FIRST DIVISION BARNES, P. J., GOBEIL and PIPKIN, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
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March 16, 2021
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A20A1696. YAKOB et al. v. KIDIST MARIAM ETHIOPIAN ORTHODOX TEWAHEDO CHURCH, INC
GOBEIL, Judge.
This appeal arises from a dispute between Kidist Mariam Ethiopian Orthodox
Tewahedo Church (the “Church”) and its former priest, Abba Yakob, who serves as
Archbishop over several churches, and seven members of the Church’s administrative
board (collectively, Yakob and the defendant board members are referred to as the
“Defendants”). The Church filed a complaint seeking to dispossess Yakob from a
portion of real estate wholly owned by the Church (the real estate is referred to as the
“church building”); enjoin the defendant board members from “disrupting Church
services”; prevent the defendant board members from acting as a replacement board of directors; and obtain declaratory relief concerning the conduct of a meeting of the
Church’s general assembly.
The underlying case is ongoing, but the trial court has issued interlocutory
injunctions and orders that form the basis of this appeal. In the first order on appeal,
the trial court granted the Church’s motion to compel the defendant board members’
attendance at administrative board meetings or, alternatively, should those members
fail to attend scheduled board meetings, deem a quorum established if a majority of
board members attended the meeting.1 Also, the Defendants appeal from a 2017
interlocutory injunction concerning Holy Week worship services and governing the
parties’ respective access to the church building.
As an initial matter, the Defendants argue that the underlying dispute is
ecclesiastical in nature, and therefore the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
1 In the same order, the trial court also granted the special master’s motion to destroy certain ballots and denied the Holy Synod of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, Inc.’s (the “Synod”) objection to the Church as the real party in interest. The Synod is the highest ecclesiastical council in the Ethiopian Orthodox Tawahedo Church. Prior to the entry of this order, the Synod moved to intervene in the case. The Defendants consented to the motion, but the Church opposed it, and the court conducted a hearing on the issue. In its order denying the motion to intervene, the court ruled that the Synod could not show a protectable interest in the secular issues before the court. This order is not at issue in this appeal, nor have the Defendants appealed the trial court’s decision regarding the Synod’s real-party-in- interest challenge.
2 The Defendants also argue that the trial court erred by granting the motion to compel
because doing so upset the status quo. Finally, the Defendants contend that the 2017
injunction violates the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment clauses
by restraining Yakob from performing his religious duties. As explained below, we
reverse the trial court’s grant of the Church’s motion to compel and affirm the
interlocutory injunction regarding access to the church building.
We begin by sharing some background of the Church and the history leading
to this appeal. A 1995 decision by this Court relates to this very Church and provides
helpful background. In Kidist Mariam Ethiopian Orthodox Tawahedo Church, Inc.
v. Kidist Mariam Ethiopian Orthodox Tawahedo Church, Inc. (“Kidist I”), 219 Ga.
App. 470 (465 SE2d 491) (1995), this Court described the Church as follows:
The Kidist Mariam Church was established under Georgia’s Nonprofit Corporation Code, OCGA § 14-3-101 et seq. and is dedicated to the religious, spiritual and liturgical precepts of a religious body known as the Ethiopian Orthodox Tawahedo Church (“EOTC”). However, the corporation’s articles of incorporation reserve control of the internal affairs of the corporation and its bylaws provide the Kidist Mariam Church with autonomy, and reflect the corporation’s limited acceptance of the final authority of the Archbishop and, under him, of the clergy, in matters relating to religious faith and the observance of religious practice and church liturgy.
3 Id. at 471 (punctuation and footnote omitted). We explained that the Church’s
structure is a “hybrid” of the congregational and hierarchical forms of church
governance,2 noting that “[w]hile the [Church] corporation submits to EOTC’s
hierarchical dictates regarding religious, spiritual and liturgical matters, it reserves
control of the internal affairs of the corporation and provides the [Church] with
autonomy.” Id. at 473 (1).3 The Church’s bylaws establish an internal corporate
2 A congregational church is one that is “strictly independent of other ecclesiastical associations, and one that so far as a church government is concerned, owes no fealty or obligation to any higher authority,” and control of the church’s decisions and local church property (such as the church building) rests with the local church’s members. Crumbley v. Solomon, 243 Ga. 343, 343-344 (254 SE2d 330) (1979) (citation and punctuation omitted). On the other hand, hierarchical churches are “those organized as a body with other churches having similar faith and doctrine with a common ruling convocation or ecclesiastical head.” Id. at 344 (citation and punctuation omitted). In a hierarchical church, to determine whether the local or parent church has the right to control local property, we apply “neutral principles of law,” including “state statutes, corporate charters, relevant deeds, and the organizational constitutions of the denomination.” Id. at 343 (citation and punctuation omitted). 3 In their brief on appeal, the Defendants contend that the Church is “ecclesiastically hierarchical” in structure, but they point to nothing in the record to support this contention. While they maintain that this Court’s application of Kidist I to the facts of the instant case should be made with “due recognition” that the Church expressly affirmed its allegiance to EOTC in 1995, the Defendants have failed to demonstrate how the recognition of the Patriarch as the “supreme religious leader of the [C]hurch” conflicts with our prior determination that the Church’s governance structure is a hybrid of congregational and hierarchical.
