Alan Amirault v. Dawn Rush, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: March 26, 2026
• Docket: 4:25-cv-00556
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Alan Amirault, No. CV-25-00556-TUC-RM

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Dawn Rush, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 On October 6, 2025, Plaintiff Alan Amirault filed a pro se Complaint (Doc. 1), along 16 with an Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). On March 6, 2026, 17 Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 6.) For the 18 following reasons, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application for Leave to Proceed in 19 Forma Pauperis, deny without prejudice his Motion for leave to File a First Amended 20 Complaint, and require Defendants Dawn Rush, Mark J. Dannels, Jeffrey Glover, Kris 21 Mayes, and Brian McIntyre to answer portions of the original Complaint. 22 I. Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis 23 The Court may authorize the commencement and prosecution of any action without 24 prepayment of fees if a litigant submits an affidavit showing that he is unable to pay the 25 fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). In his Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, Plaintiff 26 avers that he is unemployed, that his only income is from disability insurance benefits, that 27 his expenses nearly equal his income, that he has a total of $20.00 in his bank account, and 28 that he has no assets except his vehicle. (Doc. 2) The Court finds that Plaintiff is unable to 1 pay the costs of these proceedings and will accordingly grant his Application to Proceed in 2 Forma Pauperis. 3 II. Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint 4 Plaintiff moves for leave to file a first amended complaint. (Doc. 6.) Pursuant to 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1), a party may amend its pleading “once as a matter 6 of course” within 21 days after serving it or 21 days after service of a responsive pleading 7 or service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f). Plaintiff’s initial Complaint has not yet 8 been served, and accordingly Plaintiff is entitled to amend as a matter of course. 9 However, Local Rule of Civil Procedure 15.1(b) requires a party filing an amended 10 pleading as a matter of course to file a separate notice with “a copy of the amended pleading 11 that indicates in what respect it differs from the pleading which it amends, by bracketing 12 or striking through the text that was deleted and underlining the text that was added.” 13 LRCiv 15.1(b). Here, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint fails 14 to comply with this requirement. Although the Court might, under certain circumstances, 15 excuse a pro se plaintiff’s failure to strictly comply with LRCiv 15.1(b), the Court finds 16 that requiring strict compliance here is appropriate given the length of Plaintiff’s original 17 Complaint and because Plaintiff may benefit from the guidance set forth in this Order when 18 drafting an amended complaint. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s proposed first amended complaint 19 (Doc. 7) omits a First Amendment claim that is included in the original Complaint and 20 which, as discussed below, the Court finds sufficiently states a claim. 21 Accordingly, the Court will deny without prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to 22 File a First Amended Complaint. If Plaintiff wishes to file an amended complaint curing 23 any of the deficiencies addressed in this Order, he may do so in compliance with the 24 requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) and LRCiv 15.1(a)-(b). 25 III. Statutory Screening of Complaints 26 The Prison Litigation Reform Act states that a district court “shall dismiss” an in 27 forma pauperis complaint if, at any time, the court determines that the action “is frivolous 28 or malicious” or that it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1 1915(e)(2). Section 1915(e) “applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not just those 2 filed by prisoners.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); see also 3 Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 4 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 5 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 6 required, but Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully harmed- 7 me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[A] complaint must contain 8 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 9 face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim 10 is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 11 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 12 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 13 statements, do not suffice.” Id. 14 The Court must “construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 15 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A complaint filed by a pro se litigant “must be held to less stringent 16 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). 17 Nevertheless, “a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential 18 elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 19 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 20 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 21 facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend before dismissal of the action. 22 See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127-29. 23 IV. Plaintiff’s Complaint 24 In his 41-page Complaint, Plaintiff asserts 33 claims—many of which overlap— 25 against six named Defendants and three Doe Defendants. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff indicates that 26 his claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 27 Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act 28 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131-34; and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1 794. (Id. at 1 ¶ 1.) 2 Plaintiff is a resident of Benson, Arizona who is subject to Arizona’s sex-offender 3 registration statutes, A.R.S. § 13-3821, et seq. (Id. at 2 ¶ 7.) He alleges that his sex- 4 offender worksheet score and general recidivism score demonstrate low-risk, but that 5 Defendant Dawn Rush—a sex-offender analyst with the Cochise County Sheriff’s 6 Office—nevertheless increased his risk classification from level one to level two, without 7 providing notice or an opportunity to be heard, based on a computerized worksheet 8 designed to tally risk factors into a numerical score. (Id. at 2, 4-5 ¶¶ 8, 21-23, 25-26.) 9 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant John Doe 2, a United States Marshals Service (“USMS”) 10 employee, instructed Rush to use the computerized worksheet that altered Plaintiff’s 11 classification, and that Defendant John Doe 3, a USMS supervisor, approved the 12 instruction, even though USMS’s statutory authority is limited to the interstate 13 apprehension of individuals who fail to register. (Id. at 1, 3-5 ¶¶ 2, 15-16, 20, 26.) 14 Plaintiff challenges Arizona’s sex-offender registration scheme as excessive, 15 irrational, and punitive. (See id. at 1-2, 6-7 ¶¶ 3, 32.) Plaintiff complains that the 16 categorical bar on removal from the sex-offender registry renders him permanently 17 ineligible for Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) and Section 8 housing programs. 18 (Id. at 3, 6 ¶¶ 12-13, 29.) Plaintiff also alleges that he has been permanently disabled since 19 2014 due to allergies, migraines, and neuropathy, and that the sex-offender registration 20 scheme’s recurrent in-person reporting requirements, potential for broad community 21 notification, and categorical bans on housing and employment exacerbate his disabilities. 22 (Id. at 4 ¶¶ 17-19.) Although unclear, Plaintiff appears to indicate that he was charged with 23 failure to register at a time when he was hospitalized. (Id. at 4 ¶ 18.) He alleges Defendants 24 failed to offer reasonable modifications, including remote reporting and extended reporting 25 windows during acute medical events. (Id. at 12-13 ¶ 67, 71.) 26 Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory and 27 injunctive relief. (Id. at 37-38 ¶¶ 218-221.) With respect to the requested injunctive relief, 28 Plaintiff seeks to enjoin Defendants from (1) enforcing allegedly unconstitutional 1 provisions of Arizona’s sex-offender registration scheme as applied to Plaintiff; (2) 2 enforcing Senate Bills 1236 and 1404; (3) imposing reporting or classification obligations 3 without individualized hearings, risk assessments, and consideration of Plaintiff’s 4 disabilities; and (4) refusing to provide reasonable modifications. (Id. at 37 ¶ 219.) 5 V. Discussion 6 Because Plaintiff’s Complaint challenges Arizona’s sex-offender registration 7 scheme, the Court begins with an overview of the relevant statutes before moving into a 8 discussion of Plaintiff’s specific claims. 9 Arizona’s first sex-offender registration statute was enacted in 1951, and since that 10 time, the statutory scheme has undergone numerous revisions, with “the duties placed on 11 sex offenders,” “the access to their information,” and “the penalties for failing to comply 12 with registration requirements” increasing over the years. See State v. Henry, 228 P.3d 13 900, 903, 905 (Ariz. App. 2010). Under the currently operative statutory scheme, 14 individuals convicted of certain specified sex offenses are required to register as sex 15 offenders, see A.R.S. § 13-3821(A), and, with limited exceptions, registration is a life-long 16 requirement, State v. Trujillo, 462 P.3d 550, 552 (Ariz. 2020). Failure to comply with the 17 sex-offender registration requirements is punishable as a felony. A.R.S. § 13-3824. 18 Registrants must allow themselves to be fingerprinted and photographed, must 19 provide a DNA sample, and must disclose a variety of information about themselves, 20 including their names and aliases, vehicle information, addresses, and the physical location 21 of their residences. A.R.S. § 13-3821(I), (O). Registrants must also disclose their online 22 identifiers—defined as “any electronic email address information or instant message, chat, 23 social networking or other similar internet communication name”—as well as the names 24 of any websites or internet communication services where the online identifiers are used. 25 Id. § 13-3821(I), (S)(3). Registrants must annually report in person to the sheriff of their 26 county of registration to confirm in writing all required information. Id. § 13-3821(J). 27 They must also report changes in names, addresses, online identifiers, and vehicles within 28 72 hours, excluding weekends and legal holidays. Id. § 13-3822(A), (C)-(D). Registrants 1 must report name and address changes in person and in writing, and they must report 2 changes in online identifiers and vehicles either in person or electronically. Id. They must 3 report changes to online identifiers before using the changed or new online identifiers to 4 communicate on the internet. Id. § 13-3822(C). 5 Arizona’s sex-offender registration scheme contains tiered community notification 6 requirements. A.R.S. § 13-3825. For level one offenders who have not been convicted of 7 a dangerous crime against children, local law enforcement agencies may disseminate 8 information about the offender to other law enforcement agencies and provide notice to 9 people with whom the offender resides. Id. § 13-3825(C)(2). For level one offenders 10 convicted of a dangerous crime against children, and for level two and level three offenders, 11 a notification including the offender’s photograph, address, and a summary of the 12 offender’s status and criminal background is disseminated in nonelectronic format to the 13 surrounding neighborhood, area schools, appropriate community groups, and prospective 14 employers, and a press release is given to local electronic and print media. Id. § 13- 15 3825(C)(1). The Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) maintains information about 16 offenders convicted of certain offenses, as well as any offender whose risk assessment has 17 been determined to be a level two or level three, on a sex-offender website. See id. § 13- 18 3827(A). The information maintained on the sex-offender website includes offenders’ 19 names, addresses, ages, current photographs, offenses, and notification levels. Id. § 13- 20 3827(B). Local law enforcement agencies are tasked with categorizing offenders and 21 placing them into notification levels. Id. § 13-3825(D). With limited exceptions that do 22 not appear to be relevant here, see id. § 13-3825(N), 13-923, the statutory scheme does not 23 entitle registrants to request a hearing to challenge their risk assessment score and 24 notification level. 25 Under Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) regulations, 26 lifetime sex-offender registrants are categorically barred from federally subsidized 27 housing. 24 C.F.R. § 982.553(a)(2)(i). 28 . . . . 1 A. Bivens Claims 2 Plaintiff sues two unnamed USMS officials, John Doe 2 and John Doe 3 (Doc. 1 at 3 3 ¶¶ 15-16), and he indicates generally that his claims arise under Bivens (id. at 1 ¶ 1), but 4 he does not label any particular claim as a Bivens claim. In Count 23, Plaintiff raises a 5 claim under the anti-commandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment. (Doc. 1 at 25 ¶¶ 6 156-160.)1 The Court liberally interprets this claim as a Bivens claim asserted against 7 Defendants John Doe 2 and 3. 8 In Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized an implied damages action against federal 9 officials directly under the Fourth Amendment. See generally 403 U.S. 388. Over the 10 following decade, the Supreme Court recognized implied damages actions against federal 11 officials in two other cases. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (congressional 12 staffer’s Fifth Amendment sex discrimination claim); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) 13 (federal prisoner’s Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care claim). In the years since, 14 “expanding the Bivens remedy” has become “a disfavored judicial activity.” Ziglar v. 15 Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 135 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). 16 Now, when analyzing a proposed Bivens claim, a court must engage in a two-step 17 inquiry. Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 492 (2022). First, the court must determine 18 whether the claim “presents a new Bivens context,” and, if it does, the court must determine 19 whether “there are special factors indicating that the Judiciary is at least arguably less 20 equipped than Congress to weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to 21 proceed.” Id. at 492 (internal quotation marks omitted). This two-step analysis “often 22 resolve[s] to a single question: whether there is any reason to think that Congress might be 23 better equipped to create a damages remedy.” Id. 24 Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants John Doe 2 and John Doe 3, without statutory 25 authority and in violation of the anti-commandeering doctrine, directed and approved 26 actions taken by Defendant Rush. (Doc. 1 at 25 ¶¶ 157-160.) Plaintiff’s claims against the 27 federal Doe Defendants present a new Bivens context because they do not involve the same

28 1 Plaintiff also references the anti-commandeering doctrine in Count 1. (Doc. 1 at 8 ¶ 40.) That portion of Count 1 will be dismissed with prejudice as duplicative of Count 23. 1 constitutional rights at issue in Bivens, Davis, and Carlson, and the factual allegations 2 underlying Plaintiff’s claims are entirely dissimilar. See Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 139 (a claim 3 presents a new Bivens context if there are any meaningful differences between the claim 4 and the three cases in which the Supreme Court has implied a damages action). There are 5 rational reasons “to think that Congress is better suited to weigh the costs and benefits of 6 allowing a damages action” for violation of the anti-commandeering doctrine of the Tenth 7 Amendment, and therefore expansion of Bivens is prohibited. See Egbert, 596 U.S. at 496 8 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state 9 a Bivens claim for damages in Count 23. 10 To the extent Plaintiff seeks declaratory and/or injunctive relief with respect to 11 Defendants John Doe 2 and John Doe 3—as opposed to damages—Plaintiff still has failed 12 to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution 13 bars the federal government from “commanding the States’ officers, or those of their 14 political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.” Haaland v. 15 Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255, 281 (2023) (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 16 (1997) (alteration marks omitted)). But states and their localities are free to voluntarily 17 assist with federal enforcement efforts. See United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865, 889 18 (9th Cir. 2019). Here, Plaintiff does not plead facts plausibly showing that John Doe 2 and 19 John Doe 3 compelled Rush to enforce federal laws. To the contrary, Plaintiff’s Complaint 20 indicates that Defendant Rush voluntarily accepted instructions from USMS and alleges 21 that the instructions related to the enforcement of state sex-offender registration laws. 22 Under the facts alleged, the anti-commandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment is 23 inapplicable. 24 The Court will dismiss Count 23, and Defendants John Doe 2 and John Doe 3, with 25 prejudice to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages pursuant to Bivens, and without prejudice 26 to the extent Plaintiff seeks declaratory and/or injunctive relief. 27 B. Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 28 Plaintiff indicates generally that his claims arise under Title II of the ADA and § 1 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. (Doc. 1 at 1 ¶ 1.) Counts 6, 7, and 19 of the Complaint 2 allege ADA violations. (Id. at 12-14, 23 ¶¶ 65-77, 138-142.)2 Specifically, in Counts 6 3 and 19, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the ADA by failing to provide reasonable 4 modifications to the sex-offender in-person reporting requirements. (Id. at 12-14, 23 ¶¶ 5 66-71, 140-142.) In Count 7, Plaintiff alleges that his exclusion from federally subsidized 6 housing violates his rights under the ADA. (Id. at 14 ¶¶ 73-77.) Plaintiff does not 7 specifically allege violations of the Rehabilitation Act in any of the counts of the 8 Complaint. However, because the elements of a claim under § 504 of the Rehabilitation 9 Act and Title II of the ADA overlap, the Court liberally construes Counts 6, 7, and 19 as 10 alleging violations of both Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 11 To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege facts plausibly 12 showing: “(1) he is a ‘qualified individual with a disability’; (2) he was either excluded 13 from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or 14 activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such 15 exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability.” Duvall v. 16 Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended on denial of reh’g (Oct. 17 11, 2001). To state a claim under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must plausibly 18 allege: “(1) he is an individual with a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to receive the 19 benefit; (3) he was denied the benefits of the program solely by reason of his disability; 20 and (4) the program receives federal financial assistance.” Id. 21 A “qualifying disability” is any physical or mental impairment that “substantially 22 limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Plaintiff alleges that he is 23 a qualified individual with a disability because he suffers from “severe environmental 24 allergies, chronic migraines, and neuropathy.” (Doc. 1 at 12 ¶ 66.) Plaintiff indicates he 25 receives Social Security disability benefits (see id. at 4 ¶ 17), but he fails to allege any facts 26 describing how his conditions substantially limit any of his life activities for purposes of 27 plausibly alleging that he is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA.

