M. S. Coleman, J.
FACTS:
On October 31, 1972 the Michigan Legislature enacted PA 294 "to Amend the Title of Act No. 218 of the Public Acts of 1956” and to add Chapter 31 to the Insurance Code of 1956. Two phrases were deleted from the title and two important ones were added, shown as follows:
"AN ACT to revise, consolidate and classify the laws of the state of Michigan relating to the insurance and surety business; to regúlate the incorporation or formation of domestic insurance and surety companies and associations and the admission of foreign and alien companies and associations; to provide their rights, powers and immunities and to prescribe the conditions on which companies and associations organized, existing, or authorized under this act may exercise their powers; to provide the rights, powers and immunities and to prescribe the conditions on which other persons, firms, corporations and associations engaged in an insurance or surety business may exercise their powers; to provide for the imposition of a privilege fee on domestic insurance companies and associations, and the state accident fund; to provide for the imposition of a tax on the business of foreign and alien companies and [460]*460associations; to provide for the imposition of a tax on the business of surplus line agents; TO MODIFY TORT LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF CERTAIN ACCIDENTS: TO REQUIRE SECURITY FOR LOSSES ARISING OUT OF CERTAIN ACCIDENTS; to provide for the departmental supervision and regulation of the insurance and surety business within this state; and to provide penalties for the violation of this act, and to repeal certain acts;”
The provisions of the new Chapter 31 which are at issue are set forth in § 3135(1), which reads in part:
"A person remains subject to tort liability for non-economic loss caused by his ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement.”
The new provisions become effective on October 1, 1973.
By an Executive Message dated November 22, 1972 Governor William G. Milliken, acting pursuant to art 3, § 8, of the Const of 1963, requested of this Court an advisory opinion with respect to the constitutionality of 1972 PA 294, submitting four questions.
By Senate Resolution 336 of November 28, 1972, the Senate also requested an advisory opinion with respect to this act, submitting three questions.
Pursuant to an order of the Court, a preliminary hearing was held on January 16,1973.
By order of February 2, 1973, this Court granted the requests of the Governor and the Senate with respect to a total of three questions1 and requested [461]*461the Attorney General to file briefs on the affirmative and negative sides of each question and in[462]*462vited briefs amicus curiae. Oral arguments were heard on March 9,1973.
The three questions before the Court are:
1. Does the act embrace more than one object in violation of the following Michigan constitutional limitation: "No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title.” Const 1963, art 4, §24.
2. Does the "modification or amendment by reference of any other Michigan statutory provisions with respect to the substantive law of torts by reason of section 3135” violate the following Michigan constitutional limitation: "No law shall be revised, altered or amended by reference to its title only. The section or sections of the Act altered or amended shall be reenacted and published at length.” Const 1963, art 4, § 25.
3. Are the phrases "serious impairment of body function” and "permanent serious disfigurement” as used in § 3135 of the Act "sufficient for legal interpretation?”
ISSUES:
1.
The first question posed by the Court raises the issue of whether the legislation is unconstitutional as violating art 4, § 24, which reads:
"No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title. No bill shall be altered or amended on its passage through either house so as to change its original purpose as determined by its total content and not alone by its title.”
[463]*463The provision has been in every Constitution since 1850.
It is the opinion of the Court that the act does not embrace more than one object and that only one is expressed in the title.
Emphasis is given to the fact that the subject matter constitutes a code and that inherently the scope of a code must be broad enough to encompass the various facets necessary to the drafting of. a unified law. If we fail to permit such a design codes may not be enactéd in Michigan so long as the "one-object” limitation is present in the constitution.
The title to that which is known as "The Insurance Code of 1956” (MCLA 500.100 et seq.; MSA 24.1100 et seq.), prior to 1972 included a number of descriptive phrases and provisions all of which related to the insurance and surety business. It was a broad and comprehensive title and was intended, as a reading of it reveals, to cover a comprehensive insurance surety code sectioned from 100 through 8302. It consists of virtually one entire volume of Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated and of Michigan Statutes Annotated.
