Alan Metzgar v. KBR, Incorporated

Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Alan Metzgar v. KBR, Incorporated. Read the opinion of the Court — 744 F.3d 326 →

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit·Decided March 7, 2014·No. 13-1430·Published

Opinion

Filed: March 7, 2014

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1430

(8:09-md-02083-RWT, 8:09-cv-00744-RWT, 8:09-cv-02739-RWT, 8:09- cv-02740-RWT, 8:09-cv-02741-RWT, 8:09-cv-02742-RWT, 8:09-cv- 02743-RWT, 8:09-cv-02744-RWT, 8:09-cv-02745-RWT, 8:09-cv-02746- RWT, 8:09-cv-02747-RWT, 8:09-cv-02748-RWT, 8:09-cv-02749-RWT, 8:09-cv-02750-RWT, 8:09-cv-02979-RWT, 8:09-cv-02980-RWT, 8:09- cv-02981-RWT, 8:09-cv-02982-RWT, 8:09-cv-02983-RWT, 8:09-cv- 02984-RWT, 8:09-cv-02985-RWT, 8:09-cv-02986-RWT, 8:09-cv-02987- RWT, 8:09-cv-03299-RWT, 8:09-cv-03300-RWT, 8:09-cv-03301-RWT, 8:09-cv-03302-RWT, 8:09-cv-03303-RWT, 8:09-cv-03304-RWT, 8:09- cv-03305-RWT, 8:09-cv-03306-RWT, 8:09-cv-03307-RWT, 8:09-cv- 03308-RWT, 8:09-cv-03309-RWT, 8:09-cv-03310-RWT, 8:09-cv-03311- RWT, 8:09-cv-03312-RWT, 8:09-cv-03313-RWT, 8:09-cv-03314-RWT, 8:09-cv-03315-RWT, 8:09-cv-03316-RWT, 8:10-cv-00388-RWT, 8:10- cv-00389-RWT, 8:10-cv-00390-RWT, 8:10-cv-00814-RWT, 8:10-cv- 00815-RWT, 8:10-cv-00836-RWT, 8:10-cv-01160-RWT, 8:11-cv-00336- RWT, 8:11-cv-00337-RWT, 8:11-cv-00338-RWT, 8:11-cv-01092-RWT, 8:11-cv-02634-RWT, 8:11-cv-02635-RWT, 8:11-cv-03292-RWT, 8:11- cv-03542-RWT, 8:12-cv-03070-RWT)

In re: KBR, INCORPORATED, Burn Pit Litigation.

--------------------------

ALAN METZGAR; PAUL PARKER; RICHARD RONALD GUILMETTE; WILLIAM G. BRISTER, JR.; HENRY J. O'NEILL; MICHAEL AUW; CORY CASALEGNO; MICHAEL DOUGLAS MOORE; DAVID U. LACKEY; RANDALL L. ROBINSON; DEAN GUY OLSON; ALBERT PAUL BITTEL, III; FRED ROBERT ATKINSON, JR.; ROBYN SACHS, personal representative of Christopher Sachs, deceased; JENNIFER MONTIJO; STEPHEN FLOWERS; JOANNE OCHS; MELISSA OCHS; JAMES MORGAN; DAVID NEWTON; CHRIS BOGGIANO; EARL CHAVIS; BENNY LYLE REYNOLDS; JOSHUA ELLER; ROBERT CAIN; CRAIG HENRY; FRANCIS JAEGER; DAVID MCMENOMY; MARK POSZ; EL KEVIN SAR; SMSgt. GLEN S. MASSMAN; SSgt. WENDY L. MCBREAIRTY; PABLO BERCHINI; BRIAN P. ROBINSON; MAURICE CALLUE; DENNIS WAYNE BRIGGS; EDWARD LEE BUQUO; WAYNE E. FABOZZI; SHARLENE S. JAGGERNAUTH; FLOYD JAMES JOHNSON, SR.; TAMRA C. JOHNSON; RICHARD LEE KEITH; DANIEL SANTIAGO MORALES; PHILLIP MCQUILLAN; ILDEBBRANDO PEREZ; LUIGI ANTONIO PROVENZA; RUTH ANN REECE; EDUARDO SAAVEDRA, SR.; JILL R. WILKINS, personal representative of Kevin E. Wilkins, deceased; MICHAEL DONNELL WILLIAMS; JERMAINE LYNELL WRIGHT; EDWARD ADAMS; KENNETH BALDWIN; DONNA WU; JOHN DOES 1−1000; JANE DOES 1−1000; WALLACE MCNABB; KEVIN PAUL ROBBINS; BRIAN BLUMLINE; ROBERT BIDINGER; UNKNOWN PARTIES; BENJAMIN BOEKE; CRAIG KERVIN; BARRY ZABIELINSKI; DAVID GREEN; NICK DANIEL HEISLER; DERROL A. TURNER; VINCENT C. MOSELEY; ALEX HARLEY; JOHN A. WESTER, JR.; BILL JACK CARLISLE, JR.; ANTHONY EDWARD ROLES; MARCOS BARRANCO; JOEL LUGO; SHAWN THOMAS SHERIDAN; JAYSON WILLIAMS; EUNICE RAMIREZ; LEE WARREN JELLISON, JR.; GEORGE LUNDY; THOMAS KELLECK; DAN BOWLDS; TONY ALLEN GOUCKENOUR; JOHN WILLIAM JACKSON; JOHN PETE TROOST; DEBORAH ANN WHEELOCK; CHARLES HICKS; SEAN ALEXANDER STOUGH; JEFFREY MORGAN COX; JAMES WARREN GARLAND; DANNY LAPIERRE; KENNETH HARRIS; ANTHONY JEROME WILLIAMS; KATHY VINES; PATRICK CASSIDY; WILLIAM BARRY DUTTON; CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL KOZEL; RICHARD MCANDREW; LORENZO PEREZ; JESSEY JOSEPH PHILIP BACA; DANIEL TIJERNIA; HEINZ ALEX DISCH; JAMES MCCOLLEM; TRAVIS FIDELL PUGH; ANTHONY RAY JOHNSON; DAVID MICHAEL ROHMFELD; JOSHUA DAVID BEAVERS; MATTHEW JOEL FIELDS; STEVEN E. GARDNER; STEPHEN R. JONES; KEVIN SCOTT TEWES; HANS NICOLAS YU; THOMAS OLSON; BRIAN PAULUS; PAUL MICHAEL WIATR; MICHAEL FOTH; BRETT ANTHONY MAZZARA; LISA ROUNDS, Personal representative of Andrew Ray Rounds, deceased; DAVID ROUNDS, Personal representative of Andrew Ray Rounds, deceased; PETER BLUMER; SCOTT ANDREW CHAMBERLAIN; TIMOTHY E. DIMON; WILLIAM PHILIP KRAWCZYK, SR.; SEAN JOHNSON; SHERRY BISHOP, Individually and as representative of the estate of Kirk A. Bishop; GENE BISHOP; PATRICK BISHOP; ALBERT JOHNSON, JR.; DAVID JOBES; GENE LEONARD MATSON; TIMOTHY J. WATSON; ANDREW MASON; MICHELLE BROWN; JONATHAN LYNN; CHARLES KINNEY; MICHAEL MCCLAIN; BASIL SALEM; JUSTIN GONZALES; MATTHEW GUTHERY; CHRISTOPHER LIPPARD; DAVID PARR; JOHN F. MONAHAN; AMANDA BRANNON; L. CHANDLER BRANNON, and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

KBR, INCORPORATED; KELLOGG BROWN & ROOT, LLC; HALLIBURTON COMPANY; KELLOGG BROWN & ROOT SERVICES, INCORPORATED; BROWN AND ROOT SERVICES; DII INDUSTRIES, LLC; HALLIBURTON ENERGY

2 SERVICES, INC.; KBR HOLDINGS, LLC; KELLOGG BROWN & ROOT, INCORPORATED; KELLOGG BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED; KBR GROUP HOLDINGS INCORPORATED; KBR TECHNICAL SERVICES, INCORPORATED,

Defendants – Appellees,

and

ERKA LTD,

Defendant.

O R D E R

The Court amends its opinion filed March 6, 2014, as

follows:

On page 29, footnote 5, line 2, the spelling of the

word "exception" is corrected.

For the Court – By Direction

/s/ Patricia S. Connor Clerk

3 PUBLISHED

In re: KBR, INCORPORATED, Burn Pit Litigation

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Filed: March 7, 2014

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1430

In re: KBR, INCORPORATED, Burn Pit Litigation.

--------------------------

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

KBR, INCORPORATED; KELLOGG BROWN & ROOT, LLC; HALLIBURTON COMPANY; KELLOGG BROWN & ROOT SERVICES, INCORPORATED; BROWN AND ROOT SERVICES; DII INDUSTRIES, LLC; HALLIBURTON ENERGY

2 SERVICES, INC.; KBR HOLDINGS, LLC; KELLOGG BROWN & ROOT, INCORPORATED; KELLOGG BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED; KBR GROUP HOLDINGS INCORPORATED; KBR TECHNICAL SERVICES, INCORPORATED,

Defendants – Appellees,

and

ERKA LTD,

Defendant.

O R D E R

The Court amends its opinion filed March 6, 2014, as

follows:

On page 29, footnote 5, line 2, the spelling of the

word "exception" is corrected.

For the Court – By Direction

/s/ Patricia S. Connor Clerk

3 PUBLISHED

In re: KBR, INCORPORATED, Burn Pit Litigation

KBR, INCORPORATED; KELLOGG BROWN & ROOT, LLC; HALLIBURTON COMPANY; KELLOGG BROWN & ROOT SERVICES, INCORPORATED; BROWN AND ROOT SERVICES; DII INDUSTRIES, LLC; HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC.; KBR HOLDINGS, LLC; KELLOGG BROWN & ROOT, INCORPORATED; KELLOGG BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED; KBR GROUP HOLDINGS INCORPORATED; KBR TECHNICAL SERVICES, INCORPORATED,

2 Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, Senior District Judge. (8:09-md-02083-RWT, 8:09-cv-00744-RWT, 8:09-cv-02739-RWT, 8:09- cv-02740-RWT, 8:09-cv-02741-RWT, 8:09-cv-02742-RWT, 8:09-cv- 02743-RWT, 8:09-cv-02744-RWT, 8:09-cv-02745-RWT, 8:09-cv-02746- RWT, 8:09-cv-02747-RWT, 8:09-cv-02748-RWT, 8:09-cv-02749-RWT, 8:09-cv-02750-RWT, 8:09-cv-02979-RWT, 8:09-cv-02980-RWT, 8:09- cv-02981-RWT, 8:09-cv-02982-RWT, 8:09-cv-02983-RWT, 8:09-cv- 02984-RWT, 8:09-cv-02985-RWT, 8:09-cv-02986-RWT, 8:09-cv-02987- RWT, 8:09-cv-03299-RWT, 8:09-cv-03300-RWT, 8:09-cv-03301-RWT, 8:09-cv-03302-RWT, 8:09-cv-03303-RWT, 8:09-cv-03304-RWT, 8:09- cv-03305-RWT, 8:09-cv-03306-RWT, 8:09-cv-03307-RWT, 8:09-cv- 03308-RWT, 8:09-cv-03309-RWT, 8:09-cv-03310-RWT, 8:09-cv-03311- RWT, 8:09-cv-03312-RWT, 8:09-cv-03313-RWT, 8:09-cv-03314-RWT, 8:09-cv-03315-RWT, 8:09-cv-03316-RWT, 8:10-cv-00388-RWT, 8:10- cv-00389-RWT, 8:10-cv-00390-RWT, 8:10-cv-00814-RWT, 8:10-cv- 00815-RWT, 8:10-cv-00836-RWT, 8:10-cv-01160-RWT, 8:11-cv-00336- RWT, 8:11-cv-00337-RWT, 8:11-cv-00338-RWT, 8:11-cv-01092-RWT, 8:11-cv-02634-RWT, 8:11-cv-02635-RWT, 8:11-cv-03292-RWT, 8:11- cv-03542-RWT, 8:12-cv-03070-RWT)

Argued: October 30, 2013 Decided: March 6, 2014

Before DIAZ and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and Joseph F. ANDERSON, Jr., United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Floyd wrote the opinion, in which Judge Diaz and Judge Anderson have joined.

ARGUED: Susan L. Burke, BURKE PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Robert A. Matthews, MCKENNA LONG & ALDRIDGE LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Joseph Rice, Frederick C. Baker, James W. Ledlie, MOTLEY & RICE, LLP, Mt. Pleasant, South Carolina, for Appellants. Raymond B. Biagini, Daniel L. Russell, Jr., Shannon G. Konn, MCKENNA LONG & ALDRIDGE LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

3 FLOYD, Circuit Judge:

Since the United States began its military operations in

Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, respectively, its use of

private contractors to support its mission has risen to

“unprecedented levels.” Comm’n on Wartime Contracting in Iraq

and Afghanistan, At What Risk? Correcting Over-Reliance on

Contractors in Contingency Operations 1 (Feb. 24, 2011) (laying

out the findings of a bipartisan congressional commission). At

times, the number of contract employees has exceeded the number

of military personnel alongside whom they work in these

warzones. Id. Courts—including this Court—have struggled with

how to treat these contractors under the current legal

framework, which protects government actors but not private

contractors from lawsuits in some cases. See, e.g., Boyle v.

United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988); Harris v. Kellogg

Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 724 F.3d 458 (3d Cir. 2013); Taylor

v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402 (4th Cir.

2011); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009);

Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271

(11th Cir. 2009). This case requires us to make another

contribution to this changing legal landscape.

Appellees are companies that contracted with the United

States government to provide certain services at military bases

4 in Iraq and Afghanistan, including waste disposal and water

treatment. Appellants contend that they suffered harm as a

result of the contractors’ waste disposal and water treatment

practices and brought state tort and contract claims to seek

redress for their alleged injuries. Prior to discovery, the

district court dismissed Appellants’ claims, holding that (1)

the claims were nonjusticiable, (2) the contractors were immune

from suit, and (3) federal law preempted the state tort laws

underlying Appellants’ claims. Because the district court

lacked the information necessary to dismiss Appellants’ claims

on these bases, we vacate the district court’s decision and

remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

The Army contracted with Appellees KBR, Inc.; Kellogg Brown

& Root LLC; Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc.; and Halliburton

(collectively, KBR) to provide waste disposal and water

treatment services on military bases in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In fifty-eight separate complaints, Appellants—the majority of

whom are United States military personnel—(Servicemembers)

brought various state tort and contract claims, including the

following causes of action: negligence; battery; nuisance;

negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress;

5 willful and wanton conduct; negligent hiring, training, and

supervision; breach of duty to warn; breach of contract; and

wrongful death. Many of the pending cases are purported class

actions. The Servicemembers contend that they suffered injuries

as a result of KBR’s waste disposal and water treatment

practices. According to the Servicemembers, these injuries

occurred because KBR “violated military directives in its

performance of waste disposal and water treatment services” and

breached LOGCAP III—its contract with the government.

“LOGCAP” stands for “Logistics Civil Augmentation Program.”

Under that program, which the Army established in 1985,

“civilian contractors [may] perform selected services in wartime

to augment Army forces” and “release military units for other

missions or fill shortfalls.” Army Reg. 700-137, at 1-1 (Dec.

16, 1985). On December 14, 2001, the Army awarded the LOGCAP

III contract to KBR. LOGCAP III is a ten-year contract that

governs a wide array of services on military bases in Iraq,

Afghanistan, Kuwait, Djibouti, Jordan, Kenya, Uzbekistan, and

Georgia, including waste disposal, water treatment, and other

vital services. The military executes LOGCAP III through

various “task orders” that incorporate “statements of work,”

which define KBR’s responsibilities.

In their First Amended Complaint, the Servicemembers

contend that KBR violated LOGCAP III’s waste management and

6 water treatment components in two major ways. First, the

Servicemembers allege that KBR failed to properly handle and

incinerate waste by “burn[ing] vast quantities of unsorted waste

in enormous open air burn pits with no safety controls” from

2003 to the present. They aver that the burned waste included

trucks, tires, rubber, batteries, Styrofoam, metals, petroleum,

chemicals, medical waste, biohazard materials, human remains,

asbestos, and hundreds of thousands of plastic water bottles. A

report that the Department of Defense presented to Congress

identifies many of these items as “prohibited from burning.”

Dep’t of Defense, Report to Congress on the Use of Open-Air Burn

Pits by the United States Armed Forces 6 (Apr. 28, 2010).

According to the Servicemembers, the smoke from these burn pits

contained “carcinogens and respiratory sensitizers . . .,

creating a severe health hazard [and] potentially causing both

acute and chronic health problems.” Second, the Servicemembers

contend that KBR provided contaminated water to military forces.

Specifically, they argue that KBR did not perform water quality

tests or ensure that water contained proper levels of chlorine

residual.

On October 16, 2009, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict

Litigation transferred all of the cases to the District of

Maryland for consolidated pretrial proceedings. KBR filed its

first motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

7 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) on January 29,

2010. KBR argued that (1) the Servicemembers’ claims are

nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine; (2) KBR is

entitled to “derivative sovereign immunity” based on the

“discretionary function” exception to the federal government’s

waiver of immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28

U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq.; and (3) the FTCA’s “combatant

activities” exception preempts the state tort laws underlying

the Servicemembers’ claims. The district court denied the first

motion to dismiss without prejudice, concluding that it did not

have enough information to decide whether to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. See In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit

Litig. (Burn Pit I), 736 F. Supp. 2d 954, 957 (D. Md. 2010).

The court found that the political question doctrine, derivative

sovereign immunity, and the combatant activities exception did

not compel dismissal based on the facts alleged in the

complaint. However, due to its concern about unleashing “the

full fury of unlimited discovery” on “government contractors

operating in war zones,” the court asked the parties to submit a

joint discovery plan for limited jurisdictional discovery. Id.

at 979.

