managing, and Vicari was NAMA's Chief Compliance Officer. Id. ¶¶ 10-12. Plaintiffs McCarthy, Reidenbach, Wilder, and Atkinson were senior executives of Nikko. Id. ¶¶ 13-16. Specifically, McCarthy was Nikko's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Reidenbach was Nikko's Chief Financial Officer and Chief Operating Officer, Wilder was Nikko's President, and Atkinson was Nikko's Head of Global Trading. Id.
Defendants are Japanese nationals that maintain extensive contacts with the United States through an elaborate corporate structure.
Nikko, a privately-held investment advisor and asset manager, is incorporated in Japan and has its principal offices in Tokyo. Id. ¶ 17. Nikko has $165 billion under management, and is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), though it has no securities listed on any United States exchange. Id. ; Sayato Decl. ¶ 4. Nikko files periodic and continuous Form 13F reports with the SEC, as is required for "institutional investment managers that use the U.S. mails and exercise investment discretion over $100 million," as well as Form PF reports, which "must be filed by SEC-registered investment advisors that, with their related persons, have at least $150 million in private fund assets under management." Sayato Decl. ¶ 4.
Defendant SMTB is an institutional investment manager that owns 91.6% of Nikko. FAC ¶ 18. As part of that ownership, SMTB oversees and controls Nikko's business operations, and consolidates the Company's financial results with its own. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. SMTB filed Form 13F-NT with the SEC under Central Index Key Number 0001046017. Id.
*351Defendant SMTH is a publicly traded company that owns 100% of the shares of SMTB, and its ADRs are traded in the United States. Id. ¶ 19. The majority of SMTH's officers are also officers or executives of SMTB. Id.
Defendant Shibata was educated in the United States and is a Japanese citizen and resident. Shibata Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5. Shibata joined Nikko as Executive Chairman in July 2013, and assumed the roles of Representative Director, President and CEO in April 2014. Shibata Decl. ¶ 2.
In 2009, after SMTB acquired Nikko from Citibank, the Company established a stock option plan (the "2009 Plan") to retain existing employees and attract new talent. FAC ¶ 31-32. Two years later, Nikko established a second plan to advance the same purpose (the "2011 Plan," and together with the 2009 Plan, the "Plans"). Id. ¶ 42. SMTB worked with Nikko's senior management team, including Plaintiffs McCarthy and Wilder, to develop the Plans. Id. ¶¶ 31, 42. The governing documents for both Plans were substantively identical and included (1) an "Allotment Agreement" signed on behalf of Nikko and by each grantee, and (2) accompanying "Terms and Conditions" describing the Plans. Id. ¶¶ 36-41, 43-49. Those documents - including the Allotment Agreements signed by each of the Plaintiffs -- were written in Japanese. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss ("Defs.' Br."), at 2.
Under the Plans' similar terms, Plaintiffs were awarded units of stock acquisition rights ("SARs"), FAC ¶¶ 50-59, which provided for an exercise period of up to 10 years, id. ¶¶ 126, 261. In the event the Company did not implement an IPO by a designated date,1 the Plans granted participants the right to liquidate their vested SARs. Id. ¶¶ 248, 261. Specifically, participants would have the option, but not the obligation, to sell their SARs back to Nikko at the "fair market value" of the Company less a pre-identified strike price.2 Id. ¶¶ 35, 43. To calculate "fair market value," the Plans required Nikko to obtain opinions from three independent evaluators twice a year, commencing approximately six months after the designated date. Id. ¶ 36-38, 44. In the event Nikko did implement an IPO before the designated date, the process for exercise was more straightforward. Participants were to be granted the right to exercise their SARs at the strike price, and if the market price exceeded the strike price, the participant could reasonably expect to profit from the transaction. Id. ¶¶ 34, 43.
Under the terms of both Plans, participants who left the Company prior to exercising their rights were expressly permitted to retain their vested options. The Plans' Terms and Conditions provided that, in the event an employee left after the Company went public, the employee had to exercise his rights within three months of departure. See Defs.' Exs. 2, 4, 6.
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ROBERT W. SWEET, U.S.D.J.
