[455] OPINION
CARPENETI, Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Before 2009 the Alaska Board of Game employed a controversial scoring system in order to distribute permits to subsistence hunters in a popular caribou and moose hunting area between Anchorage and Fairbanks. In 2009, the Board amended its regulations to abolish the scoring system and replace it with two separate subsistence hunts: a community harvest hunt for groups and a separate hunt for individuals. A local tribe was subsequently granted a community harvest permit pursuant to the new rules. An individual resident brought suit challenging the new system, alleging violations of the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act, his due process rights, the Board's governing statutes, and several provisions of the Alaska Constitution. The tribe intervened on the side of the State and a private organization intervened on the side of the individual. In July 2010, the superior court granted summary judgment and enjoined the community harvest hunt as unconstitutional. The superior court later awarded attorney's fees to the individual and private organization.
The tribe appeals both decisions, which we have consolidated for consideration. We conclude that the underlying appeal is moot because the challenged regulation has been substantively changed since 2009; because we decline to reach the merits of these claims, this appeal is dismissed. Accordingly, we vacate the attorney's fee award granted to the private organization as it stands against the tribe, but otherwise leave it undisturbed. We vacate the grant of attorney's fees to the individual as he is not an attorney and such an award was improper.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The Ahtna people have hunted caribou and moose for centuries in Alaska, primarily in a region surrounded by Anchorage, Fairbanks, and the Matanuska-Susitna Valley. This case involves a roughly 23,000 square-mile stretch of land called the Nelchina basin, known as Game Management Unit 13. Due to the area's popularity with local Native hunters and other Alaska residents from throughout the state, the Board has struggled to find a coherent, workable regulatory policy that satisfies Alaska's subsistence law.1 After the subsistence law was modified in 1992, the entire harvestable surplus of the Nelching caribou and bull moose herds was allocated to subsistence uses and designated as a Tier II hunt. The criteria considered under the Tier II system were (1) "the customary and direct dependence on the game population by the subsistence user for human consumption as a mainstay of livelihood," and (2) "the ability of the subsistence user to obtain food if subsistence use is restricted or eliminated." 2 This system was controversial and the Board frequently received complaints about inequality, unfairness, and false applications. The local tribe, Ahtna Tene Nené (Ahtna) claimed that under this system it could not obtain enough permits to meet its people's subsistence needs. It also argued that the system discriminated against members with higher incomes and that it prevented young people from obtaining permits, keeping the tribe from passing down its long-standing hunting traditions and way of life. In 2006, the Board of Game conducted a series of investigations in response to the many complaints it received about its Tier II system.
The Board found that under the current system hunting permits had shifted from the most dependent local residents to less subsistence-dependent urban residents. After applying the criteria of the Joint Boards of Fisheries and Game,3 the Board found that the current policy did not adequately accommodate customary and traditional subsistence uses.4 Based on a proposal from eight [456] Ahtna villages, the Board abolished the Tier II system and established a new Tier I system consisting of two hunts: a community hunt and an individual hunt. The community hunt allowed any village, community, group, or individual to apply for a earibou community harvest permit as long as it met the necessary requirements and had a designated hunt administrator.5 Each member included in the caribou community harvest permit would be granted one harvest ticket each year. A similar moose community harvest program was also established. The other hunt, open to all individual Alaskan residents, consisted of a lottery-type drawing system that limited each family to one caribou harvest ticket every four years. Ahtna was subsequently granted a community harvest permit for the designated community hunt area specified in its application.
In March 2009, Kenneth Manning challenged the new Tier I system put in place by the Board. In April 2009, Ahtna moved to intervene and answered the complaint. The Alaska Fish & Wildlife Conservation Fund {(AFWCEF) then moved to intervene and filed its own complaint. Manning then filed a motion for preliminary injunction and AFWCF filed a memorandum in partial support. The superior court denied the request for preliminary injunction against the community harvest permit issued to Ahtna in June 2009, but found that Manning had raised "serious and substantial questions" about whether the community hunt was unconstitutionally residency-based. Thus, the court severed the community residency requirement and ordered the implementation of a sharing opportunity for non-locals.
