Adler v. Lincoln Housing Authority

544 A.2d 576, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 93, 1988 WL 68069
CourtSupreme Court of Rhode Island
DecidedJuly 6, 1988
Docket87-76-Appeal
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 544 A.2d 576 (Adler v. Lincoln Housing Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Adler v. Lincoln Housing Authority, 544 A.2d 576, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 93, 1988 WL 68069 (R.I. 1988).

Opinion

OPINION

MURRAY, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court granting the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The plaintiff, Amy Adler, was an employee of the defendant town of Lincoln Housing Authority and was supervised by the executive director, the defendant John Pal-ma (Palma). The plaintiff’s employment was terminated on February 5, 1982. She alleges that her discharge was due to her exercise of free speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, in violation of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1981). 1 The trial justice held that plaintiff failed to meet the burden of making an initial showing that her speech was constitutionally protected. He granted de *578 fendants’ motion for a directed verdict and dismissed the complaint.

The facts are largely undisputed. The plaintiff learned of an employment possibility at the Lincoln Housing Authority in December 1980 from her father, Robert Custis, who at that time was chairman of the board of commissioners of the housing authority. The plaintiff was interviewed by defendant Palma and was later offered a position that was titled “secretary/bookkeeper and leased housing manager.” Her responsibilities included administration of the federally funded section-8 housing program. The plaintiff worked with Palma and the assistant executive director, Carol Kennedy (Kennedy).

Working relations in the office were pleasant until June 1981, when plaintiff noticed strained relations between Palma and Kennedy. Kennedy informed the board of commissioners about the developing hostilities between her and Palma. The board convened to discuss the matter, and on the following day, plaintiff, Palma, and Kennedy met with the chairman and vice-chairman at the housing authority office. The plaintiff and Kennedy were directed to report any future intra-office problems to Palma first, who in turn would contact the commissioners upon request.

Subsequent to the meeting, relations between Palma and Kennedy grew steadily worse and Palma began to direct his anger toward plaintiff. Both Palma and Kennedy testified that Kennedy’s refusal to intervene and help resolve a personal matter between Palma and his girlfriend was the cause of their deteriorating relationship.

Beginning in October 1981 plaintiff maintained written records regarding Palma’s behavior. She noted that Palma’s conduct included excessive absenteeism and use of the office as a personal residence. In addition, plaintiff stated that Palma used public vehicles for personal matters, purchased fuel with housing authority credit cards, and charged long-distance telephone calls to the office. The plaintiff believed that Palma was improperly ignoring regulations concerning the priority of applicants for section-8 housing and that because of his actions the tenants were being deprived of benefits intended for recipients of federal assistance.

The plaintiff apprised her father of Pal-ma’s activities. A meeting of the entire board of commissioners of the housing authority was convened on January 7, 1982. Subsequently, personnel relations worsened, and on February 2, 1982, defendant Palma, through Kennedy, informed plaintiff that she was no longer responsible for administering section-8 housing. In response plaintiff approached Palma and inquired about his decision to change her duties. Palma replied that he owed her no explanation. The plaintiff asked to file a grievance, and Palma replied that the request was denied. The plaintiff questioned Palma’s authority to deny her the right to file a grievance, and he replied that if she questioned his authority, she was fired.

The plaintiff contacted one of the commissioners who instructed her to compose a written grievance for review by the board of commissioners. The plaintiff provided a copy of the grievance to Palma in accordance with the directive that she had received from the chairman and vice-chairman of the board. On Friday, February 5, 1982, plaintiff received a letter from Palma stating that she was terminated for “noncompliance and acceptance of work directives and work orders of the Executive Director * * *. Additionally, your direct appeal to the individual Commissioners for reversal of the Executive Director’s orders was in violation of personnel policy, and thereof renders you grossly insubordinate to your superior.”

At plaintiff's request, the board of commissioners held a hearing on March 18, 1982, regarding her termination. The board sustained Palma’s decision to terminate plaintiff. The plaintiff instituted proceedings in Superior Court, alleging that defendants terminated her for speaking out about defendant Palma’s malfeasance in office. The plaintiff also sought damages against defendant Palma, individually, for the intentional infliction of emotional dis *579 tress. 2

At the close of plaintiff’s testimony the trial justice granted defendants’ motion for a directed verdict. The plaintiff alleges that the trial justice (1) erroneously directed a verdict for defendants, (2) erred in dismissing the § 1983 civil rights claim against defendant Palma, (3) erred in dismissing the § 1983 civil rights claim against the Lincoln Housing Authority, and (4) erred in dismissing the conspiracy claim.

I

In considering a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court should review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, without weighing the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses, and extract from the record only the reasonable inferences that support the non-moving party’s position. “If, after such review, the court finds no issues upon which reasonable persons might draw conflicting conclusions, the court should grant the motion. On appeal, we use the same-criteria in reviewing the motion.” Sousa v. Chaset, 519 A.2d 1132, 1135 (R.I.1987); Powers v. Carvalho, 117 R.I. 519, 524-25, 368 A.2d 1242, 1246 (1977).

In the instant case the trial justice granted defendants’ motion for directed verdict. He observed that plaintiff was among ten applicants for the position at the housing authority but stated, “It just so happens that Amy Adler was the daughter of Robert Custis who was the chairman of, the Board of Commissioners. * * * So we can say with a certain degree of certitude that at that time nepotism was alive and well in the Lincoln Housing Authority.” In addition he stated that “Amy Adler became dissatisfied with the way Mr. Palma was performing his functions. She doesn’t like the silent treatment. She doesn’t like his inconsistent moods, and so she chose to violate the directive of the Commissioners. She went to her father who happened to be the chairman of the commissioners.” In addition to references that plaintiff was related to the chairman, the trial justice speculated about plaintiff’s motivation.

In his decision the trial justice stated, “It is also interesting that before that time Mr. Custis had been in a dispute with Mr. Pal-ma. Mr. Palma had made public allegations about Mr. Custis using maintenance personnel of the Authority at his home and summer residence.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
544 A.2d 576, 1988 R.I. LEXIS 93, 1988 WL 68069, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/adler-v-lincoln-housing-authority-ri-1988.