On December 10, 2010, the district court stayed the

proceedings in this case in light of the Fourth Circuit’s

pending decisions in Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Services, Inc., 657 F.3d

8 201 (4th Cir. 2011), Al Shimari v. CACI International, Inc., 658

F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2011), and Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root

Services, Inc., 658 F.3d 402. This Court ultimately dismissed

Al-Quraishi and Al Shimari after a rehearing en banc because the

cases were not subject to interlocutory appeal under the

collateral order doctrine. See Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc.,

679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Taylor concerns how to

treat military contractors under the political question

doctrine.

Following the resolution of these appeals and before any

jurisdictional discovery took place, KBR filed a renewed motion

to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. KBR

appended twenty-three new exhibits to the renewed motion to

dismiss, and the Servicemembers appended two new declarations

from military officials to their opposition to KBR’s motion. In

light of Taylor, briefs that the United States filed in Al

Shimari and Saleh v. Titan Corp., and the Supreme Court’s

decision in Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657 (2012), the

district court granted KBR’s motion to dismiss. In re KBR,

Inc., Burn Pit Litig. (Burn Pit II), 925 F. Supp. 2d 752, 772-73

(D. Md. 2013). The court held that the political question

doctrine, derivative sovereign immunity, and the combatant

activities exception each provided a basis on which to dismiss

the Servicemembers’ claims.

9 The Servicemembers now appeal, contending that the district

court erred in granting the motion to dismiss. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

On appeal from a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), “[w]e review the district court’s

factual findings with respect to jurisdiction for clear error

and the legal conclusion that flows therefrom de novo.” Velasco

v. Gov’t of Indon., 370 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2004). “[W]hen

a defendant challenges subject matter jurisdiction via a Rule

12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the district court may regard the

pleadings as mere evidence on the issue and may consider

evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding

to one for summary judgment.” Id.; see also Williams v. United

States, 50 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that “the court

may consider the evidence beyond the scope of the pleadings to

resolve factual disputes concerning jurisdiction”). However,

“when the jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with

those central to the merits, the [district] court should resolve

the relevant factual disputes only after appropriate discovery.”

Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 193 (4th Cir. 2009).

10 III.

A. Political Question Doctrine Background

We turn first to KBR’s argument that the political question

doctrine renders the Servicemembers’ claims nonjusticiable. A

claim presents a political question when the responsibility for

resolving it belongs to the legislative or executive branches

rather than to the judiciary. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,

210 (1962) (“The nonjusticiability of a political question is

primarily a function of the separation of powers.”). The

political question doctrine prevents the courts from encroaching

on issues that the Constitution assigns to these other branches

or that the judiciary is ill-equipped to decide. See id. at

217. However, in determining whether the questions that this

case presents belong to another branch of government, we remain

mindful of the fact that “[i]t is emphatically the province and

duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).

“[M]ost military decisions lie solely within the purview of

the executive branch.” Taylor, 658 F.3d at 407 n.9. As this

Court explained in Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir.

2012), “the Constitution delegates authority over military

affairs to Congress and to the President as Commander in Chief.

It contemplates no comparable role for the judiciary. . . .

[J]udicial review of military decisions would stray from the

11 traditional subjects of judicial competence.” Id. at 548.

However, “acting under orders of the military does not, in and

of itself, insulate the claim from judicial review.” Taylor,

658 F.3d at 411. Therefore, although cases involving military

decision making often fall in the political question box, we

cannot categorize such a case as nonjusticiable without delving

into the circumstances at issue.

The Supreme Court announced a six-factor test for assessing

whether a claim poses a political question in Baker v. Carr.

Pursuant to Baker, cases involving political questions evince

(1) “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the

issue to a coordinate political department,” (2) “a lack of

judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving”

the issue, (3) “the impossibility of deciding [the issue]

without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for

nonjudicial discretion,” (4) “the impossibility of a court’s

undertaking independent resolution [of the issue] without

expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of

government,” (5) an “unusual need for unquestioning adherence to

a political decision already made,” or (6) “the potentiality of

embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various

departments on one question.” Id. at 217.

This Court considered whether examining a government

contractor’s actions can invoke a political question in Taylor.

12 In doing so, the Court adapted Baker to the government

contractor context through a new two-factor test. Under the

Taylor test, we first consider “the extent to which [the

government contractor] was under the military’s control.” 658

F.3d at 411. Second, we evaluate “whether national defense

interests were closely intertwined with the military’s decisions

governing [the government contractor’s] conduct.” Id. Pursuant

to the second factor, the political question doctrine renders a

claim nonjusticiable if deciding the issue “would require the

judiciary to question ‘actual, sensitive judgments made by the

military,’” which can occur even if the government contractor is

“nearly insulated from direct military control.” Id. (quoting

Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., No. 2:09cv341, 2010

WL 1707530, at *5 (E.D. Va. Apr. 19, 2010)). In evaluating the

Taylor factors, we “look beyond the complaint, [and] consider []

how [the Servicemembers] might prove [their] claim[s] and how

KBR would defend.” Id. at 409 (first and second alterations in

original) (quoting Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 565 (5th

Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In Taylor, this Court determined whether the political

question doctrine barred a Marine’s negligence suit against a

government contractor. The Marine—Peter Taylor—was electrocuted

and suffered severe injuries when the government contractor’s

employee turned on a generator at a military base in Iraq

13 despite Marine Corps’ instructions not to do so. Id. at 404.

When considering the first factor, the Court held that the

government contractor was not under the military’s control

because its contract specified that “the contractor shall have

exclusive supervisory authority and responsibility over

employees.” Id. at 411 (internal quotation marks omitted).

However, when considering the second Taylor factor, the Court

explained that assessing the government contractor’s

contributory negligence defense would require it to evaluate

Taylor’s conduct and certain military decisions, such as the

military’s choice to employ a generator. Id. at 411-12. The

Court therefore determined that “an analysis of [the

contractor’s] contributory negligence defense would ‘invariably

require the Court to decide whether . . . the Marines made a

reasonable decision.’” Id. at 411 (second alteration in

original) (quoting Taylor, 2010 WL 1707530, at *6).

Accordingly, based on the second factor alone, this Court opted

to affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss the case.

Id. at 412. The Court’s analysis suggests that, if a case

satisfies either factor, it is nonjusticiable under the

political question doctrine.

Although the Court evaluated Taylor’s claim under the new

two-factor test, it did not ignore the traditional Baker

analysis. In a footnote, the Court noted that considering

14 whether the Marines’ actions contributed to Taylor’s injuries

“would run afoul of the second and fourth Baker factors”:

Here, we have no discoverable and manageable standards for evaluating how electric power is supplied to a military base in a combat theatre or who should be authorized to work on the generators supplying that power. Furthermore, any such judicial assessment thereof would show a lack of respect for the executive branch.

Id. n.13. The Court added this analysis so it could compare the

factual scenario at issue in Taylor to the circumstances

underlying this Court’s earlier decision in Tiffany v. United

States, 931 F.2d 271 (4th Cir. 1991)—a case that utilized the

Baker factors. This comparison simply bolstered the decision

that the Court had already reached using the new two-factor

test; the Court did not rely on a Baker-style analysis to arrive

at its conclusion. We therefore proceed with our analysis in

this case using only the Taylor test.

B. “Military Control” Factor

The district court concluded that both Taylor factors

counseled in favor of finding that the political question

doctrine rendered the Servicemembers’ claims nonjusticiable.

With respect to the first Taylor factor, the district court

found that the military made the decision to use burn pits and

chose where to locate them. Burn Pit II, 925 F. Supp. 2d at

761-62 & n.14. The court based this determination on the

15 declarations of various military officers and civilians and a

letter from General David Petraeus, which states, “There is and

will continue to be a need for burn pits during contingency

operations.” Id. at 762 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The court also found that the military controlled water supply

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, a determination it made

based on the declarations of two military officers and two Army

publications. Id. at 762-63. Finally, the court concluded

that, contrary to the contract at issue in Taylor, LOGCAP III

and certain task orders related to burn pits and water treatment

“demonstrate[d] pervasive and plenary military control” over the

functions at issue in this case. Id. at 764. The district

court therefore held that the first Taylor factor “weigh[ed]

heavily in favor of dismissing the[] cases.” Id.

The Servicemembers object to the district court’s

conclusion that the military controlled KBR and, therefore,

contend that this case does not satisfy the first Taylor factor.

With regard to the burn pit component of their claims, the

Servicemembers aver that the record contains evidence indicating

that the military decided to use a burn pit at only a single

military base: Camp Taji in Iraq. Accordingly, the

Servicemembers argue that any other surface burning occurred

without military authorization. The Servicemembers further

contend that the Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance

16 Document supports their argument because it specifies that

“[o]pen burning will not be the regular method of solid waste

disposal.” Dep’t of Defense, DoD 4715.5-G, Overseas

Environmental Baseline Guidance Document ¶ C7.3.14 (March 2000).

According to a report that the Department of Defense

presented to Congress, open-air burn pits are an acceptable

method of waste disposal on military bases. Dep’t of Defense,

Report to Congress on the Use of Open-Air Burn Pits by the

United States Armed Forces 4 (Apr. 28, 2010). However, the

report makes clear that burn pits are not the preferred method

of waste disposal, and the military should utilize them only

after exhausting other options, such as landfills and

incinerators. Id. In any event, “the decision to use burn pits

in deployed operations is retained at operational command level,

based on local conditions and in accordance with higher level

guidance.” Id. at 4-5 (footnotes omitted). The report notes

that “[t]he operational commander shall develop and approve a

solid waste management plan for the contingency operation,” and

“[t]he use of open-air burn pits shall not be allowed unless

included within this plan.” Id. at 5 n.5 (internal quotation

marks omitted). An “operational commander” is the senior

commander of a Joint Task Force or deployed force. Id.