In July 2009, AFWCF filed a motion for summary judgment and in August Manning filed a motion for declaratory relief under the public trust doctrine. The court found that the State and Ahtna were substantially in compliance with its earlier order and allowed the hunt to proceed given the modified community harvest permit and secondary Tier I system. The State and Ahtna filed eross motions for summary judgment at the end of August 2009. Oral argument was heard on the summary judgment motions in January 2010. In July 2010, the superior court granted summary judgment for Manning and AFWCF and enjoined the Abtna community harvest permit as unconstitutional, concluding that it was fundamentally a residency based permit and an impermissible delegation of authority under the public trust doe-trine. The superior court also concluded that the public notice of the changes noted above was insufficient under the Administrative Procedure Act and that the Board decision to change the caribou hunt from a Tier II to Tier I hunt was arbitrary and unreasonable. The court either declined to reach or rejected the other challenges to the regulations brought by Manning and AFWCFE.
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[455] OPINION
CARPENETI, Chief Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Before 2009 the Alaska Board of Game employed a controversial scoring system in order to distribute permits to subsistence hunters in a popular caribou and moose hunting area between Anchorage and Fairbanks. In 2009, the Board amended its regulations to abolish the scoring system and replace it with two separate subsistence hunts: a community harvest hunt for groups and a separate hunt for individuals. A local tribe was subsequently granted a community harvest permit pursuant to the new rules. An individual resident brought suit challenging the new system, alleging violations of the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act, his due process rights, the Board's governing statutes, and several provisions of the Alaska Constitution. The tribe intervened on the side of the State and a private organization intervened on the side of the individual. In July 2010, the superior court granted summary judgment and enjoined the community harvest hunt as unconstitutional. The superior court later awarded attorney's fees to the individual and private organization.
The tribe appeals both decisions, which we have consolidated for consideration. We conclude that the underlying appeal is moot because the challenged regulation has been substantively changed since 2009; because we decline to reach the merits of these claims, this appeal is dismissed. Accordingly, we vacate the attorney's fee award granted to the private organization as it stands against the tribe, but otherwise leave it undisturbed. We vacate the grant of attorney's fees to the individual as he is not an attorney and such an award was improper.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The Ahtna people have hunted caribou and moose for centuries in Alaska, primarily in a region surrounded by Anchorage, Fairbanks, and the Matanuska-Susitna Valley. This case involves a roughly 23,000 square-mile stretch of land called the Nelchina basin, known as Game Management Unit 13. Due to the area's popularity with local Native hunters and other Alaska residents from throughout the state, the Board has struggled to find a coherent, workable regulatory policy that satisfies Alaska's subsistence law.1 After the subsistence law was modified in 1992, the entire harvestable surplus of the Nelching caribou and bull moose herds was allocated to subsistence uses and designated as a Tier II hunt. The criteria considered under the Tier II system were (1) "the customary and direct dependence on the game population by the subsistence user for human consumption as a mainstay of livelihood," and (2) "the ability of the subsistence user to obtain food if subsistence use is restricted or eliminated." 2 This system was controversial and the Board frequently received complaints about inequality, unfairness, and false applications. The local tribe, Ahtna Tene Nené (Ahtna) claimed that under this system it could not obtain enough permits to meet its people's subsistence needs. It also argued that the system discriminated against members with higher incomes and that it prevented young people from obtaining permits, keeping the tribe from passing down its long-standing hunting traditions and way of life. In 2006, the Board of Game conducted a series of investigations in response to the many complaints it received about its Tier II system.
