Acevedo-Padilla v. Novartis Ex Lax, Inc.

740 F. Supp. 2d 293, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104526, 2010 WL 3785689
CourtDistrict Court, D. Puerto Rico
DecidedSeptember 30, 2010
DocketCivil 08-1185 (SEC)
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 740 F. Supp. 2d 293 (Acevedo-Padilla v. Novartis Ex Lax, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Acevedo-Padilla v. Novartis Ex Lax, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 2d 293, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104526, 2010 WL 3785689 (prd 2010).

Opinion

OPINION and ORDER

SALVADOR E. CASELLAS, Senior District Judge.

Pending before this Court is Defendant Ex Lax, Inc.’s (“Defendant” or “Ex Lax”) motion for summary judgment. Docket # 29. Plaintiffs Hernán Acevedo-Padilla (“Acevedo”), Nitza I. Medina-Martinez, and their conjugal partnership (collectively “Plaintiffs”) opposed (Docket # 64), Defendant replied (Docket # 89), and Plaintiffs sur-replied (Docket # 101). After reviewing the filings, and the applicable law, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED.

Procedural Background

On February 12, 2008, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., Puerto Rico Law No. 80, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 185(a), Law No. 100, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146 et seq., and Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141 & 5142. According to Plaintiffs, Acevedo was subjected to harassment, and eventually dismissed because of his age, and replaced by a younger employee with similar job qualifications. Defendant filed its answer (Docket # 3), and discovery then ensued.

On March 25, 2009, Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of age based discrimination. Docket #29. Specifically, Ex-Lax argues that Acevedo was dismissed because he did not meet the legitimate work expectations, and not because of his age. Defendant further contends that Acevedo has not shown that the proffered reason for his dismissal is a mere pretext for discrimination. Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs fail to set forth a harassment claim under the ADEA. As such, Ex-Lax contends that summary judgment is warranted.

In opposition, Plaintiffs aver that Acevedo met his employer’s legitimate work expectations. They further contend that Ex-Lax’s proffered reasons for Acevedo’s dismissal is a pretext. Specifically, they point to Carlos Ceinos (“Ceinos”), Ex- *297 Lax’s Site Leader’s, alleged derogatory comments about employees in Acevedo’s age range. Moreover, they argue that Acevedo received satisfactory reviews, performance bonuses and salary increases. According to Plaintiffs, Ceinos’ remarks and conduct show that Acevedo’s subsequent dismissal was motivated by discriminatory animus.

Standard of Review

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b) provides that: “A party against whom a claim ... is asserted ... may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party’s favor as to all or any part [of the claims asserted against him/her].” The Court may grant the movant’s motion for summary judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Ramírez Rodríguez v. Boehringer Ingelheim, 425 F.3d 67, 77 (1st Cir.2005). At this stage, the court examines the record in the “light most favorable to the nonmovant,” and indulges all “reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994).

Once the movant has averred that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of at least one fact in issue that is both genuine and material. Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir.1990) (citations omitted). “A factual issue is ‘genuine’ if ‘it may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party’ and, therefore, requires the finder of fact to make ‘a choice between the parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.’ ” DePoutot v. Raffaelly, 424 F.3d 112, 116 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting, Garside, 895 F.2d at 48 (1st Cir.1990)). By like token, ‘material’ “means that a contested fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under the governing law if the dispute over it is resolved favorably to the nonmovant.” Rojas-Ithier v. Sociedad Espanola de Auxilio Mutuo, 394 F.3d 40, 42-43 (1st Cir.2005) (citations omitted). Therefore, there is a trial-worthy issue when the “evidence is such that there is a factual controversy pertaining to an issue that may affect the outcome of the litigation under the governing law, and the evidence is sufficiently open-ended to permit a rational fact-finder to resolve the issue in favor of either side.” Id. (citations omitted).

In order to defeat summary judgment, the opposing party may not rest on conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation. See, Hadfield v. McDonough, 407 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir.2005) (citing, Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990)). Nor will “effusive rhetoric” and “optimistic surmise” suffice to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Cadle Co. v. Hayes, 116 F.3d 957, 960 (1st Cir.1997). Once the party moving for summary judgment has established an absence of material facts in dispute, and that he or she is entitled to judgement as a matter of law, the ‘party opposing summary judgement must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion.’ Méndez-Laboy v. Abbott Lab., 424 F.3d 35, 37 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting, Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994)). “The nonmovant must produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form sufficient to limn a trialworthy issue.... Failure to do so allows the summary judgment engine to operate at full *298 throttle.” Id,.; see also Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir.1991) (warning that “the decision to sit idly by and allow the summary judgment proponent to configure the record is likely to prove fraught with consequence.”); Medina-Munoz, 896 F.2d at 8, (quoting Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989)) (holding that “[t]he evidence illustrating the factual controversy cannot be conjectural or problematic; it must have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve”).

Applicable Law and Analysis

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
740 F. Supp. 2d 293, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104526, 2010 WL 3785689, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/acevedo-padilla-v-novartis-ex-lax-inc-prd-2010.