Alexander v. Alexander

982 S.W.2d 116, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 4041, 1998 WL 372145
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedJuly 2, 1998
Docket01-97-01193-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by30 cases

This text of 982 S.W.2d 116 (Alexander v. Alexander) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Alexander v. Alexander, 982 S.W.2d 116, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 4041, 1998 WL 372145 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

OPINION

O’CONNOR, Justice.

Mark Alexander, the appellant here and respondent below, appeals from the trial court’s granting of spousal support to his ex-wife, Brenda Alexander, the appellee here and petitioner below. We affirm.

Background

Mark and Brenda were married in 1983 and separated in April 1997. Brenda filed suit for divorce in the spring of 1997. On the day of trial, August 18, 1997, Brenda asked for and received leave to file an amended petition, seeking spousal support while she completed her college education.

The trial court found Mark at fault for the divorce. It found Mark and Brenda agreed during the marriage that she would stay at home while the children were small, and that Brenda has few skills for jobs other than those paying minimum wage. The trial court concluded the following: the marriage lasted more than 10 years; Brenda lacked sufficient property to provide for her minimum reasonable needs; she clearly lacked earning ability adequate to provide for her minimum reasonable needs; she diligently sought suitable employment and to develop skills to become self-supporting before and during the divorce suit; and she was eligible for spousal maintenance under section 3.9602 of the Family Code. 1 Mark was ordered to pay $575 a month (which is 20 percent of his monthly income) in spousal support until May 2000.

Analysis

Mark appeals, claiming Brenda has not met the requirements of section 3.9602(2), which authorizes the award of spousal maintenance in limited circumstances.

When a divorce is sought in a marriage lasting 10 years or more, a spouse may seek spousal maintenance under the Family Code. To be eligible for spousal maintenance, the spouse seeking support must lack sufficient property to meet her minimum reasonable needs and must show she cannot support herself (1) due to a disability, or (2) because she must care for a child with a disability and requiring substantial care and supervision, or (3) she “clearly lack[s] earning ability in the labor market adequate to provide support for [her] minimum reasonable needs.” Tex. Fam. Code §8.002(2) (1998). Generally, there is a presumption that maintenance is not warranted unless the spouse is seeking suitable employment or is developing skills necessary to become self-supporting while the spouses are separated and the divorce suit is pending. Tex. Fam.Code §8.004(a) (1998).

If a trial court determines a spouse is eligible for spousal support, it shall determine the amount and duration of the support by considering all relevant factors, including the financial resources of both spouses; medical, retirement, insurance, or other benefits; the education and employment skills of both spouses; time required for the spouse seeking support to acquire sufficient education or skills to support herself; the length of the marriage; the age, employment history, earning ability, and health of the spouse seeking support; the ability of the spouse from whom support is sought to provide for his or her needs, child support, and spousal support; and a spouse’s contribution as a homemaker. Tex. Fam.Code §8.003 (1998).

Facts

After Brenda and Mark married in 1983, she worked for a semester and a half while *118 he went to school. She stopped working in March 1984, because .she had trouble with her pregnancy. To complete the remaining semester and a half he needed for his degree, Mark sold cars and worked for his father over the summer, and took out a loan for the fall semester.

Brenda testified that when she and Mark married, she had 19 hours of college credit. At the time they separated, she had 25 hours of college credit and was enrolled in four homs. During the marriage, she stayed home to raise their three children. Their youngest child began school in August 1995, and Brenda began looking for full-time work in September 1995. She applied for between 80 and 45 minimum-wage jobs, but received no offers. She said she was not hired because she was not qualified for the jobs. She said she had few office skills, had taken a typing class in ninth grade, and did some filing in 1981.

In December 1995, Brenda’s volunteering at her children’s school led her to a job as a substitute teacher. She substituted full-time from December 1996 to May 1997, at $6.00 an hour, earning $738 a month.

Brenda decided to return to school and in January 1996, began taking classes part-time at Montgomery College with a government-funded grant. She is working for a bachelors degree in nursing and plans to graduate in May 2000. Under her degree plan, she needs to take between 12 and 17 hours a semester.

At the time of the hearing, Brenda was taking classes full-time and working at her attorney’s office two days a week for $5.15 an hour, minimum wage. On Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, Brenda had classes from 9:00 a.m. to 2:50 p.m., then picked up her children from their school, spent the evening with them until they went to bed, and studied from 10:00 p.m. until 12:00 or 1:00 a.m. On Tuesday and Thursday, she worked from 8:00 a.m. until 3:00 p.m. at her attorney’s, picked up the children, and returned to work until 5:00 p.m. She had a 3.90 grade-point average and was a member of an honor society.

Brenda testified that when she first returned to school, Mark did not want her to go, and said she would have to pay for it herself and should get a real job. After they separated, she asked for his help while she finished school, but he said she should quit and get a job. She testified he told her he would quit his job and disappear if he was ordered to pay any spousal support. Brenda asked for maximum spousal support through May 2000, so she could finish her degree.

Brenda has a manicurist license, but said she could not work as a manicurist because she is allergic to acrylic nails. She has not applied for a manicurist job since 1995. Brenda had not applied for jobs other than as a substitute teacher and for her attorney since filing for divorce. She had not applied for other jobs that might pay more than minimum wage since filing for divorce. On cross-examination, Mark’s attorney asked Brenda,

Q. Now that’s the real problem, isn’t it? How can you work when you’re going to school full-time?
A. I don’t understand what you’re asking ' me.
Q. You don’t have time to work because you’re going to school too much; isn’t that right?
A. Yes, sir. I’m trying to finish.

Brenda decided not to substitute teach any longer because she could only work Tuesdays and Thursdays and the school could not guarantee that she would be called to work on those days. Her work at her attorney’s office was definite employment each Tuesday and Thursday. She planned to work for her attorney until she got certified as an emergency medical technician, an EMT, in December or January 1998. As an EMT, she would earn about $7.50 an hour, about $750 a month.

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Bluebook (online)
982 S.W.2d 116, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 4041, 1998 WL 372145, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alexander-v-alexander-texapp-1998.