The title of the Code refers to the consolidation and classification of the insurance-surety business of Michigan, to the regulation of the incorporation of formation of insurance-surety companies, to the admission of foreign companies to do business in Michigan, to the conditions under which the insurance business may operate, to the rights, powers and immunities of businesses operating in the insurance-surety field, to the imposition of a privilege fee on domestic companies and to a tax on foreign companies, to the supervision and regulation of insurance-surety companies within the state and to penalties for violation of the act.
[464]*464This Code intended to and did and does regulate generally and broadly the insurance-surety business of Michigan. The 1972 Legislature determined to regulate further this business in Michigan by modifying to some extent the tort liability arising out of certain accidents and to require security for losses arising out of such accidents.
In the instant case the amendatory language in the title discloses that the object of the Insurance Code is now to include a modification of accidental tort liability which is intrinsic to the "no-fault insurance concept” or "automobile injury reparation reform” concept. The Legislature might have chosen a different statute to which to append an amendment or a new and separate statute might have been enacted — but either choice would have brought on the same criticisms which have been raised here. Almost certainly, it would then have been argued that it was the Insurance Code which should have been amended.
In any event, all possible presumptions should be afforded to find constitutionality. The amended title should be construed reasonably, not narrowly and with unnecessary technicality.
The addition of the phrases "to modify tort liability arising out of certain accidents; to require security for losses arising out of certain accidents” relates directly to the insurance-surety business. This entails reimbursement of and security for losses, particularly in relationship to motor vehicle accidents. Much of the said business relates to losses from accidental torts. It is and was reasonable and logical for the Legislature to classify the matter herein referred to as related to the Insurance Code. Such action cannot be said to have been prompted by deceit or some ulterior motive. The so-called "logrolling” argument may be valid [465]*465in some instances, but does not apply in this case. The Code was in being and had been since 1956. The amendment in question cannot be said to have allowed the passage of a law not fully understood (although the subject matter may be complex and difficult for a layman to understand), or that the amendment brought into the Code subjects having no connection with the Insurance Code. The Legislature and the public were well aware of the intention and context of this legislation. One is safe in assuming that probably no piece of legislation since statehood has received more attention or been more noted than the present change in the automobile injury reparation provisions.
An act may include all matters germane to its object. It may include all those provisions which directly relate to, carry out and implement the principal object. As a review of the cases will show, the purpose of this constitutional limitation is to insure that both the legislators and the public have proper notice of legislative content and to prevent deceit and subterfuge.
The provision was recently discussed in Maki v East Tawas, 385 Mich 151 (1971). The majority reaffirmed at p 157 the following principle as quoted in MacLean v State Board of Control for Vocational Education, 294 Mich 45 (1940):
" 'The constitutional provision was designed mainly to prevent the legislature from passing laws not fully understood, Thomas v Collins [1885], 58 Mich 64; it was intended that the legislature, in passing an act, should be fairly notified of its design, Attorney General, ex rel. Longyear, v Weiner [1886], 59 Mich 580; and that legislatures and parties interested might understand from the title that only provisions germane to the object therein expressed would be enacted, Blades v Board of Water Commissioners of Detroit [1889], 122 Mich 366; and to avoid bringing into one bill subjects [466]*466diverse in their nature and having no necessary connection, but with a view to combining in their favor the advocates of all — or what is commonly spoken of as logrolling in legislation. State Mutual Rodded Fire Ins. Co. v Foster [1934], 267 Mich 118.’ ”
The particular section at issue in Maki was declared unconstitutional. The title spoke of immunity from governmental acts of negligence while the act itself spoke of immunity from all tort liability incurred while engaged in a governmental function. Thus, the section exceeded the scope of the title and was severed from the remainder of the act.
The plaintiffs in Kuhn v Department of Treasury, 384 Mich 378 (1971) sought a judgment declaring the state income tax act unconstitutional. In affirming summary judgment for the defendant, the Court said at 387-388:
"Plaintiffs’ next contention is that the Act violates Michigan Constitution of 1963, art 4, §24, because in addition to imposing a tax it appropriates three million dollars to the revenue division of the Department of Treasury to cover initial expenses of administration and enforcement. This Court has long and consistently said that art 4, §24, and similar 'one object’ provisions in earlier constitutions, are to be construed reasonably 'and not in so narrow and technical a sense as unnecessarily to embarrass legislation.’ Ryerson v Utley (1868), 16 Mich 269, 277, citing People, ex rel. Drake, v Mahaney (1865), 13 Mich 481, 494. The object of the Act was to provide for creation and collection of a state income tax. The appropriation in the Act was utterly germane to that object. A statute may authorize the doing of all things which are in furtherance of the general purpose of the Act without violating the 'one object’ limitation of art 4, § 24, and so an appropriation in the Act to finance its administration and provisions for disposition of the taxes collected are proper and constitutional.”