4 governance structure consisting of a general assembly, an administrative board, an
executive committee, and an audit committee. The administrative board’s functions
include entering into contracts, suing, and being sued on behalf of the Church;
allocating the annual budget; and preparing and submitting annual reports, and short
and long term plans to the general assembly for approval. The general assembly has
the highest authority with regard to property and related rights of the Church.
With this history in mind, we now turn to the facts relevant to the instant
appeal, which show that Yakob served as priest of the Church until 2016. As part of
his employment, he enjoyed use of a parsonage, or residence, located within the
church building. In 2005, the Patriarch of the EOTC appointed Yakob Archbishop of
the Diocese of Georgia, Tennessee, South Carolina, and North Carolina, and Florida.
According to the Church’s complaint, the administrative board met on October
9, 2016, and voted to terminate Yakob’s employment as priest for the Church.4 The
following day, the Church sent Yakob a letter detailing the meeting’s events, and
4 The Defendants dispute the facts, circumstances, and effect of this vote, as well as the legitimacy of the Church’s termination of Yakob’s position as priest. However, the events of October 9, 2016, precipitated the facts giving rise to the Church’s complaint, and therefore this information provides relevant background. The parties’s disagreement on Yakob’s employment termination is not relevant to the narrow issues presented in this appeal, and we express no opinion on that issue.
5 demanding that Yakob vacate the parsonage, noting its “authority to control its own
property and those employed by and receiving benefits from the Church.” The Church
noted that its decision to terminate Yakob’s employment as priest was not an attempt
“to suspend or terminate [Yakob’s] religious role as Archbishop of the Diocese[.]”
The Church alleges that on Sunday, October 16, 2016, Yakob and several of
his supporters attempted to gain access to the church building and later “disrupted the
worship services by chanting, singing, and banging drums for more than 30 minutes
during the liturgy, arguing that [ ] Yakob should be allowed inside and that the
service could not continue without him.” According to the Church, Yakob led a
second disruption the following Sunday at which he and his supporters, including the
defendant board members, announced they were “cancelling” the October 10, 2016
termination letter and dissolving the administrative board. Several individuals then
purported to elect a replacement board and attempted to take control of the Church
and its property by changing the church building’s locks and security codes,
providing Yakob with access to the Church’s property, switching the Church’s
registration with the Georgia Secretary of State, changing access to the Church’s bank
accounts, and “otherwise acting on behalf of the Church.”
6 In the complaint, as amended, the Church sought: (1) a dispossessory writ
ordering Yakob removed from the parsonage; (2) a temporary restraining order and
interlocutory and permanent injunctive relief prohibiting the replacement board from
acting on behalf of the Church “pending resolution of the question as to the
[replacement] [b]oard’s authority to act on behalf of the Church” and barring the
Defendants from “disrupt[ing]” Church services; and (3) declaratory relief concerning
the Church’s legal rights and obligations in connection with the conduct of an
extraordinary meeting of the Church’s general assembly.
In October 2016, the trial court entered a temporary restraining order (“TRO”).
The TRO established an access schedule for the church building, granting the Church
and its supporters access to the church building on Sunday mornings for worship, and
granting the Defendants and their supporters access to the church building on Sunday
afternoons. Additionally, the TRO permitted Yakob to maintain his residence located
in the parsonage pending the resolution of the Church’s dispossessory claim, but
barred Yakob from entering the church building, fellowship hall, or any other
building located on Church property with the exception of the Defendants’ allotted
Sunday hours for peaceful worship. With regard to the administrative board, the TRO
designated the board identified in the Church’s complaint, consisting of twenty
7 individuals, seven of whom are defendant board members, as the “only properly
constituted Board permitted to” change the church building’s locks and security
codes, provide Yakob with access to Church property, make changes to the Church’s
registration with the Secretary of State, access or make changes to the Church’s bank
accounts, or “otherwise act on behalf of the Church or hold themselves out as being
entitled to act on behalf of the Church.”
In January 2017, following a hearing, a transcript of which does not appear in
the record, the court entered a consent interlocutory injunction (the “consent
interlocutory injunction”). Similar to the terms set forth in the TRO, in the consent
interlocutory injunction, the Defendants and the Church agreed in relevant part (1)
as to the identity of the board members; (2) that this board would be the only board
authorized to act on behalf of the Church; and (3) Yakob’s access to the church
building would be limited to the parsonage and the church building for peaceful
worship during the Defendants’ access periods. The Defendants also agreed to
continue to adhere to the alternating access schedule for the competing factions to
utilize the church building for worship.
