7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9
10 ABBAS QAISAR, Case No. 2:26-cv-00425-KES-SAB-HC
11 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR 12 v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, DENY RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS, 13 WARDEN, et al., AND DIRECT RESPONDENTS TO PROVIDE PETITIONER WITH BOND 14 Respondents. HEARING BEFORE IMMIGRATION JUDGE 15 (ECF Nos. 15, 18) 16 17 Petitioner, represented by counsel, is an immigration detainee proceeding with a petition 18 for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 19 I. 20 BACKGROUND 21 Petitioner is a citizen of Pakistan who entered the United States on January 7, 2025, was 22 encountered by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), charged as an alien present in 23 the United States who has not been admitted or paroled, and detained. (ECF No. 15 at 4; ECF 24 No. 15-1 at 4.1) Petitioner is currently detained at the California City Detention Facility. (ECF 25 No. 15 at 4.) On January 5, 2026, an immigration judge denied Petitioner’s claims for relief, and 26 on January 28, 2026, an appeal was filed with the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). That 27 appeal remains pending. (ECF No. 15 at 24.) 1 On February 13, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a motion 2 for temporary restraining order. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) On February 19, 2026, the Court granted 3 Petitioner’s motion to appoint counsel. (ECF No. 9.) On March 11, 2026, Petitioner filed a first 4 amended petition (“FAP”) challenging his prolonged detention on due process grounds. (ECF 5 No. 15.) On March 27, 2026, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 18.) To date, no 6 response to the motion to dismiss has been filed, and the time for doing so has passed. 7 II. 8 DISCUSSION 9 A. Overview of Caselaw Regarding Immigration Detention Statutes 10 An intricate statutory scheme governs the detention of noncitizens during removal 11 proceedings and after a final removal order is issued. “Where an alien falls within this statutory 12 scheme can affect whether his detention is mandatory or discretionary, as well as the kind of 13 review process available to him if he wishes to contest the necessity of his detention.” Prieto- 14 Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008). 15 “Four statutes grant the Government authority to detain noncitizens who have been 16 placed in removal proceedings: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b) (‘Section 1225(b)’), 1226(a) (‘Subsection 17 A’), 1226(c) (‘Subsection C’), and 1231(a) (‘Section 1231(a)’).” Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th 18 525, 529 (9th Cir. 2023). “Subsection A is the default detention statute for noncitizens in 19 removal proceedings and applies to noncitizens ‘[e]xcept as provided in [Subsection C].’” 20 Avilez, 69 F.4th at 529 (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). “[D]etention under 21 Subsection A is discretionary” and “provides for release on bond or conditional parole.” Id. 22 “Subsection C provides for the detention of ‘criminal aliens’ and states that ‘[t]he Attorney 23 General shall take into custody any alien who’ is deportable or inadmissible based on a 24 qualifying, enumerated offense.” Avilez, 69 F.4th at 530 (alteration in original) (quoting 8 25 U.S.C. § 1226(c)). “[D]etention under Subsection C is mandatory,” and “[r]elease under 26 Subsection C is limited to certain witness protection purposes.” Id. “Section 1231(a) applies to 27 detention after the entry of a final order of removal” and “governs detention during a ninety-day 1 “[I]n a series of decisions since 2001, ‘the Supreme Court and [the Ninth Circuit] have 2 grappled in piece-meal fashion with whether the various detention statutes may authorize 3 indefinite or prolonged detention of detainees and, if so, may do so without providing a bond 4 hearing.’” Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II), 715 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting 5 Rodriguez v. Hayes (Rodriguez I), 591 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010)). In Zadvydas v. Davis, 6 533 U.S. 678 (2001), two noncitizens, who had been ordered removed but whose removal could 7 not be effectuated due to lack of a repatriation treaty or because their designated countries 8 refused to accept them, challenged their prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which 9 governs detention beyond the ninety-day removal period. Applying the canon of constitutional 10 avoidance because a “statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious 11 constitutional problem,” the Supreme Court “read an implicit limitation into” § 1231(a)(6) and 12 held that the statute “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably 13 necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 14 689. Thus, “after a presumptively reasonable six-month period of post-removal period detention, 15 the alien was entitled to release if he successfully demonstrated that there was ‘good reason to 16 believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.’” 