[467]*467Similar language was used in People v Carey, 382 Mich 285 (1969) in discussing an earlier version of art 4, § 24:
"The main purpose of Const 1908, art 5, § 21, was to prevent the legislature from passing laws not fully understood and to avoid bringing into one bill subjects diverse in their nature and having no necessary connection. It was intended that the legislature, in passing law, should be fairly notified of its design and that the legislature and public might understand from the title that only provisions germane to the expressed object would be enacted.”2
As indicated above, the goal is notice, not restriction of legislation. This Court, in Local No 1644, AFSC & ME, AFL-CIO, v Oakwood Hospital Corp, 367 Mich 79, 91 (1962), said:
"Numerous cases have held that the 'object’ of a statute is the general purpose or aim of the enactment. The legislature may empower a body created by it to do everything requisite, necessary or expedient to carry out the principal objective to be attained. Legislation, if it has a primary object, is not invalid because it embraces more than 1 means of attaining its primary object. ” (Emphasis added.)
In Metropolitan Funeral System Association v Commissioner of Insurance, 331 Mich 185 (1951), plaintiffs were contesting the constitutionality of an act which required those engaged in the mortuary business to sever all connection with the insurance business. One argument was that the act regulated both the insurance and mortuary busi[468]*468ness whereas the title of the act spoke only to the regulation of insurance. This allegedly was a violation of the predecessor to art 4, § 24. In rejecting the claim, the Court quoted at 192 from Regents of University of Michigan v Pray, 264 Mich 693 (1933):
" 'Being a codification, the statute necessarily embodies various and somewhat diversified provisions of the drain law. But as against objections here raised, we do not find that the act violates article 5, § 21, of the Constitution, in that it embraces more than one object or because the title is deficient in. that it is not sufficiently broad to cover the provisions of the act. Title to a codification statute can scarcely be expected to embody reference to every detail of the act. Such is not the constitutional requirement. If the title fairly apprises legislators and the public generally of the act as a whole, such title is sufficient. Vernor v Secretary of State, 179 Mich 157 (Ann Cas 1915D 128) [1914], If the title is adequate, and the statute contains only that which is germane to its general purposes, it does not offend article 5, § 21, of the State Constitution.’ ”
Perhaps the most explicit explanation of the purpose behind the one-object provision is found in Rohan v Detroit Racing Association, 314 Mich 326 (1946), where the Court at 355-356 quoted the following provisions from Commerce-Guardian Trust & Savings Bank v Michigan, 228 Mich 316 (1924):
" 'This provision was adopted in pur first Constitution, and has remained in the several subsequent revisions without change. Its purpose and the effect to be given to it by the legislature have been many times discussed and passed upon by this court. It may be said at the outset that the provision is designed to serve two purposes. First, to prevent action by the legislature without receiving the concurrence therein of the requisite number of members by — "bringing together into [469]*469one bill subjects diverse in their nature, and having no necessary connection, with a view to combine in their favor the advocates of all.” — What is commonly spoken of as log-rolling in legislation — and also to prevent clauses being — "inserted in bills of which the titles gave no intimation, and their passage secured through legislative bodies whose members were not generally aware of their intention and effect.” People, ex rel. Drake, v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, 494 [1865]. And, second, to "challenge the attention” of those affected by the act to its provisions. People v Wohlford, 226 Mich. 166, 168 [1924].’ ”3
Precedent is clear and the careful consideration of the various facets of the first question dictates the opinion of the Court that the act embraces only one subject which is expressed in the title.
2.
The second question posed is whether 1972 PA 294 violates art 4, §25 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution which reads:
"No law shall be revised, altered or amended by reference to its title only. The section or sections of the act altered or amended shall be re-enacted and published at length.”
