Hays, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the trial court sustaining defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition failed to state a cause of action.
The petition alleges that due to defendant’s negligent operation of an automobile her husband was permanently disabled and rendered incapable to carry on marital relations. It states that plaintiff “has been permanently deprived of the aid, services, support, affection, society, companionship and consortium, including sexual relations, of her said husband” and asks damages on account thereof.
While not appearing in the record, it appears from appellee’s argument that the husband’s cause of action against the defendant has been settled and dismissed with prejudice. Assuming such to be the case we deem it to be immaterial to this appeal and the issue here presented.
The sole question for determination is: May a wife maintain an action for damages for loss of consortium against one [274]*274who, by his negligence, has permanently incapacitated her husband?
I. “Consortium” at common law included not only conjugal fellowship of husband and wife, but also service as a prominent, if not the dominant, factor; not so much the service resulting in the performance of labor or the earning of wages, as the service which contributed and assisted in all the relations of domestic life. Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N. C. 120, 126 S.E. 307, 37 A.L.R. 889. This concept of the term became known as the “material” or “practical” version. As the attitude of the courts toward the status of husband and wife, one to the other, changed, a more modern and limited version thereof was adopted by various jurisdictions. Under it the term “consortium” was limited to “the right which husband and wife have to each other’s society, comfort, and affection.” 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife, section 11, page 402; Black’s Law Dictionary, and has become known as the “sentimental version.” This court has defined it as “conjugal fellowship of husband and wife; and the right of each to the company, cooperation, affection and aid of the other in every conjugal relation.” Price v. Price, 91 Iowa 693, 60 N.W. 202, 29 L.R.A. 150, 51 Am. St. Rep. 360; McGlothlen v. Mills, 221 Iowa 204, 265 N.W. 117. Thus it appears that the “sentimental” version has been accepted in Iowa and it is on this theory that the parties have submitted this case.
While this exact question has been before this court on at least one other occasion it does not appear to have been determined and is therefore one of first impression. In the early case of Lewis v. Maddy, 187 Iowa 603, 605, 174 N.W. 346, it appears that plaintiff’s husband was injured by defendant’s negligence which resulted in his death one hour later. A demurrer to the petition was sustained. This court said: “Without passing upon the legal question thus presented, it is enough to say that the damages for such a brief space of time would necessarily be nominal. * * * We could not, therefore, reverse for the purpose of allowing nominal damages, even though the legal contention of plaintiff were sustained. We shall not, therefore, undertake to pass upon it.”
[275]*275At common law the right of a husband to maintain an action for damages for loss of consortium was recognized, usually under the “material” version which included services. 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife, section 401(3). It is said in 1 Cooley on Torts, Third Ed., 469, that since Blackstone’s day there has been an extension of the common-law right of a husband to recover for loss of consortium to cases in which the personal injury sustained by the wife was the result of negligence; so that it is generally held that it makes no difference whether the injury is intentionally or negligently inflicted. Feneff v. New York Cent. & Hudson River R. Co., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436, 24 L.R.A., N.S., 1024, 133 Am. St. Rep. 291; annotation 23 A.L.R. 2d 1378.
While appellee asserts, perhaps correctly, this court has never passed upon the right of the husband to maintain such an action based upon negligence, we find many expressions of the court bearing, at least indirectly, upon the question.
In McKinney v. Western Stage Co., 4 (Clarke) Iowa 420, a husband sought to recover damages due to his wife’s injury caused by defendant’s negligence. At page 423 we said: “We suppose that at common law, the rule is well settled that for an injury to the person of the wife during coverture, by battery, or to her character, by slander, or for any such injury, the wife must join with her husband in the suit. When, however, the injury is such that the husband receives a separate loss or damage, as if in consequence of the battery, he has been deprived of her society, or been put to expense, he may bring a separate action in his own name. * * * It therefore follows, that in the case before us, the husband might maintain his separate action for any loss sustained by him in consequence of being deprived of the society of his wife, or being put to expense on account of the injury.”
