Alex Omar O. A. v. United States of America, et al

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ALEX OMAR O. A.,

12 Petitioner, No. 2:26-cv-00105-TLN-CKD

13 14 v. ORDER 15 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al, 16 Respondents.

17 18 This matter is before the Court on Petitioner ALEX OMAR O. A.’s (“Petitioner”) Motion 19 for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”).1 (ECF No. 3.) Respondents United States of 20 America, Pamela Bondi, Kristi Noem, Polly Kaiser, Todd Lyons, and Tonya Andrews 21 (collectively, “Respondents”) filed an opposition.2 (ECF No. 11.) Respondents indicated no 22

23 1 On January 14, 2025, Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (ECF No. 1.) Based on the substance of Petitioner’s petition and the relief requested therein, the Court 24 liberally construed the petition as a motion for a TRO. (ECF No. 5.)

25 2 In a footnote, Respondents seek to dismiss all respondents other than Tonya Andrews. (ECF No. 11 at 1 n.1.) The request, as made, is improper. If Respondents seek to dismiss any 26 respondents from this action, they must do so in a properly noticed motion. See Ortega v. Kaiser, 27 No. 25-CV-05259-JST, 2025 WL 2243616, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2025) (“[A] request for court order must be made by motion. As a result, a request for affirmative relief is not proper when 28 raised for the first time in an opposition.”). 1 objection to the Court’s consideration of Petitioner’s motion on the briefing, without oral 2 argument and as one for a preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 11 at 1.) For the reasons set forth 3 below, the Court issues a preliminary injunction. 4 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 5 Petitioner is a native and citizen of El Salvador who entered the United States on April 11, 6 2014. (ECF No. 11 at 2.) Upon entry, an asylum officer provided Petitioner with a credible fear 7 interview, issued a positive fear finding and served Petitioner a Notice to Appear. (Id.) On 8 August 9, 2017, Petitioner failed to appear for his immigration court hearing and was issued a 9 removal order. (Id.) In December 2020, Petitioner’s Motion to Reopen his removal proceedings 10 was granted. (Id.) On May 11, 2023, Petitioner was convicted of domestic violence and battery. 11 (Id.) On October 9, 2025, Petitioner was arrested, detained, and placed in immigration custody. 12 (Id.) On December 3, 2025, an immigration judge denied Petitioner’s applications for relief and 13 ordered him removed from the United States. (Id.) Petitioner then appealed his removal order. 14 (Id.) 15 II. STANDARD OF LAW 16 A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy. Courts consider whether a petitioner 17 has established: “[1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer 18 irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his 19 favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 20 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Petitioner must “make a showing on all four prongs” of the Winter test. 21 Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). 22 In evaluating a petitioner’s motion, a district court may weigh a petitioner’s showings on 23 the Winter elements using a sliding-scale approach. Id. A stronger showing on the balance of the 24 hardships may support issuing a preliminary injunction even where there are “serious questions 25 on the merits . . . so long as the [petitioner] also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable 26 injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Id. Simply put, a petitioner must 27 demonstrate, “that [if] serious questions going to the merits were raised [then] the balance of 28 hardships [must] tip[ ] sharply” in petitioner’s favor in order to succeed in a request for a 1 preliminary injunction. Id. at 1134–35. 2 III. ANALYSIS 3 The Court considers each of the Winter elements with respect to Petitioner’s Motion. 4 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 5 The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits government deprivation of an 6 individual’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Hernandez v. Session, 872 F.3d 7 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the borders of 8 the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) 9 (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including 10 noncitizens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”). These 11 due process rights extend to immigration proceedings, including deportation proceedings. Id. at 12 693–94; see Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). 13 Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there 14 exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the 15 procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the 16 Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); 17 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies, 18 the question remains what process is due.”). The Court considers each step in turn. 19 i. Liberty Interest 20 “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of 21 physical restrain—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” 22 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or 23 over whose liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their 24 liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025). “Although in 25 some circumstances the initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the 26 government’s discretion, the government’s decision to release an individual from custody creates 27 ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only 28 if [they] fail[ ] to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].” Id. (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 1 482) (modifications in original). “Accordingly, a noncitizen release from custody pending 2 immigration proceedings has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Salcedo 3 Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 WL 2637503, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 4 2025). To determine whether an individual’s conditional release rises to the level of a protected 5 liberty interest, courts have “compar[ed] the specific conditional release in the case before them 6 with the liberty interest in parole as characterized by Morrissey.” R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25- 7 cv-01141-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 2617255, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept 9, 2025) (“R.D.T.M. I”). 