Defendants Nikko Asset Management Co., Ltd. ("Nikko" or the "Company"), Takumi Shibata ("Shibata"), Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Bank, Limited ("SMTB"), and Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Holdings, Inc. ("SMTH") (collectively, the "Defendants") have moved on grounds of forum non conveniens and lack of personal jurisdiction to dismiss the First Amended Complaint ("FAC") of plaintiffs Christina Alfandary ("Alfandary"), Jeffrey Hansen ("Hansen"), Laurie Vicari ("Vicari"), Timothy McCarthy ("McCarthy"), Bill Wilder ("Wilder"), Frederick Reidenbach ("Reidenbach"), and Gregory Atkinson ("Atkinson") (collectively, the "Plaintiffs") seeking to enforce certain stock acquisition rights ("SARs"). Upon the conclusions set forth below, the motion is denied.
*350I. Prior Proceedings
On July 7, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed their Complaint. On September 20, 2017 filed their First Amended Complaint ("FAC") of 81 pages alleging the Defendants' fraudulent scheme, FAC ¶¶ 77-156, and ten causes of action: (1) violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10(b)(5) by Hansen, id. ¶¶ 157-71; (2) by all Plaintiffs, id. ¶¶ 172-85; (3) violations by Shibata of Section 20 of the Securities and Exchange Act ("SEA"), id. ¶¶ 186-89; (4 & 5) violations by SMTB and SMTH of Section 20 of the SEA, id. ¶¶ 190-95; (6) common law fraud id. ¶¶ 212-16; (7) conspiracy to commit common law fraud, id. ¶¶ 217-24; (8) breach of contract, id. ¶ 225; (9) breach of contract against Nikko, id. ¶¶ 263-65; and (10) for declaratory judgment, id. ¶¶ 266-70.
The instant motion was heard and marked fully submitted on April 11, 2018.
II. The Facts
The parties submitted substantial affidavits with exhibits in support of and in opposition to the pending motion from which the following account of relationships and events is drawn, see Kitaru Innovations Inc. v. Chandaria ,
The dispute between these sophisticated, well-advised parties concerns a series of complicated interrelated intra-corporate transactions.
During the relevant time period, Plaintiffs Alfandary, Vicari, and Hansen (collectively, the "NAMA Plaintiffs") were all senior executives of Nikko Asset Management of America, Inc. ("NAMA") in New York, a wholly owned subsidiary of Nikko. FAC ¶¶ 10-12, 20. Specifically, Alfandary was United States Business Head of NAMA, Hansen was NAMA's Senior Fund Manager and Managing, and Vicari was NAMA's Chief Compliance Officer. Id. ¶¶ 10-12. Plaintiffs McCarthy, Reidenbach, Wilder, and Atkinson were senior executives of Nikko. Id. ¶¶ 13-16. Specifically, McCarthy was Nikko's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Reidenbach was Nikko's Chief Financial Officer and Chief Operating Officer, Wilder was Nikko's President, and Atkinson was Nikko's Head of Global Trading. Id.
Defendants are Japanese nationals that maintain extensive contacts with the United States through an elaborate corporate structure.
Nikko, a privately-held investment advisor and asset manager, is incorporated in Japan and has its principal offices in Tokyo. Id. ¶ 17. Nikko has $165 billion under management, and is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), though it has no securities listed on any United States exchange. Id. ; Sayato Decl. ¶ 4. Nikko files periodic and continuous Form 13F reports with the SEC, as is required for "institutional investment managers that use the U.S. mails and exercise investment discretion over $100 million," as well as Form PF reports, which "must be filed by SEC-registered investment advisors that, with their related persons, have at least $150 million in private fund assets under management." Sayato Decl. ¶ 4.
Defendant SMTB is an institutional investment manager that owns 91.6% of Nikko. FAC ¶ 18. As part of that ownership, SMTB oversees and controls Nikko's business operations, and consolidates the Company's financial results with its own. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. SMTB filed Form 13F-NT with the SEC under Central Index Key Number 0001046017. Id.
*351Defendant SMTH is a publicly traded company that owns 100% of the shares of SMTB, and its ADRs are traded in the United States. Id. ¶ 19. The majority of SMTH's officers are also officers or executives of SMTB. Id.