In McDonald v. Chicago & N.W. R.R. Co., 26 Iowa 124, 140, 95 Am. Dec. 114, we said: “At common law where the action was for a tortious injury to a married woman, the husband suing alone might recover for the expenses of a cure, for loss of service, and of the society of his wife. But in a suit in the name of the husband and wife, the cause of action was the in[276]*276jury to the wife, and the recovery was limited to damages for that injury * * * and did not embrace the injury to the husband, who alone was liable to pay the medical attendant, and who alone was considered damnified by the loss of the services and society of his wife * * * . But our statute has changed the common-law rule as to parties in such cases. Rev. 2775. This provides that ‘in an action brought by a man and his wife for an injury done to the wife, in respect of which she is necessarily joined as co-plaintiff, it shall be lawful for the husband to join thereto claims in his own right.’ ” See also Musselman v. Galligher, 32 Iowa 383.
Lane v. Steiniger, 174 Iowa 317, 156 N.W. 375, was an action by a husband to recover damages on account of his wife’s injury and death due to being struck by a truck. It is said at pages 318, 319 of 174 Iowa: “Had death been instantaneous, no right of action would have accrued to the husband. Major v. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co., 115 Iowa 309. But she survived several hours after the collision and, because of this, the husband might have maintained an action * * * for loss of services, but for the enactment of section 3477-a, Code [Supplement], 1913 * * *. * * * All left to the husband, then, was the inconsiderable claim for loss of consortium during a few hours.” This ease is cited in Lewis v. Maddy, supra. See also Mowry v. Chaney, 43 Iowa 609; Jacobson v. Fullerton, 181 Iowa 1195, 165 N.W. 358; Bohanan v. Maxwell, 190 Iowa 1308, 181 N.W. 683, 14 A. L. R. 1004. Such a right clearly existed at common law so far as the husband was concerned, and we find no statute which deprives him of the same.
There is another type of action, recognized at common law and in this state, where the right of consortium is deemed to be a property right entitled to protection in the courts. For the alienation of the affections of a spouse an action could, at common law and in this state, be maintained by either the husband or the wife in her own name, depending upon which is the injured party. The gravamen of this action is the loss of consortium. 41 C. J. S., Husband and Wife, section 11; 42 C. J.
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Hays, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the trial court sustaining defendant’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition failed to state a cause of action.
The petition alleges that due to defendant’s negligent operation of an automobile her husband was permanently disabled and rendered incapable to carry on marital relations. It states that plaintiff “has been permanently deprived of the aid, services, support, affection, society, companionship and consortium, including sexual relations, of her said husband” and asks damages on account thereof.
While not appearing in the record, it appears from appellee’s argument that the husband’s cause of action against the defendant has been settled and dismissed with prejudice. Assuming such to be the case we deem it to be immaterial to this appeal and the issue here presented.
The sole question for determination is: May a wife maintain an action for damages for loss of consortium against one [274]*274who, by his negligence, has permanently incapacitated her husband?
I. “Consortium” at common law included not only conjugal fellowship of husband and wife, but also service as a prominent, if not the dominant, factor; not so much the service resulting in the performance of labor or the earning of wages, as the service which contributed and assisted in all the relations of domestic life. Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N. C. 120, 126 S.E. 307, 37 A.L.R. 889. This concept of the term became known as the “material” or “practical” version. As the attitude of the courts toward the status of husband and wife, one to the other, changed, a more modern and limited version thereof was adopted by various jurisdictions. Under it the term “consortium” was limited to “the right which husband and wife have to each other’s society, comfort, and affection.” 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife, section 11, page 402; Black’s Law Dictionary, and has become known as the “sentimental version.” This court has defined it as “conjugal fellowship of husband and wife; and the right of each to the company, cooperation, affection and aid of the other in every conjugal relation.” Price v. Price, 91 Iowa 693, 60 N.W. 202, 29 L.R.A. 150, 51 Am. St. Rep. 360; McGlothlen v. Mills, 221 Iowa 204, 265 N.W. 117. Thus it appears that the “sentimental” version has been accepted in Iowa and it is on this theory that the parties have submitted this case.
While this exact question has been before this court on at least one other occasion it does not appear to have been determined and is therefore one of first impression. In the early case of Lewis v. Maddy, 187 Iowa 603, 605, 174 N.W. 346, it appears that plaintiff’s husband was injured by defendant’s negligence which resulted in his death one hour later. A demurrer to the petition was sustained. This court said: “Without passing upon the legal question thus presented, it is enough to say that the damages for such a brief space of time would necessarily be nominal. * * * We could not, therefore, reverse for the purpose of allowing nominal damages, even though the legal contention of plaintiff were sustained. We shall not, therefore, undertake to pass upon it.”