17 Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1062 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701). 18 In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to 19 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Demore distinguished Zadvydas by emphasizing 20 detention under § 1226(c) has a “definite termination point” and “in the majority of the cases it 21 lasts for less than the 90 days we considered presumptively valid in Zadvydas.” Id. at 529 (noting 22 that “in 85% of the cases in which aliens are detained pursuant to § 1226(c), removal 23 proceedings are completed in an average time of 47 days and a median of 30 days” and “[i]n the 24 remaining 15% of cases, in which the alien appeals the decision of the Immigration Judge to the 25 Board of Immigration Appeals, appeal takes an average of four months, with a median time that 26 is slightly shorter”).2 However, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, which created the 27 2 “Thirteen years after the decision in Demore, the government admitted that the figures it provided to the Court, and 1 majority rejecting the facial challenge to mandatory detention under § 1226(c), specifically noted 2 that “a lawful permanent resident alien such as respondent could be entitled to an individualized 3 determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became 4 unreasonable or unjustified.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 5 In the Rodriguez class action, noncitizens “challenge[d] their prolonged detention 6 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), 1226(c), and 1231(a) without individualized bond 7 hearings and determinations to justify their continued detention.” Rodriguez v. Robbins 8 (Rodriguez III), 804 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015). In Rodriguez II, to avoid constitutional 9 concerns, the Ninth Circuit held that mandatory detention under § 1226(c) and § 1225(b) is 10 implicitly time-limited and expires after six months. Thereafter, the government’s authority to 11 detain shifts to § 1226(a), which requires a bond hearing governed by the procedural 12 requirements set forth in Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011).3 Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d 13 at 1138–44. In Rodriguez III, the Ninth Circuit held that for noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. 14 §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c), “the government must provide periodic bond hearings every 15 six months so that noncitizens may challenge their continued detention as ‘the period of . . . 16 confinement grows.’” Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Diouf v. Napolitano (Diouf II), 17 634 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011)). 18 In Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth 19 Circuit’s interpretation that §§ 1225(b) and 1226(c) included “an implicit 6–month time limit on 20
21 2019 WL 7491555, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2019) (citations omitted). Although the “Supreme Court had inferred from the government’s brief in Demore that in cases in which the alien appeals, the time of detention was ‘about five 22 months,’” the government’s 2016 letter clarified that for years 1999–2001, the “length of detention in cases where the alien appealed [was] 382 days, or a little more than a year.” Id. (citations omitted). 23 [I]n cases in which an appeal was filed, in most years the average length of detention was more than 300 days, or more than double the five-month estimate the Court relied on in Demore. The 24 data from the Jennings case show that 460 members of the respondent section 1226(c) subclass were detained for an average of 427 days (over fourteen months) with some individual detention 25 periods exceeding four years. Indeed, when the GAO conducted a study, it found that as of 2015, the median length of time it takes the BIA to complete an appeal of a removal order exceeds 450 days. 26 Rodriguez, 2019 WL 7491555, at *5 (citations omitted). 3 In Singh, the Ninth Circuit provided guidance as to the procedural requirements for the bond hearings. 27 Specifically, “the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that an alien is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of bond.” Singh, 638 F.3d at 1208. Due process also requires a contemporaneous 1 the length of mandatory detention” and reversed Rodriguez III, holding that the Ninth Circuit 2 misapplied the constitutional avoidance canon to find a statutory right under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) 3 to “periodic bond hearings every six months in which the Attorney General must prove by clear 4 and convincing evidence that the alien’s continued detention is necessary.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 5 296, 304, 306. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit “to consider [the] 6 constitutional arguments on their merits.” Id. at 312. The Ninth Circuit, in turn, remanded the 7 case to the district court to consider the constitutional arguments in the first instance, but noted 8 that it had “grave doubts that any statute that allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without 9 any process is constitutional or that those who founded our democracy precisely to protect 10 against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so.” Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 11 252, 255, 256 (9th Cir. 2018). 12 Following Jennings, the Ninth Circuit upheld the “construction of § 1231(a)(6) to require 13 a bond hearing before an IJ after six months of detention for an alien whose release or removal is 14 not imminent” with the government “bear[ing] a clear and convincing burden of proof at such a 15 bond hearing to justify an alien’s continued detention.” Aleman Gonzalez v. Barr, 955 F.3d 762, 16 766 (9th Cir. 2020). The Supreme Court reversed on other grounds, Garland v. Aleman 17 Gonzalez, 596 U.S. 543, 546 (2022), and “[i]n a companion case decided that same day arising 18 from the Third Circuit, Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, [596] U.S. [573], 142 S. Ct. 1827, 213 19 L.Ed.2d 125 (2022), the Supreme Court separately rejected [the Ninth Circuit’s] statutory 20 interpretation in Aleman Gonzalez,” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1201 (9th Cir. 21 2022), holding that “there is no plausible construction of the text of § 1231(a)(6) that requires the 22 Government to provide bond hearings before immigration judges after six months of detention, 23 with the Government bearing the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a 24 detained noncitizen poses a flight risk or a danger to the community,” Arteaga-Martinez, 596 25 U.S. at 581. Arteaga-Martinez declined to reach the constitutional claims. Id. at 583. 26 “[A]fter the Supreme Court’s decisions in Jennings and Arteaga-Martinez, it remain[ed] 27 undetermined whether the Due Process Clause requires additional bond procedures under any 1 concerned a petitioner detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) who sought a second bond 2 hearing before an IJ at which the government would bear the burden of proof by clear and 3 convincing evidence. Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1201, 1193. The Ninth Circuit held that “due 4 process does not require the procedures Rodriguez Diaz would have us impose” because 5 “Section 1226(a) offers substantial procedural protections to detained persons, and Rodriguez 6 Diaz has not shown that these procedures violate due process, either facially or as applied.” Id. 7 B. Procedural Due Process 8 The FAP asserts that “Respondents’ prolonged detention of Petitioner without a bond 9 hearing violates his right to Due Process.” (ECF No. 15 at 25.) Here, Petitioner is subject to 10 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). (Id. at 4.) The Ninth Circuit has yet to take a 11 position on whether due process requires a bond hearing for noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. 12 § 1225(b). However, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that “district courts throughout this circuit 13 have ordered immigration courts to conduct bond hearings for noncitizens held for prolonged 14 periods under § 1226(c)” based on due process and noted that “[a]ccording to one such court 15 order, the ‘prolonged mandatory detention pending removal proceedings, without a bond 16 hearing, will—at some point—violate the right to due process.’” Martinez v. Clark, 36 F.4th 17 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted), vacated on other grounds, 144 S. Ct. 1339 (2024). 18 Further, the First, Second, and Third Circuits have found that “the Due Process Clause imposes 19 some form of ‘reasonableness’ limitation upon the duration of detention . . . under [section 20 1226(c)].” Reid v. Donelan, 17 F.4th 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2021) (alterations in original) (citation 21 omitted). Accord Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2024) (“conclud[ing] that a 22 noncitizen’s constitutional right to due process precludes his unreasonably prolonged detention 23 under section 1226(c) without a bond hearing”); German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. 24 Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 209–10 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that after Demore and Jennings, 25 petitioners detained pursuant to § 1226(c) can still bring as-applied challenges to their detention 26 and that due process affords them a bond hearing once detention becomes unreasonable). Contra 27 Banyee v. Garland, 115 F.4th 928 (8th Cir. 2024). 1 Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends finding that unreasonably prolonged 2 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) without an individualized bond hearing violates 3 due process. The Court now turns to whether Petitioner’s detention has become unreasonably 4 prolonged such that due process requires a bond hearing. 