Various task orders associated with LOGCAP III mesh with

the report’s description of surface burning as a waste disposal

17 method that the military authorized but discouraged. Iraq Task

Orders 139 and 159 specifically mention “surface burning” as a

permitted method of waste disposal, although these task orders

allow KBR to engage in surface burning only “[u]pon formal

notification” and indicate that surface burning is not the

preferred method of waste disposal. Afghanistan Task Order 13

places certain limitations on “[t]rash burning,” and Afghanistan

Task Orders 14 and 98 specify that KBR “shall provide trash pick

up and disposal service,” including “the operation of a burn

pit.” Pursuant to Afghanistan Task Order 113, KBR “shall

operate and maintain the burn pit . . . until provision of a[n]

. . . incinerator.” Iraq Task Orders 116, 118, and 145 and

Afghanistan Task Order 97 direct KBR to perform general waste

management tasks but do not specifically mention surface burning

or burn pits.

Declarations from various military officials and civilians

indicate that the military decided what method of waste disposal

to use on bases in Iraq and Afghanistan. Major Tara Hall, who

served as the Army’s Chief of Preventive Medicine and Force

Health Protection Officer for the Multi-National Corps-Iraq,

stated that “the Army decided which method of waste disposal to

use at military bases in Iraq. KBR did not decide which methods

of waste disposal were appropriate in the contingency

environment of Iraq.” According to Gerald E. Vincent, a

18 civilian who served as Environmental Program Manager for the

Multi-National Corps-Iraq, “the U.S. military made the decisions

about which method of waste disposal to use at each base camp in

Iraq . . . . When appropriate, . . . KBR personnel would

provide input in the decision[-]making process leading to the

decisions about which method of waste disposal would be used.”

Dr. R. Craig Postlewaite, Acting Director of Force Health

Protection and Readiness Programs and Director of Force

Readiness and Health Assurance, explained that “the U.S.

military, as a matter of policy and doctrine, decides which

methods of waste disposal, e.g., burn pits or incinerators, to

use at military camps in such war theaters, including Iraq and

Afghanistan.” He went on to state that “the U.S. military

decides where to locate burn pits at such camps” and “[t]he U.S.

military also controls what items or substances may be disposed

of in burn pits at military camps in these theaters of war.” In

sum, this evidence indicates that the military allowed the use

of burn pits and decided whether, when, and how to utilize them.

Although some evidence demonstrates that the military

exercised control over KBR’s burn pit activities, the

Servicemembers presented evidence—which the district court did

not discuss—contradicting this picture. A military guidance

document regarding LOGCAP, which the Servicemembers appended to

their memorandum in opposition to KBR’s first motion to dismiss,

19 explains that a statement of work “is a description of the work

that is to be performed. It details who, what, when and where

but not ‘how’.” U.S. Army, LOGCAP 101 Working with LOGCAP in

SWA (Draft) 13. The same document goes on to explain that the

military “do[esn’t] tell the LOGCAP Contractor[s] how to perform

the Mission; [it] just tell[s] them what the end result has to

be.” Id. at 14. The Servicemembers provided declarations that

support this account. Patrick Perkinson, a former Hazardous

Materials and Safety Supervisor for KBR, explained in his

declaration that “KBR, not the military, was responsible for

choosing the location of the burn pits” at Camp Diamondback in

Iraq. In his declaration, KBR’s former Corporate Environmental

Manager, Lee Lasiter, stated that KBR “was exclusively

responsible for operating burn pits in Iraq and Afghanistan

[and] for management of wastes generated in the performance of

the LOGCAP contract.” Declarants Rick Lambeth, Sylvester L.

Aleong, David Jobes, Claude Jordy, and Ronald Smith each made

similar statements regarding KBR’s operational control over the

burn pits at various military bases.

The evidence that KBR submitted also speaks to the

military’s control over water treatment at bases in Iraq and

Afghanistan. Pursuant to Iraq Task Orders 59, 89, 139, and 159

and Afghanistan Task Orders 116 and 118, KBR “install[ed],

operate[d] and maintain[ed] potable and non-potable water

20 systems.” Afghanistan Task Orders 13 and 97 direct KBR to

“produce, distribute, and store potable/non-potable water,” and

Afghanistan Task Orders 14 and 98 require KBR to “produce,

distribute, and dispose of potable and non-potable water.”

According to Major Sueann O. Ramsey, who served as the Chief of

Preventive Medicine for the Multi-National Corps-Iraq,

The military had oversight over the provision of water services at base camps within Iraq. Technical medical bulletins provided the basic standards and testing methodologies that governed the provision of potable and non-potable water services. [Multi-National Corps-Iraq] policies provided detailed specifications for military and contractor personnel who were authorized to provide water services in Iraq.

Colonel Steven W. Swann, who served as Commander of the 30th

Medical Brigade and Corps Surgeon for the Multi-National Corps-

Iraq, similarly explained that, “[i]n Iraq, the Army had

oversight regarding the testing, production, and distribution of

potable and nonpotable water at base camps. Preventive Medicine

detachments regularly tested the water to ensure that the water

was safe for soldiers and other personnel at the base camps.”

Accordingly, this evidence suggests that, although the military

delegated many water treatment functions to KBR, the military

oversaw water treatment in Iraq and Afghanistan to some degree.

To gauge whether the military’s control over KBR rose to

the level necessary to implicate the political question doctrine

in this case, we—like the Taylor Court—look to the Eleventh

21 Circuit’s decision in Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root

Services, Inc. In Carmichael, the Eleventh Circuit considered

whether the political question doctrine barred a negligence suit

against a government contractor and its employee. 572 F.3d at

1275. The employee was driving a truck in a military convoy

transporting fuel in Iraq. Id. at 1278. When the truck rolled

over, the plaintiff was seriously injured, leaving him in a

permanent vegetative state. Id. The Eleventh Circuit agreed

with the district court’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s suit

would “require reexamination of many sensitive judgments and

decisions entrusted to the military in a time of war.” Id. at

1281. Specifically, pursuant to the Army Field Manual and

various task orders, the military decided the date and time of

the convoy’s departure, the speed of travel, the route, how much

fuel to transport, the number of trucks in the convoy, the

distance between vehicles, and what security measures were

necessary. Id. The court characterized this level of military

involvement as “plenary control” warranting application of the

political question doctrine. Id. at 1276; see id. at 1281-83.

At this point in the litigation, it does not appear that

the military’s control over KBR’s burn pit and water treatment

tasks rose to the level of the military’s control over the

convoy in Carmichael. In fact, based on the current record, the

case at hand more closely resembles the situation in Harris v.

22 Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. In Harris, which we discuss

in more detail below, the Third Circuit applied a test very

similar to the Taylor test to determine whether the political

question doctrine barred a plaintiff’s claims against a military

contractor. The court explained that “where the military does

not exercise control but merely provides the contractor with

general guidelines that can be satisfied at the contractor’s

discretion, contractor actions taken within that discretion do

not necessarily implicate unreviewable military decisions.” 724

F.3d at 467. The court concluded that the military did not

exercise control over the contractor because the military did

not provide detailed instructions regarding how to complete work

orders or get involved in the contractor’s assignments. Id.

Similarly, in this case, the military guidance document

that the Servicemembers provided suggests that the military told

KBR what goals to achieve but not how to achieve them. The task

orders demonstrate that the military delegated trash disposal

and water treatment functions to KBR, but they do not establish

whether the military directed these tasks. Only one declarant

indicated that the military decided where to locate burn pits

and determined what substances to dispose of via surface

burning. Several other declarations—including some that KBR

provided—demonstrate that the military chose which method of

waste disposal to use, but they do not indicate whether the

23 military told KBR how to implement that method. Furthermore,

although two declarants stated that the military controlled

water testing in Iraq, neither declarant spoke regarding water

treatment in Afghanistan, which is also at issue in this

litigation. In short, although the evidence shows that the

military exercised some level of oversight over KBR’s burn pit

and water treatment activities, we simply need more evidence to

determine whether KBR or the military chose how to carry out

these tasks. We therefore cannot determine whether the military

control factor renders this case nonjusticiable at this time.

C. “National Defense Interests” Factor

We now turn to the second Taylor factor: “whether national

defense interests were closely intertwined with the military’s

decisions governing KBR’s conduct.” 658 F.3d at 411. As part

of this analysis, we consider whether the Servicemembers’ claims

or KBR’s defenses require us to question the military’s

judgments. See id. When considering the second Taylor factor,

the district court noted that KBR “assert[ed] that [its] conduct

was reasonable because the United States Military determined the

method of waste disposal, determined burn pit logistics, and

determined water control operations.” Burn Pit II, 925 F. Supp

2d at 765. The district court also explained that KBR planned

to raise a causation defense alleging that the military—not KBR—

24 caused the Servicemembers’ injuries. 1 Id. According to KBR,

this defense would “require the [c]ourt to scrutinize the

military’s environmental testing efforts and its contemporaneous

conclusions that burn pits posed no long-term health problems.”