Defendant Shibata was educated in the United States and is a Japanese citizen and resident. Shibata Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5. Shibata joined Nikko as Executive Chairman in July 2013, and assumed the roles of Representative Director, President and CEO in April 2014. Shibata Decl. ¶ 2.
In 2009, after SMTB acquired Nikko from Citibank, the Company established a stock option plan (the "2009 Plan") to retain existing employees and attract new talent. FAC ¶ 31-32. Two years later, Nikko established a second plan to advance the same purpose (the "2011 Plan," and together with the 2009 Plan, the "Plans"). Id. ¶ 42. SMTB worked with Nikko's senior management team, including Plaintiffs McCarthy and Wilder, to develop the Plans. Id. ¶¶ 31, 42. The governing documents for both Plans were substantively identical and included (1) an "Allotment Agreement" signed on behalf of Nikko and by each grantee, and (2) accompanying "Terms and Conditions" describing the Plans. Id. ¶¶ 36-41, 43-49. Those documents - including the Allotment Agreements signed by each of the Plaintiffs -- were written in Japanese. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss ("Defs.' Br."), at 2.
Under the Plans' similar terms, Plaintiffs were awarded units of stock acquisition rights ("SARs"), FAC ¶¶ 50-59, which provided for an exercise period of up to 10 years, id. ¶¶ 126, 261. In the event the Company did not implement an IPO by a designated date,1 the Plans granted participants the right to liquidate their vested SARs. Id. ¶¶ 248, 261. Specifically, participants would have the option, but not the obligation, to sell their SARs back to Nikko at the "fair market value" of the Company less a pre-identified strike price.2 Id. ¶¶ 35, 43. To calculate "fair market value," the Plans required Nikko to obtain opinions from three independent evaluators twice a year, commencing approximately six months after the designated date. Id. ¶ 36-38, 44. In the event Nikko did implement an IPO before the designated date, the process for exercise was more straightforward. Participants were to be granted the right to exercise their SARs at the strike price, and if the market price exceeded the strike price, the participant could reasonably expect to profit from the transaction. Id. ¶¶ 34, 43.
Under the terms of both Plans, participants who left the Company prior to exercising their rights were expressly permitted to retain their vested options. The Plans' Terms and Conditions provided that, in the event an employee left after the Company went public, the employee had to exercise his rights within three months of departure. See Defs.' Exs. 2, 4, 6. If an employee left before an IPO, he had until three months after the IPO to exercise his rights, provided however that during this three month period, Nikko could require former employees to sell their rights back, thereby allowing Nikko to control the size of the float in a public offering. See ECF No. 32-2, Section 2(10) (v) (b) . The Plans did not, however, provide that the Company could force a sale *352before an IPO. On the contrary, Section 2(10)(iii) explicitly states that Nikko "must have implemented the IPO at the time of the exercise of the Stock Acquisition Rights." Id.
All Plaintiffs were participants in either the 2009 Plan, the 2011 Plan, or both. Plaintiffs began to receive information about their rights under the 2009 Plan in early 2010, and received similar information on the 2011 Plan one year later (the "Allotment Packages"). FAC ¶¶ 10-16. The Allotment Packages were distributed to Plaintiffs at their place of employment, which for the NAMA Plaintiffs was New York City. Id. NAMA Plaintiffs also were sent "Award Notices" at or around the same time. See Defs.' Exs. 18-19, 20-22.
By the end of 2015, all Plaintiffs had terminated their employment with NAMA or Nikko. FAC ¶¶ 10-16. However, Plaintiffs retained units of SARs under the Plans after departing NAMA or Nikko. Id. ¶¶ 121, 151. In addition, upon their termination from NAMA, Hansen and Alfandary each entered into a separation agreement with NAMA and "its current and former parents, subsidiaries, and affiliated entities, and their respective ... officers, directors and employees" (the "Separation Agreements"). Miller Decl., Ex. 11 ("Hansen Separation Agreement"); id. Ex. 12 ("Alfandary Separation Agreement"). The Separation Agreements provide for Defendants' express consent to the "exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of New York County, New York" for "any action regarding" the Agreement. Id. The Separation Agreements also contain merger clauses in which the parties agree that the Separation Agreements "supersede[ ] and cancel[ ] all prior ... written and oral agreements" between them. Id.
