Agro Dynamics, LLC v. Drug Enforcement Administration

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: March 27, 2025
• Docket: 3:20-cv-02082
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 AGRO DYNAMICS, LLC, Case No.: 20-cv-02082-JAH-KSC

11 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 12 v. DENYING IN PART FEDERAL DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS DRUG ENFORCEMENT 14 ADMINISTRATION, SAN DIEGO [ECF No. 45] 15 COUNTY, et. al., 16 Defendant. 17 18 19 Before the Court is Defendants Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) Special 20 Agents Paul Gelles, Eric Ball, Kieran Garcia, Marsha Dawe, Ross Van Nostrand, and 21 Jeremy Feuz, and DEA Task Force Officers (“TFO”) Frank Haskell, Andrew Aguilar, 22 Jason Stein, Timothy Smith, Michael Astorga, and Christopher Morris’ (jointly “Federal 23 Defendants”) motion for judgment on the pleadings. ECF No. 45 (“Motion” or “Mot.”). 24 Plaintiff Agro Dynamics, LLC (“Plaintiff”) opposes the motion. After a thorough review 25 26 of the parties’ submissions and for the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS IN 27 PART AND DENIES IN PART Federal Defendants’ Motion. 28 1 BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff originally filed this action in Superior Court of California, County of San 3 Diego on September 22, 2020. See Notice of Removal, Ex. A (ECF No. 1-2). Federal 4 Defendants removed the action to federal court on October 22, 2020. Notice of Removal, 5 (ECF No. 1). On November 13, 2020, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) 6 asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, California Civil Code § 52.1, claims for violations 7 of the United States Constitution and the California Constitution, and claims for 8 conversion, trespass to chattels, and negligence. FAC (ECF No. 8). Plaintiff named 9 Federal Defendants and the County of San Diego, San Diego Sheriff Department officers 10 Steve Bodine, Justin Moore, Dwayne Prickett, Christopher Perez, Ricardo Andrade 11 (collectively “County Defendants”), and Does 1 through 50 as defendants. Id. Plaintiff 12 alleges Federal Defendants along with certain officers of the San Diego Sheriff’s 13 Department seized and destroyed over $3 million dollars’ worth of hemp plants pursuant 14 to an invalid search warrant executed on Plaintiff’s property located in Fallbrook, 15 California on which Plaintiff legally cultivated industrial hemp. Id. ¶¶ 36-64. 16 County Defendants and Federal Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss. See 17 ECF Nos. 9, 11. Thereafter, this Court granted in part and denied in part the motions. See 18 ECF No. 18. The following claims by Plaintiff survived the motion to dismiss: § 1983 19 claim against the County for failure to train, § 1983 claims against County Officers in their 20 individual capacities and Federal Officers in their individual capacities based on violations 21 of the Fourth Amendment, a Bane Act claim against County Defendants premised on the 22 Fourth Amendment and Article I Section 13 of the California Constitution, a claim under 23 the U.S. Constitution against Federal Officers in their individual capacities based on 24 violation of the Fourth Amendment, and conversion, trespass to chattels, and negligence 25 against County Defendants. Id. Plaintiff was provided an opportunity but did not amend 26 the complaint. Federal Defendants and County Defendants filed separate answers to the 27 First Amended Complaint on October 24, 2023. See ECF Nos. 19, 21. 28 1 On April 2, 2024, Federal Defendants filed the instant motion along with a motion 2 to file documents under seal. See ECF Nos. 45, 46. Plaintiff filed an opposition on May 3 3, 2024 (“Opposition” or “Opp’n”) and Federal Defendants filed a reply on May 15, 2024 4 (“Reply”). See ECF Nos. 49, 50. Finding the matter suitable for disposition without oral 5 argument, the Court took the motion under submission on the parties’ briefs. 6 LEGAL STANDARD 7 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), a party may move for judgment on the 8 pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings are closed--but early enough not to delay the trial.” FED. 9 R. CIV. P. 12(c). Judgment on the pleadings is proper only when there is no unresolved 10 issue of fact and no question remains that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 11 matter of law. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 12 (9th Cir. 1989); Honey v. Distelrath, 195 F.3d 531, 532-33 (9th Cir. 1999). The standard 13 applied on a Rule 12(c) motion is essentially the same as that applied on Rule 12(b)(6) 14 motions. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 896 F.2d at 1550, and see Fleming v. Pickard, 581 15 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). Thus, the allegations of the non-moving party are accepted 16 as true, and all inferences reasonably drawn from those facts must be construed in favor of 17 the responding party. Fleming, 581 F.3d at 925. 