Albright v. United States

26 Cl. Ct. 1119, 1992 U.S. Claims LEXIS 412, 1992 WL 220416
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedSeptember 11, 1992
DocketNos. 268-84C, 400-84C, 316-85C, 526-87C
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 26 Cl. Ct. 1119 (Albright v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Albright v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1119, 1992 U.S. Claims LEXIS 412, 1992 WL 220416 (cc 1992).

Opinion

ORDER

YOCK, Judge.

This civilian overtime and premium pay dispute is before the Court on the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction filed on June 4, 1990. For the reasons stated herein, defendant’s motion is granted in part and denied in part.

Facts

All the plaintiffs in this case are guards employed by the United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The [1121]*1121dispute centers around entitlement to overtime, night differential, Sunday premium, and holiday pay. Plaintiffs contend that they were not compensated for the approximately twenty minutes per day they spent performing preshift and postshift duties such as attending roll call, checking out and returning items like keys and weapons, and briefing the next shift. Plaintiffs claim that these duties, which were actually, but not officially, part of their principal work and the time spent in performing them, were more than de minimis. Therefore, they claim that they are entitled to overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988), and overtime, night differential, Sunday premium, and holiday pay under the Federal Employees Pay Act (FEPA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 5542, 5544, 5546 (1988).

This case is actually a consolidation of four class action suits.1 All plaintiffs are present or former members of a union, the American Federation of Government Employees AFL-CIO (AFGE). All are, or were previously, bound by collective bargaining agreements between the AFGE and the BOP. These agreements contained grievance arbitration provisions which allowed employees to grieve their wage claims by submitting them to arbitration.

The first collective bargaining agreement was reached before the effective date of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), Pub.L. No. 95-454, 91 Stat. 1111, which was January 11, 1979. This agreement covered the period from June 1, 1978 to November 30, 1979, but apparently remained in effect until a new collective bargaining agreement was reached on September 15, 1981.

This 1978 agreement contains Article Twenty-nine which summarizes the grievance procedure. According to Article Twenty-nine’s provisions, its purpose was to “provide the exclusive procedure for the consideration and resolution of grievances” while only excluding “statutory appeal procedures and matters excluded from mandatory negotiations by Executive Order 11491 * * *.” The Executive order directed that such appeal procedures could not cover matters for which there was a statutory appeal procedure. The September 15, 1981, collective bargaining agreement and all subsequent agreements contained broadly written grievance and arbitration procedures that allowed grievances to be submitted on any matters that would be properly grievable under the section 7121 of the CSRA.

In their complaint before this Court, the plaintiffs assert that, for various reasons, their claims do not have to be grieved under the collective bargaining agreement and that they can sue for recovery directly in this Court. The defendant counters that the CSRA, which comprehensively overhauled the pre-existing structure for handling claims by federal employees, bars all but one category of plaintiffs from bringing suit directly in this Court for claims arising during the course of their employment.

Discussion

As an initial matter, this Court must decide whether the amounts of time claimed by the plaintiffs are sufficient to [1122]*1122warrant an award of overtime pay. Based on Abrahams v. United States, 1 Cl.Ct. 305 (1982), the time expended each day must be at least ten minutes or more; anything less is considered de minimis and will not support an award of overtime pay. Abrahams, 1 Cl.Ct. at 311. If plaintiffs can prove that the uncompensated time was over ten minutes per day, they then can overcome the de minimus hurdle.

Turning to the major issues in this case, this Court must keep in mind that the CSRA is “an elaborate remedial system that has been constructed step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations * * *.” Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 2417, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983). Additionally, the CSRA’s “integrated scheme of administrative and judicial review” has been interpreted to foreclose an avenue to the courts that, prior to enactment of the CSRA, had been open to federal employees by statute. Carter v. Gibbs, 909 F.2d 1452, 1456 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 46, 112 L.Ed.2d 22 (1990). Congress, through the CSRA, “narrowly circumscribed the role of the judiciary in its carefully crafted civil service scheme.” Id.

The main provision of the CSRA concerning grievance procedures is 5 U.S.C. § 7121(a)(1) and (2) (1988). It reads as follows:

(a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, any collective bargaining agreement shall provide procedures for the settlement of grievances, including questions of arbitrability. Except as provided in subsections (d) and (e) of this section, the procedures shall be the exclusive procedures for resolving grievances which fall within its coverage.
(2) Any collective bargaining agreement may exclude any matter from the application of the grievance procedures which are provided for in the agreement.

Thus, the issue is whether the exclusive grievance procedure mandated by section 7121 of the CSRA, as construed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Carter, and Harris v. United States, 841 F.2d 1097 (Fed.Cir. 1988), compels dismissal of the claims of all the plaintiffs. In short, the answer is yes for those plaintiffs who were part of a bargaining unit covered by a collective bargaining agreement when their claims arose.

According to the Federal Circuit in Carter, a collective bargaining agreement must specifically exclude FLSA overtime issues to preserve judicial review of overtime claims. Carter, 909 F.2d at 1458. The CSRA, 5 U.S.C. § 7121, requires that issues that are not specifically excluded in the agreement have to be brought under the negotiated grievance procedure specified in the agreement. Thus, the overtime issues which were not excluded must be pursued under the negotiated grievance procedures, and review in the courts is not allowed. Carter, 909 F.2d at 1455. The collective bargaining agreements between plaintiffs’ union, the AFGE, and plaintiffs’ employer, the BOP, did not specifically exclude FLSA or FEPA overtime issues. Plaintiffs do not dispute that this pay dispute is a “grievance” within the meaning of the CSRA, 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(9) (1988). But, while Carter

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Bluebook (online)
26 Cl. Ct. 1119, 1992 U.S. Claims LEXIS 412, 1992 WL 220416, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/albright-v-united-states-cc-1992.