PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff-appellant Kenzo Akinaka (Akina-ka) appeals from the judgment of the first circuit court dismissing his complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants-appellees Disciplinary Board of the Hawai'i Supreme Court and Carole R. Richelieu in her capacity as Chief Disciplinary Counsel (appellees). Akinaka filed suit seeking to force appellees to initiate disciplinary proceedings against two attorneys who represented an individual that Akinaka had sued in an earlier partition action. The circuit court, in granting appellees’ motion to dismiss and/or motion for summary judgment, concluded that appellees are immune from lawsuit and liability and dismissed the complaint against them.
For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court but on the alternate ground that Akinaka had no standing to file his complaint against appellees.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 13, 1990, Akinaka filed a complaint for partition of real property in the circuit court against William Kukahiko.
See Akinaka v. Kukahiko,
Civil No. 90-226. In his complaint, Akinaka asked the court to declare that he held a two-thirds interest in certain Hilo, Hawai'i property and that Ku-kahiko held a one-third interest in the property. Akinaka then asked the court for an order to sell the property and to distribute the proceeds to himself and Kukahiko according to their ownership interests. Kuka-
hiko’s attorneys
responded by filing a counterclaim alleging that Kukahiko owned the entire property on the basis of a prior agreement of sale. The counterclaim also alleged that Akinaka held title to the Hilo property as trustee pursuant to a constructive trust and that Kukahiko was entitled to a conveyance of any interest Akinaka held as trustee.
The case went to trial on February 23, 1993. The trial court ultimately found in favor of Akinaka and entered judgment accordingly. The property was subsequently sold and the sale proceeds distributed two-thirds to Akinaka and one-third to Kukahiko.
Akinaka, however, felt that Kukahiko’s attorneys were unethical in prosecuting the counterclaim. In particular, Akinaka argued that the counterclaim was unfounded because Kukahiko’s attorneys withdrew the constructive trust theory at trial and failed to produce any evidence of an “agreement of sale.” Aki-naka also contended that Kukahiko’s attorneys made false or unsubstantiated statements in a number of court pleadings and documents in order to bolster Kukahiko’s claim of ownership in the property.
From 1991 through 1996, Akinaka filed numerous complaints against Kukahiko’s attorneys with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC). After thoroughly investigating each of Akinaka’s allegations, ODC repeatedly concluded that there were no factual or legal bases to support Akinaka’s claims. ODC therefore declined to take any disciplinary action against Kukahiko’s attorneys.
Akinaka, however, was not satisfied with ODC’s decision. On July 11, 1997, Akinaka filed a complaint for declaratory and injunc-tive relief against appellees seeking to force them to bring disciplinary proceedings against Kukahiko’s attorneys.
In his complaint, Akinaka alleged that “Appellees’ refusal to bring disciplinary action against [Kukahiko’s attorneys] was an abuse of discretion and a violation of his First Amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances as set forth in the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution.” Akinaka thereafter asked for a declaratory ruling “that there exists probable cause for the Appellees to prosecute [Kukahiko’s attorneys] for unethical conduct, and that Ap-pellees be ordered to conduct a disciplinary hearing regarding alleged ethical violations by [them].”
Appellees subsequently moved to dismiss the complaint, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. In their motion, appellees argued,
inter alia,
that Akinaka’s lawsuit was barred because they were immune from civil liability.
The trial court eventually agreed with appellees and entered an order finding that “there are no issues of disputed fact and as a matter of law appellees are immune from lawsuit and liability” and dismissed Aki-naka’s complaint with prejudice. Akinaka thereafter appealed.
On appeal, Akinaka argues that the trial court erred in granting appellees’ motion to dismiss because appellees are not immune from an action for prospective declaratory
and injunctive relief. Akinaka also argues that even if appellees are immune under Supreme Court Rule 2.8, that rule violates his first amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances. We do not reach Akinaka’s immunity arguments because we hold that Akinaka did not have standing to file his complaint against appel-lees.
II. JURISDICTION
“Standing is concerned with whether the parties have the right to bring suit.”
Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture,
77 Hawai'i 64, 67, 881 P.2d 1210, 1213 (1994). Although neither the parties nor the trial court considered the question of standing, this court has a duty,
sua sponte,
to determine whether Akinaka had standing to prosecute his complaint against appellees.
State v. Kam,
69 Haw. 483, 488, 748 P.2d 372, 375-76 (1988).
See also Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawai‘i County Planning Commission,
79 Hawai'i 425, 431, 903 P.2d 1246, 1252 (1995) (“[i]t is well-settled that every court must determine as a threshold matter whether it has jurisdiction to decide the issue[s] presented”) (citation, internal quotation marks and elipsis omitted). This is because in “the absence of ripeness and standing, we are without jurisdiction to consider this appeal.”