The 1850 Michigan Constitution provided in art 4, §25:
"No law shall be revised, altered or amended by reference to its title only; but the act revised and the section or sections of the act altered or amended shall be re-enacted and published at length.”
Except for some punctuation and some rear[470]*470rangement of words in the latter half of the provision, this language has continued through to this date (also see 1908 Const, art 5, §§ 21, 22).
The first consideration given to determining the meaning of constitutional language simply should be to read it. It is especially important that we do so in this matter before the Court because interpretations over the years seem to be leading away from the "plain and simple language” of the section.
The language of §25 is quite clear. It says succinctly and straightforwardly that no law (meaning statutory enactment) shall be revised, altered or amended by reference to its title only. The constitutional language then proceeds to state how it shall be done (i.e., the section[s] of the act in question shall be amended by reenacting and republishing at length).
There are only two sentences in § 25. Although the second word is "law”, it is obvious from the reading of the entire section that "law” means act or section of an act. Section 25 is worded to prevent the revising, altering or amending of an act by merely referring to the title of the act and printing the amendatory language then under consideration. If such a revision, alteration or amendment were allowed, the public and the Legislature would not be given notice and would not be able to observe readily the extent and effect of such revision, alteration or amendment.
A second consideration in determining the meaning of constitutional language is the analysis of precedent. How have the courts interpreted this language? In pursuing precedent, those cases decided at a time proximate to the ratification of the constitution are important in that they better reflect the meaning of the language of the constitution at the time it was written.
[471]*471In this instance, the most important source case is People v Mahaney, 13 Mich 481 (1865). As noted above, the language of §25 first appeared in the 1850 constitution. In Mahaney, the Court, speaking through Justice Cooley, had to resolve several challenges to the enactment of a law "to establish a police government for the city of Detroit”, (p 490.) The act called for a transfer of duties of various public officials and repealed all inconsistent acts. The legislation was quite broad for it not only instituted a police government but modified "the powers and duties of sheriffs, constables, water and sewer commissioners, marshals, mayors and justices, and imposes new duties upon the executive and the citizen”, (p 497.)
Much of Justice Cooley’s discussion in Mahaney is particularly pertinent to the present case. An example is this statement found on pp 496, 497:
"If, whenever a new statute is passed, it is necessary that all prior statutes modified by it by implication should be re-enacted and published at length as modified, then a large portion of the whole code of laws of the state would require to be republished at every session, and parts of it several times over, until from the mere immensity of the material, it would be impossible to tell what the law was.”
From the arguments presented to this Court, it appears that over 200 statutes might be related in some way to 1972 PA 294. It is conceded that there are others related but not even shown on the computer print-outs.4 To hold that each of these possibly hundreds of acts or portions thereof, in addition to the subject act, must be reenacted and republished clearly illustrates the unreasonable[472]*472ness of such an interpretation. To require such a recital would result in the ultimate of confusion.
Further, the constitututional division of powers5 mandates that the courts not interfere with legislative action by fabricating standards not constitutionally required. Considerations of practicality and common sense indicate that the Legislature must be allowed sufficient discretion at this point, provided that such discretion is exercised within constitutional limitations.
Justice Cooley stated further in Mahaney:
"This constitutional provision must receive a reasonable construction, with a view to give it effect. The mischief designed to be remedied was the enactment of amendatory statutes in terms so blind that the legislators themselves were sometimes deceived in regard to their effect, and the public, from the difficulty in making the necessary examination and comparison, failed to become apprised of the changes made in the laws.” (p 497.)
This citation indicates that another reason for the language in § 25 is to require that notice be given to the Legislature and the public of what is being changed and the content of the act as revised, altered or amended. This is similar in command to §24 (see above). The language and content of 1972 PA 294 is entirely sufficient to give that notice.
To continue the language from Mahaney at p 497:
"An amendatory act which purported only to insert certain words, or to substitute one phrase for another in an act or section which was only referred to but not republished, was well calculated to mislead the careless as to its effect, and was, perhaps, sometimes drawn in [473]*473that form for that express purpose. Endless confusion was introduced into the law, and the constitution wisely prohibited such legislation.”
1972 PA 294 does not violate these standards set forth in this reference. It does not revise, alter or amend in such prohibited fashion.