The Board found that under the current system hunting permits had shifted from the most dependent local residents to less subsistence-dependent urban residents. After applying the criteria of the Joint Boards of Fisheries and Game,3 the Board found that the current policy did not adequately accommodate customary and traditional subsistence uses.4 Based on a proposal from eight [456] Ahtna villages, the Board abolished the Tier II system and established a new Tier I system consisting of two hunts: a community hunt and an individual hunt. The community hunt allowed any village, community, group, or individual to apply for a earibou community harvest permit as long as it met the necessary requirements and had a designated hunt administrator.5 Each member included in the caribou community harvest permit would be granted one harvest ticket each year. A similar moose community harvest program was also established. The other hunt, open to all individual Alaskan residents, consisted of a lottery-type drawing system that limited each family to one caribou harvest ticket every four years. Ahtna was subsequently granted a community harvest permit for the designated community hunt area specified in its application.
In March 2009, Kenneth Manning challenged the new Tier I system put in place by the Board. In April 2009, Ahtna moved to intervene and answered the complaint. The Alaska Fish & Wildlife Conservation Fund {(AFWCEF) then moved to intervene and filed its own complaint. Manning then filed a motion for preliminary injunction and AFWCF filed a memorandum in partial support. The superior court denied the request for preliminary injunction against the community harvest permit issued to Ahtna in June 2009, but found that Manning had raised "serious and substantial questions" about whether the community hunt was unconstitutionally residency-based. Thus, the court severed the community residency requirement and ordered the implementation of a sharing opportunity for non-locals.
In July 2009, AFWCF filed a motion for summary judgment and in August Manning filed a motion for declaratory relief under the public trust doctrine. The court found that the State and Ahtna were substantially in compliance with its earlier order and allowed the hunt to proceed given the modified community harvest permit and secondary Tier I system. The State and Ahtna filed eross motions for summary judgment at the end of August 2009. Oral argument was heard on the summary judgment motions in January 2010. In July 2010, the superior court granted summary judgment for Manning and AFWCF and enjoined the Abtna community harvest permit as unconstitutional, concluding that it was fundamentally a residency based permit and an impermissible delegation of authority under the public trust doe-trine. The superior court also concluded that the public notice of the changes noted above was insufficient under the Administrative Procedure Act and that the Board decision to change the caribou hunt from a Tier II to Tier I hunt was arbitrary and unreasonable. The court either declined to reach or rejected the other challenges to the regulations brought by Manning and AFWCFE.
Ahtna and the State both moved for stays of the decision and the superior court entered final judgment on July 22, 2010. On July 26, 2010, the State and AFWCF filed a stipulation acknowledging that the time nee-essary to revert back to the Tier II system would cause hunters to miss the prime hunting season and asked for the Tier I non-communal hunt to proceed as planned with an allowance for Abhtna community hunters that had intended to hunt under the community harvest permit. On July 28, 2010, the superior court denied the stay requested by Ahtna, but accepted the State-AFWCEF stipulation for a partial, temporary stay. On that same day, the Board met to adopt emer-geney regulations in response to the superior court's order. On August 5, 2010, Ahtna filed an appeal with this court and an emer-geney motion for stay of judgment.6 We denied the stay on August 11, 2010.
The Board amended its system for caribou permits in October 2010 in response to the superior court's grant of summary judgment to AFWCF and Manning. The first amendment adopted by the Board added express language stating that the application for any community harvest permit was open to any group of 25 or more Alaskans that wished to harvest as a community, regardless of residency.[457] 7 The second amendment changed the individual Tier I hunt so that any individual or household that participated in that hunt would be awarded a permit every year it applies, instead of onee every four years.8 These regulations were not yet final at the time this appeal was filed, but became effective in 2011.9
The superior court also awarded attorney's fees to AFWCF and Manning, a pro se litigant who held a law degree but not a bar lieense. The superior court issued judgment for costs holding the State and Ahtna jointly and severally lable for payment of $5,000 to both Manning and AFWCF, and later issued another judgment for costs holding the State and Ahtna jointly and severally liable for payment of $5,000 to AFWCF. Ahtna appealed these judgments, arguing that (1) the superior court erred by awarding fees to Manning, a pro se non-attorney litigant; and (2) if this court overturned the superior court on appeal, the fee award should be remanded because Manning and AFWCF would no longer be the prevailing parties.
We heard oral argument in the substantive appeal, case number S-18968, in September 2011. Shortly afterward, we issued an order requesting supplemental briefing regarding mootness. Both parties submitted briefs asking us to review the underlying substantive claims presented.
