Adebonojo v. Williams

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: January 3, 2025
• Docket: 24-1269
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 24-1269 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 01/03/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 3, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court DAVID ADEBONOJO,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v. No. 24-1269 (D.C. No. 1:23-CV-00894-GPG) DEAN WILLIAMS; PHIL WEISER, (D. Colo.) Attorney General, State of Colorado,

Respondents - Appellees. _________________________________

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY* _________________________________

Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

David Adebonojo is a prisoner at the Colorado Territorial Correctional

Facility. Proceeding pro se,1 he seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal

the district court’s dismissal of his application for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (requiring COA to appeal denial of habeas relief from

state-court judgment). We deny a COA and dismiss this appeal.

* This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 Although we “liberally construe” Mr. Adebonojo’s pro se filings, “we do not assume the role of advocate.” Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Appellate Case: 24-1269 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 01/03/2025 Page: 2

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Adebonojo was charged with seven counts of aggravated robbery, seven

counts of felony menacing, and three counts of theft in Colorado state court. He was

convicted by a jury on all charges and was sentenced to 18 years in prison on

September 23, 2019. Mr. Adebonojo appealed, but the Colorado Court of Appeals

(CCA) dismissed his appeal with prejudice as untimely. He then filed a motion for

postconviction relief in state district court, which denied the motion without a

hearing. Mr. Adebonojo appealed the denial of his postconviction motion, and the

CCA affirmed on November 17, 2022. He did not seek review from the Colorado

Supreme Court.

On April 10, 2023, Mr. Adebonojo filed his § 2254 application in the United

States District Court for the District of Colorado. The district court denied Mr.

Adebonojo’s application, dismissing some claims for procedural defects and

dismissing the remaining claims on the merits.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Before a state prisoner can appeal the denial of relief under § 2254, he must

obtain a COA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). We will issue a COA “only if the

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id.

§ 2253(c)(2). This standard requires “a demonstration that . . . includes showing that

reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition

should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were

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adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.

473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the applicant

must show that the district court’s resolution of the constitutional claim was either

“debatable or wrong.” Id.

We review the district court’s legal analysis de novo, but in doing so “we

remain bound by the constraints of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(AEDPA) of 1996.” Johnson v. Martin, 3 F.4th 1210, 1218 (10th Cir. 2021). AEDPA

provides that when a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in a state court, a

federal court can grant habeas relief only if the applicant establishes that the state-

court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,”

or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1), (2). Clearly

established federal law “includes only the holdings, as opposed to the dicta,” of the

Supreme Court’s decisions. Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015) (internal

quotation marks omitted). These holdings “must be construed narrowly and consist

only of something akin to on-point holdings.” Al-Yousif v. Trani, 779 F.3d 1173,

1183 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). A state-court decision

involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law “only if every

fairminded jurist would agree” that the state-court decision did not comport with

clearly established federal law. Dunn v. Reeves, 594 U.S. 731, 740 (2021) (brackets

and internal quotation marks omitted).

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If the application was denied because of procedural defects, the applicant faces

a double hurdle. Not only must the applicant make a substantial showing of the denial

of a constitutional right, but he must also show “that jurists of reason would find it

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack, 529

U.S. at 484. “Where a plain procedural bar is present and the district court is correct

to invoke it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either that

the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should be

allowed to proceed further.” Id.

B. Claims for Relief

Mr. Adebonojo seeks from this court a COA to raise four arguments on appeal: (1)

his “right to be present” was violated because his “absence from the arraignment court

prevented him from entering a plea to commence speedy trial,” Aplt. Br. at 11; (2) his

“right to appeal” his state-court convictions was violated because “state[] officials

confiscate[d] his writing material” and “withheld [his] access to a law library” during the

time available to file his notice of appeal, id. at 4; (3) the state trial court lacked

jurisdiction over the charges filed against him; and (4) his “own attorneys conspired with

the state and its courts [against him],” engaging in outrageous government conduct, id. at

12. Each argument was properly rejected by the district court.

1. Denial of Speedy Trial

The district court denied Mr. Adebonojo’s speedy-trial claim because of

procedural defects. The court ruled that to the extent the speedy-trial claim is based on a

violation of Mr. Adebonojo’s speedy-trial rights under a state statute, the claim was

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procedurally defaulted because it was not raised in Colorado state court until he sought

postconviction relief, and in those proceedings the CCA determined the claim was not

properly brought because it could have been raised on direct appeal. See Colo. R. Crim.