8 As a preliminary matter, the Court finds Respondents’ argument — that Petitioner is an 9 “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 and therefore subject to mandatory detention, 10 ineligible for release, parole, or a custody redetermination hearing — unpersuasive. 11 Courts have concluded “[f]or [§1225] to apply, several conditions must be met — in 12 particular, an ‘examining immigration officer’ must determine that the individual is: (1) an 13 ‘applicant for admission’; (2) ‘seeking admission’; and (3) ‘not clearly and beyond a doubt 14 entitled to be admitted.” Martinez v. Hyde, No. CV 25-11613- BEM, 2025 WL 2084238, at *2 15 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025). 16 First, there is no evidence in the record that an immigration officer made the requisite 17 determinations for § 1225 to apply or that Petitioner is seeking admission and not clearly and 18 beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted. Following and adopting the reasoning of other courts, 19 this Court finds Petitioner is not actively seeking lawful entry because he already entered the 20 United States over eleven years ago. Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503, at *8 (collecting cases 21 concluding that § 1225 applies only to noncitizens “seeking admission,” a category that does not 22 include noncitizens like Petitioner, living in the interior of the country.). 23 Further, Respondents’ proposed interpretation of the statute disregards the relationship 24 between §§ 1225 and 1226 and would render the recent amendment to § 1226(c) superfluous. 25 Lepe v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-01163-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2716910, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 26 23, 2025). Specifically, and as many courts have discussed in length, if every “applicant for 27 admission” is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225, there would have been no need for § 28 1226(c)(1)(E), which mandates detention for every noncitizen who is “present in the United 1 States without being admitted or paroled” and who has been “charged with, arrested for, or admits 2 to” committing certain crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E); Maldonado v. Olson, No. 25-CV-3142 3 (SRN/SGE), 2025 WL 2374411, at *12 (D. Minn. Aug 19, 2025) (“The Court will not find that 4 Congress passed the Laken Riley Act to ‘perform the same work’ that was already covered by § 5 1225(b)(2).”). 6 Finally, Respondents acknowledge “until recently, the Government interpreted § 1226(a) 7 to be an available detention authority for [noncitizens] present without being admitted or paroled 8 placed directly in full removal proceedings under § [1229(a)].” The Government’s new 9 interpretation of §§ 1225 and 1226 is inconsistent with decades of prior statutory interpretation 10 and practice. Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, at *4 (collecting cases). The Court finds that the 11 Government’s former practice of applying § 1226(a) to petitioners in similar circumstances is 12 consistent with the text and statutory scheme. 13 As to whether there exists a protected liberty interest, the Court finds Petitioner has a 14 liberty interest as he has developed “enduring attachments of normal life” as described in 15 Morrissey, 409 U.S. at 482. Moreover, Petitioner was released from immigration detention, 16 which created a reasonable expectation that he would be entitled to retain his liberty, absent a 17 material change in circumstances. Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503, at *6. Petitioner’s 18 detention goes against United States Supreme Court precedent which recognizes that individuals 19 who have been released from custody, even where such release is conditional, have a liberty 20 interest in their continued release. Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482. 21 Given this, the Court finds Petitioner has established a strong likelihood of success in 22 showing that he has a liberty interest. 23 ii. Procedural Due Process 24 Having found a protected liberty interest, the Court examines what process is necessary to 25 ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. To 26 determine such, the Court considers three factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by 27 the official action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 28 procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 1 safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 2 and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 3 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 4 First, Petitioner has a substantial private interest in remaining free from detention. 5 Petitioner had been living in the United States since he entered in 2014 –– over eleven years. 6 (ECF No. 11 at 2.) Despite this, Petitioner has now been detained since October 9, 2025, without 7 a bond hearing. (ECF No. 10 at 4.) Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of finding 8 Petitioner’s private interest has been impacted by his detention. See Manzanarez v. Bondi, No. 9 1:25-CV-01536-DC-CKD (HC), 2025 WL 3247258, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (finding 10 similarly). 