IH. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"We resolve issues of standing and mootness using our independent judgment because, as matters of judicial policy, these are questions of law." 10
Whether the court applied the proper legal analysis in awarding attorney's fees is a question of law that we review de novo.11
IV. DISCUSSION
A. This Appeal Is Moot.
"We refrain from deciding questions where the facts have rendered the legal issues moot."12 A claim is moot if it "has lost its character as a present, live controversy.13 8 A controversy is a claim that affects the legal rights of a party; it is "definite and concrete admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts."14 "[A] case is moot if the party bringing the action would not be entitled to any relief even if it prevails." 15 Issuing a decision regarding regulations that are no longer in effect is merely an academic exercise; it provides no explanation of a party's rights under the existing law.
We have previously recognized that we must be especially careful while reviewing requests for a declaratory judgment because those cases may easily become advisory opinions if the controversy is moot.16 New or amended regulations may present unique factual situations that do not result in the same disagreement between the parties. By issuing a declaratory judgment on former versions of amended regulations, the court assumes that the dispute has remained the same. This assumption may not be true. "Even in a declaratory judgment case ... where the rights or obligations of parties are delineated by the court, courts should avoid becoming involved in premature adjudication [458] of disputes that are uncertain to occur." 17 If a regulation is amended, the case may become moot if the specific relief that the parties seek is no longer available.
Here, the parties principally sought declaratory relief regarding the Board's 2009 regulation. Manning brought his suit for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the Board's regulation and alleging violations of the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act, his due process rights, the Board's governing statutes, and several provisions of the Alaska Constitution. In July 2010, the superior court granted summary judgment for Manning and AFWCF and enjoined the community harvest permit as unconstitutional. On appeal, Ahtna argued that (1) the community harvest permit granted to Ahtna was not fundamentally a local-residency based permit; (2) the Board acted within its authority in issuing the community harvest permit, thereby providing different hunting opportunities based on different patterns of subsistence use; and (8) the administrative responsibilities of the hunt administrator through the community harvest permit did not constitute an illegal delegation of statutory authority. AFWCF disputed Ahtna's arguments and maintained that the system granted preferential harvest opportunities to community harvest permit participants based on residency and distinguished between Tier I participants in violation of the Alaska Constitution.
The Board amended the challenged regulation in October 2010. The first amendment adopted by the Board added express language stating that the application for any community harvest permit was open to any group of 25 or more Alaskans that wished to harvest as a community, regardless of residency.18 This amendment clarified that eligibility for a community harvest permit was not dependent on residency. The second amendment changed the individual Tier I hunt so that any individual or household that participated in that hunt would be awarded a permit every year that the individual or household applies, instead of once every four years.19 This amendment addressed the challenge to substantially different hunting opportunities. As noted above, these new regulations became effective on July 1, 2011.20
This appeal is moot because the regulation that Manning and AFWCF originally challenged is no longer in effect. Moreover, the core issues of their dispute have been addressed by the adopted changes. Thus, there is no live controversy for the court to decide and the relief sought by these parties is no longer available through court intervention.21 AFWCF now asks for a broad declaration that the subsistence statutes and entire permitting scheme are unconstitutional, but those claims are not properly raised by the facts of this case. We have long held that challenges to administrative permitting decisions based on rules that are no longer valid are moot, despite the fact that permit opponents seek declaratory judgments that the ageney actions were unlawful.22
[459] Even where an appeal is moot, we retain the discretion to address an issue.23 Our inquiry in such a case focuses on whether any exception to the mootness doctrine applies to the appeal.24 We turn now to that question.
1. The public interest exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply.
We will hear moot cases if they fall under the public interest exception.
The public interest exception requires the consideration of three main factors: (1) whether the disputed issues are capable of repetition, (2) whether the mootness doe-trine, if applied, may cause review of the issues to be repeatedly cireumvented, and (8) whether the issues presented are so important to the public interest as to justify overriding the mootness doctrine.