18 DISCUSSION 19 Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s 20 claims for two reasons, (1) they are not subject to suit under § 1983 because they were 21 federal officers acting under color of federal law, not state law; and (2) this case presents a 22 new context under Bivens and extensions of the remedy are not appropriate. Mot. at 9-19. 23 A. Judicial Notice 24 In their motion for judgment on the pleadings, Federal Defendants request that this 25 Court take judicial notice of two facts: (1) the DEA San Diego Integrated Narcotic Task 26 Force was established in accordance with 21 U.S.C. § 873 and (2) that local peace officers 27 assigned to the Narcotic Task Force were deputized as Task Force Officers of the DEA 28 under 21 U.S.C. § 878(b). Request for Judicial Notice (ECF No. 45-1). Federal 1 Defendants contend that the two facts are not subject to reasonable dispute because they 2 are supported by “sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Id. at 2. In 3 support of their request, they submit a Narcotic Task Force Agreement between the DEA 4 and the San Diego Police Department, a Narcotic Task Force Agreement between the DEA 5 and the San Diego Sheriff’s Department, “Deputization Authorization/Request” and 6 Extension forms for individual Task Force Officers, and the declaration of Cynthia Cruz, 7 a DEA Mission Support Specialist who serves as the custodian of records.1 8 In response, Plaintiff argues consideration of extrinsic evidence on a motion for 9 judgment on the pleadings is improper. Opp’n at 14-17. Plaintiff also argues Ms. Cruz’s 10 declaration does not comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 because she attests the statements were 11 made “to the best of [her] knowledge” under penalty of perjury, instead of being “true and 12 correct” under penalty of perjury. Id at 15. Plaintiff further argues the two facts are not 13 “adjudicative facts” and are neither generally known nor are from sources that cannot be 14 reasonably questioned because the exhibits submitted by Federal Defendants are not 15 matters of public record. Id at 16-17. 16 A court may, when addressing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, consider 17 facts for which it takes judicial notice. Heliotrope General, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189 18 F.3d 971, 981 n. 18 (9th Cir. 1999). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, courts may take 19 judicial notice of facts that are “not subject to reasonable dispute.” FED. R. EVID. 201(b). 20 Facts are not subject to dispute if they are “generally known” within the court’s jurisdiction 21 or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot be 22 reasonably questioned.” Id.; Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th 23 Cir. 2018). 24 Adjudicative facts are facts that involve the immediate parties of a case and describe 25 “who did what, where, when, [and] how,” relevant to the resolution of the case. United 26

27 1 Federal Defendants motion to file the Narcotic Task Force Agreements and Deputization 28 1 States v. Gould, 536 F.2d 216, 219 (8th Cir. 1976). The formation of a task force pursuant 2 to federal law between the DEA and local law enforcement agencies, and that local law 3 enforcement officers were deputized as Task Force Officers, are adjudicative facts subject 4 to judicial notice. 5 Ms. Cruz made her statements in support of the request for judicial notice “under 6 penalty of perjury” and certified that her statements were true. Cruz Decl. at 1-2 (ECF No. 7 45-2). Because the declaration includes the language “under penalty of perjury” and a 8 representation that the statements therein are true, the declaration complies with the 9 verification requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1746. See Kersting v. United States, 865 F. Supp. 10 669, 676 (D. Haw. 1994) (determining a declaration that is made “under penalty of perjury” 11 and declares that the document is true complies with the verification requirements of 12 28 U.S.C. § 1746). Ms. Cruz attests that the two Narcotic Task Force Agreements are true 13 and accurate copies of those entered into between the DEA and San Diego Police 14 Department in July 2018 and the DEA and San Diego Sheriff’s Department in August 15 2018, and that the Deputization Request/Authorization and Extension documents are “true 16 and accurate copies of the deputization paperwork associated with DEA Task Force 17 Officers Andrew Aguilar, Michael Astorga, Frank Haskell, Christopher Morris, Timothy 18 Smith and Jason Stein.” Cruz Decl. ¶¶ 4, 5, 7. 19 While not publicly available, the documents are created and held by the government. 