State v. Moniz,
69 Haw. 370, 373, 742 P.2d 373, 376 (1987).
“It is well settled that the crucial inquiry with regard to standing is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his or her invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his or her behalf.”
In re Application of Matson Navigation Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
81 Hawai'i 270, 275, 916 P.2d 680, 685 (1996). In deciding whether the plaintiff has the requisite interest in the outcome of the litigation, we employ a three-part test: (1) has the plaintiff suffered an actual or threatened injury as a result of the defendant’s wrongful conduct; (2) is the injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions; and (3) would a favorable decision likely provide relief for plaintiffs injury.
Bush v. Watson,
81 Hawai'i 474, 479, 918 P.2d 1130, 1135 (1996).
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PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff-appellant Kenzo Akinaka (Akina-ka) appeals from the judgment of the first circuit court dismissing his complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants-appellees Disciplinary Board of the Hawai'i Supreme Court and Carole R. Richelieu in her capacity as Chief Disciplinary Counsel (appellees). Akinaka filed suit seeking to force appellees to initiate disciplinary proceedings against two attorneys who represented an individual that Akinaka had sued in an earlier partition action. The circuit court, in granting appellees’ motion to dismiss and/or motion for summary judgment, concluded that appellees are immune from lawsuit and liability and dismissed the complaint against them.
For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court but on the alternate ground that Akinaka had no standing to file his complaint against appellees.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 13, 1990, Akinaka filed a complaint for partition of real property in the circuit court against William Kukahiko.
See Akinaka v. Kukahiko,
Civil No. 90-226. In his complaint, Akinaka asked the court to declare that he held a two-thirds interest in certain Hilo, Hawai'i property and that Ku-kahiko held a one-third interest in the property. Akinaka then asked the court for an order to sell the property and to distribute the proceeds to himself and Kukahiko according to their ownership interests. Kuka-
hiko’s attorneys
responded by filing a counterclaim alleging that Kukahiko owned the entire property on the basis of a prior agreement of sale. The counterclaim also alleged that Akinaka held title to the Hilo property as trustee pursuant to a constructive trust and that Kukahiko was entitled to a conveyance of any interest Akinaka held as trustee.
The case went to trial on February 23, 1993. The trial court ultimately found in favor of Akinaka and entered judgment accordingly. The property was subsequently sold and the sale proceeds distributed two-thirds to Akinaka and one-third to Kukahiko.
Akinaka, however, felt that Kukahiko’s attorneys were unethical in prosecuting the counterclaim. In particular, Akinaka argued that the counterclaim was unfounded because Kukahiko’s attorneys withdrew the constructive trust theory at trial and failed to produce any evidence of an “agreement of sale.” Aki-naka also contended that Kukahiko’s attorneys made false or unsubstantiated statements in a number of court pleadings and documents in order to bolster Kukahiko’s claim of ownership in the property.
From 1991 through 1996, Akinaka filed numerous complaints against Kukahiko’s attorneys with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC). After thoroughly investigating each of Akinaka’s allegations, ODC repeatedly concluded that there were no factual or legal bases to support Akinaka’s claims. ODC therefore declined to take any disciplinary action against Kukahiko’s attorneys.
Akinaka, however, was not satisfied with ODC’s decision. On July 11, 1997, Akinaka filed a complaint for declaratory and injunc-tive relief against appellees seeking to force them to bring disciplinary proceedings against Kukahiko’s attorneys.
In his complaint, Akinaka alleged that “Appellees’ refusal to bring disciplinary action against [Kukahiko’s attorneys] was an abuse of discretion and a violation of his First Amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances as set forth in the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution.” Akinaka thereafter asked for a declaratory ruling “that there exists probable cause for the Appellees to prosecute [Kukahiko’s attorneys] for unethical conduct, and that Ap-pellees be ordered to conduct a disciplinary hearing regarding alleged ethical violations by [them].”
Appellees subsequently moved to dismiss the complaint, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. In their motion, appellees argued,
inter alia,
that Akinaka’s lawsuit was barred because they were immune from civil liability.
The trial court eventually agreed with appellees and entered an order finding that “there are no issues of disputed fact and as a matter of law appellees are immune from lawsuit and liability” and dismissed Aki-naka’s complaint with prejudice. Akinaka thereafter appealed.