5 Courts in this circuit have taken various approaches to determining whether procedural 6 due process requires a bond hearing in a particular case. See Rodriguez v. Nielsen, No. 18-cv- 7 04187-TSH, 2019 WL 7491555, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2019) (six-month bright-line rule in 8 § 1226(c) context); Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1117 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (six- 9 factor test that considers “(1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future 10 detention; (3) the conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the 11 detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the likelihood 12 that the removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal” in § 1225(b) context); Juarez 13 v. Wolf, No. C20-1660-RJB-MLP, 2021 WL 2323436, at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 5, 2021) (eight- 14 factor test that considers “whether the detention will exceed the time the petitioner spent in 15 prison for the crime that made him [or her] removable” and “the nature of the crimes the 16 petitioner committed” in addition to the six factors set forth above in § 1226(c) context 17 (alteration in original)), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 2322823 (W.D. Wash. 18 June 7, 2021); Henriquez v. Garland, No. 5:22-cv-00869-EJD, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5–6 (N.D. 19 Cal. June 14, 2022) (applying Mathews v. Eldridge test to petitioner’s due process claim 20 requesting initial bond hearing in § 1226(c) context). 21 This Court previously found that “[t]o determine whether § 1226(c) detention has become 22 unreasonable, the Court will look to the total length of detention to date, the likely duration of 23 future detention, and the delays in the removal proceedings caused by the petitioner and the 24 government.” Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 879 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (noting Mathews 25 factors more suited to determining whether due process requires a second bond hearing and 26 rejecting other multi-factor tests). The Court will apply the three Lopez factors. 27 /// 1 1. Total Length of Detention to Date 2 Petitioner has been in immigration detention for almost sixteen months since January 3 2025. Courts have found shorter lengths of mandatory immigration detention without a bond 4 hearing to be unreasonable. See, e.g., Black, 103 F.4th at 137–38 (affirming district court 5 judgment ordering bond hearing for petitioner detained seven months); Perera v. Jennings, No. 6 21-cv-04136-BLF, 2021 WL 2400981 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2021) (granting TRO and ordering 7 individualized bond hearing for petitioner detained almost two months); Sajous v. Decker, No. 8 18-CV-2447 (AJN), 2018 WL 2357266, at *1, 11 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2018) (granting 9 preliminary injunction and ordering individualized bond hearing for petitioner detained more 10 than eight months); Jarpa v. Mumford, 211 F. Supp. 3d 706, 710, 717 n.6 (D. Md. 2016) 11 (granting habeas relief and ordering individualized bond hearing for petitioner detained nearly 12 eleven months). 13 “In general, ‘[a]s detention continues past a year, courts become extremely wary of 14 permitting continued custody absent a bond hearing.’” Gonzalez v. Bonnar, No. 18-cv-05321- 15 JSC, 2019 WL 330906, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Muse v. 16 Sessions, 409 F. Supp. 3d 707, 716 (D. Minn. 2018)). Here, Petitioner has been detained for 17 almost one year and four months. Accordingly, the Court finds that the total length of detention 18 factor weighs in favor of Petitioner. 19 2. Likely Duration of Future Detention 20 “[A]s have nearly all the other courts to consider this issue . . . the starting point of the 21 analysis is the length of detention—both how long the petitioner has been detained and how long 22 the detention is likely to last.” Gonzalez, 2019 WL 330906, at *5 (emphasis added) (collecting 23 cases). “When the alien’s removal proceedings are unlikely to end soon, this suggests that 24 continued detention without a bond hearing is unreasonable.” German Santos, 965 F.3d at 211. 25 Here, Petitioner has appealed the immigration judge’s ruling to the BIA and the parties 26 have not yet received briefing schedules. (ECF No. 15 at 16.) Petitioner contends that he “is 27 facing many more months, and likely years, in prison awaiting final adjudication of his case.” 1 adjudication times at the BIA are anticipated” because “the BIA currently faces a backlog of 2 over 200,000 cases” and “this Administration has reduced the number of BIA judges from 28 to 3 15.” (ECF No. 15 at 17.) Further, Petitioner argues that “[a]s the appeal to the IBA, possible 4 remand to the IJ, another appeal to the BIA, and a Petitioner for Review to the Ninth Circuit 5 along with any resulting remand to the BIA and IJ will last for at least 2 more years, this factor 6 weighs in favor of Petitioner.” (Id.) 7 Although future events are difficult to predict, the Court nevertheless finds that given 8 Petitioner does not have a BIA briefing schedule, the likely duration of future detention is 9 sufficiently lengthy such that this factor weighs in favor of Petitioner. See German Santos, 965 10 F.3d at 212 (finding appeal of cancellation of removal order with the BIA “could take months” 11 and potential review in the Third Circuit “would add months more in prison” such that “the 12 likelihood that [petitioner’s] detention will continue strongly supports a finding of 13 unreasonableness”); Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 (finding appeal of removal order with the 14 BIA and review in the Ninth Circuit may take up to two years or longer and favors granting 15 petitioner a bond hearing). 