20 Courts may take judicial notice of records of a government agency. See Dent v. Holder, 21 627 F.3d 365, 371 (taking judicial notice of applications for naturalization); see also 22 Interstate Nat. Gas Co. v. Southern California Gas Co., 209 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir. 1953) 23 (determining courts may take judicial notice of “records and reports of administrative 24 bodies”). The Court finds, based on Ms. Cruz’s declaration, that the adjudicative facts are 25 accurately determined by official government records and are therefore not subject to 26 dispute. Accordingly, the Court takes judicial notice that (1) the DEA San Diego Integrated 27 Narcotic Task Force was established in accordance with 21 U.S.C. § 873 and (2) that local 28 1 peace officers assigned to the Narcotic Task Force were deputized as Task Force Officers 2 of the DEA under 21 U.S.C. § 878(b). 3 B. Section 1983 Liability 4 Federal Defendants argue that judgment on the pleadings is properly entered in their 5 favor because, as federal agents and Task Force Officers serving on the Narcotic Task 6 Force, they were not acting under color of state law for purposes § 1983 liability. Mot. at 7 9-10. They contend the DEA Task Force was founded in and implemented under federal 8 authority and the allegations of the FAC create no inference they exercised power under 9 the authority of state law. Id. Plaintiff responds that the law of the case doctrine precludes 10 Defendants from revisiting the § 1983 issue. Opp’n at 12-14. Plaintiff also argues that 11 federal officers may be held liable under § 1983 when they are joint participants with state 12 actors in the specific conduct at issue. Id at 17-20. 13 1. Law of the Case 14 Plaintiff argues that the law of the case doctrine precludes this Court from addressing 15 Federal Defendants’ argument that they are not subject to suit under § 1983 because the 16 Court found that Plaintiff’s claims under § 1983 may proceed against both County and 17 Federal Defendants in its previous order granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ 18 motions to dismiss. Opp’n at 12-14. Plaintiff argues that Federal Defendants’ argument 19 on § 1983 liability in the present motion is a refined version of an earlier argument it 20 presented to this Court in its motion to dismiss. Id at 13. Under the law of the case doctrine, 21 a court may decline to revisit an issue that was decided explicitly or by necessary 22 implication in a previous disposition. See United States v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 23 443, 452 (9th Cir. 2000). 24 In a footnote in their motion to dismiss, Federal Defendants asserted they were acting 25 in their capacity as agents and TFOs of the DEA and explained, if the Court did not dismiss 26 the § 1983 claim based on their motion to dismiss, they would later seek judgment on the 27 claim because they were not acting under color of state law. Federal Defendant’s Mot. to 28 Dismiss at 16 (ECF No. 11). The Court noted Defendant’ assertion in its order addressing 1 Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Order at 22 (ECF No. 18). However, the Court 2 did not discuss, make any findings nor decide the issue of whether Federal Defendants 3 were acting under color of state law. Accordingly, the law of the case doctrine does not 4 preclude consideration of the issue here. 5 2. Merits of the Motion 6 Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, 7 or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. Wyatt v. Cole, 8 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a 9 right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the 10 alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 11 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 12 Plaintiff alleges Defendants executed a search warrant issued by the Superior Court 13 of the County of San Diego pursuant to California Penal Code § 1524 on Plaintiff’s 14 property on September 12, 2019. FAC ¶¶ 41, 47. The affidavit in support of the warrant 15 asserts Special Agent Gelles conducted an aerial reconnaissance flight and observed a 16 marijuana cultivation operation on the property in violation of provisions of the California 17 Health & Safety Code. Id ¶¶ 42, 43. Plaintiff alleges the affidavit contained material 18 misrepresentations and omissions. Id ¶¶ 45-46. When Defendants executed the warrant, 19 Plaintiff’s tenant notified Defendants the crops were hemp legally cultivated under a 20 registration from the County of San Diego. Id ¶¶ 57-58. Instead of taking any steps to 21 assess whether the crops involved were marijuana or hemp, Plaintiff contends, Defendants 22 destroyed Plaintiff’s industrial hemp plants valued at more than $3 million. Id ¶¶ 58-60, 23 63-64. 