On appeal, Akinaka argues that the trial court erred in granting appellees’ motion to dismiss because appellees are not immune from an action for prospective declaratory
and injunctive relief. Akinaka also argues that even if appellees are immune under Supreme Court Rule 2.8, that rule violates his first amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances. We do not reach Akinaka’s immunity arguments because we hold that Akinaka did not have standing to file his complaint against appel-lees.
II. JURISDICTION
“Standing is concerned with whether the parties have the right to bring suit.”
Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture,
77 Hawai'i 64, 67, 881 P.2d 1210, 1213 (1994). Although neither the parties nor the trial court considered the question of standing, this court has a duty,
sua sponte,
to determine whether Akinaka had standing to prosecute his complaint against appellees.
State v. Kam,
69 Haw. 483, 488, 748 P.2d 372, 375-76 (1988).
See also Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawai‘i County Planning Commission,
79 Hawai'i 425, 431, 903 P.2d 1246, 1252 (1995) (“[i]t is well-settled that every court must determine as a threshold matter whether it has jurisdiction to decide the issue[s] presented”) (citation, internal quotation marks and elipsis omitted). This is because in “the absence of ripeness and standing, we are without jurisdiction to consider this appeal.”
State v. Moniz,
69 Haw. 370, 373, 742 P.2d 373, 376 (1987).
“It is well settled that the crucial inquiry with regard to standing is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his or her invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his or her behalf.”
In re Application of Matson Navigation Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.,
81 Hawai'i 270, 275, 916 P.2d 680, 685 (1996). In deciding whether the plaintiff has the requisite interest in the outcome of the litigation, we employ a three-part test: (1) has the plaintiff suffered an actual or threatened injury as a result of the defendant’s wrongful conduct; (2) is the injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s actions; and (3) would a favorable decision likely provide relief for plaintiffs injury.
Bush v. Watson,
81 Hawai'i 474, 479, 918 P.2d 1130, 1135 (1996).
With respect to the first prong of this test, the plaintiff “must show a distinct and palpable injury to himself [or herself.]”
Life of the Land v. Land Use Commission of State of Hawai‘i,
63 Haw. 166, 173 n. 6, 623 P.2d 431, 446 n. 6 (1981). The injury must be “distinct and palpable, as opposed to abstract, conjectural, or merely hypothetical.”
Doyle v. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n,
998 F.2d 1559, 1566 (10th Cir.1993) (citations omitted).
III. OVERVIEW OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS IN HAWAIT
Because Akinaka misunderstands the nature and purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings, we begin with an explanation of the disciplinary process in Hawaii.
The attorney disciplinary system in Hawaii is vested in three principal bodies— the Office of Disciplinary Counsel, the Disciplinary Board of the Hawaii Supreme Court, and the Hawaii Supreme Court. The object of the disciplinary process is not to punish lawyers but to protect members of the public and to ensure the orderly and efficient administration of justice by disciplining those attorneys who do not conform to the Hawaii Rules of Professional Conduct:
[ T]he legal profession affords unscrupulous attorneys exceptional opportunities to impose and prey upon those who entrust them with business, and it is essential that members of the profession, in their relation to the public and with clients, shall be strictly honest and worthy of trust and confidence. A certificate of admission to the bar is a representation made by this court that the possessor is worthy of the confidence of clients entrusting their interests to his care. The purpose of disbarment is not punishment of the attorney, but is for the protection of the public and to maintain the integrity of the profession and the dignity of the courts, of which the attorney is an officer.
Disciplinary Board v. Kim,
59 Haw. 449, 455, 583 P.2d 333, 334 (1978).
See also
C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 79 (1986) (“the underlying purpose of disci
plining lawyers is a broad social one. The purpose is not to punish lawyers, but to protect the public, the bar, and legal institutions against lawyers who have demonstrated an unwillingness to comply with minimal professional standards”). To understand the aim of the disciplinary process in Hawaii one must understand how each body functions and how it operates within the disciplinary system.
A.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel “is the day-to-day operational arm of the Disciplinary Board,” Kibe,
Overview of the Hawaii Attorney Discipline System,
22 HAWAII BAR JOURNAL 83, 85 (1990), and has the power and duty “[t]o investigate all matters involving alleged misconduct called to [it’s] attention whether by complaint or otherwise.”
RSCH Rule 2.6(b)(2). Once ODC receives an ethics complaint,
it conducts an investigation to see whether there is evidence that an attorney licensed to practice law in this State or an attorney specially admitted to appear in a particular proceeding in this State has violated, by act or omission, any provision of the Hawaii Rules of Professional Conduct.
See
RSCH Rules 2.1, 2.2(b), and 2.7(a). Following its investigation, ODC may recommend one of the following: (1) that the complaint be dismissed with a finding of no disciplinary misconduct by the attorney;
(2) that non-disciplinary proceedings be initiated for minor misconduct;
(3) that the attorney be informally admonished;
or (4) that formal disciplinary proceedings be instituted.
