Akilul Solomun-Gebremadhen v. Norbal Vasquez, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 AKLILU SOLOMUN-GEBREMADHEN, Case No. 1:26-cv-00237-JLT-EPG (HC)

12 Petitioner, ORDER CONVERTING THE MATTER TO A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION1; GRANTING 13 v. THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN PART; AND REFERRING THE MATTER TO 14 NORBAL VASQUEZ, et al., THE ASSIGNED MAGISTRATE

15 Respondents. (Doc. 3) 16 I. INTRODUCTION 17 Before the Court is Akilul Solomun-Gebremadhen’s request for a temporary restraining 18 order (Doc. 3). He filed it with his petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. 19 § 2241 to challenge his ongoing detention. (Doc. 1.) Having evaluated the TRO request, 20 Respondents’ opposition, (Doc. 10) and Petitioner’s reply (Doc. 11), the Court converts the 21 matter into a motion for preliminary injunction, GRANTS that motion IN PART, and REFERS 22 the matter to the assigned magistrate judge for a determination on the merits. 23 II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 24 Petitioner is a citizen of Eretria who entered the United States without inspection on or 25 about September 24, 2024 near Sasabe, Arizona, where he was encountered by DHS. (Doc. 1 at 26 2; Doc. 10 at 2.) To the officers, Petitioner expressed a fear of returning to Eretria, and he was 27

28 1 The parties agreed that the motion for temporary restraining order could be converted to a preliminary 1 subsequently referred for a credible fear interview by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 2 (“USCIS”) pursuant to INA § 235(b)(1). (Doc. 1 at 2.) Petitioner established that he had a 3 credible fear of persecution after being imprisoned and punished in Eretria for evading 4 compulsory military service. (Id.) Consequently, the officers placed him into immigration 5 proceedings for adjudication of his claims for protection. (Id.) 6 Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear in Immigration Court, which charged him as an 7 alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled pursuant to INA §§ 8 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212 (a)(7)(A)(i). (Doc. 10 at 2.) In mid-December, Petitioner was given an 9 Order of Release on Recognizance (“OREC”) under INA § 236/8 USC § 1226(a)(2). Petitioner 10 asserts that he has no criminal history, has filed a Form I-589 asylum application, and has 11 complied with all OREC requirements. (Doc. 3 at 5.) Even still, on December 17, 2025, at a 12 regular ICE check-in, he was detained. He is currently held at the Mesa Verde ICE Processing 13 Facility in Bakersfield, California. (Id.) Respondents assert Petitioner’s OREC was revoked due 14 to a violation of his release when officers tried to reach him by phone to complete a biometric 15 check-in, they were unable to do so. (Doc. 10-1 at 18) The government opposes the issuance of 16 preliminary injunctive relief and maintains that Petitioner’s detention is “mandatory” under 17 expedited removal procedures set forth at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (See generally Doc. 10.) 18 III. LEGAL STANDARD 19 The standard governing the issuing of a TRO is “substantially identical” to the standard 20 for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 21 F.3d 832, 839 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2001). A party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish: (1) 22 they are “likely to succeed on the merits” of their claims, (2) they are “likely to suffer irreparable 23 harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction,” (3) “the balance of equities tips in [their] 24 favor” and (4) “an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 25 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see also Ctr. For Food Safety v. Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2011) 26 (“After Winter, ‘plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in 27 order to obtain a preliminary injunction.’”). 28 The party seeking a preliminary injunction has the burden to “make a showing on all four 1 prongs” of the Winter test to obtain a preliminary injunction. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. 2 Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) 3 (holding that the moving party has “the burden of persuasion”); see also Hecox v. Little, 104 4 F.4th 1061, 1073 (9th Cir. 2023). The Court may weigh the request for a preliminary injunction 5 with a sliding-scale approach. Alliance, at 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, a stronger showing 6 on the balance of hardships may support the issuance of a preliminary injunction where there are 7 “serious questions on the merits … so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of 8 irreparable injury, and that the injunction is in the public interest.” Id. Finally, “a preliminary 9 injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. 10 IV. ANALYSIS 11 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 12 This first factor “is the most important” under Winter, and “is especially important when 13 a plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation and injury.” Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1041 (9th 14 Cir. 2023). Petitioner argues he is likely to succeed on his claim that Respondents violated his 15 Fifth Amendment Due Process rights when he was detained without notice or provided a custody 16 hearing before a neutral arbiter. (Doc. 3 at 9-16.) 