Alexander v. Youngstown Board of Education

454 F. Supp. 985, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18445
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedApril 12, 1978
DocketCiv. A. C74-118Y
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 454 F. Supp. 985 (Alexander v. Youngstown Board of Education) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Alexander v. Youngstown Board of Education, 454 F. Supp. 985, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18445 (N.D. Ohio 1978).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CONTIE, District Judge.

On June 3, 1974, nine named students of the Youngstown, Ohio public school system and their parents initiated this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983-1988, and 2000d, to redress the alleged deprivation under color of law of rights guaranteed by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 1 Plaintiffs named as defendants the Youngstown Board of Education and its individual members, the Superintendent. of the Youngstown City School District, the Governor of the State of Ohio, the Attorney General of the State of Ohio, the Ohio State Board of Education and its individual members, and the Superintendent of Public Instruction, Ohio Department of Education. 2 The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), and 1343(3) and (4).

In their complaint, plaintiffs assert that the State defendants by their action and inaction have effected segregation on the basis of race in the Youngstown public school system in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution. Specifically, it is asserted that these defendants acting through subunits of state government have engaged in practices which have had the foreseeable and actual effect of incorporating into the school system private residential, racial discrimination. It is further contended that the State defendants have allocated educational resources in a manner that has resulted in racial discrimination in the provision of school facilities and other resources, *987 and in the establishment and maintenance of a pattern of racially separate schools.

With regard to the Youngstown school defendants, plaintiffs essentially allege that these defendants acting under color of state law have in the past pursued and are presently pursuing policies and practices in the operation of the Youngstown public schools with the purpose and effect of perpetuating a segregated school system. Such racially discriminatory practices and policies assertedly include the planning and construction of new school facilities, the designation of attendance zones and feeder patterns, the assignment of students and teachers, and the fostering of existing racially discriminatory patterns in public and private housing. Further, it is alleged that the Youngstown defendants have wholly failed and refused to take appropriate action to rectify the foreseeable effects of their asserted policies and practices of discrimination on the basis of race upon the Youngstown public schools.

Equitable relief in the form of a permanent injunction is sought. Plaintiffs also request an award of attorneys’ fees and the costs incurred in prosecuting this action.

Both the Youngstown defendants and the State defendants have essentially denied the allegations of the complaint.

Plaintiffs, having initiated this action in their own behalf and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, moved the Court on July 2, 1976, to certify the within action as a class action under Rule 23(b)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. By Order of July 26, 1976, this Court certified “the class of all children attending the Youngstown Public Schools and their parents or guardians” as the class represented by the named plaintiffs.

Subsequently, the Court in its Order of December 29, 1976 granted the motion of defendants, the Governor and Attorney General of the State of Ohio, for summary judgment and dismissed them as party defendants.

Thereafter, this action proceeded to trial on the issue of liability. The Court duly heard extensive testimony and received numerous exhibits in January and February, 1977.

After the trial of this action and submission of the parties’ briefs, the United States Supreme Court, on June 27, 1977, rendered its decision in Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 97 S.Ct. 2766, 53 L.Ed.2d 851. Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to file additional briefs in light of this decision.

Upon consideration of the entire record herein, the Court enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

More than two decades ago, the Supreme Court declared in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495, 74 S.Ct. 686, 692, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), that racially, segregated public educational facilities are inherently unequal and deprive students of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 The Brown decision was concerned with “the elimination of state-mandated or deliberately maintained dual school systems with certain schools for Negro pupils and others for white pupils.” Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 737, 94 S.Ct. 3112, 3123, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1974).

In order to constitute a violation of the Constitution, this duality or racially segregated condition of the public schools must have resulted from discriminatory state action. Swann v. Board of Education; 402 U.S. 1, 17-18, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1277, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). As recognized in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), the primary purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is the prevention of official conduct *988 which discriminates on the basis of race. Absent a statutorily mandated dual school system, a predicate for finding unlawful state-imposed segregation exists where “school authorities have carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting a substantial portion of the students, schools, teachers, and facilities within the school system.” Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 201, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 2694, 37 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973).

The burden is upon plaintiffs to prove not only the existence of segregated schools, but also the creation or maintenance thereof by intentional state action. Id. at 198, 93 S.Ct. at 2692. Proof of a racially discriminatory purpose or intent is essential to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Conley v. Patterson
N.D. Ohio, 2023
Armour v. State of Ohio
775 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ohio, 1991)
United States v. Yonkers Board of Education
624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D. New York, 1985)
Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of Education
615 F. Supp. 1139 (M.D. Tennessee, 1985)
Alexander v. Youngstown Board of Education
675 F.2d 787 (Sixth Circuit, 1982)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
454 F. Supp. 985, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18445, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alexander-v-youngstown-board-of-education-ohnd-1978.