RSCH Rule 2.7(a).
Because ODC acts in a quasi-prosecutorial manner
in the disciplinary process,
see In re Ruffalo,
390 U.S. 544, 551, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968), it “has full discretion to investigate, reinvestigate, weigh and reweigh actual or likely evidence, charge or not charge, and to reconsider and reverse or modify any decisions with respect to any of the foregoing at any time during the process.”
Doyle v. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n,
998 F.2d at 1566. The decision whether or not to file a formal complaint against an attorney is made by ODC with approval by the Disciplinary Board.
Once ODC makes its recommendation, the proposal is then reviewed by one of the two Disciplinary Board members assigned for that purpose. RSCH Rules 2.4(d) and 2.7(a). If the first Board member concurs with ODC’s recommendation, the recommendation is thereafter implemented. RSCH Rule 2.7(a). If, however, the initial Board member disagrees with ODC’s recommendation, ODC may request that the second Board member review its recommendation. The decision of the second Board member is final. RSCH Rule 2.7(a).
B.
Disciplinary Board of the Hawai‘i Supreme Court
The Disciplinary Board is comprised of eighteen individuals who are appointed by the supreme court and serve staggered three-year terms. RSCH Rules 2.4(a) and 2.4(b). The Disciplinary Board has the power and duty to investigate ethics complaints and attorney incapacity, RSCH Rule 2.4(e)(1), supervise the ODC, RSCH Rule 2.4(e)(2), adopt rules governing attorney discipline procedures, RSCH Rule 2.4(e)(5), adopt and publish advisory opinions, RSCH Rule 2.4(e)(6), and act as a reviewing body in which formal disciplinary action is taken. RSCH Rules 2.4(e)(3) and 2.5. In the event that formal disciplinary action is taken, the board chairperson assigns a hearing committee or officer to conduct the appropriate proceedings.
See supra
note 9 and accompanying text.
The bedrock principle that the attorney disciplinary process is for the protection of the general public and the administration of justice is reaffirmed by having a large number of non-lawyers serve on the Disciplinary Board.
“The presence of lay members on the Board ensures that the attorney discipline system remains accountable to the public. The participation of non-lawyers on the Board enhances the credibility of the lawyer ethics process and defeats allegations that complaints against lawyers are simply ‘swept under the rug’ by their peers.” Kibe,
Overview of the Hawaii Attorney Discipline System,
22 HAWAII BAR JOURNAL at 85.
See also
Devlin,
The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the United States,
4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911, 939 (1994) (“[j]udicial branch authority over a lawyer disciplinary system with public members assures that protection of the public is the primary purpose_ Non-lawyer participation provides assurance to the public that the disciplinary system is serving its interests, rather than those of individual lawyers”).
C.
Hawai'i Supreme Court
This court has the ultimate responsibility to “regulate the practice of law in this state and to ensure that the integrity of the profession is maintained by disciplining attor
neys who indulge in practices inconsistent with the high ethical standards demanded of all members of the bar.”
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lau,
79 Hawai'i 201, 207, 900 P.2d 777, 783 (1995) (citation omitted).
See also In re Corey,
55 Haw. 47, 48, 515 P.2d 400, 401 (1973),
cert. denied,
417 U.S. 911, 94 S.Ct. 2609, 41 L.Ed.2d 215 (1974) (“[t]his court has jurisdiction over matters concerning disciplinary action of members of the bar”);
In re Trask,
46 Haw. 404, 415, 380 P.2d 751, 758 (1963) (“[t]he power to regulate the admission to practice and disbarment or disciplining of attorneys is judicial in nature and is inherent in the courts”).
Although ODC and the Disciplinary Board can impose remedial measures and lesser forms of sanctions against attorneys, only this court can impose the more severe disciplinary sanctions against an attorney for ethical misconduct.
See
RSCH Rule 2.3(a) (only the supreme court can disbar, suspend, or publicly censure an attorney for ethical misconduct). However, even these “[d]egrees of discipline must be disassociated with the concept of punishment for wrongdoing[.]”
State Bar of Michigan v. Block,
9 Mich.App. 698, 158 N.W.2d 49, 54 (1968). For again, “[t]he purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings is to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have not discharged, will not discharge, or are unlikely properly to discharge their professional duties to clients, the public the legal system, and the legal profession.” ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions Std 1.1,
reprinted in
SELECTED STATUTES RULES AND STANDARDS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 347, 358 (1990). The attorney disciplinary process is therefore not necessarily concerned with the individual client,
but rather with “the professional conduct and ethics of the attorney dealing with the client[.]”