The third NAMA Plaintiff, Vicari, lost her employment file during a residential move, and no longer possesses "any records" relating to "[her] termination of employment with NAMA." Vicari Aff. ¶¶ 15-16. Plaintiffs allege, however, that "it was NAMA's regular business practice to negotiate the terms of separation with each of its departing executives," covering, among other things, "any vested SARs held in the employee stock option plans." Alfandary Aff. ¶ 36.
According to Plaintiffs, in 2014 and 2015, Shibata represented to members of Nikko's then-senior management that he wanted to "prevent prior management from deriving any value whatsoever from existing employee stock option plans, including the 2009 and 2011 Stock Option Plans." FAC ¶ 68. Shibata also told senior management that he wanted to force existing option holders to forfeit their vested options in order to free up money for a new compensation plan. Id. ¶ 70. Shibata indicated to at least one member of senior management, Plaintiff Reidenbach, that he would not allow internal opposition to this endeavor. Id. ¶ 71. Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that SMTB and its parent, SMTH, were "aware of" and "willful participants in" the scheme. FAC ¶¶ 5, 84, 89, 91-94.
To execute this scheme, Defendants first undertook to alter Nikko's valuation process to obtain artificially low valuations of the Company. Id. ¶¶ 2, 79. This was accomplished in part by selecting evaluators that Defendants could control, and giving the evaluators limited and inaccurate data, in violation of the terms governing the valuation process set forth in the Plans. Id. ¶ 36. As a result, the Company was valued conveniently below the 2009 Plan's strike price, which was calculated during the depths of the great recession, and far less than the 2011 Plan's strike price, which reflected the Company's increased value two years later. Id.
By causing the Company's valuation to be set at a figure less than the 2009 and *3532011 strike prices, Defendants rendered all vested SARs worthless. Id. ¶ 2. To reap the benefits of that effort, Defendants then forced participants to exercise their SARs on these terms. Id. ¶ 8. Despite the fact that the Company had not conducted an IPO by the designated dates, Nikko advised 2009 and 2011 Plan grantees that it was willing to buy their SARs in July 2015 and January 2017, respectively. Id. ¶ 121, 151. These two offers (the "Purchase Offers") explained that the evaluators decided the fair market value of Nikko shares was less than the relevant strike price,3 and Nikko was consequently willing to purchase the SARs for ¥1 per share. Id. ¶¶ 122-23. The Purchase Offers further explained that, for grantees like Plaintiffs who were no longer employees, the SARs would become unexercisable and extinguished if they did not submit a purchase request by a certain date.4 Id. ¶¶ 124, 151.
As a result of the foregoing events, Plaintiffs filed the present action. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied in its entirety.
III. The Applicable Standard
"A federal court has discretion to dismiss a case on the ground of forum non conveniens 'when an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear the case, and ... trial in the chosen forum would establish ... oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant ... out of all proportion to plaintiff's convenience, or ... the chosen forum is inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court's own administrative and legal problems.' " Sinochem Intern. Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Intern. Shipping Corp. ,
In order to avoid dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), Plaintiffs must establish personal jurisdiction with respect to each Defendant. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal. , --- U.S. ----,
IV. The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the FAC on Forum Non Conveniens Grounds is Denied
Courts reviewing a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens "should *354begin with the assumption that the plaintiff's choice of forum will stand unless the defendant meets the burden of demonstrating ... that 'trial in the chosen forum would be unnecessarily burdensome for the defendant or the court.' " Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp. ,
The first step in the inquiry is to establish the existence of an adequate alternative forum. Bank of Credit & Commerce Int'l (Overseas) Ltd. v. State Bank of Pakistan ,
Upon this showing, courts determine whether to dismiss for forum non conveniens by considering the private and public interest factors from Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert ,
There may also be "questions as to the enforceability [sic ] of a judgment if one is obtained." Borden, Inc. v. Meiji Milk Prods. Co., Inc. ,
Unless the balance of the Gulf Oil factors weighs "strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed." Gulf Oil ,
A. The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Nikko Plaintiffs' Claims for Forum Non Conveniens is Denied