17 The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits government deprivation of an 18 individual’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Hernandez v. Session, 872 F.3d 19 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the borders of 20 the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) 21 (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the United States, including 22 noncitizens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”). These 23 due process rights extend to immigration proceedings. Id. at 693–94. “Even when the 24 government has discretion to detain an individual, its subsequent decision to release the 25 individual creates ‘an implicit promise’ that she will be re-detained only if she violates the 26 conditions of her release.” Garro Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-CV-05632-PCP, --- F. Supp. 3d. ----, 27 2025 WL 3691938, at *30 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2025) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 28 482 (1972)). Other courts, including this Court, have held similarly. J.E.H.G. v. Chestnut, No. 1 1:25-CV-01673-JLT-SKO, 2025 WL 3523108, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025) (citing Doe v. 2 Becerra, No. 2:25-CV-00647-DJC-DMC, 2025 WL 691664, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025)). 3 In analyzing procedural due process claims such as this one, courts must first determine 4 whether a protected liberty interest exists under the Due Process Clause. See Kentucky Dep’t of 5 Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989.) If a protected liberty interest is found to 6 exist, the court then must examine whether the procedures necessary to ensure that any 7 deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. (Id.) To the extent 8 that Respondents substantively address Petitioner’s due process argument, they deploy a blanket 9 assertion that Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” subject to mandatory detention under 8 10 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) of the INA and therefore categorically ineligible for a bond hearing. 11 (Doc. 10 at 4.) 12 Respondents also rely on Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 13 (1953) and its progeny for the proposition that the Fifth Amendment does not apply to Petitioner. 14 (Id. at 8.) This Court has rejected this exact argument on numerous occasions. See e.g., M.R.R. v. 15 Chestnut, No. 1:25-CV-01517-JLT-SKO, 2025 WL 3265446, at 10* (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025). 16 Although Petitioner’s claim is ultimately constitutional in nature, it turns on whether 17 section 1225(b) or section 1226(a) justify Petitioner’s re-detention. Courts nationwide, including 18 this one, have overwhelmingly rejected Respondents’ new legal position and found the DHS 19 policy unlawful. See, e.g., Ortiz Donis v. Chestnut, 1:25-CV-01228-JLT, 2025 WL 2879514 at 20 *3–6 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025); see also, M.R.R. v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-CV-01517-JLT, 2025 WL 21 3265446 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025); Hortua v. Chestnut, et al., No. 1:25-cv-01670-TLN-JDP, 22 2025 WL 3525916 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025); Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-CV-6582 23 (LAK), ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) 24 (estimating over 350 cases ruled the DHS policy improper across 160 different judges sitting in 25 about 50 different courts nationwide); Mirley Adriana Bautista Pico, et al. v. Kristi Noem, et al., 26 No. 25-CV-08002-JST, 2025 WL 3295382, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2025) (collecting cases); 27 Armando Modesto Estrada-Samayoa v. Orestes Cruz, et al., No. 1:25-CV-01565-EFB (HC), 28 2025 WL 3268280, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025) (collecting cases). 1 Even assuming Respondents are correct that § 1225(b) is the applicable detention 2 authority for all “applicants for admission,” Respondents fail to meaningfully contend with the 3 liberty interest created by the fact that the Petitioner in this case was released on recognizance in 4 September 2024 before the current manifestation of this interpretation. Thus, the Court must 5 evaluate the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-335 (1976), to 6 determine whether the procedures (or lack thereof) that have been applied to Petitioner are 7 sufficient to protect the liberty interest at issue. Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921at *3. In Mathews, the 8 Court determined the following: 9 [O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three 10 distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 11 interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 12 Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 13 procedural requirement would entail. 14 During his year on parole, Petitioner built a life outside detention. Petitioner has a substantial 15 private interest in being out of custody and his detention denies him that liberty interest. 16 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“Freedom from imprisonment—from government 17 custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the 18 Due Process] Clause protects.”). 