Id. Because these considerations suggested that “[t]he actions

complained of [were] not ones taken by [KBR] alone” and “KBR’s

defense[] . . . would necessarily require review of the

reasonableness of military decisions,” the district court

concluded that the second Taylor factor indicated that this case

was nonjusticiable. Id. at 765-66. The court therefore held

that the political question doctrine prevented it from reaching

the merits of the case. Id.

Regarding the second Taylor factor, the case at hand is

somewhat similar to the circumstances at issue in Taylor itself.

As it did in Taylor, KBR counters the Servicemembers’ claims by

arguing that the military’s decisions—not KBR’s actions—led to

the Servicemembers’ injuries. See Taylor, 658 F.3d at 405, 407.

As KBR explained in its memorandum in support of its renewed

motion to dismiss in this case, “[t]he substantial record before

this [c]ourt is replete with evidence, including military

1 The district court also stated that KBR planned to raise a contributory negligence defense. See Burn Pit II, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 765. However, as we explain below, it is more appropriate to characterize KBR’s argument as a causation defense.

25 declarations and government documents, that supports KBR’s

liability defense that [the Servicemembers’] alleged injuries

were caused by military decisions and conduct, not by KBR.”

However, unlike the contributory negligence defense at issue in

Taylor, analyzing KBR’s defense in this case would not

“invariably require the Court to decide whether . . . the

[military] made a reasonable decision.” Id. at 411 (first

alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Rather than characterizing its argument as a

contributory negligence defense, KBR’s memorandum in support of

its renewed motion to dismiss labels its theory a “proximate

causation” defense. 2 This causation defense simply requires the

district court to decide if the military made decisions

regarding (1) whether to use, how to use, and where to locate

burn pits and (2) how to conduct water treatment. KBR’s defense

therefore does not necessarily require the district court to

evaluate the propriety of these judgments. 3

2 Even if KBR were to re-plead contributory negligence, thereby possibly requiring the district court to question the military’s decision making when it evaluates the Servicemembers’ negligence claims, this defense would not affect the Servicemembers’ breach of contract claims. The political question doctrine would therefore not render the entire suit nonjusticiable. 3 In its brief, KBR argues that the Servicemembers indirectly question military judgments by contending that KBR acted negligently because, according to KBR, the military

26 This case more closely resembles the Third Circuit’s recent

decision in Harris. In that case, the court considered whether

the political question doctrine barred a suit against a military

contractor accused of negligently performing maintenance duties

and causing a soldier’s death. 724 F.3d at 463. The contractor

raised a causation defense similar to KBR’s defense in this

case, contending that the military proximately caused the

soldier’s death through its maintenance actions. Id. at 474.

The Third Circuit concluded that the defense required the

evaluation of strategic military decisions only if the governing

law used a proportional-liability system that assigned liability

based on fault. The court therefore held the case was

justiciable as long as the plaintiffs did not seek any relief

that implicated the proportional-liability system. Id. at 475.

For example, under a pure joint-and-several liability system,

the plaintiffs could obtain all of their relief from the

actually made the decisions at issue in this case. However, at this point in the litigation, it is unclear whether KBR or the military made the allegedly negligent decisions. Furthermore, as we explain below, because KBR raises a causation defense rather than a contributory negligence defense, the military’s negligence becomes an issue only under a proportional-liability system that assigns liability based on fault.

27 military contractor, preventing the need to evaluate the

military’s decisions. 4 Id. at 474.

We find the Harris court’s reasoning persuasive and

applicable here. KBR’s causation defense does not require

evaluation of the military’s decision making unless (1) the

military caused the Servicemembers’ injuries, at least in part,

and (2) the Servicemembers invoke a proportional-liability

system that allocates liability based on fault. The second

Taylor factor therefore does not necessarily counsel in favor of

nonjusticiability in this case. Because neither the first nor

the second Taylor factor currently indicates that the

Servicemembers’ claims are nonjusticiable, we hold that the

political question doctrine does not render this case

nonjusticiable at this time and vacate the district court’s

decision to dismiss the Servicemembers’ claims on that basis.

IV.

We turn next to the Servicemembers’ contention that the

district court erred in finding that KBR was entitled to

4 This case involves complaints filed in forty-two different states, so it is unclear which state’s (or states’) law will ultimately apply. Many states have limited joint-and-several liability in tort actions. See Nancy C. Marcus, Phantom Parties and Other Practical Problems with the Attempted Abolition of Joint and Several Liability, 60 Ark. L. Rev. 437, 440 & n.14 (2007).

28 immunity under the FTCA’s discretionary function exception. 5 As

a general matter, the United States is immune from suit unless

it waives that immunity. See United States v. Mitchell, 445

U.S. 535, 538 (1980). The United States waived its immunity

from tort suits under certain circumstances in the FTCA, see 28

U.S.C. § 2674, but that waiver is subject to certain exceptions,

see id. § 2680. One of these exceptions is the “discretionary

function” exception, which renders the government immune from

“[a]ny claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the

failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty

on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the

5 The district court did not explicitly rely on the discretionary function exception in concluding that KBR was immune from suit. Instead, the district court quoted a lengthy passage from its Burn Pit I decision, in which “[t]his ground for dismissal [derivative sovereign immunity] was described.” 925 F. Supp. 2d at 766. The passage discusses the discretionary function exception. Id. at 766-67. In its appellate brief, KBR does not rely on only the discretionary function exception to support its immunity argument. Instead, it contends that “[t]here is no question that the U.S. military would be immune from suits arising from the performance of these services under a variety of exceptions to the FTCA, e.g., the discretionary function, combatant activities, and foreign country exceptions.” Although we focus on the discretionary function exception below, the conclusion we reach regarding Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940), applies regardless of which FTCA provision underpins KBR’s immunity argument. Specifically, as we discuss in detail below, Yearsley allows government contractors to enjoy immunity from suit only if they adhere to the terms of their contracts with the government, and the record is not developed enough at this stage in the litigation to allow us—or the district court—to determine whether KBR satisfied this requirement.

29 Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”

Id. § 2680(a). A discretionary function is one that “involves

an element of judgment or choice.” Berkovitz ex rel. Berkovitz

v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).

The FTCA explicitly excludes independent contractors from

its scope. See 28 U.S.C. § 2671. Specifically, the statute

does not include government contractors in its definition of

“federal agency” or “employee of the government.” Id. (“[T]he

term ‘Federal agency’ . . . does not include any contractor with

the United States. . . . ‘Employee of the government’ includes

(1) officers or employees of any federal agency, members of the

military or naval forces of the United States, members of the

National Guard . . . , and persons acting on behalf of a federal

agency in an official capacity . . . and (2) any officer or

employee of a Federal public defender organization . . . .”).

The discretionary function exception includes both of these

terms.

Despite this language, KBR contends that it is entitled to

derivative sovereign immunity, which “protects agents of the

sovereign from liability for carrying out the sovereign’s will.” 6

6 KBR argues that the FTCA’s discretionary function exception entitles it to immunity, not that the provision preempts the state tort laws underlying the Servicemembers’ claims. In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988), which we discuss in more detail in Part V of this

30 Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702, 736 (D. Md. 2010),

rev’d on other grounds, Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Servs., Inc., 657

F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 2011), appeal dismissed, Al Shimari, 679 F.3d

205. The concept of derivative sovereign immunity stems from

the Supreme Court’s decision in Yearsley v. W.A. Ross

Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940). In that case, the Supreme

Court considered whether a private contractor could be held

liable for damage resulting from a construction project that

Congress authorized. Id. at 19-20. When the project caused

erosion that damaged nearby property, the injured landowners

sued the contractors, claiming that they had effected a taking

of their property without just compensation. Id. The Supreme

Court explained that

opinion, the Supreme Court considered whether a military contractor was liable under state tort law for an injury that resulted from a design defect. Id. at 502-03. The Court held that the case involved “uniquely federal interests.” Id. at 505-06. The Court then explained that the FTCA’s discretionary function exception “demonstrate[d] the potential for, and suggest[ed] the outlines of, ‘significant conflict’ between the federal interests and state law.” Id. at 511. In light of these determinations, the Court crafted a test to ensure the preemption of state laws that clashed with the federal interest at play. See id. at 512. Although Boyle, like the case at hand, drew on the discretionary function exception, the Supreme Court specified that Boyle does not govern the question of whether immunity extends to “nongovernment employees.” See id. at 505 n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted). KBR asks for derivative sovereign immunity rather than preemption under the discretionary function exception in this case, thus rendering Boyle inapposite.

31 it is clear that if this authority to carry out the project was validly conferred, that is, if what was done was within the constitutional power of Congress, there is no liability on the part of the contractor for executing its will. Where an agent or officer of the Government purporting to act on its behalf has been held to be liable for his conduct causing injury to another, the ground of liability has been found to be either that he exceeded his authority or that it was not validly conferred.