As to both the private and public interest Gulf Oil factors, Defendants have not *355met their heavy burden. See Teevee Toons, Inc. ,
Regarding the private interest factors, Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs' claims are based upon Defendants' conduct in connection with the valuations of Nikko undertaken pursuant to the Plans, all the witnesses and documents relevant to the dispute are in Japan, and therefore this factor favors the foreign forum. Plaintiffs counter that much of the relevant evidence in this case, including contemporaneous audio recordings illustrating fraud, is already located in New York. Indeed, Defendants' concerns regarding access to evidence are mitigated by current technology. See Metito (Overseas) Ltd. v. Gen. Elec. Co. , No. 05 Civ. 9478 (GEL),
Defendants have also cited concerns about compelling "unwilling witnesses." Defs' Br. at 19. But neither specific witnesses nor their testimony have been identified, and even if such a list had been provided, "it has not shown why the testimony of these witnesses could not be obtained in the form of depositions or letters rogatory." Hatzlachh Supply v. Tradewind Airways Ltd. ,
Further, Plaintiffs carry the burden of proving their claims, and any hypothetical inability to obtain testimony from non-willing witnesses cannot be deemed to weigh in favor of dismissal. See Wahl v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. ,
There are also cost-shifting considerations. The Nikko Plaintiffs are individuals while the corporate Defendants are multi-national financial institutions alleged to have conducted a major segment of their enterprise in New York City, and as such are comparatively better suited to handle the travel costs attending to this litigation. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. ,
*356Finally, Defendants cite Borden, Inc. v. Meiji Milk Prods. Co., Ltd. ,
Here, the requested relief is monetary and therefore the enforceability considerations proposed by Defendants do not apply. See FAC at 79.
On the evidence presented, the balance of the private interest factors weighs in favor of Plaintiffs. See DiRienzo v. Philip Servs. Corp. ,
The public Gilbert factors also favor litigation in this forum. First, Defendants do not argue that "administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion" require dismissal. See Teevee Toons, Inc. ,
The same goes for the public interest factors relating to having local disputes settled locally, having the trial in a forum familiar with the law governing the action, and the interest in avoiding burdening jurors with cases that have no impact on their community. Defendants contend that, "[s]imply put, Japan has a much greater interest in this litigation than does the United States" because the dispute challenges conduct which occurred in Japan, and involves Japanese domiciliaries in relation to a Japanese-law contract and the valuation of a Japanese company. See Defs.' Br. 15. What Defendants fail to adequately address is that all of the Nikko Plaintiffs are United States citizens. A New York juror would view the facts no differently than if effected by a New-York based entity.
Further, the local interest derived from citizenship and residence is reinforced by the strong national interest that the United States has in enforcing its securities laws. See generally DiRienzo ,
Nor does the final public interest factor -- "the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws or in the application of foreign law," see Teevee Toons, Inc. ,
This leaves a possible question as to the applicable law with respect to the remaining claims. This lack of clarity as to the remaining claims in itself confirms that this factor is at most neutral. See Erausquin v. Notz, Stucki Mgmt. (Bermuda) Ltd. ,
On balance, the Gulf Oil Factors can hardly be said to tilt "strongly in favor" of the Defendants here. Defendants' motion to dismiss the Nikko Plaintiffs' claims for forum non conveniens is denied.
B. The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the NAMA Plaintiffs on Forum Non Conveniens Grounds is Denied
The forum non conveniens conclusions set forth above with respect to the Nikko Plaintiffs apply equally to the NAMA Plaintiffs, but the analysis is complicated by the Award Notices and the Separation Agreements executed upon termination of employment. See Lazare Kaplan Intern. Inc. v. KBC Bank N.V. ,
Defendants seek to enforce the forum selection clauses contained in the Award Notices. Defs.' Br. 15-17. They argue that the NAMA Plaintiffs each signed Award Notices acknowledging that their Allotment Agreements are governed by Japanese law, and agreed that "any claim or dispute" regarding those Agreements, the Plans, or the SARs could be heard only in Tokyo District Court. See Defs.' Br. 12; Defs.' Exs. 18-22.
The NAMA Plaintiffs contend that in the Separation Agreements, which were entered on a date later than the Award Notices, Defendants agreed to the exclusive jurisdiction of New York for resolution of all disputes among the parties. Pls.' Br. 8, ECF No. 40.