16 3. Delays in Removal Proceedings Caused by Petitioner and Government 17 Petitioner contends that he “has caused no delay other than brief ones to seek legal 18 counsel and allow his counsel to prepare” whereas “the government caused a three-month delay - 19 from October 2025 to January 2026 - when the case was reassigned to a new IJ and the final 20 merits’ hearing set for October was postponed until January.” (ECF No. 15 at 17, 18.) 21 Accordingly, the Court finds that the delay factor is neutral. 22 4. Weighing the Factors 23 The Court appreciates that the government has a strong interest in enforcing immigration 24 laws, ensuring the presence of noncitizens at their removal proceedings, and protecting the 25 public from danger. However, the “government interest at stake here is not the continued 26 detention of Petitioner, but the government’s ability to detain [Petitioner] without a bond 27 hearing.” Zagal-Alcaraz v. ICE Field Off., No. 3:19-cv-01358-SB, 2020 WL 1862254, at *7 (D. 1 (D. Or. Apr. 13, 2020). See Henriquez, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5 (“Although the Government has 2 a strong interest in enforcing the immigration laws and in ensuring that lawfully issued removal 3 orders are promptly executed, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without 4 providing an individualized bond hearing is low.”). On the other hand, it “is beyond dispute” that 5 Petitioner’s interest here is “fundamental.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 6 2017) (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). “Freedom from imprisonment— 7 from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the 8 liberty [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Both the length of 9 detention to date, “which is the most important factor,” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1118, and the 10 likely duration of future detention weigh in favor of finding continued detention unreasonable. 11 The delay factor is neutral. Accordingly, the Court recommends finding that Petitioner’s 12 continued detention has become unreasonable and due process requires that Petitioner be 13 provided a bond hearing. 14 C. Remedy 15 Petitioner argues: 16 A bond hearing before a neutral arbiter is the usual remedy for prolonged detention. Petitioner is rightly concerned, though, that he will not receive an 17 impartial hearing before the immigration court. Immigration judges are at-will employees that fall within the ambit of the Department of Justice, rather than the 18 judiciary branch. The Department of Justice, being a part of the executive branch, is not neutral, but is instead a named respondent in this habeas action. As such, it 19 should not be given the authority to decide whether Petitioner must remain incarcerated. See Guasco v. McShane, No. 1:25-cv-1650, 2025 WL 3270201, at 20 *2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2025) (noting that other habeas courts have “assailed the Government’s practice of acting both as the prosecution and the judge in making 21 a unilateral and unreviewed decision as to detention”) (internal citation omitted). 22 (ECF No. 15 at 19.) In support of this contention, Petitioner relies on, inter alia: (1) a “DOJ 23 memo from August 2025 reminded immigration judges that the Attorney General sets policy for 24 the immigration courts, and that a ‘determination and ruling by the Attorney General with 25 respect to all questions of law shall be controlling’”; (2) articles indicating that “[s]ince President 26 Trump took office, more than 1 in 7 immigration judges have been fired, often for 27 ideological/political differences”; (3) DHS’s recruitment of “Deportation Judges”; and (4) DHS’s 1 judicial independence and due process for individuals navigating the immigration system.’” 2 (ECF No. 15 at 19–22 (citations omitted).) Petitioner therefore “request[s] an order of immediate 3 release, or in the alternative, a bond hearing presided over by this Court.” (Id. at 22.) 4 In support of his position, Petitioner cites to Guasco v. McShane, No. 1:25-cv-1650, 2025 5 WL 3270201, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2025), which observed that “courts have assailed the 6 Government’s practice of ‘act[ing] both as the prosecution and the judge in making a unilateral 7 and unreviewed decision as to detention.’” Id. (quoting Castillo v. Andra-Ybarra, No. CV 25- 8 1074 JB/JFR, 2025 WL 3251223, at *8 (D.N.M. Nov. 21, 2025)). However, Guasco concerned 9 “8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) (the ‘Automatic Stay Regulation’) [that] automatically stay[s] the 10 immigration judge’s bond order upon the Government’s filing of a notice of intent to appeal that 11 order to the Board of Immigration Appeals,” which is not at issue in this matter. Guasco, 2025 12 WL 3270201, at *1. Petitioner also relies on L.G.M. v. LaRocco, 788 F. Supp. 3d 401 (E.D.N.Y. 13 2025), which ordered a bond hearing before the district court in a prolonged immigration 14 detention case. L.G.M. is not binding in this matter. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 15 n.7 (2011) (“A decision of a federal district court judge is not binding precedent in either a 16 different judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a different 17 case.” (quoting 18 J. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 134.02[1] [d], p. 134–26 (3d ed. 18 2011)). 19 The Court appreciates Petitioner’s concerns, but Petitioner has not established that due 20 process requires in his particular case that a bond hearing be held by the district court. “The 21 Court finds, consistent with other post-Jennings cases, that the appropriate remedy is a bond 22 hearing before an immigration judge rather than immediate release.” Lopez, 631 F. Supp. 3d at 23 882. The Court further finds that “the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence 24 that an alien is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of bond” and that the 25 bond hearing must comport with the other requirements of Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1208 26 (9th Cir. 2011). See Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 785 (9th Cir. 2024) (stating that “the BIA 27 properly noted that the government bore the burden to establish by clear and convincing 1 pursuant to the Due Process Clause); Black, 103 F.4th at 159 (affirming district court’s order 2 “requir[ing] the government to show at such a bond hearing, by clear and convincing evidence, 3 the need for Black’s continued detention” under § 1226(c)); German Santos, 965 F.3d at 214 4 (holding that in order to justify a noncitizen’s continued detention under § 1226(c) “the 5 Government bears the burden of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence. That evidence 6 must be individualized and support a finding that continued detention is needed to prevent him 7 from fleeing or harming the community”); Juarez, 2021 WL 2323436, at *8 (requiring bond 8 hearing to comport with requirements of Singh); Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1120–21 (same); 9 Djelassi v. ICE Field Off. Dir., 434 F. Supp. 3d 917, 923–24 (W.D. Wash. 2020) (same); 10 Martinez v. Clark, No. C18-1669-RAJ-MAT, 2019 WL 5968089, at *11 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 11 2019) (same and collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 5962685 12 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2019). 13 In the event Petitioner is “determined not to be a danger to the community and not to be 14 so great a flight risk as to require detention without bond,” the immigration judge should 15 consider Petitioner’s financial circumstances and alternative conditions of release. Hernandez, 16 872 F.3d at 1000. See Black, 103 F.4th at 138 (The district court “correctly directed the 17 immigration judge (‘IJ’), in setting his bond and establishing appropriate terms for his potential 18 release, to consider his ability to pay and alternative means of assuring appearance.”). 19 III. 20 RECOMMENDATIONS & ORDER 21 Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that: 22 1. The first amended petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 15) be GRANTED. 23 2. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 18) be DENIED. 24 3. Respondents be ordered to provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing before 25 an immigration judge that complies with the requirements set forth in Singh v. Holder, 26 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011), and where “the government must prove by clear and 27 convincing evidence that [Petitioner] is a flight risk or a danger to the community to ] danger to the community and not to be so great a flight risk as to require detention 2 without bond,” the immigration judge should consider Petitioner’s financial 3 circumstances and alternative conditions of release. Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 4 1000 (9th Cir. 2017). 5 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 6 | Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 7 | Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 8 | FOURTEEN (14) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file 9 | written objections with the Court, limited to fifteen (15) pages in length, including any 10 | exhibits. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 11 | Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days 12 | after service of the objections. The assigned District Judge will then review the Magistrate 13 | Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file 14 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 15 | Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 16 | 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 17 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. DAA Le 19 | Dated: _ April 23, 2026 STANLEY A. BOONE 20 United States Magistrate Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28