Id. at 20-21 (citations omitted). In other words, under

Yearsley, a government contractor is not subject to suit if (1)

the government authorized the contractor’s actions and (2) the

government “validly conferred” that authorization, meaning it

acted within its constitutional power. Id. Applying this test,

the Supreme Court determined that the contractors were not

liable for damaging the plaintiffs’ land because they acted

pursuant to Congress’s valid authorization. Id. at 21-22.

Yearsley does not explicitly mention sovereign immunity.

In fact, the Court based its holding on the fact that the

government had “impliedly promised to pay [just] compensation

[for any taking] and ha[d] afforded a remedy for its recovery.”

Id. at 21. Yearsley’s ultimate holding is therefore quite

narrow:

So, in the case of a taking by the Government of private property for public use such as petitioners allege here, it cannot be doubted that the remedy to obtain compensation from the Government is as comprehensive as the requirement of the Constitution, and hence it excludes liability of the Government’s representatives lawfully acting on its behalf in relation to the taking.

32 Id. at 22. Despite this narrow holding, this Court has

recognized, based on Yearsley, “that contractors and common law

agents acting within the scope of their employment for the

United States have derivative sovereign immunity.” Butters v.

Vance Int’l, Inc., 225 F.3d 462, 466 (4th Cir. 2000). Our

sister circuits have reached similar conclusions. See Ackerson

v. Bean Dredging LLC, 589 F.3d 196, 206-07 (5th Cir. 2009)

(determining that the district court correctly dismissed claims

against a contractor when the plaintiff did not allege that the

contractor exceeded its authority or that Congress did not

validly confer such authority); McMahon v. Presidential Airways,

Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (acknowledging the

existence of derivative sovereign immunity and its origin in

Yearsley); Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580, 583 (9th Cir.

1963) (applying Yearsley and concluding that contractor was not

liable for work it performed pursuant to a federal contract).

After a well-reasoned discussion in Burn Pit I, the

district court concluded that KBR was not entitled to derivative

sovereign immunity under Yearsley at that time because immunity

depended on whether KBR acted within the scope of its authority,

which the court could not determine at that point in the

litigation. See 736 F. Supp. 2d at 968. The district court

reversed course in Burn Pit II, finding that the Supreme Court’s

33 2012 decision in Filarsky v. Delia compelled extending

derivative sovereign immunity to KBR. See 925 F. Supp. 2d at

767. Specifically, the district court noted that Filarsky

cautioned against leaving individuals who work alongside

government employees “holding the bag—facing full liability for

actions taken in conjunction with government employees who enjoy

immunity for the same activity.” Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1666;

Burn Pit II, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 767. Therefore, without

applying the law to the facts at hand, the district court

concluded that KBR was immune from suit because it was a

military contractor “performing services for the government in

war zones.” Burn Pit II, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 767.

In Filarsky, the Supreme Court considered whether an

attorney was entitled to qualified immunity in a 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 action when he assisted government employees in

investigating whether a firefighter was feigning illness to

avoid work. 132 S. Ct. at 1660-61. The Court determined that

the common law did not distinguish between government employees

and private actors serving the government in 1871, when Congress

enacted § 1983. See id. at 1661-65. Because Congress had not

expressed “clear legislative intent” contrary to the common law

treatment, the Court determined that qualified immunity was not

linked to whether an individual was a full-time government

employee. Id. at 1665 (internal quotation marks omitted).

34 Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether a government employee

performing the same action would be entitled to qualified

immunity. Id. The Court then turned to the policy

justifications underlying qualified immunity to see if they also

counseled in favor of applying it to private actors assisting

government employees. Those interests are “avoid[ing]

‘unwarranted timidity’ in performance of public duties, ensuring

that talented candidates are not deterred from public service,

and preventing harmful distractions from carrying out the work

of government that can often accompany damages suits.” Id. The

Court determined that all of these interests supported extending

qualified immunity to the attorney. Id. at 1665-66.

Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, there is no

indication that the Supreme Court intended Filarsky to overrule

Yearsley and its progeny. See Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1669

(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[I]t does not follow that every

private individual who works for the government in some capacity

necessarily may claim qualified immunity . . . . Such

individuals must satisfy our usual test for conferring

immunity.”). The Supreme Court framed the question presented in

Filarsky as “whether an individual hired by the government to do

its work is prohibited from seeking such immunity [under

§ 1983], solely because he works for the government on something

other than a permanent or full-time basis.” Id. at 1660. After

35 tracing the history of common law immunity up to the point

Congress enacted § 1983, the Court concluded “immunity under

§ 1983 should not vary depending on whether an individual

working for the government does so as a full-time employee, or

on some other basis.” Id. at 1662-65 (emphasis added). The

opinion never mentions Yearsley, sovereign immunity, or the FTCA

and never purports to extend beyond § 1983 qualified immunity.

We therefore believe that the district court erred in concluding

that Filarsky compelled altering the conclusion that it reached

in Burn Pit I.

We interpret Filarsky as reaffirming the principles

undergirding the Yearsley rule, albeit in the context of § 1983

qualified immunity rather than derivative sovereign immunity.

Like Filarsky, Yearsley recognizes that private employees can

perform the same functions as government employees and concludes

that they should receive immunity from suit when they perform

these functions. Furthermore, Yearsley furthers the same policy

goals that the Supreme Court emphasized in Filarsky. By

rendering government contractors immune from suit when they act

within the scope of their validly conferred authority, the

Yearsley rule combats the “unwarranted timidity” that can arise

if employees fear that their actions will result in lawsuits.

Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1665. Similarly, affording immunity to

government contractors “ensur[es] that talented candidates are

36 not deterred from public service” by minimizing the likelihood

that their government work will expose their employer to

litigation. Id. Finally, by extending sovereign immunity to

government contractors, the Yearsley rule “prevent[s] the

harmful distractions from carrying out the work of government

that can often accompany damages suits.” Id.

We now turn to applying the Yearsley rule, which asks us to

consider whether the government authorized KBR’s actions in this

case. 7 As this Court explained in Butters v. Vance

International, Inc., that inquiry involves determining whether

KBR “exceeded [its] authority under [its] valid contract,” which

the Court also characterized as exceeding “the scope of [its]

employment.” 225 F.3d at 466. The parties debate whether we

should construe the scope of KBR’s authority narrowly or

broadly. According to the Servicemembers, KBR exceeded its

authority in this case because it violated the specific terms of

LOGCAP III and other “government directives.” By contrast, KBR

takes a broader view, contending that it acted within the scope

7 The parties do not dispute that the military had the power to delegate waste management and water treatment functions to a government contractor. We therefore need not consider the component of the Yearsley analysis that asks whether “the project was validly conferred, that is, if what was done was within the constitutional power of Congress.” Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 20-21.

37 of its authority by performing general waste management and

water treatment functions. 8

Yearsley supports the Servicemembers’ view. In Yearsley,

the Supreme Court emphasized that “[t]he Court of Appeals . . .

found it to be undisputed that the work which the contractor had

done . . . was all authorized and directed by the Government of

the United States.” 309 U.S. at 20 (emphasis added) (internal

quotation marks omitted). This language suggests that the

contractor must adhere to the government’s instructions to enjoy

derivative sovereign immunity; staying within the thematic

umbrella of the work that the government authorized is not

8 KBR suggests that a government contractor is entitled to derivative sovereign immunity if it qualifies as a common law agent of the government. Specifically, KBR cites an unpublished decision from this Court, which explains that, under Virginia law, “[w]hether an agent acted within the scope of his authority turns not on whether the particular act at issue—often a tort committed by the agent—is ‘within the scope of the agent’s authority, but [on] whether the service itself in which the tortious act was done was . . . within the scope of such authority.’” First Tenn. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 501 F. App’x 255, 260 (4th Cir. 2012) (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Broaddus v. Standard Drug Co., 179 S.E.2d 497, 503 (Va. 1971)). However, common law agent status is not sufficient to establish derivative sovereign immunity. As the Eleventh Circuit reasoned in McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., if all common law agents of the government enjoyed derivative sovereign immunity due to their agency status, the immunity of the government and its officers would be coextensive, which is not necessarily the case. See 502 F.3d at 1343-45 & n.15. Furthermore, as we explain below, Yearsley itself supports our conclusion that simply being the government’s common law agent does not entitle a contractor to derivative sovereign immunity.

38 enough to render the contractor’s activities “the act[s] of the

government.” See id. at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Ninth Circuit similarly interpreted Yearsley in Myers v.

United States. In that case, the court considered whether

landowners could recover from a private company that damaged

their property while constructing a road pursuant to a

government contract. See 323 F.2d at 580-82. The court held

that, “[t]o the extent that the work performed by [the

contractor] was done under its contract with the Bureau of

Public Lands, and in conformity with the terms of said contract,

no liability can be imposed upon it for any damages claimed to

have been suffered by the [landowners].” Id. at 583. The court

went on to explain that, “[i]f [the landowners] suffered any

damage from any act of [the contractor] over and beyond acts

required to be performed by it under the contract, or acts not

in conformity with the terms of the contract,” the contractor

was not liable because the landowners consented to its actions.

Id. In other words, when the contractor exceeded its authority

under the contract, Yearsley did not provide the basis for

escaping liability; the landowners’ acquiescence did.