[275]*275At common law the right of a husband to maintain an action for damages for loss of consortium was recognized, usually under the “material” version which included services. 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife, section 401(3). It is said in 1 Cooley on Torts, Third Ed., 469, that since Blackstone’s day there has been an extension of the common-law right of a husband to recover for loss of consortium to cases in which the personal injury sustained by the wife was the result of negligence; so that it is generally held that it makes no difference whether the injury is intentionally or negligently inflicted. Feneff v. New York Cent. & Hudson River R. Co., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436, 24 L.R.A., N.S., 1024, 133 Am. St. Rep. 291; annotation 23 A.L.R. 2d 1378.
While appellee asserts, perhaps correctly, this court has never passed upon the right of the husband to maintain such an action based upon negligence, we find many expressions of the court bearing, at least indirectly, upon the question.
In McKinney v. Western Stage Co., 4 (Clarke) Iowa 420, a husband sought to recover damages due to his wife’s injury caused by defendant’s negligence. At page 423 we said: “We suppose that at common law, the rule is well settled that for an injury to the person of the wife during coverture, by battery, or to her character, by slander, or for any such injury, the wife must join with her husband in the suit. When, however, the injury is such that the husband receives a separate loss or damage, as if in consequence of the battery, he has been deprived of her society, or been put to expense, he may bring a separate action in his own name. * * * It therefore follows, that in the case before us, the husband might maintain his separate action for any loss sustained by him in consequence of being deprived of the society of his wife, or being put to expense on account of the injury.”
In McDonald v. Chicago & N.W. R.R. Co., 26 Iowa 124, 140, 95 Am. Dec. 114, we said: “At common law where the action was for a tortious injury to a married woman, the husband suing alone might recover for the expenses of a cure, for loss of service, and of the society of his wife. But in a suit in the name of the husband and wife, the cause of action was the in[276]*276jury to the wife, and the recovery was limited to damages for that injury * * * and did not embrace the injury to the husband, who alone was liable to pay the medical attendant, and who alone was considered damnified by the loss of the services and society of his wife * * * . But our statute has changed the common-law rule as to parties in such cases. Rev. 2775. This provides that ‘in an action brought by a man and his wife for an injury done to the wife, in respect of which she is necessarily joined as co-plaintiff, it shall be lawful for the husband to join thereto claims in his own right.’ ” See also Musselman v. Galligher, 32 Iowa 383.
Lane v. Steiniger, 174 Iowa 317, 156 N.W. 375, was an action by a husband to recover damages on account of his wife’s injury and death due to being struck by a truck. It is said at pages 318, 319 of 174 Iowa: “Had death been instantaneous, no right of action would have accrued to the husband. Major v. Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co., 115 Iowa 309. But she survived several hours after the collision and, because of this, the husband might have maintained an action * * * for loss of services, but for the enactment of section 3477-a, Code [Supplement], 1913 * * *. * * * All left to the husband, then, was the inconsiderable claim for loss of consortium during a few hours.” This ease is cited in Lewis v. Maddy, supra. See also Mowry v. Chaney, 43 Iowa 609; Jacobson v. Fullerton, 181 Iowa 1195, 165 N.W. 358; Bohanan v. Maxwell, 190 Iowa 1308, 181 N.W. 683, 14 A. L. R. 1004. Such a right clearly existed at common law so far as the husband was concerned, and we find no statute which deprives him of the same.
There is another type of action, recognized at common law and in this state, where the right of consortium is deemed to be a property right entitled to protection in the courts. For the alienation of the affections of a spouse an action could, at common law and in this state, be maintained by either the husband or the wife in her own name, depending upon which is the injured party. The gravamen of this action is the loss of consortium. 41 C. J. S., Husband and Wife, section 11; 42 C. J. S., Husband and Wife, section 665; Nolin v. Pearson, 191 Mass. 283, 77 N.E. 890, 4 L. R. A., N. S., 643, 114 Am. St. Rep. [277]*277605, 6 Ann. Cas. 658; Feneff v. New York Cent. & Hudson River R. Co., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436, 24 L. R. A., N. S., 1024, 133 Am. St. Rep. 291; Foot v. Card, 58 Conn. 1, 18 A.1027, 6 L. R. A. 829, 18 Am. St. Rep. 258; Price v. Price, 91 Iowa 693, 60 N.W. 202, 29 L. R. A. 150, 51 Am. St. Rep. 360; McGlothlen v. Mills, 221 Iowa 204, 265 N.W. 117; Rank v. Kuhn, 236 Iowa 854, 20 N.W.2d 72.
