Burrell v. Hanger
Opinion
OPINION
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Homer L. Burrell, an attorney appearing pro se, filed suit in district court against James L. Hanger. Burrell alleged that Hanger had failed to pay a bill for legal services in the sum of $1,500.00. The jury returned a verdict for Burrell in the amount of $500.00.
Pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 82(a), which provides for the award of attorney’s fees to prevailing parties, the district court awarded Burrell attorney’s fees of $125.00. 1 Hanger appealed the award of attorney’s fees to superior court. The superior court reversed the district court, and held that a prevailing pro se attorney could not receive fees under Civil Rule 82. Burrell petitioned *387 this court and we granted his petition. The issues for determination are whether Bur-rell should receive an award of attorney’s fees, and if so, how much.
II. PRO SE ATTORNEY’S FEES UNDER CIVIL RULE 82(a)
Sherry v. Sherry, 622 P.2d 960, 966 (Alaska 1981), controls the result on the question of whether Burrell should receive attorney’s fees. In Sherry, the superior court had dismissed an action without prejudice at the plaintiff’s request. We held that the defendant who was an attorney appearing pro se could receive an award of attorney’s fees under Alaska Civil Rule 41(a) which addresses voluntary dismissals. 2
The instant case concerns Alaska Civil Rule 82(a) whereas Sherry concerned Alaska Civil Rule 41(a). However, the principle is the same and we see no reason to deny attorney’s fees to the pro se attorney under Civil Rule 82(a) while granting them under Civil Rule 41(a). Accordingly, we hold that Burrell should receive attorney’s fees under Civil Rule 82(a).
We must now determine whether the $125.00 which the district court awarded Burrell was the correct amount. Burrell suggests that the district court may have erred because in awarding the $125.00, it did not employ the segregation of time procedure set forth in Sherry. For the following reasons, we conclude that the procedure used in Sherry does not apply to the instant case, and that the district court used the correct procedure. In Sherry, attorney’s fees were awarded under Civil Rule 41(a) based on the number of hours the pro se attorney had worked. We held that the pro se attorney could receive attorney’s fees only for the time he had expended on the case as an attorney active in the litigation, and not for the time he had expended in the role of a client. Accordingly, we required the trial court in Sherry to segregate the hours expended in the attorney role from the hours expended in the client role.
The procedure set forth in Sherry need not apply to this case. Here the district court did not base its award on the number of hours Burrell worked on the case, and thus it did not segregate between hours in the attorney role and hours in the client role. Rather, the district court used the schedule set forth in Civil Rule 82(a)(1). Under this schedule, a party who recovers a money judgment receives attorney’s fees equal to a fixed percentage of the money judgment. Burrell recovered a money judgment of $500.00. The schedule provides that for money judgments of $2,000.00 or less, a party should receive attorney’s fees equal to twenty-five percent of the money judgment. The district court awarded Burrell attorney’s fees of $125.00. Thus, the district court correctly determined the amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded pursuant to the schedule in Civil Rule 82(a)(1). 3
*388 This case is remanded to the superior court with instructions to vacate its judgment and to reinstate the judgment of the district court.
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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650 P.2d 386 (Burrell v. Hanger) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.