19 In Rocha Chavarria v. Chestnut, the Court recently found that the Petitioner had 20 demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his procedural due process claim because 21 (1) he had demonstrated a liberty interest in his continued release, and (2) that his continued 22 detention without written notice and a hearing was unlawful. Rocha Chavarria v. Chestnut, No. 23 1:25-cv-1755-DAD-AC, 2025 WL 3533606, *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025). The court ordered the 24 immediate release of Petitioner who allegedly “incurred compliance violations” that were not 25 identified and where respondents did not suggest the alleged violations were the reason for 26 petitioner’s re-detention. (Id.) See also, Gholami v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-CV-01644-DAD-DMC 27 (HC), 2025 WL 3640675 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2025) (construing Respondent’s non- 28 responsiveness and unsubstantiated allegations of release violations as concessions that the 1 present matter and Rocha Chavarria were not substantively distinguishable). 2 Unlike the Respondents in Rocha Chavarria, Petitioner’s failure to complete a self-report 3 check-in and to provide immigration officials with up-to-date contact information constitutes 4 sufficient, independent verifiable supporting evidence regarding the quantity, nature and 5 substance of Petitioner’s alleged reporting violations and rationale for re-arresting him. C.f. 6 C.A.R.V. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01395-JLT-SKO, 2025 WL 3059549, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 7 2025) (finding “key factual assertions” made by Respondents were not adequately supported 8 when the deportation officer did not state the “basis for personal knowledge for the facts claimed 9 in his declaration.”). 10 Nevertheless, the Court finds there is at least some risk of erroneous deprivation under 11 the present circumstances, with the record suggesting several reasons why Petitioner’s detention 12 may not be justified. First, in 2024, in releasing him on parole, DHS necessarily concluded that 13 he was not a flight risk or danger to the community. Noori v. LaRose, et al., 2025 WL 2800149, 14 at 13* (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025) (In general, ‘[r]elease reflects a determination by the government 15 that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.’” Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. 16 Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions, 905 F.3d 17 1137 (9th Cir. 2018).” 18 The Supreme Court has held that “the Constitution requires some kind of a hearing 19 before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 20 127 (1990) (emphasis in original). However, the Court also recognized that there may be 21 situations that urgently require arrest, in which a prompt post-deprivation hearing is appropriate. 22 Id. at 128 (noting there may be “special case[s]” where a pre-deprivation hearing is 23 impracticable); Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-05436-RFL, 2025 WL 1983677, at *9 24 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025) (“absent evidence of urgent concerns, a pre-deprivation hearing is 25 required to satisfy due process, particularly where an individual has been released on bond by an 26 IJ”). The rapidly developing caselaw on this subject gives limited guidance as to where this line 27 should be drawn. Some courts that have addressed detention-related habeas petitions brought by 28 persons released with enhanced supervision conditions have required pre-deprivation process, 1 but in somewhat different circumstances. In E.A.T.-B. v. Wamsley, No. C25-1192-KKE, 2025 2 WL 2402130, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 19, 2025), the district court ordered the release of a 3 petitioner arrested by ICE immediately after appearing in immigration court. That court agreed 4 with the petitioner that ICE’s post hoc explanation that violations warranted his detention was 5 pretextual, given that ICE first became aware of petitioner’s alleged violations a few hours 6 before his immigration hearing, DHS did not raise those violations at the hearing or argue the 7 petitioner should be detained for any reason, and the petitioner was then provided multiple, 8 inconsistent justifications for his arrest. Id. In Arzate v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00942-KES-SKO 9 (HC), 2025 WL 2230521, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2025), converted to preliminary injunction 10 sub nom, 2025 WL 2411010, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2025), the court ordered immediate 11 release of in immigration detainee who had been in compliance with his conditions of release, 12 even though he had incurred a misdemeanor arrest while on parole, in part because no charges 13 were ever filed. 14 In contrast, this Court ordered a bond hearing in Martinez Hernandez v. Andrews, No. 15 1:25-CV-01035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025), where the petitioner’s 16 records indicated numerous violations. Though Martinez Hernandez offered explanations for the 17 violations and there was a dispute of fact as to whether the violations occurred, ICE’s reliance 18 upon those violations was “not obviously pretexual.” Id. at * 12 (“If Respondent’s view of the 19 facts is correct, it is at least arguable that providing Petitioner with notice and a pre-deprivation 20 hearing would have been impracticable and/or would have motivated his flight.”). As this Court 21 noted in Martinez Hernandez: 22 In similar circumstances, courts have refused to release the petitioners but have ordered timely bond hearings. Carballo v. 23 Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00978-KES-EPG (HC), 2025 WL 2381464, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2025), citing Perera v. 24 Jennings, et. al, No. 21-CV-04136-BLF, 2021 WL 2400981, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2021); Pham v. Becerra, No. 23-CV-01288- 25 CRB, 2023 WL 2744397, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2023). “[A]llowing a neutral arbiter to review the facts would significantly 26 reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation.” Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-05436-RFL, 2025 WL 1983677, at *8 (N.D. 27 Cal. July 17, 2025). Thus, the Court concludes that prompt, post- deprivation process is required here. 28 1 Id. Finally, as to the third Mathews factor, this Court concludes that the government’s interest in 2 detaining Petitioner without proper process is slight. “Since respondents did not engage with 3 Petitioner’s due process arguments, they have not provided the court with any information 4 regarding the burden on the government.” Rocha Chavarria, 2025 WL 3533606, at *4. In sum, 5 sum, the Court concludes that Petitioner has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits 6 on his due process claim. 7 B. Remaining Preliminary Injunction Factors 8 The remaining preliminary injunction factors—irreparable harm, the balance of equities, 9 and the public interest—decidedly weigh in favor of Petitioner. “[I]t is well established that the 10 deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. 11 Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)); 12 see also Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 767 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Deprivation of physical 13 liberty by detention constitutes irreparable harm.”). By successfully demonstrating that 14 Respondents lack a basis to detain him, Petitioner has succeeded in showing irreparable harm. 15 As to the final two Winter factors, “[w]hen the government is a party, the analysis of the 16 balance of the hardships and the public interest merge.” Nat'l Urban League v. Ross, 484 F. 17 Supp. 3d 802, 807 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 18 1092 (9th Cir. 2014)). The Court finds there is no equitable reason that would tip the balance in 19 the Government's favor. Though the government has a compelling interest in enforcing the 20 immigration laws, granting relief to Petitioner will not seriously impinge its ability to do so. The 21 Government “cannot reasonably assert that it is harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being 22 enjoined from constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. U.S. Immigr. & Nat. Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 23 (9th Cir. 1983). Moreover, “the public has a strong interest in upholding procedural protections 24 against unlawful detention, and the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the costs to the public of 25 immigration detention are staggering.” Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-cv-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at 26 *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (quoting Jorge M.F. v. Wilkinson, No, 21-cv-01434, 2021 WL 27 783561, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021)). In sum, the last two Winter factors also weigh in 28 Petitioner's favor. 1} V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 2 1. Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 3) is converted to a 3 | Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and it is GRANTED in PART. 4 2. Petitioner SHALL be provided a substantive bond hearing no later than 5 | February 17, 2026, at which the Immigration Judge will determine whether Petitioner poses a 6 | risk of flight or a danger to the community if he is released. 7 3. At any such hearing, the Government SHALL bear the burden of establishing, by 8 | clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of 9 | flight, and Petitioner SHALL be allowed to have counsel present. 10 4. The bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is waived. See 11 | Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2011). Courts regularly waive security in cases 12 | like this one. See, e.g., Zakzouk v. Becerra, No. 25-cv-06254, 2025 WL 2899220, at *8 (N.D. 13 | Cal. Oct. 10, 2025). 14 5. The parties are directed to meet and confer no later than 14 days from the 15 | date of the entry of this order, and, if possible, submit a joint proposed briefing schedule 16 | discussing the abeyance of further proceedings on the merits pending the 9" Circuit Appeal of 17 | Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, 779 F.Supp.3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025). If the parties are unable 18 | to agree to a joint proposed briefing schedule, the Court will rule on the request. 19 6. The government may file a further brief on the merits of the habeas petition 20 | within 30 days. Alternatively, as soon as it can within that 30-day period, the government may 21 | file a notice that it does not intend to file further briefing. If the government files an additional 22 | brief, Petitioner may file a further brief within 30 days thereafter. 23 5. The matter is referred to the assigned magistrate judge for consideration of the 24 | merits of the petition as quickly as possible. 25 26 IT IS SO ORDERED. | Dated: _February 3, 2026 Charis [Tourn TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28