Block,
158 N.W.2d at 54.
IV. AKINAKA DOES NOT HAVE STANDING
Because of the nature and purpose of our disciplinary process, we reiterate that AMnaka had no standing to file his complaint against appellees because (1) AMnaka has no recognizable interest in the outcome of the ODC’s investigation against Kukahiko’s attorneys, and, therefore, (2) AMnaka was not injured by ODC’s refusal to institute disciplinary proceedings against Kukahiko’s attorneys.
“We note first that a private person or a lawyer has no standing to participate in a disciplinary proceeding.”
Application of Phillips,
510 F.2d 126, 126 (2d Cir.1975). This is because the private individual has no interest in the outcome of a disciplinary proceeding, inasmuch as the purpose of the disciplinary system is to protect the general public and the legal profession, not the private individual, from attorneys who commit professional misconduct.
See, e.g., Cotton v. Steele,
255 Neb. 892, 587 N.W.2d 693, 699 (1999). As such, AMnaka, or any complainant for that matter, has no standing to participate in the disciplinary process because “one does not have standing to assert a violation of rights belonging to another, since the person entitled to a right is the only one who can be
directly
injured by its deprivation.”
Doyle,
998 F.2d at 1566. “The only one who stands to suffer direct injury in a disciplinary proceeding is the lawyer involved. [The complainant] has no more standing to insert himself substantively into a license-based discipline system than he has to compel the
issuance
of a license.”
Id.
at 1567.
Moreover, AMnaka acquires no tangible benefit by participating in the disciplinary process. For when an attorney is disciplined for ethical misconduct, the purpose of such discipline is to correct the unprofessional conduct and/or to suspend the attorney from the practice of law until such remedial measures can be absorbed. This imposed discipline is not punishment, does not provide “a means of redress for one claiming to have been personally wronged by an attorney[,]”
Cotton,
587 N.W.2d at 699, and does not
translate into a cause of action that accrues to the private individual against the attorney.
AMnaka’s only function, as the complainant, in the disciplinary process is to supply evidence of the alleged attorney malfeasance to ODC.
See Ramos Colon v. United States Attorney for the District of Puerto Rico,
576 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1978);
Starr v. Mandanici,
152 F.3d 741, 748 (8th Cir.1998) (the complainant’s “role begins and ends with the filing of his ethics grievance”). Akinaka has no right to dictate the course of an investigation or even compel ODC to take any action on his complaint. To conclude otherwise, as Akinaka would have us do,
would mean that complainants, who have no actual stake in the outcome of disciplinary proceedings, could force ODC to conduct a full-scale investigation and hearing into every complaint it receives, regardless of whether that complaint is unfounded or frivolous. This would not only be an absurd waste of time and resources,
but it would also effectively usurp the discretionary authority that ODC has in considering whether to prosecute an ethics complaint against a lawyer,
see Doyle,
998 F.2d at 1566; C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 101,
and would also distort the aim and purpose of the disciplinary process.
Finally, because the disciplinary process is designed to protect the public and the legal profession, not the private individual, from unprofessional attorneys, Akinaka suffered no cognizable injury when ODC refused to commence disciplinary proceedings against Kukahiko’s attorneys:
Thus, when a citizen files a disciplinary complaint, there are two possible outcomes: either some form of discipline is assessed against the attorney or no discipline is assessed. Neither result confers any legally cognizable benefit or causes
any legally cognizable injury to the complainant who initiated the proceeding. Stated another way, one who files a disciplinary complaint against an attorney has no personal stake in the outcome of the proceeding other than whatever personal satisfaction or disappointment he or she may derive therefrom. The disposition of the disciplinary action does not deprive the complainant of any civil remedy he or she may have against the attorney who was the subject of the complaint.
Our system for disciplining attorneys exists for the protection of the public and not as a means of redress for one claiming to have been personally wronged by an attorney. Thus, any dereliction of duty of the part of Counsel for Discipline or his or her staff that results in failure to discipline an attorney who should be disciplined poses a risk of injury to the general public, not to any particular individual. Generally, sufficient standing as a party in litigation may not be based merely on a general interest common to all members of the public.
Cotton,
587 N.W.2d at 699.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the circuit court but on the ground that Akinaka lacked standing to bring suit against appel-lees.
Poe v. Hawai‘i Labor Relations Board,
87 Hawai'i 191, 197, 953 P.2d 569, 575 (1998) (“Where the circuit court’s decision is correct, its conclusion will not be disturbed on the ground that it gave the wrong reason for its ruling.”)