Accordingly, as Yearsley and Myers show, KBR is entitled to

derivative sovereign immunity only if it adhered to the terms of

its contract with the government.

39 At this point in the litigation, the record does not

contain enough evidence to determine whether KBR acted in

conformity with LOGCAP III, its appended task orders, and any

laws and regulations that the contract incorporates. We also

lack evidence regarding whether the military permitted or

required KBR to deviate from the contract’s terms under certain

circumstances. Accordingly, we hold that the district court

erred in finding that KBR was entitled to derivative sovereign

immunity at this time and vacate the court’s decision to dismiss

the Servicemembers’ claims on that ground.

We also note that the district court did not address

whether KBR’s waste management and water treatment activities

constituted “discretionary functions” under the FTCA. However,

as we explain above, a discretionary function “involves an

element of judgment or choice.” Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536. If

the military dictated exactly how KBR should undertake its waste

management and water treatment tasks, those functions were not

discretionary because they did not involve an element of

judgment or choice. By contrast, if KBR enjoyed some discretion

in how to perform its contractually authorized responsibilities,

the discretionary function exception would apply, and KBR could

be liable. The district court should conduct this inquiry

before determining whether KBR is entitled to derivative

sovereign immunity under the discretionary function exception.

40 V.

Finally, the Servicemembers contend that the district court

erred in finding that the FTCA’s combatant activities exception

preempted the state tort 9 laws undergirding their claims.

Pursuant to the combatant activities exception, the United

States is immune from “[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant

activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard,

during time of war.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j). The statute does not

define the terms “arising out of” and “combatant activities.”

Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Boyle v. United

Technologies Corp., multiple circuit courts have held that the

federal interests inherent in the combatant activities exception

conflict with, and consequently can preempt, tort suits against

government contractors when those suits arise out of what those

courts viewed as combatant activities. See Harris, 724 F.3d

9 We note that the Servicemembers bring breach of contract claims in addition to their tort claims. In general, “[t]he FTCA does not apply to common law contract claims.” Tritz v. U.S. Postal Serv., 721 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2013). However, it may apply when a plaintiff brings a contract claim seeking a tort remedy rather than a contract remedy such as rescission. See id. Because the district court did not discuss how the FTCA affects the Servicemembers’ breach of contract claims, we decline to address this issue to allow the district court to do so in the first instance on remand. See Q Int’l Courier, Inc. v. Smoak, 441 F.3d 214, 220 n.3 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Although we are not precluded from addressing [questions the district court did not reach], we deem it more appropriate to allow the district court to consider them, if necessary, in the first instance on remand.”).

41 458; Saleh, 580 F.3d 1; Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328,

1336 (9th Cir. 1992). The district court initially found that

the combatant activities exception did not preempt state law

because the record was not developed enough to assess whether

preemption was appropriate. See Burn Pit I, 736 F. Supp. 2d at

976-78. However, the district court once again reversed course

in Burn Pit II, holding that preemption was appropriate under a

test that the United States recommended in amicus briefs that it

filed in this Court’s rehearing en banc of Al Shimari and in

support of denying the petition for writ of certiorari in Saleh.

See Burn Pit II, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 769-72.

Before we can reach the question of whether the combatant

activities exception preempts state tort law due to the United

States’ proposed test, we must first decide whether to apply the

United States’ test at all—an analytical step that the district

court skipped. The Supreme Court’s Boyle decision governs this

inquiry. Boyle arose when a Marine helicopter co-pilot died

after his helicopter crashed into the ocean during a training

exercise. 487 U.S. at 502. Although the co-pilot survived the

crash, he could not open the helicopter’s escape hatch, causing

him to drown. Id. The co-pilot’s father sought to hold the

military contractor that built the helicopter liable under state

tort law, contending that it defectively repaired part of the

42 helicopter’s flight control system and defectively designed the

escape hatch. Id. at 502-03. The Court explained,

In most fields of activity, to be sure, this Court has refused to find federal pre-emption of state law in the absence of either a clear statutory prescription or a direct conflict between federal and state law. But we have held that a few areas, involving “uniquely federal interests,” are so committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control that state law is pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the courts-so-called “federal common law.”

Id. at 504 (citations omitted). 10 The Court then analyzed

whether the situation at hand in that case invoked “uniquely

federal interests” in a way that warranted preemption.

The Boyle Court employed a three-step process to determine

whether federal law preempted state law. First, it identified

the “uniquely federal interests” at issue in that case. See id.

at 504-07. Second, it determined whether there was a

“significant conflict” between those interests and state law.

Id. at 507-12. The Court identified the FTCA’s discretionary

function exception as “a statutory provision that demonstrates

the potential for, and suggests the outlines of, ‘significant

conflict’ between federal interests and state law.” Id. at 511.

The Court then explained that “‘second-guessing’ [the

10 This excerpt from Boyle makes clear that Congress need not act affirmatively to cause the preemption of state law. The Servicemembers’ arguments to this effect therefore lack merit.

43 government’s selection of a helicopter design] through state

tort suits against contractors would produce the same effect

sought to be avoided by the FTCA exemption” because government

contractors would raise their prices to compensate for possible

lawsuits, rendering the government financially liable. Id. at

511-12 (citation omitted). Third, the Court formulated a test

that ensured preemption of state laws that clashed with the

federal interests at play. See id. at 512-13.

We now turn to the first step of the Boyle analysis. The

D.C. Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and Third Circuit have each

articulated a different “uniquely federal interest” underlying

cases in which a litigant attempts to hold a government actor

responsible for its combatant activities—in other words, the

federal interest buttressing the combatant activities exception.

In Saleh, the D.C. Circuit began its inquiry by noting that,

although “[t]he legislative history of the combatant activities

exception is ‘singularly barren,’ . . . it is plain enough that

Congress sought to exempt combatant activities because such

activities ‘by their very nature should be free from the

hindrance of a possible damage suit.’” 580 F.3d at 7 (quoting

Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d 767, 769 (9th Cir. 1948)).

The court went on to explain that the “traditional rationales

44 for tort law—deterrence of risk-taking behavior, compensation of

victims, and punishment of tortfeasors—are singularly out of

place in combat situations, where risk-taking is the rule.” Id.

In light of these considerations, the D.C. Circuit determined

that “the policy embodied by the combatant activities exception

is simply the elimination of tort from the battlefield, both to

preempt state or foreign regulation of federal wartime conduct

and to free military commanders from the doubts and uncertainty

inherent in potential subjection to civil suit.” Id. Based on

similar considerations, the Ninth Circuit articulated the

interest underlying the combatant activities exception as

“recogniz[ing] that during wartime encounters no duty of

reasonable care is owed to those against whom force is directed

as a result of authorized military action.” Koohi, 976 F.2d at

1337.

The Third Circuit rejected both of these approaches in

Harris. The court noted that the FTCA limits the combatant

activities exception to “claim[s] arising out of . . . combatant

activities,” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (emphasis added), and pointed

out that, in other areas of the law, “arising out of” “denote[s]

any causal connection.” 724 F.3d at 479 (quoting Saleh, 580

F.3d at 6) (internal quotation marks omitted). In light of this

“arising out of” language, the court concluded that the Ninth

Circuit’s formulation of the interest was too narrow because it

45 rested on the premise that “no duty of reasonable care is owed

to those against whom force is directed,” Koohi, 976 F.2d at

1337 (emphasis added), which omits individuals who suffer harms

that flow tangentially from wartime force. See Harris, 724 F.3d

at 480. The court cited Saleh favorably, see id., but

ultimately determined that the D.C. Circuit’s formulation of the

interest underlying the combatant activities exception was too

broad, id. at 480-81. Specifically, the court explained that

the FTCA “does not provide immunity to nongovernmental actors.

So to say that Congress intended to eliminate all tort law is

too much.” Id. at 480. The Third Circuit therefore announced a

test that falls between these two extremes: “The purpose

underlying § 2680(j) . . . is to foreclose state regulation of

the military’s battlefield conduct and decisions.” Id.

We find the Third Circuit’s analysis persuasive and adopt

its formulation of the interest at play here. In Boyle, the

Supreme Court reasoned that no “uniquely federal interest”

warrants preemption when the federal government has little or no

control over a contractor’s conduct. See 487 U.S. at 509-10

(explaining that the government would have no interest in the

design of a helicopter door if it ordered stock helicopters that

just happened to have a certain door design). Due to Boyle and

the FTCA’s omission of government contractors, we agree that the

D.C. Circuit’s test is too broad because it does not limit the

46 interest of “eliminat[ing] . . . tort from the battlefield” to

actors under military control. See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 7. We

also agree with the Third Circuit’s conclusion that the Ninth

Circuit’s test is too narrow because of the combatant activities

exception’s broad “arising out of” language. If the interest at

play were “recogniz[ing] that during wartime encounters no duty

of reasonable care is owed to those against whom force is

directed,” Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1337, the combatant activities

exception presumably would contain language limiting its scope

to claims stemming directly from the use of force.