Because the "enforcement of valid forum-selection clauses, bargained for by the parties, protects their legitimate expectations and furthers vital interests of the justice system ... a valid forum-selection clause should be given controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases." Atl. Marine Const. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Western Dist. of Texas ,
In cases like this, where parties have entered into multiple agreements specifying different mandatory forums for dispute resolution, courts must evaluate which forum-selection clause is valid. See Asoma Corp. v. SK Shipping Co. ,
Here, the Separation Agreements entered into between Alfandary and Hansen, while slightly different, are substantially similar for purposes of this inquiry.5 Both Separation Agreements contain the following integration clause (the "Integration Clause"):
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between Nikko and you, and supersedes and cancels all prior and contemporaneous written and oral agreements, if any, between Nikko and you. You affirm that, in entering into this Agreement, you are not relying upon any oral or written promise or statement made by anyone at any time on behalf of Nikko.
See Hansen Separation Agreement, Hansen Aff., Ex. A ¶ 9; Alfandary Separation Agreement, Alfdandary Aff., Ex. C ¶ 13.
Moreover, the Separation Agreements contain the following identical forum selection clauses:
This Agreement may not be changed or altered, except by a writing signed by Nikko and you. This Agreement is entered into in the State of New York, and the laws of the State of New York will apply to any dispute concerning it, excluding the conflict-of-law principles thereof. Furthermore, any action regarding this Agreement or its enforcement shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of New York County, New York.
See Hansen Separation Agreement ¶ 14; Alfandary Separation Agreement ¶ 18.
Because the later-executed Separation Agreements contain a merger clause that broadly "supersedes and cancels all prior and contemporaneous written and oral agreements," the Separation Agreements are fully integrated. See Starter Corp. v. Converse, Inc. ,
V. The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the FAC on Personal Jurisdiction Grounds is Denied
Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction with respect to each Defendant. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal. , --- U.S. ----,
Because Section 27 of the SEA authorizes service of process "wherever the defendant may be found," it allows the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the limit of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., SEC v. Unifund SAL ,
The due process test for personal jurisdiction has two parts: the "minimum contacts" inquiry and the "reasonableness" inquiry. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp. ,
Specific jurisdiction exists when the defendant has "purposefully directed" his activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from injuries "aris[ing] out of or relat[ing] to those activities." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz ,
General jurisdiction, by contrast, exists where the defendant-corporation is "fairly regarded as at home," Goodyear ,
The reasonableness inquiry requires courts to decide whether asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendant comports with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Goodyear ,
A. Personal Jurisdiction Exists Over All Defendants As To Claims Brought by Plaintiffs Hansen and Alfandary
At the outset, personal jurisdiction exists over all Defendants as to claims brought by Plaintiffs Hansen and Alfandary. The Separation Agreements executed by NAMA on behalf of Nikko, Shibata, SMTB and SMTH provided for the "exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of New York County, New York" for any claims arising out of their employment. Plfs.' Ex. 11, ¶ 14; Plf. Ex. 12, ¶ 18. Because the Separation Agreements governs (see supra at 358-59) Defendants Nikko, Shibata, SMTB, and SMTH have consented to this Court's jurisdiction with respect to the claims asserted by Plaintiffs Hansen and Alfandary.6 See generally D.H. Blair & Co., Inc. v. Gottdiener ,
B. Personal Jurisdiction Exists Over Defendants Nikko, Shibata, SMTB and SMTH As To All Claims
Putting the Separation Agreements aside, the Court also has personal jurisdiction over Defendants with respect to all *361claims, because each Defendant has sufficient minimum contacts in the United States and exercising jurisdiction over them would not be unreasonable.
1. Nikko Has Sufficient Minimum Contacts in the United States
While Nikko is incorporated and maintains its principal place of business in Japan, this Court nonetheless has general jurisdiction over it. Defendants principally rely on Daimler AG v. Bauman ,
Instead, Plaintiffs have alleged facts demonstrating that Nikko has had continuous and systematic operations in the United States such that it may fairly be considered at home here. Nikko has been registered as an investment adviser firm with the SEC since at least August 1999. FAC ¶ 17. As part of its registration, Nikko has filed with the SEC: (1) a Form ADV; (2) Form 13F reports, which are required for institutional investment managers that use the United States mails and exercise investment discretion over $100 million; and (3) Form PF reports, which are required for SEC-registered investment advisers that have, with their related persons, at least $150 million in private fund assets under management. See Sayato Decl., ECF No. 34, ¶ 4.