At early common law such an action was not permitted by a wife. This was on the theory that the wife had no right of consortium, only the husband could be damnified by a loss thereof ; or that, assuming the existence of a right, the restrictions of coverture required that the husband be joined as a party plaintiff. When this was done it created the anomalous situation of one joint tort-feasor suing another. Nolin v. Pearson, supra; Duffies v. Duffies, 76 Wis. 374, 45 N.W. 522, 8 L. R. A. 420, 20 Am. St. Rep. 79. Under the recognized rule that where there is a wrong there must be a remedy, necessity required that the coverture restriction be modified to allow the wife to bring suit in her own name. Wolf v. Frank, 92 Md. 138, 48 A. 132, 52 L. R. A. 102.
Today, except where such an action is prohibited by statute, the general rule is to allow the wife to maintain such an action. However, in so doing, the courts, including Iowa, say that before liability can attach to a defendant it must appear that the acts done which effectuated the alienation must have been done with intent to produce such results; that it must appear to be a wrong directed at the wife, an intent to deprive her of her spouse’s affections. In Rank v. Kuhn, supra, it is said that plaintiff in order to recover must show three things: (1) wrongful conduct of the defendant (2) loss of affection or consortium and (3) causal connection between the conduct and the loss. See also Maahs v. Schultz, 207 Wis. 624, 242 N.W. 195. To the writer, whether this requirement has any greater meaning or significance than the recognized rule that one to recover in an action based upon negligence must establish (1) defendant’s negligence (2) injury or damage and (3) proximate cause between the negligence and the injury, quaere. See Lilligren v. Burns Detective Agency, 135 Minn. 60, 160 N.W. 203, L. R. A. [278]*2781917B 679; Sheard v. Oregon Elec. Ry. Co., 137 Ore. 341, 2 P.2d 916; Prosser on Torts (1941) page 948; 22 Michigan Law Review 1; 30 Columbia Law Review 651. But be that as it may, it must be conceded that in this state “consortium” is deemed to be a property right. In Price v. Price, supra, page 698 of 91 Iowa, we find the following statement: “As it [consortium] is a valuable property right when due to the husband, it must be so regarded when due to the wife.”
While at common law the husband and wife were considered as one, and he was the one, this archaic rule has been changed or modified by various legislative enactments and thus the status and rights of a married woman depend in a great measure upon the statutes in the respective states. While this court in approaching a matter of first impression should and does give careful consideration to the decisions of other jurisdictions upon the question, and, in the absence of statutory expression, to the common-law rule, its ultimate duty is to adopt that rule best supported by logic and sound reasoning and in accord with the spirit of our own legislative expression. Nickel v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 269 Wis. 647, 70 N.W.2d 205.
Perhaps the dominant reason at common law for denying relief to the wife was her lack of capacity to sue at law except as she was joined with her husband as a party plaintiff. Such rule is no longer recognized in Iowa. Rule 10, R. C. P., provides “A married woman may sue or be sued without joining her husband.” See also section 1687, Code of 1851.
Again,- at common law, a wife’s property, at least during coverture, belonged to the husband, with the possible exception of choses in action which became his if and when realized upon during the coverture. The Iowa rule is different. Section 597.1, Code of 1954, provides: “A married woman may own in her own right, real and personal property, acquired by descent, gift, or purchase, and manage, sell, and convey the same, and dispose thereof by will, to the same extent and in the same manner the husband can property belonging to him.” See section 2202, Code of 1873.
Section 597.18, Code of 1954 (section 1454, Code of 1851), [279]*279permits a married woman to make contracts and enforce them the same as if she were unmarried.