28 2 Counts 7 and 19 also allege equal protection violations. The Court addresses the equal protection components of those claims in Section IV(C)(6), infra. 1 Furthermore, assuming that Arizona’s sex-offender registry constitutes a public 2 entity’s service, program, or activity, Plaintiff does not allege that participation in the 3 registry is a “benefit,” Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998), 4 nor that he was excluded from participation in the registry by reason of his alleged 5 disability. To the contrary, Plaintiff challenges his required participation in the sex- 6 offender registry as burdensome and punitive. To the extent Plaintiff alleges that 7 Defendants violated the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act by failing to remove him from the 8 sex-offender registry, lower his classification status, or alter his in-person reporting 9 requirements, Plaintiff does not cite, and the Court has not located, any authority requiring 10 a public entity to remove an individual from a sex-offender registry or alter the individual’s 11 registry status or reporting requirements in order to accommodate the individual’s 12 disability. Furthermore, Plaintiff concedes that he never requested any accommodations 13 for his alleged disability (Doc. 1 at 4, 13 ¶¶ 19, 68), and he fails to make any non-conclusory 14 factual allegations showing that any Defendant knew of his alleged disability. 15 With respect to Count 7, Plaintiff contends that he has been denied the benefits of 16 HUD and Section 8 housing programs, but he does not contend that he was denied the 17 benefits of the housing programs due to his alleged disabilities; instead, he alleges that his 18 inability to participate in the housing programs stems solely from his placement on the sex- 19 offender registry. (Id. at 14 ¶¶ 73-74.) Furthermore, Plaintiff does not sue any federal 20 official responsible for implementing the regulations that exclude Plaintiff from federally 21 subsidized housing, and Plaintiff does not directly challenge those federal regulations, 22 instead challenging only Arizona’s sex-offender registration statutes. 23 Because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts plausibly stating a claim for violation of 24 the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, the Court will dismiss Counts 6, 7, and 19 without 25 prejudice. 26 C. Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 27 To state a claim on which relief can be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff 28 must allege facts plausibly showing that “(1) acts by the defendants (2) under color of state 1 law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities and (4) caused him 2 damage.” Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting 3 Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 4 1994) (internal alteration marks omitted)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he 5 suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant, and he must 6 allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. 7 Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 8 Plaintiff alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Count 32 (Doc. 1 at 30-31 ¶¶ 9 197-200), and specific constitutional violations in various other Counts. The Court 10 interprets the claims alleging constitutional violations as claims raised under 42 U.S.C. § 11 1983, and the Court will dismiss Count 32 with prejudice as duplicative. 12 1. Individual- vs. Official-Capacity Claims 13 Plaintiff sues Defendant Kris Mayes, the Attorney General of Arizona, in her 14 official capacity, and appears to sue Defendant Dawn Rush in her individual capacity. 15 (Doc. 1 at 2-3 ¶¶ 8, 12.) It is unclear whether Plaintiff is suing Defendants Sheriff Mark J. 16 Dannels, Colonel Jeffrey D. Glover, Ken Hunter, and Brian McIntyre in their individual or 17 official capacities. (See id. at 2-3 ¶¶ 9-11, 13.) 18 Individual-capacity suits “seek to impose personal liability upon a government 19 official for actions he takes under color of state law,” whereas official-capacity suits 20 “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an 21 officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). To state an 22 individual-capacity claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts plausibly 23 showing that a government-official defendant, “through the official’s own actions, has 24 violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 676. To state an official-capacity claim 25 under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts plausibly showing that a policy or custom of the 26 entity of which the defendant is an agent was the moving force behind the constitutional 27 violation. Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 167. There is no respondeat superior liability under 28 § 1983, and therefore, a defendant’s position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly 1 violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights, or a municipality’s employment of such a person, 2 does not on its own result in liability. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 3 (1978); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 4 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dannels, as the elected sheriff of Cochise County, 5 is responsible for CCSO policies as well as oversight, training, and supervision within the 6 sex-offender registration unit, and that he failed to supervise or intervene to ensure 7 constitutionally adequate procedures for sex-offender classification determinations. (Doc. 8 1 at 2, 5-6, 31 ¶¶ 9, 27, 200.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Glover, as the Director of 9 DPS, is “responsible for statewide administration and enforcement of sex-offender 10 registration” in Arizona, and that he likewise failed to supervise or intervene to ensure 11 policies to protect Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (Doc. 1 at 3, 6, 31 ¶¶ 10, 28, 200.) 12 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hunter, as the Deputy Director of DPS, is “responsible for 13 implementing and maintaining DPS’s sex-offender registry protocols,” and that he, like 14 Glover, failed to supervise or intervene to ensure constitutional policies. (Doc. 1 at 3, 6, 15 31 ¶¶ 11, 28, 200.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant McIntyre, as the Cochise County 16 Attorney, “participates in the enforcement of A.R.S. § 13-3821 and related provisions,” 17 which provide no avenue for registrants to seek relief from lifetime registration. (Doc. 1 18 at 3, 6, 14, 20, 27-28, 31 ¶¶ 13, 30, 77, 120, 175, 200.) 19 To the extent Plaintiff is asserting individual-capacity claims against Defendants 20 Dannels, Glover, Hunter, and McIntyre, he has not alleged facts plausibly showing that any 21 of those Defendants were personally involved in any alleged violations of Plaintiff’s 22 constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s individual-capacity 23 claims against Dannels, Glover, Hunter, and McIntyre without prejudice. 24 To the extent Plaintiff is suing Dannels and McIntyre in their official capacities, the 25 real party in interest is Cochise County. See Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 165.3 To the extent

26 3 The Cochise County Sheriff’s Department and Cochise County Attorney’s Office are nonjural entities incapable of suing or being sued, but Cochise County may be sued. See 27 A.R.S. § 11-201(A)(1) (counties may sue and be sued); Payne v. Arpaio, No. CV09–1195– PHX–NVW, 2009 WL 3756679, at *4 (D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2009) (county sheriff’s department 28 is a nonjural entity); Wilson v. Yavapai Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, No. CV 11–8199–PCT–JAT, 2012 WL 1067959, at *4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 29, 2012) (county sheriff’s office and county 1 Plaintiff is asserting official-capacity claims against Glover and Hunter, the real party in 2 interest is the State of Arizona. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 3 71 (1989) (when a state official is sued in his official capacity, the real party in interest is 4 not the individual, but the state itself). 5 Absent waiver or abrogation of sovereign immunity, the Eleventh Amendment 6 generally bars suits brought by a private party against a state or its instrumentality. Douglas 7 v. Cal. Dep’t of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 817 (9th Cir. 2001); L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 8 979 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1992). The doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), 9 provides an exception to this general rule, allowing actions for prospective declaratory or 10 injunctive relief to be brought “against state officers in their official capacities for their 11 alleged violations of federal law,” Coalition to Def. Affirmative Action v. Brown, 674 F.3d 12 1128, 1134 (9th Cir. 2012), provided the official sued has a “fairly direct” connection with 13 the enforcement of the challenged law, L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass’n, 979 F.2d at 704. The Arizona 14 DPS implements Arizona’s sex-offender registration statutes. See Doe v. Mayes, No. CV- 15 24-02259-PHX-MTL, 2025 WL 1865805, at *2 (D. Ariz. July 7, 2025). Accordingly, the 16 Court finds that Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against Glover and Hunter are not 17 barred by the Eleventh Amendment.4 However, the official-capacity claims against Hunter 18 will be dismissed with prejudice as duplicative of the official-capacity claims asserted 19 against Glover. 20 Plaintiff states that Defendant John Doe 1 is the immediate supervisor of Defendant 21 Rush, that he is sued in both his individual and official capacities, and that he failed to 22 supervise or intervene when Rush reclassified Plaintiff’s sex-offender level. (Doc. 1 at 3,

23 attorney are non-jural entities). Because the defendants work for different entities within Cochise County, the Court declines at this stage to dismiss the official-capacity claims 24 against either as redundant, to ensure that the named defendants in this action are capable of fully providing the injunctive relief sought. 25 4 Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Mayes, as the Attorney General of Arizona, enforces Arizona’s sex-offender registration statutes. (Doc. 1 at 3, 6, 14, 20, 27-28, 31 ¶¶ 12, 29, 26 77, 120, 175, 200.) Focusing on the four corners of Plaintiff’s Complaint at the screening stage, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against Mayes on 27 Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds. But see Mayes, 2025 WL 1865805, at *2 (dismissing on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds official-capacity claims against 28 Mayes challenging Arizona’s sex-offender registration statutes after finding an insufficient connection between the Attorney General and enforcement of the statutes). 1 5, 31 ¶¶ 14, 26, 200.) Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to § 1983 suits, Iqbal, 556 2 U.S. at 676, Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant John Doe 1 is the supervisor of Defendant 3 Rush and failed to intervene when Rush reclassified Plaintiff are insufficient to state an 4 individual-capacity claim. Furthermore, any official-capacity claims against Defendant 5 John Doe 1 are duplicative of the official-capacity claims against Sheriff Dannels. 6 Accordingly, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Defendant John Doe 1. 7 2. Senate Bills 1236 and 1404—Standing 8 In Count 33, Plaintiff alleges that Senate Bills 1236 and 1404 violate due process, 9 equal protection, and the ex post facto clause. (Doc. 1 at 31-34 ¶ 202-208.) He requests a 10 declaratory judgment that Senate Bills 1236 and 1404 are illegal, and injunctive relief 11 enjoining their enforcement. (Id. at 37 ¶¶ 218-219.) 12 The Arizona legislature passed Senate Bills 1236 and 1404 during the 2024 13 legislative session. Senate Bill 1236 adds information to the sex-offender website of 14 additional categories of offenders, based primarily on the offender’s and victim’s age at 15 the time of the offense. See Doe v. Mayes, No. CV-24-02259-PHX-MTL, 2024 WL 16 4870503, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 22, 2024). Senate Bill 1404 adds a reporting requirement 17 for sex offenders who have legal custody of a child who is enrolled in school, and expands 18 community notification requirements to level one offenders convicted of a dangerous crime 19 against children. Id. at *2. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege any facts plausibly 20 indicating that Senate Bills 1236 or 1404 altered his sex-offender registration, reporting, 21 publication, or community notification requirements. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown 22 that he has standing to assert constitutional challenges to Senate Bills 1236 and 1404, and 23 Count 33 will be dismissed without prejudice. 24 3. Due Process Claims 25 Plaintiff raises due process claims in Counts 1, 2, 8, 10, 11, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26 28, 29, and 31. (Doc. 1 at 8-10, 15, 17-18, 22-26, 28-30 ¶¶ 35-48, 78-83, 90-101, 133-137, 27 143-155, 161-164, 179-187, 193-196.) Specifically, Plaintiff raises a substantive due 28 process claim in Count 1 and a procedural due process claim in Count 2. (Id. at 8-10 ¶¶ 1 35-48.) In the other claims, he alleges (1) that the in-person reporting requirements of 2 Arizona’s sex-offender registration scheme impinge his liberty interests in travel/relocation 3 (Counts 8, 24), and bodily integrity/health (Count 22); (2) that the community notification 4 and Internet posting requirements impinge his liberty interests in privacy (Count 11), 5 reputation (Counts 21, 29), family integrity (Count 18), and occupational liberty (Count 6 20); (3) that his reclassification as a level two registrant was arbitrary and irrational, and 7 Defendants treated him hostilely (Counts 25, 28, 31); and (5) that the indefinite burdens of 8 the sex-offender registration scheme violate his due process rights (Count 10). (Id. at 15, 9 17-18, 22-26, 28-30 ¶¶ 78-83, 90-101, 133-137, 143-155, 161-164, 179-187, 193-196.)5 10 The Court analyzes below the substantive due process claim raised in Count 1 and 11 the procedural due process claim raised in Count 2. The Court will dismiss Counts 8, 10, 12 11, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 28, 29, and 31 with prejudice as duplicative to the extent they 13 allege due process violations, although the Court considers the allegations of those counts 14 for context regarding the contours of Plaintiff’s due process claims in Counts 1 and 2. 15 a. Substantive Due Process 16 The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause prohibits states from depriving 17 persons of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 18 § 1. The clause protects individuals against violations of both substantive and procedural 19 due process. Regino v. Staley, 133 F.4th 951, 959 (9th Cir. 2025). “Substantive due 20 process refers to certain actions that the government may not engage in, no matter how 21 many procedural safeguards it employs.” C.R. v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 22 1154 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). When a law infringes a 23 fundamental right, it will survive substantive due process scrutiny “only if the infringement 24 is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Regino, 133 F.4th at 960 (internal 25 5 Plaintiff purports to assert both due process and First Amendment violations in Counts 8 26 and 25. (Doc. 1 at 15, 26-27 ¶¶ 78-83, 165-168.) The Court interprets Count 8 as asserting a liberty interest in travel for purposes of Plaintiff’s due process claims. The Court analyzes 27 the First Amendment retaliation portion of Count 25 in Section IV(C)(9), infra. In Count 10, Plaintiff asserts both due process and Eighth Amendment violations. (Id. at 17 ¶¶ 90- 28 95.) The Court analyzes the Eighth Amendment portion of Count 10 in Section IV(C)(8), infra. 1 quotation marks omitted). Laws that do not infringe on any fundamental rights are 2 constitutional “so long as they are rationally related to legitimate government interests.” 3 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 Fundamental rights are those that are so “deeply rooted” in the nation’s “history and 5 tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty . . . that neither liberty nor justice 6 would exist if they were sacrificed.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 7 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has held “that 8 persons who have been convicted of serious sex offenses do not have a fundamental right 9 to be free from [sex-offender] registration and notification requirements[.]” Doe v. 10 Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); see also Richardson v. Barr, 11 827 F. App’x 624, 625 (9th Cir. 2020) (same); Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th 12 Cir. 2014) (same); United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1012 (9th Cir. 2012) 13 (same). In light of this precedent, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a substantive due 14 process claim implicating strict scrutiny review. 6 Accordingly, rational basis review 15 applies to Plaintiff’s substantive due process claims. 16 Arizona’s requirements for sex-offender registration and community notification 17 generally satisfy rational basis review given their reasonable relation to the government’s 18 interest in public safety and preventing recidivism. See John D. v. Vanderpool, No. CV 19 05–2254–PHX–JAT, 2006 WL 2038466, at *5-6 (D. Ariz. July 19, 2006) (Arizona “has a 20 reasonable and legitimate interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its 21 citizens, and community notification is rationally related to achieving that interest by 22 alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in their community”); Tandeske, 361 F.3d at 23 597 (finding sex-offender registration statute had a reasonable relation to the legitimate 24 governmental purposes of public safety). 25 It may be possible for Plaintiff to state a claim that Arizona’s sex-offender 26 registration statutes fail rational basis review to the extent they require lifetime registration

27 6 Furthermore, the Court notes that Plaintiff alleges only indirect, incidental burdens on his right to interstate travel, bodily integrity, family integrity, and occupational liberty, and he 28 cites no authority supporting the existence of a fundamental liberty interest in rehabilitation and reentry. 1 and do not provide any avenue of removal for individuals who no longer pose any public 2 safety risk or danger of recidivism.7 However, Plaintiff has not alleged facts plausibly 3 showing that he poses no public safety risk or danger of recidivism. See Smith v. Doe, 538 4 U.S. 84, 102 (2003) (finding statute requiring lifetime reporting for individuals convicted 5 of aggravated or multiple sex offenses “reasonably related to the danger of recidivism”). 6 Plaintiff does not include any information about the conviction or convictions that triggered 7 his registration requirement, including the nature and date of those convictions, or about 8 his criminal history generally, and he concedes that his general recidivism risk score “was 9 over the minimal score by 2 points.” (Doc. 1 at 5 ¶ 23.) Plaintiff has failed to plausibly 10 allege that Arizona’s sex-offender registration statutes violate his substantive due process 11 rights. 12 In addition to providing enhanced protection from legislation that infringes 13 fundamental rights, substantive due process protects individuals from misconduct by 14 government officials that is so egregious it “shocks the conscience.” Cnty. of Sacramento 15 v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998). To be “conscience-shocking,” conduct must be so “brutal” 16 and “offensive” that it does not “comport to traditional ideas of fair play and decency.” 17 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated 18 his substantive due process rights by arbitrarily and irrationally reclassifying him as a level 19 two registrant. However, this allegedly inaccurate classification does not rise to the level 20 of conscience-shocking conduct that would violate substantive due process. See 21 Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 435. 22 The Court will dismiss Count 1 without prejudice. 23 b. Procedural Due Process 24 In Count 2, Plaintiff alleges that he was reclassified as a level two registrant without 25 notice or a hearing, in violation of procedural due process. (Doc. 1 at 9-10 ¶ 43-48.) “A 26 section 1983 claim based upon procedural due process has three elements: (1) a liberty or

27 7 In Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, the Supreme Court expressed no opinion as to whether principles of substantive due process were violated by a law requiring 28 the public disclosure of sex-offender information regardless of current dangerousness. 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003). 1 property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the 2 government; (3) lack of process.” Houston v. Maricopa Cnty., 116 F.4th 935, 945 (9th Cir. 3 2024) (internal quotation and alteration marks omitted). If sex-offender registration is 4 required solely by the fact of one’s conviction, any additional process is superfluous, and 5 a procedural due process challenge to the registration laws fails. Connecticut Dep’t of Pub. 6 Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2003). “Arizona has determined that conviction is 7 sufficient, as opposed to a determination of dangerousness or risk level, to warrant lifetime 8 subjection to [sex-offender] registration requirements.” Doe v. Sheridan, No. CV-23- 9 01938-PHX-SMM, 2025 WL 3485201, at *12 (D. Ariz. Nov. 7, 2025). Because registrants 10 have “already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest” their convictions, a 11 procedural due process challenge to Arizona’s lifetime registration requirement fails. Id. 12 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Greer v. Arizona, No. CV 13–0166–TUC– 13 BGM, 2013 WL 2896866, at *4-5 (D. Ariz. June 13, 2013) (dismissing procedural due 14 process claim because “the Arizona sex offender registration and notification statutes turn 15 on the fact of conviction”). 16 However, the community notification provisions of Arizona’s sex-offender 17 registration statutes do not hinge solely on the fact of a registrant’s conviction. The degree 18 to which information about registered sex offenders is disseminated depends on whether 19 the offenders are classified as level one, level two, or level three offenders, and the statutory 20 scheme tasks local law enforcement agencies with placing offenders into notification 21 levels, with registrants generally not entitled to a hearing to challenge their classification. 22 See A.R.S. § 13-3825(C)-(D). Additional process may be necessary if “it gives a sex 23 offender the ability to prove or disprove facts related to the applicability” of a sex-offender 24 registration requirement. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d at 1014. Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s 25 allegations that he was classified as a level two registrant without notice, a hearing, or an 26 opportunity to challenge the classification is sufficient to plausibly state a procedural due 27 process claim. 28 The Court will require Defendant Rush to answer Count 2 of the Complaint in her 1 individual capacity, and will require Defendants Mayes, Dannels, Glover, and McIntyre to 2 answer Count 2 in their official capacities. 3 4. Void for Vagueness 4 In Count 14, Plaintiff alleges that the sex-offender classification procedures of 5 Arizona’s registration scheme are void for vagueness. (Doc. 1 at 19-20 ¶¶ 112-117.) 6 “[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense 7 with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited 8 and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” 9 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). A criminal statute is void for vagueness 10 “if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct 11 is forbidden.” United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979). 12 Plaintiff does not allege that A.R.S. § 13-3824—which imposes criminal penalties 13 on registrants who fail to comply with Arizona’s sex-offender registration requirements— 14 fails to give fair notice of what conduct is prohibited. Instead, Plaintiff challenges as 15 opaque the process by which registrants’ risk levels are classified. Because Plaintiff does 16 not challenge provisions imposing a criminal offense on sex offenders, and does not allege 17 that Arizona’s sex-offender registration laws fail to provide fair notice of what conduct 18 may subject registrants to criminal penalties, the void-for-vagueness doctrine is 19 inapplicable. See Mayes, 2025 WL 1865805, at *6 (finding void-for-vagueness doctrine 20 inapplicable where challenged terms did “not impose a criminal offense on sex offenders,” 21 but, rather, directed law enforcement’s dissemination of sex-offender information). 22 The Court will dismiss Count 14 without prejudice. 