Nikko also provides investment advisory services in the United States through its wholly owned subsidiary, NAMA. See id. ¶¶ 4, 12, FAC ¶ 17. In NAMA's own Form ADV, dated June 29, 2017, Nikko is listed as its majority owner and control person. FAC ¶ 20. Two of Nikko's ten board members sit on the board of NAMA. Sayato Decl. ¶ 13. From 2009 to 2012, Nikko repeatedly sent senior executive from Tokyo to NAMA's New York office to "among other things, answer questions regarding and otherwise discuss the 2009 Stock Option Plan with NAMA employee-participants." See FAC ¶ 58. In connection with the Plans, Nikko sent grants of stock to at least 39 employees in the United States. Sayato Decl. ¶¶ 14-15. In sum, Nikko's contacts go beyond merely "doing business" in the United States and demonstrate that Nikko may fairly be considered "at home" here. Daimler , 134 S.Ct. at 762 n.20.
Even in the absence of general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction exists over Nikko because Plaintiffs' claims arise from allegedly fraudulent conduct that Nikko purposefully directed to the United States. As an initial matter, Nikko granted the SARs at issue as part of a deliberate effort to "provide for the long-term welfare of Company employees, and to incentivize" its global employees, including those in New York. FAC ¶ 32. As part of the 2009 and 2011 Plans, Nikko awarded SARs to at least 39 New York employees residing in the United States. FAC ¶ 33. Furthermore, in July 2015 and January 2017, Nikko sent the Purchase Offers from its Tokyo offices to grantees with SARs under the 2009 and 2011 Plans, including those in *362New York.7 FAC ¶¶ 121, 128.
Defendants contend that cases such as Walden v. Fiore ,
Here, by contrast, the FAC alleges that Nikko's scheme was accomplished in substantial part by purposefully directing fraudulent correspondence to former Nikko and NAMA employees in the United States, including in New York, New Jersey, Nevada, and California. See FAC ¶¶ 128-34. Significantly, these Purchase Offers are alleged to contain the fraudulent valuation that is the very cause of Plaintiffs' injury. See, e.g., Eades v. Kennedy, PC Law Offices ,
In addition to sending the Purchase Offers to Plaintiffs in the United States, other circumstances further indicate that Defendants could reasonably anticipate being sued here. Even if Nikko's extensive relationship with New York did not directly give rise to Plaintiffs' present claims, it clearly relates to this litigation. See Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez ,
Based on these facts and others contained in the pleadings and papers attached *363thereto, Nikko has sufficient minimum contacts in the United States to exercise personal jurisdiction over it.
2. Shibata Has Sufficient Minimum Contacts in the United States
The Court may likewise exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant Shibata. The facts suggest that Shibata purposefully availed himself of the benefit of doing business in this forum, and could reasonably have anticipated litigating claims here.
In 2014, Shibata became the President and CEO of Nikko. FAC ¶ 17. In that role, Shibata was intimately involved in business operations and management in the United States, including by directing and controlling the issuance and repurchase of the stock options to Plaintiffs in the United States. Id. ¶¶ 41, 80, 121 (describing Shibata as "de facto plan administrator"). As part of that effort, Shibata himself sent and signed the allegedly fraudulent Purchase Offers from Tokyo to former employees in the United States, including California, Nevada, New York, and New Jersey. See id. ¶¶ 128-34. These documents were signed by Shibata personally on Nikko letterhead. Id. ¶ 121. In the course of his tenure as President and CEO of Nikko, Shibata also "directed a number of [Nikko] senior executives" to travel to New York in preparation for the stock Plans. Id. ¶ 59.
Shibata is further alleged to have personally "orchestrated [the] fraudulent scheme to distort and rig the outcome" of the Plans by, among other things, handpicking "independent" evaluators and drafting their engagement letters in such a way as to limit the available data from which they would render a valuation. Id. ¶¶ 108, 215. This conduct, according to Plaintiffs, caused their injuries in the United States. See id. ¶¶ 157-270.