Section 613.11, Code of 1954, allows a woman to sue for damages because of a negligent or wrongful injury to her, and specifically states that “there shall be no disabilities or restrictions” upon her right to recover. While we question the applicability of this section to the instant situation as it probably refers to bodily injury, its history is enlightening as to the legislative attitude regarding the status and rights of married women. See chapter 214, section 2, Acts 44th G. A.; chapter 297, Acts 49th G. A.
The foregoing statutes, even without giving to them a liberal construction to which they are entitled, Jones v. Jones, 19 Iowa 236, clearly indicate the intention of the legislature to remove the common-law restrictions of coverture. Today, a wife is no longer her husband’s chattel, but stands as his equal in the eyes of the law and the courts. See Amendment of 1926 to section 4, Article III, Iowa Constitution.
Appellant cites and relies primarily upon the case of Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 87 App. D.C. 57, 183 F.2d 811, 23 A. L. R.2d 1366. Appellee cites numerous cases from various states where relief, such as prayed for here, has been denied and calls attention to the fact that the Hitaffer case stands alone as an authority for appellant’s contention, sort of a “what has not been — may not be” contention. We have examined many of the authorities cited and do not find statutes exactly like our own dealing with the rights of married women; neither are we impressed with the various reasons advanced as a basis for denying the relief prayed.
Some courts deny relief on the ground that to allow the wife to recover would be to allow double recovery for the same wrong. These courts concede the right of the husband to recover. Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 S.W. 462, 13 A. L. R. 1320; Nickel v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 269 Wis. 647, 70 N.W.2d 205. To so hold is to say that the wife has no right of consortium or, granting such a right, it is the property of the husband. If we are to so hold we must ignore our statutes granting the wife the rights of unmarried women and our prior decisions [280]*280that consortium is a valuable property right when due to the husband and must be so regarded when due to the wife. Price v. Price, supra. There is certainly no logic to the contention that because the husband may recover for wrongs done to him, for his wife to recover for wrongs done to her, where they arise out of the same incident, is to allow a double recovery.
Some of the cited authorities hold that the alleged loss to the wife is too remote and,yet recognize the right of the husband to recover where the wife has been incapacitated. Giggey v. Gallagher Transp. Co., 101 Colo. 258, 72 P.2d 1100; McDade v. West, 80 Ga. App. 481, 56 S.E.2d 299 (by an evenly divided court). The inconsistency of the statement is self-apparent. Furthermore, it being in effect a statement as to causation, it is not in harmony with our own decisions. Dennis v. Merrill, 218 Iowa 1259, 257 N.W. 322; Roller v. Independent Silo Co., 242 Iowa 1277, 49 N.W.2d 838.
While we recognize the almost total lack of precedent for allowing- appellant’s cause of action, we deem precedent to be worthy of support only when it can stand the scrutiny of logic and sound reasoning in the light of present-day standards and ideals. We think the reasoning and logic advanced in the Hitaffer case is sound; that the reasoning and logic advanced by the great weight of authority denying relief is not. We think the modern concept of a married woman’s status and rights is well stated in Follansbee v. Benzenberg, 122 Cal. App.2d 466, 476, 265 P.2d 183, 189, 42 A. L. R.2d 832, 840:
“The old common-law rule that a wife had no right of action of this character obtained on the theory that the wife’s personality merged in that of the husband’s, that she had no right to hold property separate and apart from her husband, and had no right to sue in her own name. This hollow, debasing, and degrading philosophy, which has pervaded judicial thinking for years, has spent its course. These archaic notions no longer obtain. ‘So prone are the courts to cling to consuetudinary law, even after the reason for the custom has ceased or become a mere, memory, that it has required hundreds of years to obtain the meed of justice for married women.’ Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 S.W. 462, 470, 13 A. L. R. 1320. The legal status [281]*281of a wife has changed. Her legal personality is no longer merged in that of her husband. A husband has no longer any domination over the separate property of his wife. A wife may sue in her own name without joining her husband in the suit. Generally a husband and wife have, in the marriage relation, equal rights which should receive equal protection of the law. When the reason for the rule ceases, so should the rule.”
Appellant’s petition alleged a cause of action and the trial court was in error in sustaining the motion to dismiss. Cause reversed and remanded. — Reversed and remanded.
Bliss, Garfield, Larson, and Smith, JJ., concur.
Peterson, J., Thompson, C. J., and Oliver and Wennerstrum, JJ., dissent.