23 5. Unconstitutional Conditions 24 In Count 30, Plaintiff alleges a violation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 25 (Doc. 1 at 29-30 ¶¶ 188-192.) Under that doctrine, “‘the government may not require a 26 person to give up a constitutional right in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by 27 the government.’” Stavrianoudakis v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 108 F.4th 1128, 1136 28 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994)) (internal 1 alteration marks omitted). Plaintiff has not alleged facts plausibly showing that Defendants 2 coerced him “into forfeiting a constitutional right in exchange for a benefit” or that 3 Defendants withheld a benefit from Plaintiff based on his “refusal to surrender a 4 constitutional right.” See id. at 1137. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a 5 violation of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 6 The Court will dismiss Count 30 without prejudice. 7 6. Equal Protection 8 Plaintiff alleges equal protection violations in Counts 3, 7, 19, and 27. (Doc. 1 at 9 10, 14, 23, 27-28 ¶¶ 49-53, 72-77, 138-142, 174-178.) Specifically, in Count 3, Plaintiff 10 alleges that lifetime registration with no avenue for removal for low-risk individuals, and 11 his classification as a level two registrant, deny him equal protection of the laws. (Id. at 12 10 ¶¶ 49-53.) In Counts 7 and 27, Plaintiff alleges that, under HUD regulations, his lifetime 13 registration as a sex offender permanently and arbitrarily precludes him from federally 14 subsidized housing despite his low risk, in violation of equal protection. (Id. at 14, 27-28 15 ¶¶ 72-77, 174-178.) In Count 19, Plaintiff alleges that the in-person reporting requirements 16 of A.R.S. § 13-3822 disproportionately burden him compared to non-disabled registrants, 17 in violation of equal protection. (Id. at 23 ¶¶ 138-142.)8 18 “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies strict scrutiny 19 if the aggrieved party is a member of a protected or suspect class, or otherwise suffers the 20 unequal burdening of a fundamental right.” Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d at 1009. In the 21 absence of a suspect classification, rational basis review applies, meaning government 22 actions will be upheld “if they are rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Id. 23 (internal quotation and alteration marks omitted). Sex offenders are not a protected or 24 suspect class. Id.; see also United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001). 25 “Offender classifications based on criminal history are not suspect classifications.” Mayes, 26 2025 WL 1865805, at *7. And as discussed above, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged 27 that Arizona’s sex-offender registration statutes burden a fundamental right. Accordingly, 28 8 The ADA portion of Count 19 is addressed in Section IV(B), supra. 1 rational basis review applies to Plaintiff’s equal protection claim and, as discussed above, 2 Arizona’s sex-offender registration and notification laws generally satisfy rational basis 3 review given their rational connection to the legitimate governmental interest in public 4 safety. See Mayes, 2025 WL 1865805, at *8; Greer, 2013 WL 2896866, at *5 (“the 5 requirements of the Arizona sex offender registration and notification statutes ‘satisfy 6 rational basis review and do not violate the Equal Protection Clause’” (quoting Juvenile 7 Male, 670 F.3d at 1010)). 8 Plaintiff’s claim that his classification as a level two registrant violates equal 9 protection constitutes a “class of one” equal protection claim. “[A]n equal protection claim 10 can in some circumstances be sustained even if the plaintiff has not alleged class-based 11 discrimination, but instead claims that she has been irrationally singled out as a so-called 12 ‘class of one.’” Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008). However, 13 when state action by its nature involves “discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast 14 array of subjective, individualized assessments,” a class-of-one claim fails, as “[i]t is no 15 proper challenge to what in its nature is a subjective, individualized decision that it was 16 subjective and individualized.” Id. at 603-04. Based on the factual allegations of Plaintiff’s 17 Complaint, his classification level was determined based on a subjective, individualized 18 assessment. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a “class of one” equal 19 protection claim. 20 Counts 7 and 27 fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted because Plaintiff 21 alleges that his exclusion from federally subsidized housing results from HUD regulations 22 but Plaintiff challenges only Arizona’s sex-offender registration statutes, rather than the 23 HUD regulations, and Plaintiff has not named as a defendant any federal official 24 responsible for implementing the HUD regulations. 25 Count 19 fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted because “States are 26 not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the 27 disabled, so long as their actions toward such individuals are rational.” Bd. of Trustees of 28 U. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001). “If special accommodations for the 1 disabled are to be required, they have to come from positive law and not through the Equal 2 Protection Clause.” Id. at 368. 3 The Court will dismiss without prejudice the equal protection claims in Counts 3, 7, 4 19, and 27. 5 7. Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines 6 In Count 17, Plaintiff alleges that A.R.S. § 13-3824 subjects him to felony penalties, 7 fines, and imprisonment for noncompliance with burdensome reporting requirements, in 8 violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive fines. (Doc. 1 at 21-22 ¶¶ 9 128-132.) 10 The Eighth Amendment mandates that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor 11 excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. 12 VIII. A “fine,” within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, is “a payment to a sovereign 13 as punishment for some offense.” United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 327 (1998). 14 A fine is excessive in violation of the Eighth Amendment “if it is grossly disproportional 15 to the gravity of a defendant’s offense.” Id. at 334. 16 Plaintiff does not plead facts showing that he has standing to raise an Eighth 17 Amendment challenge to the criminal penalties attached to noncompliance with Arizona’s 18 sex-offender registration requirements. Plaintiff refers vaguely to a “charge for failure to 19 register” (Doc. 1 at 4 ¶ 18), but he does not allege that he has been prosecuted, fined, and/or 20 sentenced for noncompliance with registration requirements. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails 21 to state a claim that he has been subjected to an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth 22 Amendment. 23 The Court will dismiss Count 17 without prejudice. 24 8. Claims Alleging Punitive Statutory Scheme 25 Plaintiff raises several claims that hinge on whether Arizona’s sex-offender 26 registration scheme is properly classified as punitive. In Count 4, Plaintiff alleges that his 27 original offense predates many amendments to the registration laws, including lifetime 28 public Internet posting, and that retroactive application of the laws imposes new punitive 1 obligations on him in violation of the ex post facto clause. (Doc. 1 at 11 ¶¶ 54-58.) In 2 Counts 5, 10, and 26, Plaintiff alleges that the sex-offender registration scheme imposes 3 disproportionate punishment that forecloses rehabilitation and reintegration, in violation of 4 the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at 11-12, 17, 27 ¶¶ 59-64, 90-95, 169-173.) In Count 12, 5 Plaintiff alleges that the registration scheme imposes continuing punishment for an offense 6 for which he already served his sentence, and that his reclassification as a level two 7 registrant imposes an additional punitive sanction, in violation of the double jeopardy 8 clause. (Id. at 18-19 ¶¶ 102-106.) In Count 13, Plaintiff alleges that the registration scheme 9 constitutes an unconstitutional bill of attainder. (Id. at 19 ¶¶ 107-111.) 10 Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution prohibits States from passing bills 11 of attainder and ex post facto laws. “A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts 12 punishment without a judicial trial.” United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946). 13 An ex post facto law “imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the 14 time it was committed[,] or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.” 15 Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981). The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth 16 Amendment prohibits “multiple punishments for the same offense.” United States v. 17 Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989). The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual 18 punishments.” 19 Plaintiff’s bill of attainder, ex post facto, double jeopardy, and Eighth Amendment 20 claims all hinge on whether Arizona’s sex-offender registration statutes impose “a criminal 21 or penal sanction as opposed to a civil remedy.” Ellingburg v. United States, 607 U.S. __, 22 2026 WL 135982, at *2 (2026) (evaluating ex post facto claim); see also E.B. v. Verniero, 23 119 F.3d 1077, 1092 (3d Cir. 1997) (neither ex post facto nor double jeopardy clause 24 implicated if State has not inflicted punishment); Richardson v. Barr, 827 F. App’x 624, 25 627 (9th Cir. 2020) (rejecting ex post facto, bill of attainder, and Eighth Amendment 26 challenges to sex-offender registration laws after finding laws civil rather than punitive); 27 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 97 (2003) (noting that the factors for determining whether a law 28 constitutes punishment under the ex post facto clause have their origins in double jeopardy, 1 Eighth Amendment, and bill of attainder jurisprudence). A law is punitive if (1) the 2 legislature intended to impose punishment; or (2) the law is “so punitive either in purpose 3 or effect as to negate” the legislature’s intent that it be civil and non-punitive in nature. 4 Smith, 538 U.S. at 92. In considering whether a law’s punitive effect outweighs a 5 legislature’s regulatory intention, courts consider the factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza- 6 Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), in addition to any other relevant considerations. Smith, 7 538 U.S. at 97. The Mendoza-Martinez factors include: 8 [w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play 9 only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether the 10 behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and 11 whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. 12 372 U.S. at 168-69. 13 Applying Mendoza-Martinez and Smith, courts have repeatedly found that 14 Arizona’s sex-offender registration laws are non-punitive in nature. See State v. Trujillo, 15 462 P.3d 550, 562 (Ariz. 2020); State v. Noble, 829 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Ariz. 1992); State v. 16 Henry, 228 P.3d 900, 907 (Ariz. App. 2010)9; Arizona Dep’t of Public Safety v. Maricopa 17 Cnty. Superior Ct., 949 P.2d 983, 992 (Ariz. App. 1997). In Trujillo—which was decided 18 after the enactment of the registration statutes’ community notification and Internet posting 19 requirements—the Arizona Supreme Court held that the legislature intended to create a 20 civil regulatory scheme in enacting Arizona’s sex-offender registration statutes, and that 21 the effects of the statutes are not so punitive as to negate the legislature’s intent. 462 P.3d 22 at 554-62. The court recognized that the public dissemination of sex offenders’ 23 information may cause stigma and reputational harm, but it nevertheless concluded that the 24 primary effect of the sex-offender registration laws “is not to punish, but to advance the 25 important regulatory purpose of disseminating truthful information to the public for its own 26 safety.” Id. at 560. 27 Plaintiff alleges that the sponsor of Senate Bills 1236 and 1404 evidenced a punitive

28 9 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, on habeas review, found that Henry did not unreasonably apply federal law. Clark v. Ryan, 836 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2016). 1 rather than civil intent by pledging to be “a living nightmare for sex offenders,” and to 2 “make pedophiles’ lives hell.” (Doc. 1 at 31 ¶ 203.) But as discussed in Section IV(C)(2), 3 infra, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Senate Bills 1236 or 1404 affected his sex- 4 offender registration or notification requirements so as to give him standing to challenge 5 those laws. Statements allegedly made by the sponsor of those bills are insufficient to 6 show that the legislature had a punitive intent in enacting the other provisions of Arizona’s 7 sex-offender registration scheme. 8 Based on caselaw finding Arizona’s sex-offender registration statutory scheme to 9 be civil rather than punitive, and Plaintiff’s failure to allege that he has been affected by 10 any allegedly punitive statutory amendments made after the relevant cases were decided, 11 the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege ex post facto, Eighth 12 Amendment, double jeopardy, or bill of attainder claims. See Greer, 2013 WL 2896866, 13 at *3-4 (dismissing ex post facto claim based on caselaw finding Arizona’s sex-offender 14 registration scheme to be civil rather than criminal); Sheridan, 2025 WL 3485201, at *14- 15 15. The Court will dismiss Counts 4, 5, 19, 12, 13, and 26 without prejudice. 16 9. First Amendment Claims 17 Plaintiff alleges First Amendment violations in Counts 9, 15, 16, and 25.10 18 In Count 9, Plaintiff alleges that the public identification required by Arizona’s sex- 19 offender registration statutes constitutes compelled speech in violation of the First 20 Amendment, and that the publication requirements chill Plaintiff’s lawful online speech 21 and associational activities. (Doc. 1 at 15-16 ¶¶ 84-89.) The First Amendment protects 22 “both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.” Wooley v. 23 Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). A law that “[m]andat[es] speech that a speaker would 24 not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the speech” and is therefore considered 25 a content-based regulation to which strict scrutiny applies. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind 26 of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988). Content-based regulations of speech are 27 10 Plaintiff also alleges in Count 9 that the public dissemination of his registry status causes 28 reputational harm in violation of his liberty interests. (Doc. 1 at 16 ¶ 87.) This portion of Count 9 will be dismissed with prejudice as duplicative of Plaintiff’s due process claims. 1 constitutional only if “they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.” Reed 2 v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015). The government has compelling 3 interests in preventing crime and protecting the community. See United States v. Salerno, 4 481 U.S. 739, 749-50 (1987). And the government may narrowly tailor a law that compels 5 citizens to disclose information if the government “itself publish[es] . . . the desired 6 information to the public.” Riley, 487 U.S. at 800. Arizona’s online publication and 7 community notification schemes serve the compelling state interests “in public safety and 8 crime prevention,” and they “are narrowly tailored” in that “Arizona itself publishes 9 information compelled from sex offenders.” Mayes, 2025 WL 1865805, at *9. 10 Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted for 11 compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment, and this portion of Count 9 will be 12 dismissed without prejudice. 13 Liberally construing Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff has 14 adequately stated a claim in Count IX that the online identifier reporting requirements of 15 Arizona’s sex-offender registration statutes chills his speech and associational activities in 16 violation of the First Amendment. See generally Doe v. Harris, 772 F.3d 563 (9th Cir. 17 2014) (finding similar California sex-offender registration statutes unnecessarily chilled 18 First Amendment speech); but see Sheridan, 2025 WL 3485201, at *7-10 (distinguishing 19 Harris and finding that Arizona’s sex-offender registration statutes survive First 20 Amendment scrutiny). The Court will require Defendants Mayes, Dannels, Glover, and 21 McIntyre to answer the chilled-speech claim in Count 9 in their official capacities. 22 In Count 15, Plaintiff alleges that Arizona has denied him meaningful access to the 23 courts in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to provide any 24 avenue by which registrants may seek relief from lifetime registration. (Doc. 1 at 20-21 ¶¶ 25 118-122.) The constitutional right of access to the courts protects the “right to seek judicial 26 relief for some wrong.