24 a. TFOs 25 Defendants argue that TFOs may not be held liable under § 1983 because they acted 26 within the scope of their assignment on the Narcotic Task Force. Mot. at 10. Plaintiff 27 responds that TFOs may be found liable under § 1983 for working in concert with state 28 actors to deprive Plaintiff of its constitutional rights. Opp’n at 19. 1 According to the judicially noticed facts, the TFOs were deputized as officers of the 2 DEA serving on the task force established pursuant to federal law. To determine whether 3 local law enforcement officers assigned to a joint federal-state task force act under color of 4 state law, courts look to the totality of the circumstances, including the source of authority 5 for the program and supervision of the participants. Thai v. County of Los Angeles, 127 6 F.4th 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 2025). Although the task force was established pursuant to 7 federal law, Plaintiff alleges the TFOs participated in executing a search warrant issued 8 under state law. The pleadings are silent as to whether state and/or federal officials exerted 9 oversight, management, or regulation of the joint task force. As such, the Court finds there 10 are unresolved issue of facts pertinent to whether the TFOs were acting under color of state 11 law. Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to TFOs’ liability under § 1983 12 is DENIED. 13 b. DEA Special Agents 14 Defendants argue that federal agents on the Narcotic Task Force may not be held 15 liable under § 1983 because they acted under federal authority, not state authority, during 16 the events giving rise to this action. Mot. at 10-11. Defendants argue that federal agents 17 did not lose their federal authority while executing a state warrant on Plaintiff’s property. 18 Id. Citing Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1986), Plaintiff argues that 19 federal officers acting under federal authority are not immune from suit under § 1983 if 20 they conspired or substantially acted in concert with state actors. Opp’n at 17-19. Plaintiff 21 contends it alleges Federal Defendants worked closely with the San Diego County Sheriff’s 22 Department to execute the fraudulent state warrant to seize Plaintiff’s crops. 23 Federal agents act under color of state law if a “symbiotic relationship” exists 24 between the federal agents and state actors and the conduct at issue “can be fairly attributed 25 to the state.” Cabrera v. Martin, 973 F.2d 735, 742-43 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing to Johnson 26 v. Orr, 780 F.2d 386, 390 (3rd Cir. 1986)). A symbiotic relationship is one marked by the 27 sharing of mutual interests, actions taken in concert, and a relationship that is productive 28 to both parties. See Id., at 743. “[F]ederal officials can only be liable under section 1983 1 where there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the 2 federal actors so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” 3 Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 538 F.3d 1250, 1257 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Cabrera, 4 973 F.2d at 744). 5 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, including TFOs and federal agents, worked 6 together in investigating Plaintiff’s property, obtaining the warrant, and destroying 7 Plaintiff’s crops. FAC ¶¶ 41-46, 49-50, 55. Plaintiff also alleges that federal agents worked 8 with other state actors who were not TFOs in obtaining and executing the faulty warrant. 9 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that DEA Special Agent Gelles obtained the warrant at issue 10 from a state court judge by alleging Plaintiff’s violation of California’s Health & Safety 11 Code. Id ¶ 42. Plaintiff also alleges that all Defendants, including federal agents, TFOs, 12 and San Diego Sheriff Department officers who were not designated on the Task Force, 13 planned for and executed the raid on Plaintiff’s property that caused the destruction of 14 Plaintiff’s hemp crop. FAC ¶¶ 5-21, 55-64. 15 There remains unresolved factual issues on the extent of participation by state actors 16 in the raid and the nature of the federal agents’ relationship with state actors in the conduct 17 at issue. Whether federal agents and state actors had a “symbiotic relationship” in 18 convening the Narcotic Task Force and implementing the program is unresolved at this 19 stage of the proceedings. See Cabrera, 973 F.2d at 742-43. As a result, Defendants’ 20 motion for judgment on the pleadings under § 1983 for federal agents is DENIED. 21 c. Bivens Claim 22 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, the Supreme Court held that the 23 victim of a Fourth Amendment violation by federal drug enforcement agents had a claim 24 for damages, even when Congress had not legislated a statute providing the injured person 25 with such a cause of action. See 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971). Since then, however, the 26 Court has limited the application of Bivens and only twice recognized causes of action for 27 violations of the Constitution, a Fifth Amendment sex-discrimination claim, and a federal 28 prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate care. Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 1 490 (2022). When presented with a Bivens action under a “new context”, one that differs 2 from the three the Supreme Court has recognized, courts must determine whether special 3 factors indicate that the “[j]udiciary is at least arguably less equipped than Congress to 4 weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.” Id at 492 (internal 5 quotation and citation omitted). Expanding the Bivens remedy is a “‘disfavored’ judicial 6 activity,” and “even a modest extension is still an extension.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 7 120, 135, 147 (2017). 8 Defendants argue that the facts in this case are not squarely covered by a recognized 9 Bivens precedent, and therefore present a new context. Mot. at 12-19. Plaintiff argues that 10 judicial deception in obtaining a warrant is a recognized Bivens context under Ninth Circuit 11 precedent. Opp’n at 21-22. 12 While this Court recognizes that Plaintiff’s claim for Fourth Amendment violations 13 by federal agents involves the same legal claim and almost identical defendants as those 14 found in Bivens itself, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s case involves a “new context.”2 In 15 the present case, Plaintiff alleges that its Fourth Amendment rights were violated when 16 federal agents obtained a warrant that was invalid due to material omissions that would 17 have prevented issuance of the warrant if they were included, and in the alternative, that 18 the probable cause supporting the warrant vanished when law enforcement agents were 19 placed on notice by Plaintiff’s tenant that a County permit existed for Plaintiff’s hemp 20 cultivation. FAC ¶¶ 74-92. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, 21 Federal Defendants’ conduct in proceeding to destroy all of Plaintiff’s hemp constituted an 22 unreasonable seizure. 23 24

25 26 2 In Bivens, the defendants were agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics who were pursuing alleged violations of drug laws. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. Here, Federal Defendants include federal DEA 27 agents who were pursuing alleged violations of drug laws. The DEA inherited the duties of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. See 21 C.F.R. Ch. 2 §§ 1300-1399 (establishing the Drug Enforcement 28 1 In Bivens, the Fourth Amendment violation was a warrantless search and seizure at 2 a home, where federal drug enforcement agents entered the plaintiff’s house without a 3 warrant and then arrested him. See 403 U.S. at 389. The plaintiff sought damages for 4 “embarrassment” and other emotional harms, whereas here, Plaintiff seeks damages related 5 to commercial harm due to destruction of agricultural goods. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389- 6 90. Because a warrantless entry into a home followed by the arrest of the individual differs 7 from Federal Defendants’ act of obtaining and relying on an invalid warrant and proceeding 8 to destroy Plaintiff’s agricultural goods, this Court finds Plaintiff’s claim presents a “new 9 context.” See Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, at 147-48 (recognizing that “potential special factors 10 that were not considered in previous Bivens cases” can present a new context). 11 Furthermore, authorizing liability under Bivens in this case would expand liability 12 to Plaintiff’s lost property, which is a different category of damage than the emotional and 13 mental harms recognized in Bivens. Plaintiff’s damages are entirely focused on lost 14 agricultural profit, not emotional harms associated with the seizure. FAC ¶¶ 65-73. 15 Congress is better equipped to expand the damages action in this case because courts 16 “likely cannot predict the ‘systemwide’ consequences of recognizing a cause of action 17 under Bivens.” See Egbert, 596 U.S. at 493. 18 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Federal Defendants’ motion for judgment on the 19 pleadings as to the Bivens claim. 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 I CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 3 1. Federal Defendants’ motion to file documents under seal (ECF No. 46) is 4 GRANTED. 5 2. Federal Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 45) is 6 GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED 7 as to the request for judicial notice and Plaintiff's Bivens claim. The motion is 8 DENIED as to the § 1983 claim. ? IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: March 27, 2025

12 Mk 13 /SOHNA.HOUSTON 14 / UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28