P. 35(c)(3)(VII). The federal district court correctly held that it was barred from

reviewing the claim because it had been defaulted in state court “pursuant to an

independent and adequate state procedural rule.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

750 (1991). And to the extent the claim is based on a violation of Mr. Adebonojo’s

speedy-trial rights under the federal Constitution, the court ruled that the claim was

anticipatorily defaulted because it had not been properly presented in state court and

would be barred in that court if raised in a new proceeding. See Colo. Crim. P.

35(c)(3)(VII); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1 (if a petitioner “failed to exhaust state

remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in

order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally

barred,” the claim is procedurally defaulted). Reasonable jurists would not debate the

district court’s resolution of this claim.

2. Denial of Right to Appeal

Mr. Adebonojo’s right-to-appeal claim (which was included as part of his

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in district court) was also procedurally defaulted

because the CCA determined the claim was undeveloped and declined to address it. See

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s

resolution of this claim.

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3. Lack of Jurisdiction

As best we can tell, Mr. Adebonojo’s jurisdictional claim is that the charges

against him should have been filed and processed solely in Colorado district court by

a district-court judge, but some matters were handled by a state magistrate judge and

a county-court judge. The assignment of a state’s judicial authority among state

courts and judges, however, is purely a matter of state law and not a proper matter for

federal habeas review. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (“federal

habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)). Mr. Adebonojo argues that his claim of a violation of federal constitutional

law is supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in Old Wayne Mutual Life

Association v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 15 (1907). But the jurisdictional issue in that

case was only whether an Indiana insurance company could be sued in Pennsylvania

state court by a citizen of Pennsylvania regarding a contract made in Indiana. See id.

at 12–15. On its face that opinion is irrelevant to Mr. Adebonojo’s contention. He has

utterly failed to identify a holding of a decision by the United States Supreme Court

that has any bearing on (much less supports) his jurisdictional claim. No reasonable

jurist would debate the district court’s disposition of this claim.

4. Outrageous Government Conduct

Mr. Adebonojo makes several distinct arguments in support of his contention

that his convictions were the result of fraud and collusion by the prosecutors, public

defenders, and judicial officers involved in his case.

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Mr. Adebonojo, who is African American, first contends that there was

purposeful racial discrimination in the selection of the jury venire. He relies on

Batson v. Kentucky, which held that the government may not use peremptory

challenges to exclude a prospective juror based solely on the juror’s race. 476 U.S.

79, 89 (1986). In particular, he directs us to the statement in that opinion that a

defendant may make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination in the

selection of the venire “on proof [1] that members of the defendant’s race were

substantially underrepresented on the venire from which his jury was drawn, and [2]

that the venire was selected under a practice providing the opportunity for

discrimination.” Id. at 95 (internal quotation marks omitted). But even if Mr.

Adebonojo showed that African Americans were absent from his jury pool, he

presented no evidence to the CCA of the second Batson requirement—namely, that

the venire selection process provided an opportunity for discrimination. See Colo.

Stat. § 13-71-109 (providing that prospective jurors shall be selected from master

juror wheel by random selection method which ensures equal probability of

selection). Instead, Mr. Adebonojo makes the unsupported assertion that “‘it is the

practice of this jurisdiction to select from a jury pool containing less than 5% African

Americans.’” Aplt. Br. at 17–18. No reasonable jurist would debate the CCA’s

rejection of this claim. And to the extent that Mr. Adebonojo contends that the

selection of his venire violated Colo. Stat. § 13-71-104(3)(a), we repeat that

violations of state law are not a proper subject for federal habeas review. See

Swarthout, 562 U.S. at 219.

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Second, Mr. Adebonojo contends that state officials misrepresented where his

case was filed. But in light of the CCA decision that there was no merit to his

jurisdictional claim, any error in informing him about where the case was filed was

of no consequence, so the district court properly denied relief on this contention.

Finally, Mr. Adebonojo alleges he was misled into waiving his right to a

preliminary hearing, his competency proceedings were fraudulent, and the state

district court’s rulings on some of his motions were “perjured to aid in [his]

conviction.” Aplt Br. at 15. The district court concluded that the CCA “correctly

noted” that the first two allegations lacked record support. R. at 357. And insofar as

Mr. Adebonojo complains that the state-court judge made various false statements,

such as stating that the judge had read certain documents and that certain materials

would be promptly provided to Mr. Adebonojo, he fails to cite any authority, much

less opinions from the United States Supreme Court, suggesting that his federal

constitutional rights were thereby violated.

No reasonable jurist would debate the correctness of the district court’s denial

of Mr. Adebonojo’s outrageous-government-conduct claim.

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III. CONCLUSION

We DENY a COA, DISMISS this appeal, and GRANT Mr. Adebonojo’s

motion to proceed in forma pauperis.

Entered for the Court

Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge

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