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). The right “is 27 ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by 28 being shut out of court.” Id. Because Plaintiff does not allege the frustration of a non- 1 frivolous legal claim, the Court will dismiss Count 15 without prejudice.11 2 In Count 16, Plaintiff raises a First Amendment overbreadth challenge, alleging that 3 Arizona’s sex-offender registration statutes restrict substantially more conduct than 4 necessary to achieve legitimate governmental objectives because they apply to all 5 registrants without distinction, regardless of risk level or rehabilitation. (Doc. 1 at 21 ¶ 6 123-127.) Under the overbreadth doctrine, a statute is considered facially unconstitutional 7 if it “prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech relative to its plainly legitimate 8 sweep.” United States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 770 (2023) (internal quotation marks 9 omitted). “The mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a 10 statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.” Tucson v. 11 City of Seattle, 91 F.4th 1318, 1327 (9th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). 12 Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not plausibly allege that a substantial number of the sex- 13 offender registration statutes’ applications are unconstitutional. See Sheridan, 2025 WL 14 3485201, at *10-11 (rejecting overbreadth challenge to Arizona’s sex-offender registration 15 statutes). The Court will dismiss Count 16 of the Complaint without prejudice. 16 In Count 25, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rush’s hostile treatment of him, 17 combined with his arbitrary reclassification, “reflects retaliation against Plaintiff for his 18 attempts to comply and for his protected status as a disabled individual,” in violation of the 19 First Amendment. (Doc. 1 at 26-27 ¶¶ 165-168.) Plaintiff does not allege facts plausibly 20 showing that he engaged in constitutionally protected speech or that Rush’s allegedly 21 hostile treatment of him was causally connected to that protected speech. See Watison v. 22 Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012).12 Accordingly, Count 25 will be dismissed 23 without prejudice. 24 . . . . 25 . . . .

26 11 To the extent Plaintiff alleges in this claim that imposing lifetime registration requirements violates due process, the Court will dismiss that portion of Count 15 with 27 prejudice as duplicative of Plaintiff’s due process claims. 12To the extent Plaintiff alleges in this claim that he was retaliated against due to his alleged 28 disability, Plaintiff has not alleged facts plausibly showing that any defendant was aware of his alleged disability, as discussed in Section IV(B), supra. 1 VI. Warnings 2 A. Address Changes 3 If Plaintiff’s address changes, Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of 4 address in accordance with Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff 5 must not include a motion for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to 6 comply may result in dismissal of this action. 7 B. Possible Dismissal 8 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these 9 warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 10 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure 11 to comply with any order of the Court). 12 IT IS ORDERED: 13 1. Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is granted. 14 2. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint (Doc. 6) is 15 denied without prejudice. 16 3. The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the 17 Complaint (Doc. 1), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver 18 forms for Defendants Dawn Rush, Kris Mayes, Sheriff Mark J. Dannels, 19 Colonel Jeffrey D. Glover, and Brian McIntyre 20 4. Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court 21 within twenty-one (21) days of the date of filing of this Order. The United 22 States Marshal will not provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply 23 with this Order. 24 5. If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or 25 complete service of the Summons and Complaint on a Defendant within 26 ninety (90) days of the filing of the Complaint or within sixty (60) days 27 of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, the action may be dismissed 28 1 as to each Defendant not served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv 2 16.2(b)(2)(B)(ii). 3 6. The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the 4 Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use. 5 7. The United States Marshal must notify Defendants of the commencement of 6 this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 7 4(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants must 8 include a copy of this Order. 9 8. A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and Complaint 10 must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not the 11 Plaintiff, within thirty (30) days of the date of the notice and request for 12 waiver of service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1)(F) to 13 avoid being charged the cost of personal service. 14 9. The Marshal must immediately file signed waivers of service of the 15 summons. If a waiver of service of summons is returned as undeliverable or 16 is not returned by a Defendant within thirty (30) days from the date the 17 request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, the Marshal must: 18 a. personally serve copies of the Summons, Complaint, and this Order 19 upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 20 Procedure; and 21 b. within ten (10) days after personal service is effected, file the return 22 of service for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure 23 a waiver of service of the summons and of the costs subsequently 24 incurred in effecting service upon Defendant. The costs of service 25 must be enumerated on the return of service form (USM-285) and 26 must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for photocopying 27 additional copies of the Summons, Complaint, or this Order and for 28 preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if 1 required. Costs of service will be taxed against the personally served 2 Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 3 Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the Court. 4 10. Defendant Dawn Rush in her individual capacity, and Defendants Kris 5 Mayes, Sheriff Mark J. Dannels, Colonel Jeffrey D. Glover, and Brian 6 McIntyre in their official capacities, shall answer the procedural due process 7 claim in Count 2 of the Complaint within the time provided by the applicable 8 provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 9 11. Defendants Kris Mayes, Sheriff Mark J. Dannels, Colonel Jeffrey D. Glover, 10 Brian McIntyre in their official capacities shall answer the chilled-speech 11 claim in Count 9 of the Complaint within the time provided by the applicable 12 provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 13 12. Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on whose 14 behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion 15 or paper that does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose 16 behalf it is filed. 17 13. Defendants Ken Hunter, John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and John Doe 3 are 18 dismissed. The dismissal is without prejudice except with respect to the 19 official-capacity claims asserted against Ken Hunter and the Bivens claims 20 asserted against John Doe 2 and John Doe 3, which are dismissed with 21 prejudice. 22 14. The individual-capacity claims asserted against Defendants Sheriff Mark J. 23 Dannels, Colonel Jeffrey D. Glover, and Brian McIntyre are dismissed 24 without prejudice. 25 . . . . 26 . . . . 27 . . . . 28 . . . . l Counts 1, 3-8, 10-33, as well as the anti-commandeering portion of Count 2 2 and the compelled speech and due process portions of Count 9, are 3 dismissed. The dismissal is with prejudice as to Counts 8, 10-11, 18, 20-22, 4 24-25, 28-29, and 31-32, the anti-commandeering portion of Count 2, the due 5 process portions of Counts 9 and 15, and the Bivens portion of Count 23. The 6 dismissal is otherwise without prejudice. 7 Dated this 26th day of March, 2026. 8 9 10 — Ay U □ □ □ Honorable Rosthiary □□□□□□□ 12 United States District □□□□□ 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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