Al-Ahmed v. Twitter, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedMay 20, 2022
Docket3:21-cv-08017
StatusUnknown

This text of Al-Ahmed v. Twitter, Inc. (Al-Ahmed v. Twitter, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Al-Ahmed v. Twitter, Inc., (N.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ALI AL-AHMED, Case No. 21-cv-08017-EMC

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 9 v. MOTION TO DISMISS

10 TWITTER, INC., et al., Docket No. 30 11 Defendants.

12 13 14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 Plaintiff Al-Ahmed is a critic of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (“KSA”) and has been 16 granted asylum in the United States. Between 2013–2015, two of Twitter’s (now former) 17 employees, Defendants Ahmad Abouammo and Ali Hamad A. Alzabarah, accessed user 18 information on Al-Ahmed without authorization and provided it to KSA government officials. Al- 19 Ahmed filed this lawsuit against Abouammo, Alzabarah, and Twitter for violating the Electronics 20 Communications Privacy Act (“EPCA”), violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), 21 violating the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), violating California’s Unfair Competition 22 Law (“UCL”), breach of contract, intrusion upon seclusion, unjust enrichment, promissory 23 estoppel, negligence, negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, civil conspiracy, and replevin. 24 Al-Ahmed alleges that his Twitter account was hacked, which led to the KSA targeting him and 25 those around him. Furthermore, he alleges that Twitter’s suspension of his account in 2018 26 punishes him—the victim—and ratifies its former employees’ conduct. Pending in this Court is 27 Twitter’s motion to dismiss Al-Ahmed’s Complaint. The Court GRANTS Twitter’s motion for 1 II. BACKGROUND 2 Al-Ahmed alleges as follows in the Complaint: 3 Al-Ahmed is one of the leading critics of the KSA who resides and has been granted 4 asylum in the United States. Docket No. 1 (“Complaint”) at 2. Between August 2013 and 5 December 2015, Twitter user information was accessed without authorization and provided to 6 KSA government officials, which Twitter failed to detect for a period of time spanning over a 7 year. Id. at 4, 7. Al-Ahmed’s Arabic Twitter account, which has over 36,000 followers 8 worldwide, was one of the accounts breached during this time. Id. at 6. Al-Ahmed contends that 9 his private information, including his personal phone number and email address, which he never 10 made publicly available, was compromised due to Twitter’s conduct. Id. at 16. His account also 11 had confidential information provided by his followers and journalistic sources. Id. at 3. Al- 12 Ahmed alleges his private information was used by the KSA to silence him by stripping him of his 13 Saudi nationality, keeping him under surveillance, and attempting to kidnap and kill him on 14 multiple occasions. Id. at 6–7. His followers on Twitter, or those who otherwise contacted him 15 using Twitter, have disappeared, been arrested, or have been executed. Id. at 8. According to him, 16 “the KSA managed to fully silence [him] when they . . . suspend[ed his] Arabic Twitter account, 17 without explanation, warning, or justification.” Id. at 8. 18 On November 19, 2019, Abouammo and Alzabarah were indicted for acting as agents for 19 the government of Saudi Arabia while employed at Twitter. Id. at 4. Abouammo was the Media 20 Partnerships Manager responsible for the Middle East and North Africa region at Twitter. Id. at 3. 21 Alzabarah was a Site Reliability Engineer whose responsibility was maintaining Twitter’s 22 hardware and software to ensure uninterrupted service. Id. 23 A. Twitter’s Notice 24 On or about December 11, 2015, Twitter sent the following notice to a small group of its 25 users:

26 Dear @{{screen_name}}, As a precaution, we are alerting you that your Twitter account is one of a small group of accounts that 27 may have been targeted by state-sponsored actors. We believe IP addresses, and/or phone numbers. 1 At this time, we have no evidence they obtained your account 2 information, but we’re actively investigating this matter. We wish we had more we could share, but we don’t have any additional 3 information we can provide at this time.

