Alexander Milburn Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corporation

15 F.2d 678, 1926 U.S. App. LEXIS 2971
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedOctober 19, 1926
Docket2467
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 15 F.2d 678 (Alexander Milburn Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Alexander Milburn Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corporation, 15 F.2d 678, 1926 U.S. App. LEXIS 2971 (4th Cir. 1926).

Opinion

PARKER, Circuit Judge.

This action was instituted to recover triple damages under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Comp. St. §§ 8820-8823, 8827-8830). At the conclusion of plaintiff’s testimony, the District Judge sustained defendants’ motion for a directed verdict, and the correctness of this ruling is practically the only question presented by the writ of error. While many exceptions were taken to the exclusion of testimony, it is unnecessary to consider them in detail, for, in passing upon the exception to the direction of the verdict, we have reviewed the excluded testimony as well as that which ivas admitted, and we are satisfied that, taking all of the testimony together, plaintiff did not present a case which should have been submitted to the jury.

The plaintiff in the court below was the Alexander Milbum Company, a corporation of Baltimore, engaged in the manufacture and sale of oxyaeetylene cutting and welding apparatus and of portable acetylene flare lights. The defendants were the DavisBoumonville Company and the Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation and its subsidiary and affiliated companies, in which it owns a controlling interest, viz., the Union Carbide Company, the Union Carbide Sales Company, the Oxweld Acetylene Company, the Oxweld Railroad Service Company, the. Linde Air Products Company and the PrestO-Lite Company. All of these defendant companies are engaged in one branch or another of the oxyaeetylene industry. The Davis-Boumonville Company is engaged in the manufacture and sale of oxyaeetylene cutting and welding apparatus. The Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation is a holding company and owns the stock of the othér defendant corporations, except that of The Davis-Boumonville Company. The Union Carbide Company manufactures calcium carbide, from which acetylene gas is made. The Union Carbide Sales Company sells the carbide manufactured by the Union Carbide Company. The Prest-O-Lite Company manufactures and compresses acetylene gas and sells it in containers. The Linde Air Products Company compresses oxygen, which is used in conjunction with acetylene gas in the cutting and welding industry, and sells this oxygen in portable cylinders. The Ox-weld Acetylene Company manufactures and sells oxyaeetylene cutting and welding apparatus. The Oxweld Railroad Service Company, as its name implies, is a service company. It installs for railroad companies oxyaeetylene cutting and welding apparatus, keeps it in repair, and furnishes supervision and instruction as to its use.

The declaration contains four counts, the first three of which charge, respectively, a combination, a contract, and a conspiracy in restraint of interstate and foreign trade and commerce, and the fourth of which charges a conspiracy to monopolize such trade and commerce. Each of the counts begins by charging a violation of the Sherman Act in the most general terms, using in effect the words of the statute, and alleging that the defendants agreed to secure and control for *680 themselves the interstate and foreign trade and commerce in the articles of their manufacture, to the exclusion of all competitors. There follows in each count an allegation that part of the scheme, contract, or arrangement among the parties to the combination was:

“(a) That through the defendant the Ox-weld Railroad Service Company, to the exclusion of all competitors, there should be sold to all the railroads in the United States the oxygen manufactured by the defendant the Linde Air Products Company, the aeetylene manufactured by the defendant the Prest-O-Lite Company, the oxyacetylene apparatus and appliances for welding and cutting metals and aeetylene lighting manufactured by the defendant the Oxweld Acetylene Company, and the carbide manufactured by the defendant the Union Carbide Company.

“(b) That all oxyacetylene welding and cutting apparatus and appliances, 'portable aeetylene lights and acetylene generators required by the Army, Navy, and other departments of the United States government should be furnished and supplied, to the exclusion of all competitors, by the defendant the Davis-Bournonville Company, and that the gases and carbide required by said departments should be portioned out to the exclusion of all competitors, among the defendants the Union Carbide Sales Company, the Prest-O-Lite Company, and the Linde Air Products Company, and their associates or subsidiaries.”

This allegation as to the nature of the combination, contract, or conspiracy is followed in each count with an allegation that defendants, in furtherance thereof, committed various acts of unfair competition. The declaration concludes with a general allegation that, as a result of the combination, contract, and conspiracy, plaintiff has sustained damage to the amount of $750,000, and asks for triple damages under the statute. Plaintiff does not contend, however, that it has shown the full amount of damages alleged, but does contend that it has shown damages to the amount of $207,292.08, in which is included estimated loss of profits of $137,490.-78 on a government flare light contract, alleged to have been diverted, estimated loss of profits of $26,103 on a government contract to erect an aeetylene generating plant, known as the “advance base” contract, also alleged to have been diverted, estimated loss of profits of $37,525.56 on sales to the government of cutting and welding apparatus, alleged to have been prevented, and the sum of $6,172.-74, alleged to have been spent in advertising and in establishing agencies to compete for railroad business.

We have carefully reviewed the nearly 2,000 pages of printed testimony in the record, and have considered the arguments advanced in the approximately 900 pages of briefs, and are thoroughly convinced that the learned District Judge was correct in directing a verdict for the defendants. Without reviewing the testimony in detail, which would prolong this opinion beyond all reasonable lengths, it is sufficient to say that plaintiff has failed to prove the alleged contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade, and that, even if the conspiracy be assumed, plaintiff has failed to show that any item of the damages claimed by it has resulted therefrom. In no aspect of the ease, therefore, is plaintiff entitled to recover anything.

In passing upon the sufficiency of the proof to establish the contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade, the first question which confronts us is one as to the scope of the allegations of the declaration. Defendants contend that to recover plaintiff must establish the conspiracy to divide railroad and government business as set forth in subparagraphs (a) and (b), quoted above; whereas plaintiff contends that, even if it has failed to prove a conspiracy within the allegations of these subparagraphs, it can recover under the general allegations. It is very doubtful whether, without the subparagraphs, the declaration could be held a sufficient -statement of a cause of action to constitute the basis of a recovery; for it.is not sufficient that the declaration be framed in the words of the statute, or that it allege mere conclusions of the pleader. It must describe with definiteness and certainty the combination or conspiracy relied on, as well as the acts done which resulted in damage to plaintiff, and, in doing so, must set forth the substance of the ágreement in restraint of trade, or the plan or scheme of the conspiracy, or the facts 'constituting the attempt to monopolize. 19 R. C. L. 87; Cilley v. United Shoe Mach. Co. (C. C.) 152 F. 726; Rice v. Standard Oil Co. (C. C.) 134 F. 464.

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Bluebook (online)
15 F.2d 678, 1926 U.S. App. LEXIS 2971, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/alexander-milburn-co-v-union-carbide-carbon-corporation-ca4-1926.