[402]*402OPINION OF THE COURT BY
NAKAMURA, J.
The Hawaii Public Employment Relations Board (HPERB), concluding that no wilful violations of HRS § 89-13 had been committed by the Hawaii State Teachers Association (HSTA), dismissed the prohibited practice complaints brought by thirteen public school teachers. HPERB’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order dismissing the complaints were affirmed by the First Circuit Court, and the teachers have sought further judicial review of the administrative decision. After a thorough examination of the record, we likewise arrive at a decision that HPERB’s findings and its construction of applicable statutory provisions are not clearly erroneous.
I.
Under the system for collective bargaining in the public sector authorized by HRS Chapter 89, public employees are accorded “the right of self-organization and the right to form, join, or assist any employee organization for the purpose of bargaining collectively.”1 But employees are also free “to [403]*403refrain from any or all . . . activities [related to collective bargaining], except to the extent of making . . . payment of service fees to an exclusive representative [of an appropriate bargaining unit] as provided in section 89-4.”2
The thirteen teachers who have appealed belong to Bargaining Unit 5, which has been designated an appropriate unit for collective bargaining pursuant to HRS § 89-6, and HSTA [404]*404has been chosen by a majority of the members therein as the exclusive representative of the unit. Although twelve of the thirteen teachers did not belong to the employee organization during relevant times, all of them were nevertheless subject to the payroll deductions for “reasonable service fees necessary to defray the costs for . . . services rendered [by HSTA] in negotiating and administering... [the collective-bargaining] agreement” on behalf of the bargaining unit. See note 2 supra.
On January 13, 1978, each appellant filed a prohibited practice complaint with HPERB, alleging HSTA had, since July 1976,3 improperly expended moneys received as service fees for partisan political and union membership purposes in violation of HRS § 89-13(b)(l) and 89-13(b)(4).4 The specific remedy sought was either reimbursement or credit for any portion of the service fees disbursed in violation of HRS § 89-13.
The hearing on the complaints commenced shortly thereafter. After conducting several sessions, HPERB continued the case in order to consider HSTA’s Petition for Modification of Service Fee, which sought an increase in the service fees payable by employees in Bargaining Unit 5 for the fiscal year [405]*405beginning July 1, 1978.5 The requested raise in fees was approved in November of 1978, and the Board subsequently resumed the continued hearing. HPERB Decision 129, the subject of this appeal, was issued on June 13, 1980. The decision, a fifty-two page document, consisted of detailed findings of fact and lengthy conclusions of law. Though HPERB found “HSTA made expenditures out of service fees during the subject period in program areas clearly outside the scope of permissible service fee expenditures,” it nonetheless concluded
that no prohibited practices as described in Subsection 89-13(b)(l) and (4), HRS, have occurred for the reasons that no willful violations of Complainant employees’ rights have occurred such as would make out a case under Subsection 89-13(b)(l), and no unreasonable expenditures of service fee monies have willfully been undertaken such as would make out a case under Subsection 89-13(b)(4).
HPERB therefore dismissed the complaints.
An appeal of the decision to the circuit court followed, and the court upon review of the record affirmed the decision in all respects. A timely request for further judicial review was perfected.
The questions posed on the appeal to this court are: (1) whether HPERB erred in concluding HSTA’s legislative and Constitutional Convention (Con-Con) lobbying efforts during the relevant period were confined to areas directly related to teachers’ working conditions and therefore were chargeable to HSTA’s service fee account; (2) whether HPERB erred in holding certain articles and editorials that appeared in various issues of the organization’s news organ, Teacher Advocate, were political news items rather than candidate endorsements and therefore chargeable to the service fee account; (3) whether HPERB incorrectly interpreted the term “wilfully” as it appears in HRS § 89-13(b); and (4) whether HPERB erred in concluding certain expenditures made by HSTA did not [406]*406amount to violations of HRS § 89-13(b)(l) and 89-13(b)(4) because they were not made with “conscious, knowing, and deliberate intent” to violate HRS Chapter 89.
II.
