Alexander Palomares v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 28, 2025
• Docket: 07-24-00249-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-24-00249-CR

ALEXANDER PALOMARES, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 46th District Court Wilbarger County, Texas Trial Court No. 12,889, Honorable Cornell Curtis, Presiding

August 28, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellant, Alexander Palomares, was convicted by a jury of aggravated assault

with a deadly weapon, assault family violence by impeding breathing or circulation, and

assault family violence with a previous family violence conviction. In addition to imposing

fines, the jury assessed punishment at 80 years of confinement on the aggravated assault

with a deadly weapon count, 75 years for assault family violence by impeding breathing/circulation, and 20 years for assault family violence with a previous family

violence conviction, with the sentences to run concurrently.1

In three issues, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motions

for continuance and for mistrial. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

The September 2022 Assault

Just after midnight on September 12, 2022, Vernon, Texas police officers

responded to a 911 call at the Vernon Manor Apartments. Sergeant Tyler Bohannon,

Officer Anthony Sandoval, and Officer Hunter Earls arrived but initially could not locate

the source of the disturbance.

When officers eventually located Apartment 28, they knocked but received no

answer. The door appeared to be barricaded from inside. As Sergeant Bohannon

prepared to force entry, Glynda Rodriguez opened the door. Officer Sandoval escorted

Rodriguez outside while the other officers entered the apartment, where they found

Appellant in bed “trying to fake acting like he was asleep.”

Outside, officers observed Rodriguez’s distressed condition. Sergeant Bohannon

testified she was “distraught and very emotional, crying, upset” with a raspy voice and

1 In Texas, sentences assessed are to run concurrently unless the trial court specifically orders

consecutive terms of punishment. Miller v. State, 21 S.W.3d 327, 330 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1999, pet. ref’d) (citing Ex parte Hernandez, 758 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)).

2 trembling body. Officer Sandoval described her as “scared, upset, crying” and “frantic,”

noting she appeared “in shock” and was “zoned out for the first few minutes.”

Rodriguez told officers that Appellant had choked her by “placing both of his hands

around her throat, applying pressure,” and had also brandished a knife, stating that “either

he’s gonna kill her or she’s gonna kill herself.” She directed officers to the kitchen sink,

where Sergeant Bohannon recovered the knife exactly where she said it would be found.

Officers also observed physical evidence of injury to Rodriguez. Sergeant

Bohannon noted redness on Rodriguez’s neck that was “more prominent to [his] naked

eye” than what appeared in photographs due to lighting conditions. Officer Sandoval

observed “some redness” on her neck and injuries “just below her knee.”

Rodriguez’s Changing Testimony

On the first day of trial, Rodriguez was reluctant to testify. When asked about the

September 2022 events, she said “I really don’t want to say anything anymore.” When

pressed about whether she didn’t want anything to happen to Appellant, she confirmed

“No, I don’t want anything to happen to him.” She eventually conceded she told police

that Appellant had “put his hands around [her] neck and choked [her] until [she] couldn’t

breathe” and “threatened [her] with a knife.” She confirmed describing the knife as having

a silver handle and a silver blade, and that Appellant said he would make her kill herself

or that he would do it: “either way, I’d be dead by the time the police got there.” Despite

acknowledging she had made these statements; Rodriguez also told the jury she had lied

to officers.

3 On the second day of trial, Rodriguez provided a different account. She confirmed

that her original statements to police had been truthful, contrary to her previous day’s

recantation. She testified that Appellant had indeed choked her, though she corrected

some details. She also testified that Appellant retrieved the knife from the sink, “and he

told me either I could do it or he would do it.”

Rodriguez then revealed the reason for her first day’s testimony. She disclosed

that Appellant had called her multiple times on July 15, 2024, the night before trial began.

According to Rodriguez, Appellant gave her specific instructions about how to testify:

> Q. And did the Defendant tell you what it was he wanted you to do when you were on the witness stand?

> A. Yes.

> Q. And did you talk with him about testifying that nothing happened on that night?

> Q. And what did he tell you to say?

> A. That nothing happened; that I was making it up.

Appellant instructed Rodriguez “not to tell what really happened.” Rodriguez confirmed

she testified falsely the first day at Appellant’s request.

Appellant’s Continuance Motions

First Motion: The Discovery of Extensive Jail Communications

On July 12, 2024, four days before trial, the State notified Appellant that extensive

jail communications existed between Appellant and Rodriguez. The scope was

4 substantial: 601 jail phone calls, 48 video calls, and numerous text messages between

January 1, 2024, and July 15, 2024.

Appellant moved for continuance to review these communications. The defense

argued these contained statements from Rodriguez that could be favorable, such as her

expressing regret for making the 911 call, stating that “nothing happened,” and filing an

Affidavit of Non-prosecution.

The State responded by presenting testimony from Jeff Case, the criminal

investigator for the DA’s office, who described the process for monitoring jail

communications. Case testified that the jail system records calls from “30 to 50”

detainees who make “between 50 and 75” calls per day, plus video calls and text

messages. He explained that he downloads calls with exculpatory or inculpatory

evidence and provides them to attorneys.

Case testified he is the person tasked with reviewing jail phone calls “from time to

time.” When asked if it was possible to review every telephone call, Case replied, “Not

every one, no.” His other testimony revealed the limited scope of his actual review in this

case. His review for relevant phone calls apparently only occurred the week before trial

began. Of calls involving the Appellant, Case admitted he had reviewed only two or three

video calls and had not reviewed any of the 601 jail call recordings or text messages.

Given his estimate that reviewing such calls might require work for “eight hours a day for

weeks,” Case stated he did not have enough time, and that listening to phone calls for

“every inmate or even any single individual inmate” would be “entirely impossible” given

5 the time and resources required. Case also stated that he had stopped reviewing calls

after initially finding them to contain little verbalization or content he could understand.

The court denied the motion for continuance, relying on the State’s assurances

that the defense had access to relevant evidence.

Second Motion: The July 15 Calls Between Appellant and Rodriguez

On the morning of July 17, 2024, the State produced three additional jail calls from

July 15, the night before trial began. After Rodriguez said that Appellant had contacted

her and instructed her how to testify, the State downloaded these calls, had them

translated from Spanish, and emailed them to defense counsel at 7:49 a.m.

Appellant moved for continuance, arguing he needed time to review the calls and

obtain a Spanish translator. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that “certainly

they’re not a surprise to your client. He can tell you what was transpired during that

conversation.”

When the State sought Rodriguez’s testimony about these calls, Appellant

objected that he could not effectively cross-examine her without having reviewed the

recordings and obtained translations. The court overruled the objection, stating defense

counsel could recall Rodriguez later if needed.

The Shackling Issue

Appellant also raised concerns about being seen in handcuffs and leg restraints

by potential jurors while being transported to the courtroom. Appellant testified he was

6 shackled with chains connecting his wrists and legs for transport to the courthouse. Upon

arriving, he was escorted down the hallway near the courtroom before being unshackled

in a witness room. Defense counsel testified he saw approximately 10 to 15 jurors in the

hallway who could have seen Appellant in shackles. The court denied the motion, finding

no evidence that the brief exposure had prejudiced Appellant.

ANALYSIS

Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

convictions. We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for continuance and motion for

mistrial for abuse of discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion only if its decision is not

within the zone of reasonable disagreement. State v. Heath, 696 S.W.3d 677, 688–89

(Tex. Crim. App. 2024).

Denial of Continuance Motions (Issues 1 and 2)

In his first and second issues, Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying

his motions for continuance due to the State’s untimely disclosure of jail communications.

He argues the late production violated his rights and prevented him from adequately

preparing for trial.

To establish reversible error in denying a motion for continuance, a defendant must

show not only that the trial court abused its discretion but that he was harmed by the

denial. Gonzales v. State, 304 S.W.3d 833, 842–43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Prejudice

is demonstrated “only if the record shows with considerable specificity how the defendant

was harmed by the absence of more preparation time than he actually had.” Id. at 842.

7 Regarding the 600+ recordings not disclosed to Appellant until the eve of trial, we

find the State’s disclosure practices regarding jail communications in Wilbarger County

are troubling. While the State records an enormous volume of communications, it

apparently has no systematic process for reviewing or producing them. The problem is

entirely of the State’s own choice; nothing requires it to record inmate conversations or

conduct a review before they are disclosed to a defendant. Case’s testimony also

suggests a more fundamental problem: if a full-time investigator finds it “entirely

impossible” to review these communications efficiently, it is difficult to understand how a

solo defense practitioner could do so within the timeframe presented here. The State’s

approach to reviewing and producing these recorded communications therefore raises

concerns about its ability to meet discovery obligations under Article 39.14.

