Ade Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp.

220 F. Supp. 2d 303, 2002 WL 31015463
CourtDistrict Court, D. Delaware
DecidedSeptember 9, 2002
DocketCIV.A. 00-892 MPT
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 220 F. Supp. 2d 303 (Ade Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ade Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp., 220 F. Supp. 2d 303, 2002 WL 31015463 (D. Del. 2002).

Opinion

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION

THYNGE, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff, ADE Corporation (“ADE”), and defendant, KLA-Tencor Corporation (“KLA”), are owners of patents directed to the detection and classification of defects on the surface of silicon wafers as crystalline originated pit (“COP”) defects or particle defects. On October 10, 2000, ADE filed this patent infringement suit against KLA alleging infringement of its 6,118,525 patent. D.I. 1. KLA counterclaimed arguing that ADE infringed its 5,883,710; 6,215,551; 6,081,325; and 5,226,118 pat *307 ents. 1 Pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996); and local practice, this memorandum construes the aforementioned patents and resolves many outstanding pretrial case dispositive summary judgment motions.

THE COURT’S PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

I. Technology Overview

Directing beams of light at silicon wafers, collecting said light, and attempting to interpret said collected light as a quality tool is not new in the semiconductor industry. The ’525, ’325, ’710, and ’551 2 patents involved in this case relate to similar inventions for use in the semiconductor industry for detecting and classifying defects on the surface of silicon wafers as crystalline originate pits (“COPS”) or particles. As used in this industry and, in general, the inventions operate by focusing an incident beam of light at the surface of a silicon wafer at an oblique angle to said surface, scanning the surface with said beam, collecting light scattered from said surface, and comparing said scattered light to determine whether the scatter pattern is indicative of a silicon wafer defect (COP or particle). 3

In contrast to the previous patents, the ’118 invention does not physically, inspect the surface of silicon wafers searching for defects. Instead, the invention is directed to a system or method that analyzes or processes information previously captured from a physical scan of the surface of a silicon wafer to determine whether the data is representative of a silicon wafer defect. To accomplish this goal, the T18 invention uses predefined or manually manipulated program parameters in conjunction with computer hardware and software to guide system operators during analysis of the raw data previously collected.

II. General Principles of Patent Claim Construction

The parties quibble extensively about the terminology employed to claim the inventions involved in this case. It is difficult to fathom, however, how two very diverging viewpoints can emerge from the same claim language given that officials designated as experts in their respective fields at the United States Patent and Trademark Office studied these inventions and found them patentable. Nonetheless, this court is bestowed with the responsibility of sifting through the parties’ arguments to arrive at a claim construction for each of the contested claims. Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. In this regard, this court is mindful of the proper weight accorded both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence when performing a Markman analysis.

Claim analysis begins with the claim language used to delimit the scope of an invention. Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed.Cir.2001) (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996)); Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed.Cir.1998); Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 620 (Fed.Cir.1995). A court applies to *308 this language an “ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art” at the time the patent was filed. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int’l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951, 955 (Fed.Cir.2000) (citing Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1578 (Fed.Cir.1996); and Markman, 52 F.3d at 980); Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed.Cir.2000) (citing York Prods., Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1572 (Fed.Cir.1996)); Johnson Worldwide Associates, Inc. v. Zebco Corporation, 175 F.3d 985, 989 (Fed.Cir.1999) (citing Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1249; and York Prods., 99 F.3d at 1568). Claim construction then progresses to a consideration of the remainder of the specification and any prosecution history before the court to determine whether the intrinsic record contains information requiring an interpretation of the words used in the claim differing from that commonly understood by those skilled in the art. Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed.Cir.2001) (citing Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1576-77; Markman, 52 F.3d at 979; and Bell Communications, 55 F.3d at 620); see also Wang Labs., Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed.Cir.1999) (A review of the specification will prevent a court from construing claims to encompass embodiments that are not taught in the specification.); Southwall Techs. Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed.Cir.1995) (Arguments and amendments made during prosecution of a patent may be used to exclude a construction that was disclaimed thereby.); and Elkay Mfg. Co. v. EBCO Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973, 979 (Fed.Cir.1999) (Amendments and arguments made during patent prosecution may result in a forfeiture of certain claim scope).

If the claim words are clear on their face and the intrinsic record contains no indication that the inventors intended anything other than a common art meaning to apply, claim construction ceases without a review of extrinsic evidence. Interactive Gift, 231 F.3d at 866; Hockerson-Halberstadt, 222 F.3d at 955 (citing Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed.Cir.1998)). When the intrinsic record is unclear or ambiguous as to the meaning of claim terms, however, a court may look to extrinsic evidence to discern whether those of ordinary skill in the art attach a meaning to the claim terms eluding the court’s grasp due to its unfamiliarity with the technology involved. Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1583. If so, a court is apt to follow such a construction if that construction is consistent with the intrinsic record. Id. Typically, though, extrinsic evidence serves the impassive role of educating the court as to the technology involved because such evidence, unlike the intrinsic record, is ephemeral. Id.

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220 F. Supp. 2d 303, 2002 WL 31015463, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ade-corp-v-kla-tencor-corp-ded-2002.