4 It’s possible your account may not have been an intended target of the suspected activity, but we wanted to alert you as soon as 5 possible. We recognize that this may be of particular concern if you choose to Tweet using a pseudonym. For tips on protecting your 6 identity online, you may want to visit the Tor Project or EFF’s Protecting Yourself on Social Networks. 7 8 Id. at 14. Al-Ahmed alleges that this notice was insufficient because it failed to indicate that these 9 state-sponsored actors committed these data breaches while they were located on Twitter’s 10 premises, employed by Twitter, using Twitter’s resources, at the direction of Twitter. Id. at 15. 11 B. Twitter’s Actions in Aid of the KSA 12 Al-Ahmed alleges that Twitter provided the two employees with access to Twitter’s 13 resources with the full knowledge that they were improperly accessing user data, helped them 14 provide the information to the KSA, and helped them cover up their tracks by purging its internal 15 database of incriminating evidence. Id. at 7. Al-Ahmed also alleges that Twitter’s Privacy Policy 16 suggests that Tweets may be protected by opting to allow only Twitter followers to see them 17 through account settings, which created an illusion of security and safety. Id. at 10. Al-Ahmed 18 lastly alleges that Twitter failed to safeguard user data, evidenced by its disclosure to the 19 Securities and Exchange Commission in 2020. The disclosure stated that Twitter received a draft 20 complaint from the Federal Trade Commission alleging “violations…[r]elate[d] to the Company’s 21 use of phone number and/or email address data provided for safety and security purposes 22 [ostensibly for targeted advertising] during periods between 2013 and 2019.” Id. at 12. Thus, 23 Twitter negligently failed to implement policies, practices, and safeguards that would have 24 prevented the acts of its former employees. Id. at 37. 25 C. Twitter’s Relationship with the KSA 26 In 2011, Saudi Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal purchased $300 million worth of stock in 27 Twitter. Id. In 2015, Bin Talal made an additional investment, owning 5.2% of the company, 1 Crown Prince Bin Salman. Id. Thus, Al-Ahmed alleges that Twitter’s acts were designed to 2 appease Bin Salman, a significant investor. Id. According to Al-Ahmed, Bader al-Asaker is the 3 head of Bin Salman’s affairs and the “Saudi mastermind” behind the Twitter spy scandal. Id. at 4 13. He claims that Asaker is “Foreign Official-1” in the United States Attorneys Offices’ 5 indictment against Abouammo and Alzabarah. Id. Al-Ahmed alleges that Asaker provided 6 Abouammo and Alzabarah with “gifts, cash payments, and promises of future employment in 7 exchange for nonpublic information about Twitter uses, which constituted valuable property…” 8 Id. Furthermore, Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey met with both Asaker and Bin Salman at Twitter’s 9 headquarters on June 25, 2016, and at least one additional time in Riyadh thereafter. Id. at 13. 10 Dorsey and Asaker follow each other on Twitter. Id. 11 D. Twitter’s Suspension of Al-Ahmed’s Account 12 In 2018, Al-Ahmed’s Twitter account was suspended, preventing access to his followers. 13 Id. at 8. Al-Ahmed alleges that, as a result, he lost significant revenue and earning potential 14 related to his work as a journalist, as much of his work was contingent on his online presence. Id. 15 at 16. Al-Ahmed further alleges that his appeal of the suspension failed despite Alzabarah and 16 Abouammo’s indictment. Id. at 8. According to Al-Ahmed, preventing access to his account and 17 the list of his followers, punishes the victim and “ratifie[s] the actions of its supposedly errant 18 employees and show[s] [Twitter’s] continuing allegiance to the KSA.” Id. 19 III. LEGAL STANDARD 20 A. Motion to Dismiss 21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Warth v. Seldin
422 U.S. 490 (Supreme Court, 1975)
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman
455 U.S. 363 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Federal Trade Commission v. Accusearch Inc.
570 F.3d 1187 (Tenth Circuit, 2009)
Daniels-Hall v. National Education Ass'n
629 F.3d 992 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Wheeler v. Blumling
521 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2008)
Maya v. Centex Corp.
658 F.3d 1060 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Lee v. City Of Los Angeles
250 F.3d 668 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Marder v. Lopez
450 F.3d 445 (Ninth Circuit, 2006)
Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc.
292 P.3d 871 (California Supreme Court, 2013)
Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
519 F.3d 1025 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc.
570 F.3d 1096 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc.
873 P.2d 613 (California Supreme Court, 1994)
Mangum v. Action Collection Service, Inc.
575 F.3d 935 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Fair Housing Coun., San Fernando v. Roommates. Com
521 F.3d 1157 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Al-Ahmed v. Twitter, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/al-ahmed-v-twitter-inc-cand-2022.