Now that we have identified the federal interest at play in

this case, we move on to the second step of the Boyle analysis:

determining whether there is a significant conflict between this

federal interest and the operation of the state tort laws

underlying the Servicemembers’ claims. In Boyle, this conflict

was discrete because it was impossible to construct the

helicopter according to the government’s design and satisfy the

state-imposed duty of care. 487 U.S. at 509. However, in the

combatant activities exception realm, the conflict between

47 federal and state interests is much broader. 11 As the D.C.

Circuit explained in Saleh, “the relevant question is not so

much whether the substance of the federal duty is inconsistent

with a hypothetical duty imposed by the state.” 580 F.3d at 7.

Instead, when state tort law touches the military’s battlefield

conduct and decisions, it inevitably conflicts with the

combatant activity exception’s goal of eliminating such

regulation of the military during wartime. In other words, “the

federal government occupies the field when it comes to warfare,

and its interest in combat is always ‘precisely contrary’ to the

imposition of a non-federal tort duty.” Id. (quoting Boyle, 487

U.S. at 500).

11 Although the conflict between federal interests and state tort law is broad in the combatant activities exception context, we can also identify several specific conflicts. Notably, as the Supreme Court recognized in Boyle, imposing tort liability on contractors that carry out the government’s orders will result in the contractor charging higher prices, a cost that the taxpayers will ultimately bear. 487 U.S. at 511-12. Furthermore, haling a government contractor into a court proceeding that questions the military’s decision making will distract government personnel from their tasks and allow “judicial probing of the government’s wartime policies.” Saleh, 580 F.3d at 8. Finally, “given the numerous criminal and contractual enforcement options available to the government in responding to alleged contractor misconduct[,] . . . allowance of these claims will potentially interfere with the federal government’s authority to punish and deter misconduct by its own contractors.” Id.

48 C.

Finally, we turn to Boyle’s third step: formulating a test

that ensures preemption when state tort laws conflict with the

interest underlying the combatant activities exception. See

Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512-13. KBR argues in favor of both the test

the D.C. Circuit announced in Saleh and the test the United

States advocated in amicus briefs that it filed in connection

with Al Shimari. and the petition for writ of certiorari in

Saleh. In Saleh, the D.C. Circuit articulated the following

test: “During wartime, where a private service contractor is

integrated into combatant activities over which the military

retains command authority, a tort claim arising out of the

contractor’s engagement in such activities shall be preempted.”

580 F.3d at 9. The court reasoned that the military need not

maintain “exclusive operational control” over the contractor for

the government to have an interest in immunizing a military

operation from suit. Id. at 8-9. It therefore crafted a test

that allowed the contractor to exert “some limited influence

over an operation,” as long as the military “retain[ed] command

authority.” Id.

Alternatively, the United States recommends preemption when

(1) “a similar claim against the United States would be within

the combatant activities exception of the FTCA” and (2) “the

contractor was acting within the scope of its contractual

49 relationship with the federal government at the time of the

incident out of which the claim arose.” Brief of United States

as Amicus Curiae at 17-18, Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 679

F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012) (Nos. 09-1335, 10-1891, 10-1921). In

the amicus brief that it filed in Saleh, the United States

identified three key flaws in the Saleh test. First, it

explained that, “[u]nder domestic and international law,

civilian contractors engaged in authorized activity are not

‘combatants’; they are ‘civilians accompanying the force’ and,

as such, cannot lawfully engage in ‘combat functions’ or ‘combat

operations.’” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 15,

Saleh v. Titan Corp., 131 S. Ct. 3055 (2011) (No. 09-1313).

Therefore, the United States argued that it was inappropriate

for the Saleh test to focus on whether the contractor was

engaged in combatant activities. Id. Second, the United States

contended that the Saleh test does not account for the fact that

the combatant activities exception provides immunity for

activities “arising out of” the military’s combatant activities.

It claimed that “[a] more precise focus on claims ‘arising out

of’ the military’s combatant activities would allow for a more

accurate assessment of the contractor’s distinct role, and avoid

confusing it with the role of military personnel.” Id. at 16.

Third, the United States explained that the Saleh court “did not

address whether application of the preemption defense it

50 recognized would be appropriate if contractor employees acted

outside the scope of their employment or the contractor acted

outside the scope of the contract.” Id. The United States

reiterated these arguments in the brief it filed in Al Shimari

and formulated the above test to address these defects. See

Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae at 16-20, Al Shimari,

679 F.3d 205 (Nos. 09-1335, 10-1891, 10-1921).

In Burn Pit II, the district court favorably cited these

amicus briefs and adopted the United States’ test. 925 F. Supp.

2d at 769-71. However, the United States’ criticisms of the

Saleh test are flawed in several respects. First, even if

government contractors cannot qualify as “combatants” under

domestic and international law, this fact is irrelevant because

the Saleh test does not require private actors to be combatants;

it simply requires them to be “integrated into combatant

activities.” Saleh, 580 F.3d at 9; cf. Johnson, 170 F.2d at 770

(explaining that “combatant activities” suggests a “wider scope”

than “combatant”). Second, the United States inaccurately

contends that the Saleh test does not reflect the combatant

activities exception’s use of the phrase “arising out of.” In

fact, the Saleh test does mirror this phrase, specifying that “a

tort claim arising out of the contractor’s engagement in

[combatant activities over which the military retains command

authority] shall be preempted.” 580 F.3d at 9. Third, the

51 United States complains that the Saleh test does not address how

to treat contractors who act outside the scope of their

employment or violate the terms of their contract. However, the

purpose of the combatant activities exception is not protecting

contractors who adhere to the terms of their contracts; the

exception aims to “foreclose state regulation of the military’s

battlefield conduct and decisions.” Harris, 724 F.3d at 480.

By focusing on whether the contractor was “integrated into

combatant activities over which the military retain[ed] command

authority,” Saleh, 580 F.3d at 9, the Saleh test ensures that

the FTCA will preempt only state tort laws that touch the

military’s wartime decision making. We therefore reject the

rationales underlying the United States’ test—the same

rationales that buttressed the district court’s Burn Pit II

decision.

We agree with the Third Circuit’s determination that, if

the interest underpinning the combatant activities exception is

foreclosing state regulation of the military’s battlefield

conduct and decisions, the United States’ test is far too broad.

See Harris, 724 F.3d at 480-81. The test recommends preemption

when state tort laws touch any actions within the scope of the

contractor’s contractual relationship with the government, even

actions that the military did not authorize. In this way, the

United States’ test preempts state tort laws even when they do

52 not conflict with the federal purpose underlying the combatant

activities exception. To the contrary, the Saleh test allows

the preemption of state tort law only when it affects activities

stemming from military commands. See id. (reaching the same

conclusions). Due to the closer fit between the Saleh test and

the interest at play in this case, we adopt the Saleh test here.

The Saleh test requires a contractor to be “integrated into

combatant activities” for preemption to occur. We therefore

must determine whether waste management and water treatment

constitute “combatant activities” when these tasks occur in

warzones. In Johnson v. United States, the Ninth Circuit held

that combatant activities “include not only physical violence,

but activities both necessary to and in direct connection with

actual hostilities,” such as “supplying ammunition to fighting

vessels in a combat area during war.” 170 F.2d at 770. The

Third Circuit and at least one district court have adopted the

Johnson test. See Harris, 724 F.3d at 481 (maintaining

electrical systems on a military base in a warzone qualified as

combatant activity); Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs.,

Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 698, 711-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that

latrine maintenance constituted combatant activity because the

contractor “was providing basic life support services for active

military combatants on a forward operating base”).

53 We agree with the Johnson court’s reasoning and adopt its

test here. As the Ninth Circuit explained, “‘[c]ombat’ connotes

physical violence; ‘combatant,’ its derivative, as used here,

connotes pertaining to actual hostilities; the phrase ‘combatant

activities,’ [is] of somewhat wider scope.” Johnson, 170 F.2d

at 770 (footnote omitted). It therefore makes sense for

combatant activities to extend beyond engagement in physical

force. Furthermore, viewing “combatant activities” through a

broader lens furthers the purpose of the combatant activities

exception. If a government contractor remained subject to state

tort suits stemming from activities other than physical force,

the Saleh test would not successfully “foreclose state

regulation of the military’s battlefield conduct and decisions,”

Harris, 724 F.3d at 480, which could encompass conduct and

decisions that do not involve actual combat. Performing waste

management and water treatment functions to aid military

personnel in a combat area is undoubtedly “necessary to and in

direct connection with actual hostilities.” Johnson, 170 F.2d

at 770. We therefore hold that KBR engaged in combatant

activities under the Johnson test.

Next, the Saleh test asks whether “the military retain[ed]

command authority” over KBR’s waste management and water

treatment activities. 580 F.3d at 9. At this stage in the

litigation, although it is evident that the military controlled

54 KBR to some degree, see supra Part III.B, the extent to which

KBR was integrated into the military chain of command is

unclear. See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 4 (identifying the proper focus

as “the chain of command and the degree of integration that, in

fact, existed between the military and [the] contractors’

employees rather than the contract terms”). The district court

therefore erred in resolving this issue before discovery took

place. Accordingly, we vacate its decision to dismiss the

Servicemembers’ claims on the basis of preemption.

VI.

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court’s

decision to dismiss the Servicemembers’ claims and remand for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED

Alan Metzgar v. KBR, Incorporated, (4th Cir. 2014).

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