Mahaney then ruled:
"But an act complete in itself is not within the mischief designed to be remedied by this division and cannot be held to be prohibited by it without violating the plain intent. ”(p 497.) (Emphasis added.)
The subject act details all that is required for institution of a "no-fault” system of motor vehicle insurance. It is an act complete within itself. It falls squarely within the rule set forth in Mahaney6
It is argued, however, that there can be no supplemental or partial alterations to an act which are inconsistent with or which otherwise do violence to any other statute. That language is not in the constitution. It is not our function to introduce it therein. This is not a matter of policy nor a question of whether the provision can be interpreted so as to apply to a newly perceived problem. We should not ask "What can it mean?” Rather, we must determine "What does the constitution require?” Our task is to apply the constitution as adopted by the people. We cannot and should not attempt to anticipate and resolve all imagined difficulties.
In attempting to determine what § 25 requires, we have sought guidance from the debates which [474]*474occurred in the conventions convened to write the 1963, 1908 and 1850 constitutions. None was enlightening as to the specific intent which prompted passage of § 25.
In A Comparative Analysis of the Michigan Constitution, prepared for the last convention by the Citizens Research Council of Michigan, it was noted that procedure in the United States Congress differed in that it was the practice there "to amend laws by reference to their title only and to set forth only the amendatory language in the bill” (p 85). It was said at p 85 that the "Michigan practice, requiring bills to set forth the text of the whole section to be amended, is salutory in that it places the proposed amendment in context.” There is no indication here of the theory that every statute affected by the new act must be republished or reenacted.
Attention is also directed to Justice Cooley’s discussion of enactment of laws which comprises ch VI of his Constitutional Limitations (5th ed). In this chapter, he focuses on the predecessor to § 25. After quoting the passage from Mahaney set forth on p 497 supra, he said at 182:
"If this is a correct view of the purpose of the provision, it does not seem at all important to its accomplishment that the old law should be republished, if the law as amended is given in full, with such reference to the old law as will show for what the new law is substituted * * « y>
He further wrote at p 183:
"[Statutes which amend others by implication are not within this provision; and it is not essential that they even refer to the acts or sections which by implication they amend.”
[475]*475This analysis by Justice Cooley and the interpretation of the Citizens Research Council reinforce the determination that § 25 is directed at preventing undesirable conduct with respect to amendment of a particular act. It does not seek to correct tangential effects which the amendment, revision or alteration may have on those statutes not directly affected.
At this juncture, consideration should be given to Mok v Detroit Building and Savings Association No 4, 30 Mich 511 (1875). There an 1869 act provided a procedure for incorporating building and savings associations which required reference to an 1855 act. This in turn directed the reader to refer to an 1853 act which dealt with the creation of mining corporations. The 1869 act did alter some of the procedures and requirements of the 1853 act. This scheme was found to violate the constitution.
The actual hard fact in the Mok case was that the act of 1869, taken in connection with that of 1853 (and an act of 1855) did not furnish any distinct outline or prescribe any definite course of action by which associations could be sufficiently guided in perfecting organizations under it. The two acts had purposes and objects so entirely different it was impossible to determine what part of the general and manufacturing incorporations act was meant to be applied to the building and savings corporation.
In that case, there were amendments by reference that patently were contrary to the constitution and so are distinguishable from the matter of 1972 PA 294. In the matter before us, there is no attempt to alter or amend the statute by reference or by striking out or insertion of words without reproduction of the statute in its amended form. (See Mok, pp 515-517).
[476]*476Alan v Wayne County, 388 Mich 210 (1972) also is distinguishable. There the offending statutory language was not an amendment by implication. As Justice Williams said at p 270:
"This is not a case of so-called 'amendment by implication’ such as cases which were considered and held valid in People v Mahaney, 13 Mich 481, 496 (1865) (transfer of powers from one statute to another is not an 'amendment’ requiring republication); Underwood v McDuffee, 15 Mich 361, 366 (1867) (overall revision of statute and system of references adding new sections with the reference number of an old one is permissible where new section is not foreign to subject indicated by title of law in which inserted); People v Wands, 23 Mich 384, 388-389 (1871) (an amending act which properly amends two sections of law may have the effect of amending by implication other parts of the same body of law); Swartwout v Mich Airline R Co, 24 Mich 388, 399 (1872) (following Wands in holding that a new statute which adds a new section to a body of law may amend by implication other sections of the same body of law); and a continuing line of cases not cited here.”
