Adnan Khaki, V. Jennifer Reedal

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: March 10, 2025
• Docket: 86877-2
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

JENNIFER ASHLEY REEDAL, No. 86877-2-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION ADNAN ALI KHAKI,

Appellant.

FELDMAN, J. — Adnan Ali Khaki appeals an antiharassment protection order

(AHPO) protecting Jennifer Ashley Reedal. Because the AHPO has expired, the appeal

is moot. Although we generally dismiss appeals presenting only moot issues, we may

consider issues that are of substantial and continuing interest. Here, we identify such an

issue—the absence of required findings to permit appellate review—and vacate the

AHPO on that basis.

Reedal filed a petition for a protection order after Khaki allegedly sent her

numerous unwanted e-mails. The trial court held three hearings at which it heard

testimony and argument regarding Reedal’s petition and related matters. At the

conclusion of the third hearing, the court indicated it would review the evidence and

stated, “I’ll make a written decision and issue it to both [of] you.” The court then issued

its written decision, which states in relevant part: No. 86877-2-I

Based upon the petition, testimony, case record, and response, if any, the court finds by a preponderance of evidence that the protected person (or petitioner on their behalf) has proved the required criteria for the following protection order under chapter 7.105 RCW.

[X] Antiharassment Protection Order - The restrained person has subjected the protected person to unlawful harassment.

Also relevant here, the order states that it “is effective immediately” and “expiring

January 22, 2025.” This timely appeal followed.

Preliminarily, we must address whether this appeal is moot. “A case is moot if a

court can no longer provide effective relief.” Maldondo v. Maldondo, 197 Wn. App. 779,

790, 391 P.3d 546 (2017). The expiration of a protection order generally means we

cannot provide such relief, and a party’s challenge to the order is thus moot. See Price

v. Price, 174 Wn. App. 894, 896, 902, 301 P.3d 486 (2013) (“Both protection orders have

long expired; thus, Veronica’s challenges to these orders are moot.”). Here, the AHPO

expired on January 22, 2025 and no longer restrains Khaki. Thus, as in Price, Khaki’s

challenges to the AHPO are moot.

Addressing this issue, Khaki claims, “This case will not be moot even if the Court’s

decision on this appeal occurs after the expiration of the civil antiharassment order.

Resolution of this case in favor of Father will ‘clear his record’ and reputation which is

sufficient relief to avoid a mootness issue.” In support of this argument, Khaki cites Hough

v. Stockbridge, 113 Wn. App. 532, 537, 54 P.3d 192 (2002), rev’d on other grounds, 150

Wn.2d 234, 76 P.3d 216 (2003), which recognizes, “this court may decide a case, even if

moot, where the matter is of continuing and substantial public interest.” To determine

whether a matter satisfies this standard, we consider “(1) the public or private nature of

the question presented, (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination for the future

2 No. 86877-2-I

guidance of public officers, and (3) the likelihood of future recurrence of the question.”

State v. Beaver, 184 Wn.2d 321, 330, 358 P.3d 385 (2015) (alterations in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Hunley, 175 Wn.2d 901, 907, 287

P.3d 584 (2012)).

This public importance exception to dismissal on mootness grounds “has been

used in cases dealing with constitutional interpretation, the validity of statutes or

regulations, and matters that are sufficiently important to the appellate court.” Id. at 331.

Here, one such issue that is sufficiently important to the appellate court to avoid dismissal

on mootness grounds is proper compliance with the requirement that a trial court order

granting a protection order include sufficient findings to permit appellate review. That

question is public in nature (it transcends the parties in this proceeding), an opinion in this

appeal is desirable to provide future guidance to public officers, and the issue may recur

in the absence of appellate vigilance. We therefore address this issue despite the

expiration of the AHPO.

Motions for an antiharassment protection order are governed by RCW

7.105.010(36)(a), which defines unlawful harassment as follows:

A knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and that serves no legitimate or lawful purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.

To enter an antiharassment protection order, as the trial court did here, the court must

find each of these required criteria by a preponderance of evidence. See Shinaberger ex

rel. Campbell v. LaPine, 109 Wn. App. 304, 307-08, 34 P.3d 1253 (2001).

3 No. 86877-2-I

Here, we are unable to review whether the trial court erroneously found these

necessary elements—as Khaki argues—because the court did not enter the required

findings. Under CR 52(a)(1), “[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury . . . the

court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law.” Following

a bench trial, we review a trial court’s findings of fact to determine whether they are

supported by substantial evidence, and then review whether those findings of fact support

the trial court’s conclusions of law. Tiller v. Lackey, 6 Wn. App. 2d 470, 484, 431 P.3d

524 (2018). Findings of fact “should at least be sufficient to indicate the factual bases for

the ultimate conclusions.” In re Det. of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 218, 728 P.2d 138

(1986). Where a trial court fails to enter the required factual findings, an appellate court

“cannot review an assignment of error which requires consideration of whether there was

sufficient evidence to support such findings.” State v. Denison, 78 Wn. App. 566, 570,

897 P.2d 437 (1995).

Contrary to the legal principles stated above, there are no written findings here.

Instead, the AHPO states that the trial court has found by a preponderance of the

evidence that “the protected person . . . has proved the required criteria” including that

“[t]he restrained person has subjected the protected person to unlawful harassment.”

Such “findings,” which largely recite legal requirements, are not “sufficiently specific to

permit meaningful review.” In re Dependency of C.R.B., 62 Wn. App. 608, 619, 814 P.2d

1197 (1991) (quoting LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d at 218-19). And while written findings “may be

supplemented by the trial court’s oral decision or statements in the record,” LaBelle, 107

Wn.2d at 219, the trial court also did not provide any oral decision or findings.

4 No. 86877-2-I

Where, as here, the factual record is disputed and formal findings of fact and

conclusions of law are necessary for appellate review, remand for their entry would

typically be appropriate. See Little v. King, 160 Wn.2d 696, 707, 161 P.3d 345 (2007).

But in this case, no purpose would be served by remand because the AHPO has already

expired and, thus, no longer restrains Khaki. We therefore vacate the AHPO—effectively

providing the relief Khaki seeks despite the AHPO’s expiration—without addressing the

parties’ arguments. In granting such relief, we neither sanction nor foreclose another

petition for a protection order based on unwanted e-mails should Reedal again seek such

relief. Lastly, because Reedal has not established a proper basis for awarding attorney

fees on appeal, we deny her request.

Vacated.

WE CONCUR: