Aderholdt v. Lewis

187 A.2d 488, 1963 D.C. App. LEXIS 177

• Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 18, 1963
• Docket: 3118
• Status: Published

Opinions

MYERS, Associate Judge.

The Property Clerk of the Metropolitan Police Department appeals from a summary judgment granted appellee in an action by the latter to obtain the return of certain cash allegedly detained without right.

Appellee had placed $2,232 cash in a locker in Union Station. In his absence the Metropolitan Police Department impounded the money and delivered it to its Property Clerk, appellant, who refused to surrender it to appellee upon demand. Appellee instituted suit to recover the money, and, after the answer of defendant, moved, under the trial court’s Rule 56, for summary judgment. The court granted the motion and the sole question on appeal is the correctness of that ruling.

■ Rule 56 provides that “judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” This rule is substantially identical to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which has been construed as authorizing summary judgment only “where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, where it is quite clear what the truth is, when no genuine issue remains for trial, and it is not the purpose of the rule to deny to litigants a right of trial if they really have issues to try.” ¹

Whether there is such factual issue must be determined upon the pleadings and other materials on file at the time of the hearing on the motion, and the movant has the burden of clearly establishing the nonexistence of any material issue of fact. His pleadings and other papers are closely scrutinized and all doubts are resolved against him; and where one party has exclusive or peculiar knowledge of the crucial facts, that party, rather than his opponent, should do the disclosing.

In reaching a determination as to whether at the time of the hearing there was no genuine issue of fact so as to justify the court in granting appellee’s motion, we must assess, in the light of the above principles, the pleadings as they existed at that time. On the one hand, appellee alleges by his sworn complaint “4. * * * that he is the lawful owner of said funds * * now in the custody and possession of [appellant] ; that said funds were lawfully in the possession of [appellee] at the time the same were taken * * * and that said taking by the [appellant] was without right; that [appellee] is guilty of no violation of law of any kind with reference to said funds and has been charged with none; * * As opposed, appellant filed his unverified answer in which he avers “ * * * that the matter contained in paragraph numbered four of the complaint are conclusions only, to which no answer is required. However, if answer be required, [appellant] denies the allegations contained in paragraph numbered four of the complaint * * * [alleges] the property in question may be the proceeds of a crime and * * * that there has been no satisfactory proof of ownership by [ap-pellee] of the monies * * * ” in question. There were before the court no affidavits, depositions or admissions by either party.

We do not find that the record justifies the action of the trial court.² Ap-pellee’s affirmation under oath of his claim of ownership is not a substitute for setting forth the facts on which he predicates his claim. The denial by appellant that the money belongs to appellee points up the issue between them. Rule 56 provides for eliminating trial only in a case where there is clearly no genuine triable issue of a material fact. Where there is the “slightest doubt” as to the facts, summary judgment is not in order.³

As the record raises substantial doubt as to the legal ownership of the money, summary judgment in favor of appellee was improperly granted. The case should be reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

It is so ordered.

1 . National Screen Service Corp. v. Poster Exchange, Inc., 5th Cir., 305 F.2d 647, 651 (citing Sartor et al. v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 64 S.Ct. 724, 88 L.Ed. 967; Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426, 68 S.Ct. 641, 92 L.Ed. 784).

2 . Dewey v. Clark, 86 U.S.App.D.C. 137, 180 F.2d 766; Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 2d Cir., 149 F.2d 130; Blyther v. Pentagon Federal Credit Union, D.C.Mun.App., 182 A.2d 892; White v. Luber, D.C.Mun.App., 144 A.2d 774; Messall v. Efron, D.C.Mun.App., 72 A.2d 694; Schwartz v. Sandidge, D.C.Mun.App., 63 A.2d 869.

3 . National Screen Service Corp. v. Poster Exchange, Inc., supra, note 1.