Judicial review of decisions rendered by administrative tribunals like HPERB is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, which in pertinent part provides that:
Upon review of the record the court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case with instructions for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision and order if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, conclusions, decisions, or orders are:
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.
HRS § 91-14(g). Under the clearly erroneous test articulated above, a reviewing court will not disturb agency findings and conclusions unless it is left, after examining the record, with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” DeFries v. Association of Owners, 57 Haw. 296, 302, 555 P.2d 855, 859 (1976); see also Wailuku Sugar Co. v. Agsalud, 65 Haw. 146, 148, 648 P.2d 1107, 1110 (1982); McGlone v. Inaba, 64 Haw. 27, 34, 636 P.2d 158, 163 (1981); In re Hawaii Electric Light Co., 60 Haw. 625, 629, 594 P.2d 612, 616-17 (1979); In re Kauai Electric Division of Citizens Utility Co., 60 Haw. 166, 186, 590 P.2d 524, 538 (1978).
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[402]*402OPINION OF THE COURT BY
NAKAMURA, J.
The Hawaii Public Employment Relations Board (HPERB), concluding that no wilful violations of HRS § 89-13 had been committed by the Hawaii State Teachers Association (HSTA), dismissed the prohibited practice complaints brought by thirteen public school teachers. HPERB’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order dismissing the complaints were affirmed by the First Circuit Court, and the teachers have sought further judicial review of the administrative decision. After a thorough examination of the record, we likewise arrive at a decision that HPERB’s findings and its construction of applicable statutory provisions are not clearly erroneous.
I.
Under the system for collective bargaining in the public sector authorized by HRS Chapter 89, public employees are accorded “the right of self-organization and the right to form, join, or assist any employee organization for the purpose of bargaining collectively.”1 But employees are also free “to [403]*403refrain from any or all . . . activities [related to collective bargaining], except to the extent of making . . . payment of service fees to an exclusive representative [of an appropriate bargaining unit] as provided in section 89-4.”2
The thirteen teachers who have appealed belong to Bargaining Unit 5, which has been designated an appropriate unit for collective bargaining pursuant to HRS § 89-6, and HSTA [404]*404has been chosen by a majority of the members therein as the exclusive representative of the unit. Although twelve of the thirteen teachers did not belong to the employee organization during relevant times, all of them were nevertheless subject to the payroll deductions for “reasonable service fees necessary to defray the costs for . . . services rendered [by HSTA] in negotiating and administering... [the collective-bargaining] agreement” on behalf of the bargaining unit. See note 2 supra.
On January 13, 1978, each appellant filed a prohibited practice complaint with HPERB, alleging HSTA had, since July 1976,3 improperly expended moneys received as service fees for partisan political and union membership purposes in violation of HRS § 89-13(b)(l) and 89-13(b)(4).4 The specific remedy sought was either reimbursement or credit for any portion of the service fees disbursed in violation of HRS § 89-13.
The hearing on the complaints commenced shortly thereafter. After conducting several sessions, HPERB continued the case in order to consider HSTA’s Petition for Modification of Service Fee, which sought an increase in the service fees payable by employees in Bargaining Unit 5 for the fiscal year [405]*405beginning July 1, 1978.5 The requested raise in fees was approved in November of 1978, and the Board subsequently resumed the continued hearing. HPERB Decision 129, the subject of this appeal, was issued on June 13, 1980. The decision, a fifty-two page document, consisted of detailed findings of fact and lengthy conclusions of law. Though HPERB found “HSTA made expenditures out of service fees during the subject period in program areas clearly outside the scope of permissible service fee expenditures,” it nonetheless concluded
that no prohibited practices as described in Subsection 89-13(b)(l) and (4), HRS, have occurred for the reasons that no willful violations of Complainant employees’ rights have occurred such as would make out a case under Subsection 89-13(b)(l), and no unreasonable expenditures of service fee monies have willfully been undertaken such as would make out a case under Subsection 89-13(b)(4).
HPERB therefore dismissed the complaints.
An appeal of the decision to the circuit court followed, and the court upon review of the record affirmed the decision in all respects. A timely request for further judicial review was perfected.
The questions posed on the appeal to this court are: (1) whether HPERB erred in concluding HSTA’s legislative and Constitutional Convention (Con-Con) lobbying efforts during the relevant period were confined to areas directly related to teachers’ working conditions and therefore were chargeable to HSTA’s service fee account; (2) whether HPERB erred in holding certain articles and editorials that appeared in various issues of the organization’s news organ, Teacher Advocate, were political news items rather than candidate endorsements and therefore chargeable to the service fee account; (3) whether HPERB incorrectly interpreted the term “wilfully” as it appears in HRS § 89-13(b); and (4) whether HPERB erred in concluding certain expenditures made by HSTA did not [406]*406amount to violations of HRS § 89-13(b)(l) and 89-13(b)(4) because they were not made with “conscious, knowing, and deliberate intent” to violate HRS Chapter 89.
II.
Judicial review of decisions rendered by administrative tribunals like HPERB is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, which in pertinent part provides that:
Upon review of the record the court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case with instructions for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision and order if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, conclusions, decisions, or orders are:
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.
HRS § 91-14(g). Under the clearly erroneous test articulated above, a reviewing court will not disturb agency findings and conclusions unless it is left, after examining the record, with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” DeFries v. Association of Owners, 57 Haw. 296, 302, 555 P.2d 855, 859 (1976); see also Wailuku Sugar Co. v. Agsalud, 65 Haw. 146, 148, 648 P.2d 1107, 1110 (1982); McGlone v. Inaba, 64 Haw. 27, 34, 636 P.2d 158, 163 (1981); In re Hawaii Electric Light Co., 60 Haw. 625, 629, 594 P.2d 612, 616-17 (1979); In re Kauai Electric Division of Citizens Utility Co., 60 Haw. 166, 186, 590 P.2d 524, 538 (1978).
We have further acknowledged that “[i]n order to preserve the function of administrative agencies in discharging their delegated duties and the function of this court in reviewing agency determinations, a presumption of validity is accorded to decisions of administrative bodies acting within their sphere of expertise.” In re Hawaii Electric Light Co., 60 Haw. at 630, 594 P.2d at 617. Judicial deference to agency expertise has also been a guiding precept where the interpretation and application of broad or ambiguous statutory language by an administrative tribunal are the subject of review. For we have [407]*407recognized the wisdom of
a well established rule of statutory construction that, where an administrative agency is charged with the responsibility of carrying out the mandate of a statute which contains words of broad and indefinite meaning, courts accord persuasive weight to administrative construction and follow the same, unless the construction is palpably erroneous. Estrin v. Moss, 221 Tenn. 657, 430 S.W.2d 345 (1968); Udall v. Tollman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965); Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933).
Treloar v. Swinerton & Walberg Co., 65 Haw. 415, 424, 653 P.2d 420, 426 (1982) (quoting Waikiki Resort Hotel v. City & County, 63 Haw. 222, 242-43, 624 P.2d 1353, 1368 (1981)).
The voluminous record proffered for our scrutiny discloses the circuit court was indeed mindful of the standard forjudging agency determinations.
III.
Appellants, however, urge the circuit court nevertheless erred in affirming HPERB’s decision that HSTA’s expenditures for lobbying, other than those related to efforts directed toward securing legislative ratification of collective bargaining agreements, were permissible uses of service fees. They strenuously argue the court also erred when it affirmed the agency determination that expenses covering the publication of certain articles and editorials in the Teacher Advocate, political in nature, were still permissible expenditures of service fee moneys. But we are convinced from our own review that the foregoing HPERB rulings are reasonable and not clearly erroneous.
In its discussion of the line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible uses of service fees by employee organizations in Decision 129, HPERB noted it had previously expounded at length on the issue. The decision underscored what had been emphasized in HPERB Decisions 94, 78, and 7 with respect to the crucial statutory language, “costs for . . . services rendered in negotiating and administering an agreement.” That the Board viewed the phrase as “a term of art... [describing] a complex, comprehensive ongoing process of [408]*408union representation of all employees in the bargaining unit” was reiterated.6 And the task of separating allowable costs from the “so-called ‘union membership’ costs” was characterized again as “almost impossible.”7 We would have to agree that the duty of allocation delegated to HPERB by the legislature is by no means simple and may be well-nigh impossible. For as the Supreme Court has observed, “[t]here will, of course, be difficult problems in drawing lines between collective-bargaining activities, for which contributions may be compelled, and ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining, for which such compulsion is prohibited.” Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977). Moreover, “in the public sector the line may be somewhat hazier” than in the private. Id.
We have combed through the record with these considerations and the statutory standard of review in mind to decide Whether there is merit in appellants’ assertion that the chronicle [409]*409of proceedings before the Board cannot sustain the decisions reached by HPERB and the circuit court. But the record gives no support to this claim. Rather, we are convinced by our reading thereof that HPERB’s findings and conclusions regarding HSTA’s lobbying activities and publication of news articles and editorials in the Teacher Advocate are reasonable and supportable. The obvious mistake demanded for reversal of an agency decision does not appear. HRS § 91-14(g); see also In re Hawaii Electric Light Co., 60 Haw. at 630, 594 P.2d at 617; In re Kauai Electric Division of Citizens Utility Co., 60 Haw. at 187, 590 P.2d at 538.
IV.
Turning to appellants’ assertion that HPERB incorrectly interpreted “wilfully” as it is employed in HRS § 89-13(b), we observe at the outset that the related legislative history is devoid of any reference thereto. HPERB thus logically sought aid from a dictionary, and relying on the discussion of the pertinent term in Black’s Law Dictionary,8 ruled “that to make
[410]*410out a prohibited practice under Subsection 89-13(b), HRS, conscious, knowing, and deliberate intent to violate the provisions of chapter 89, HRS, must be proven.” We have no reason to reject the construction.
Though appellants forcefully argue an act committed “voluntarily” and “with plain indifference” to the law can only be one “wilfully” committed, we are not persuaded that the crucial word can only be read as they suggest. We earlier noted a presumption of validity attaches to decisions of administrative bodies “acting within their sphere of expertise.” In re Hawaii Electric Light Co., 60 Haw. at 630, 594 P.2d at 617. HPERB is empowered pursuant to HRS § 89-1 to administer HRS Chapter 89, Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, with specific authority to “[cjonduct proceedings on complaints of prohibited practices . . . and take such actions with respect thereto as it deems necessary and proper.” HRS § 89-5(b)(4). Furthermore, we customarily accord persuasive weight to the construction given words of broad and indefinite meaning by the agency charged with the responsibility of carrying out the mandate of the statute in question, unless the construction is palpably erroneous. Treloar v. Swinerton & Walberg Co., 65 Haw. at 424, 653 P.2d at 426. We do not find HPERB’s reading of “wilfully” to be so.
v.
The remaining question is whether HPERB erred in holding that while HSTA made disbursements “out of service fees [411]*411during the subject period in program areas clearly outside the scope of permissible service fee expenditures,”9 no prohibited practices resulted because “no willful violations of Complainant employees’ rights have occurred such as would make out a case under Subsection 89-13(b)(1), and no unreasonable expenditures ... have willfully been undertaken such as would make out a case under Subsection 89-13(b)(4).”
Jared H. Jossem (Roger W. Fonseca <& Gregory M. Sato with him on the briefs; Torkildson, Katz, Jossem & Loden, of counsel) for appellants.
T Anthony Gill (Thomas P. Gill on the brief; Gill, Park, Park & Kim, of counsel) for appellee HSTA.
Glenn D. Choy for appellee HPERB
If anything is certain in the area of present concern, it is that difficult problems are encountered “in drawing lines between collective-bargaining activities . . . and ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining.” Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. at 236. The agency officially charged with the task of drawing the lines here has deemed it an “almost impossible” one. We therefore cannot expect that such lines would be readily discernible, particularly where the permissible and the impermissible have not been clearly distinguished by prior decision. And when we apply the clearly erroneous test in the haze of uncertain statutory language, we too are left with an impression that the disbursements in question were not made with “conscious, knowing, and deliberate intent to violate the provisions of Chapter 89, HRS.”
The decision of the circuit court is affirmed.