In speaking of Mok, Justice Williams also said:
"The Court noted that it was confusing to be sent by the act of 1869 to the act of 1855 only to be told to turn to the act of 1853 * * * .”
The so-called "No-Fault Insurance” amendment modifies the title of and adds a chapter to the Insurance Code. It is a complete act and does not confuse or mislead, but publishes in one act for all the world to see what it purports to do.
We emphasize the philosophy that constitutional language must be given reasonable and practical interpretations.7 We must not extend and expand [477]*477the wording out of its original context and meaning in order to resppnd to imagined or even real mischief.
Amendments by implication are an inevitable by-product of the legislative scheme of government. It boggles the mind to contemplate the laws which would be rendered unconstitutional ab initio and the avalanche of litigation which would follow were we to construe § 25 in so extended a manner as to find unconstitutional its effect upon 1972 PA 294.
This act does not purport by its terms to directly revise, alter or amend any act or section of an act other than the Insurance Code. It does amend the title of the Insurance Code and it sets forth in full the additions to the body of the Code. To the extent which this act cuts across and affects other acts, it does not present the kind of problem toward which this constitutional provision is directed.
The notice requirement of §25 has been met, the enactment standards have been met and the act is complete within itself and meets the test of constitutionality as applied by art 4, §25 of the Michigan Constitution.
3.
The final question is whether the phrases "serious impairment of body function” and "permanent serious disfigurement” provide standards sufficient for legal interpretation.
This Court holds that such phrases are capable of legal interpretation and, indeed, that juries or judges sitting without juries frequently have and do interpret comparable phrases bearing upon various facets of the law. Such findings result from [478]*478denominated fact questions and thus are within the exclusive province of the triers of fact. Only when interpretation approaches or breaches permissible limits does it become a question of law for the Court. Such questions must be approached on a case by case basis.
When construing a statute, the Court must give effect to the legislative intent and read the language in the light of the general purpose sought to be accomplished.8
MCLA 8.3; MSA 2.212, reads:
"In the construction of the statutes of this state the rules stated in sections 3a to 3w shall be observed, unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature.”
Section 3a of said statute (MCLA 8.3a; MSA 2.212[1]) instructs:
"All words and phrases shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language * * * .”
Although there is a paucity of Michigan cases bearing upon the interpretation of "serious impairment of body function” because our laws have not employed such language heretofore, the word "serious” has been construed from early dates.9 Relevant cases from other jurisdictions appear by footnote.10
[479]*479Phrases comparable to "permanent serious disfigurement” have confronted courts over the years and there has been no apparent reluctance to construe the terminology.* 11
[480]*480A reading of the Standard Jury Instructions for civil cases indicates further the wide range of questions which our Court permits triers of fact to decide. For example, in negligence cases the jury is permitted to determine "what a reasonably careful person would do or not do” under the circumstances (10.01). It is permitted to determine questions of "contributory negligence” (11.01), "willful and wanton misconduct” (14.02), "gross negligence” (14.03), "proximate cause” (15.01) and "in[481]*481tervening negligence” or "outside force” (15.05, 15.06).
The jury must also decide the amount of damages to be awarded in order "reasonably, fairly and adequately” to compensate the injured party (30.01). The jury may decide if the injury is "continuing” or "permanent” (30.01). The jury may determine "the reasonable expenses of necessary medical care, treatment and services” (30.05) and "the loss of earning capacity” (30.06). In wrongful death actions, the jury may determine awards for losses of "parental training and guidance” or "society and companionship”.
Clearly the subject phrases "serious impairment of body function” and "permanent serious disfigurement” as used in § 3135 of this act are comprised of no less commonly used or understood words of the English language, nor is the language presently before the Court less precise than that which has been adopted to express other standards for determining tort liability. The phrases are within the province of the trier of fact and are sufficient for legal interpretation.
T. E. Brennan, T. G. Kavanagh, Swainson, and Levin, JJ., concurred with M. S. Coleman, J.