11 Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation is considerable given Petitioner has not received 12 any bond or custody redetermination hearing. “Civil immigration detention, which is nonpunitive 13 in purpose and effect is justified when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the 14 community.” R.D.T.M., 2025 WL 2617255, at *4 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 15 Respondents do not contend that Petitioner is or was a flight risk or a danger to the community. 16 (See generally ECF No. 11.) Even if Respondents did believe they had a proper reason to detain 17 Petitioner, such a belief would warrant a pre-detention hearing rather than automatic detention. 18 Indeed § 1226(a) confers “an initial bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, the opportunity 19 to be represented by counsel and to present evidence, the right to appeal, and the right to seek a 20 new hearing when circumstances materially change.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 21 1202 (9th Cir. 2022). Petitioner has not received this statutorily mandated bond hearing before a 22 neutral decisionmaker. Based on this record, the Court finds there is a serious likelihood 23 Petitioner has been and will continue to be erroneously deprived of his liberty interest. Moreover, 24 without any procedural safeguards to determine whether his detention was justifiable, the 25 probative value of additional procedural safeguards is high. R.D.T.M., 2025 WL 2617255, at *4. 26 Finally, the Government’s interest is low, and the effort and cost required to provide 27 Petitioner with procedural safeguards are minimal. See Garcia v. Andrews, No. 2:25-CV-01884- 28 TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025). 1 On balance, the Court finds the Matthews factors demonstrate Petitioner is entitled to due 2 process: a hearing to determine whether detention is warranted. Accordingly, with respect to his 3 procedural due process claim, Petitioner has shown he is likely to succeed on the merits. 4 B. Irreparable Harm 5 Petitioner has also established he will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive 6 relief. The Ninth Circuit recognizes “irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to 7 immigration detention,” including “the economic burdens imposed on detainees and their families 8 as a result of detention[.]” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 995. Such harm is present here. Petitioner 9 has been detained since October 2025, without a bond hearing and “[i]t is well established that the 10 deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. 11 Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). 12 C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest 13 As to the final two Winter factors, “[w]hen the government is a party, the analysis of the 14 balance of the hardships and the public interest merge.” Nat’l Urban League v. Ross, 484 F. 15 Supp. 3d 802, 807 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 16 (9th Cir. 2014)). The Court finds these factors also favor Petitioner. First, the balance of equities 17 tips decidedly in Petitioner’s favor as the Government “cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed 18 in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. U.S. 19 Immigr. & Nat. Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). Second, “it is always in the public 20 interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” Melendres, 695 F.3d at 1002. 21 Moreover, “the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of immigration detention 22 are staggering.” Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-CV-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 23 14, 2025) (internal citation omitted). In sum, these last two factors weigh in Petitioner’s favor. 24 Having found Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his due process claim, the 25 Court finds release is warranted to return to the status quo ante and remedy a constitutional 26 violation. See Yang v. Kaiser, No. 2:25-cv-02205-DAD-AC, 2025 WL 2791778, at *11 (E.D. 27 Cal. Aug. 20, 2025) (status quo ante is “the last uncontested status which preceded the pending 28 controversy.”). 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 In accordance with the above, the Court issues the following PRELIMINARY 3 | INJUNCTION: 4 1. Respondents must IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Petitioner Alex Omar O. A. from custody 5 under the same conditions as he was released previously, prior to his October 9, 2025 6 detention. Respondents shall not impose any additional restrictions on him, unless such 7 restrictions are determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation/custody hearing. 8 2. Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-arresting or re-detaining 9 Petitioner absent compliance with constitutional protections, including seven days’ notice 10 and a hearing before a neutral fact-finder where Respondents show: (a) there are material 11 changed circumstances which demonstrate that there is a significant likelihood of 12 Petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, or (b) Respondents demonstrate 13 by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a 14 flight risk. At any such hearing, Petitioner shall be allowed to have his counsel present. 15 3. The bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is waived. Courts 16 regularly waive security in cases like this one. See Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 17 (9th Cir. 2011). 18 4. The matter is referred to a magistrate judge for further proceedings. 19 20 | IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 | Date: January 27, 2026 7, 3 TROY L. NUNLEY CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28