Nevertheless, Appellant failed to demonstrate adequate harm from the denial of

his first motion for continuance. There is no evidence to suggest the State acted except

in good faith. Appellant was intimately familiar with the content of every communication;

he was a participant in all of them. Unlike the case cited by the Appellant involving

complex forensic evidence requiring expert analysis, see Hance v. State, 714 S.W.3d

775, 802–03 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2025, no pet.), these were conversations in

Appellant’s native language that he could have conveyed to counsel. See State v.

DeLeon, 971 S.W.2d 701, 706 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. ref’d) (holding under Brady

v. Maryland standard, “if the defendant actually knows the facts which are withheld, he is

not entitled to relief based upon the State’s failure to disclose the same facts.”).

Further, the trial court allowed Appellant the opportunity to recall Rodriguez, giving

him an opportunity to cross examine her about any statements during these 8 communications. As this Court recently noted in a similar discovery context, the trial

court’s decision to fashion an appropriate remedy was not beyond the trial court’s

discretion to impose. Alvarado v. State, No. 07-24-00323-CR, 2025 Tex. App. LEXIS

6370, at *8 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 20, 2025, no pet. h.). The circumstances here did

not deprive Appellant of fundamental tools necessary for his defense.

And even with additional time for post-judgment review of the record of these

admittedly lengthy recordings, Appellant filed no motion for new trial alleging specific

evidence that would have altered the trial’s outcome or showing how the time afforded

him was insufficient to present his defense. See Cerrillo v. State, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS

7138, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 15, 2019) (holding no abuse of discretion

in denying continuance for late disclosure of jail calls where defendant failed to file motion

for new trial alleging specific harm).

Substantively, the July 15 calls present different concerns than the earlier

communications. These recordings did not exist until the eve of trial. Article 39.14(a)

requires the State to disclose evidence “as soon as practicable,” but cannot be forced to

produce a document until it exists. In re Stormer, No. WR-66,865-01, 2007 Tex. Crim

App. Unpub. LEXIS 1154, at *7 (Tex. Crim. App. June 20, 2007, order) (per curiam)

(holding, “Article 39.14 is specifically limited to the discovery of pre-existing documents

and tangible items that are in the State’s possession.”); State v. Nunez, 704 S.W.3d 598

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 16, 2024, no pet.). The State disclosed the

recordings within two days of their creation.

9 Further, Appellant’s second motion for continuance was unsworn. See TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 29.08. “[I]f a party makes an unsworn oral motion for a continuance

and the trial judge denies it, the party forfeits the right to complain about the judge’s ruling

on appeal.” Blackshear v. State, 385 S.W.3d 589, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (cleaned

up).

We overrule Appellant’s first and second issues.

Denial of Mistrial Motion (Issue 3)

In his third issue, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by not

granting his continuance or a mistrial because the jury potentially saw him in shackles

while being transported into and through the courthouse. Although requiring an accused

person to wear handcuffs before the jury infringes a criminal defendant’s presumption of

innocence, “a momentary, inadvertent, and fortuitous encounter away from the courtroom

between a handcuffed accused and one or more of the jurors does not necessarily call

for a mistrial or reversal.” Clark v. State, 717 S.W.2d 910, 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)

(en banc).

In Clark, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that even if some jurors see the

defendant handcuffed outside the courtroom, he fails to demonstrate a violation of rights

if there is no evidence the matter was discussed by jurors or it “influenced or affected any

of the jurors who saw him handcuffed in their decisions on guilt or punishment.” Id. In

the present case, Appellant presents no evidence that any person observed him in

restraints, much less by a juror. Moreover, the trial court found that any exposure would

have been momentary given the courthouse layout. Accordingly, Appellant cannot

10 establish that his constitutional rights were violated. Id. See also Steptoe v. State, 2000

Tex. App. LEXIS 2839, at *14–15 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 25, 2000) (finding no

prejudice where no evidence showed which potential jurors, if any, observed defendant

in restraints).

We overrule Appellant’s third issue.

CONCLUSION

The trial court’s rulings were well within the zone of reasonable disagreement.

Appellant has failed to demonstrate either abuse of discretion or the specific harm

necessary to establish reversible error. We overrule all issues and affirm the judgment.

Lawrence M. Doss Justice

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