In sum, Shibata was directly involved the scheme that caused Plaintiffs' harm-a scheme that could not have been successfully executed without taking certain actions in the United States. Shibata's contacts with this forum thus have a substantial connection to Plaintiffs' claims. See, e.g., Landry v. Price Waterhouse Chartered Accountants ,
3. SMTB and SMTH Have Sufficient Minimum Contacts in the United States
Finally, personal jurisdiction may be exercised over SMTB and SMTH. The allegations in the pleadings suggest SMTB and SMTH purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of doing business in the United States.
"Courts in this Circuit have recognized the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction, which allows the acts of a co-conspirator to be attributed to a defendant for the purpose of obtaining personal jurisdiction over the defendant." In re Satyam Computer Services Ltd. Sec. Lit. ,
To make a prima facie showing of conspiracy to violate federal securities laws, Plaintiffs must demonstrate (a) a primary violation of the securities laws by another; (b) an agreement between the alleged defendant conspirator and the primary violator to violate the securities laws; (c) an illegal or fraudulent act committed by the alleged conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (d) damage to a person not a member of the conspiracy.
Here, the FAC alleges substantive violations of the Securities Exchange Act by Nikko and Shibata. FAC ¶ 9. Additionally, Plaintiffs have asserted that there was agreement between Defendants to engage in this fraud, because SMTB and SMTH executives were aware of and approved of Shibata's plan to eliminate the stock option plans through a falsified valuation process. See id. ¶ 218. The FAC further alleges that SMTB and SMTH took specific actions in furtherance of the conspiracy, for example, by working with Nikko's senior management to select the evaluators and by encouraging the fraud after becoming aware of it. Id. ¶ 193. Finally, the FAC alleges damage to Plaintiffs, who were not members of this conspiracy. Id. ¶ 222. As such, the first element of "conspiracy theory" jurisdiction has been satisfied.
The FAC contains specific facts warranting the inference that SMTB and SMTH were members of the conspiracy. For example, the FAC makes clear that SMTB and SMTH had extensive control over Nikko and Shibata. SMTB attained 100% ownership of Nikko in 2009, and SMTB is in turn controlled by SMTH. See Defs.' Exs. 17-19. SMTB exercised direct operational control over Nikko and NAMA. For example, the SMTB directors on Nikko's board of directors were actively involved in approving Nikko's budget and overseeing Nikko's daily operations, as well as those of NAMA. FAC ¶ 18. More importantly, SMTB and SMTH executives were allegedly supportive of Shibata's fraudulent scheme by enabling Nikko to "create a new, more lucrative incentive plan for [ ] Shibata without unduly diluting" SMTB and SMTH's ownership interest in Nikko. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. Cf. Allstate Life Ins. Co. ,
Lastly, Plaintiffs have shown that SMTB and SMTH's co-conspirator committed a tortious act pursuant to the conspiracy in the United States. Plaintiffs claim they were harmed by the Purchase Offers, which contained Nikko's fraudulent valuation. The overarching scheme, of which these Purchase Offers were a critical part, was developed by Nikko executives, including Shibata. Shibata signed the Purchase Offers himself and sent them from Tokyo to Plaintiffs in the United States for completion. Thus, the facts permit assertion of personal jurisdiction over SMTB and SMTH pursuant to a conspiracy theory.
Even without the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction, the Calder v. Jones "effects test" provides an alternative basis for jurisdiction.
The above-described conduct of SMTH and SMTB, including the exercise of operational and managerial control over Nikko and NAMA from Japan, as well as their participation in and support of the fraudulent repurchase scheme, was "expressly aimed" at the United States. See In Re Platinum and Palladium Antitrust Litig. ,
4. It Is Reasonable to Exercise Personal Jurisdiction Over All Defendants
Finally, like most courts conducting the reasonableness inquiry after finding that a defendant has adequate minimum contacts, this Court concludes that "this is not the rare case where the reasonableness analysis defeats the exercise of personal jurisdiction." S.E.C. v. Straub ,
In light of the above, personal jurisdiction may be exerted over Nikko, Shibata, SMTB and SMTH.9 Defendants' motion *366to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is denied.
I. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied.
It is so ordered.
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
337 F. Supp. 3d 343, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alfandary-v-nikko-asset-mgmt-co-ilsd-2018.