8 On March 20, 2017, the Defendants requested that the court alter the access
schedule set forth in the January 2017 consent interlocutory injunction. Specifically,
because the consent interlocutory injunction dealt only with Church access on
Sundays, the Defendants sought guidance for Saturdays and the 2017 Holy Week
schedule when liturgical events would be held throughout the week. Following a
hearing, the court entered a modified interlocutory injunction on April 13, 2017 (the
“April 2017 injunction”), setting forth the parties’ respective access to the church
building and prohibiting Yakob from participating in Holy Week activities in any
capacity other than as a parishioner when the Church had use of the building. Similar
to the TRO and consent interlocutory injunction, the April 2017 injunction did not
limit Yakob’s participation in worship services during the times the Defendants had
exclusive access to the church building.
In November 2019, the Church filed a motion to compel the defendant board
members’ attendance at administrative board meetings. Specifically, the Church
argued that these members’ refusal to attend board meetings had prevented the board
from conducting necessary business, and the Church implored the court to deem the
board’s quorum requirements met even if the defendant board members failed to
attend scheduled meetings. The trial court held a hearing, at which it also heard
9 argument related to a request by the Defendants’ to modify the April 2017 injunction
governing the parties’ respective access to the church building for worship. On
February 14, 2020, the trial court issued an order (the “February 2020 order): (1)
declining to modify the April 2017 injunction, finding that Yakob was not entitled to
“unfettered access to property that is owned by the Plaintiff Church and not the
Synod”; and (2) granting the Church’s motion to compel the defendant board
members’ attendance at administrative board meetings, and further deeming the
board’s quorum requirements met if the majority of board members were present. The
instant appeal followed.
1. The Church’s motion to dismiss the appeal. The Church has filed a motion
to dismiss this appeal, arguing that (a) this Court lacks jurisdiction because the appeal
is an impermissible direct appeal of an order modifying the consent interlocutory
injunction and April interlocutory injunction; and (b) the appeal is moot because an
administrative board meeting occurred subsequent to the grant of the motion to
compel. We disagree for the reasons that follow.
(a) “This Court has a duty to inquire into its jurisdiction to entertain each
appeal.” City of Dublin School Dist. v. MMT Holdings, LLC, 351 Ga. App. 112, 114
(2) (830 SE2d 487) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (4)
10 allows for direct appeals from “[a]ll judgments or orders granting or refusing
applications for . . . interlocutory or final injunctions[.]”
The Church maintains that the appeal is subject to dismissal because the order
granting the motion to compel does not constitute a new interlocutory injunction, as
it merely modifies the TRO and consent interlocutory injunction. See Jones v. Peach
Trader, Inc., 302 Ga. 504, 511 (III) (807 SE2d 840) (2017) (“orders modifying or
dissolving interlocutory injunctions are appealable only on an interlocutory basis
pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-34 (b)”). In support of this argument, the Church cites the
trial court’s March 4, 2020 order clarifying that its February 2020 order modified the
prior consent interlocutory and April 2017 injunctions, but did not constitute a new
injunction. However, “pleadings, motions, and orders are construed according to their
substance and function and not merely by nomenclature.” Forest City Gun Club v.
Chatham County, 280 Ga. App. 219, 220 (633 SE2d 623) (2006). Applying this rule
of construction, we examine the substance of the trial court’s order to determine
whether it is subject to direct appeal.
As discussed above, with respect to administrative board matters, the TRO and
consent interlocutory injunction identify the individuals who constitute the board and
dictate that the individuals identified in the Church’s complaint are the only board
11 members authorized to act on the Church’s behalf. These orders do not, however,
address issues pertaining to the conduct of board meetings or mention quorum
requirements. On the other hand, the February 2020 order compels attendance at
board meetings or, alternatively, changes the quorum requirements if fewer than 14
board members attend, and this relief is wholly distinct from the relief outlined in the
TRO and consent interlocutory injunction. Thus, it constitutes a new injunction
subject to direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (4). Accordingly, we conclude that
the portion of the trial court’s February 14, 2020 order granting the Church’s motion
to compel was not merely a modification of the prior interlocutory injunctions, and
therefore it is directly appealable.
(b) Next, the Church argues that the Defendants’ appeal of the motion to
compel is now moot because the board meeting contemplated by the February 2020
order has already occurred. This argument is without merit. “[A] case is moot when
its resolution would amount to the determination of an abstract question not arising
upon existing facts or rights[;] but a case which contains an issue that is capable of
repetition yet evades review is not moot.” Turpen v. Rabun County Bd. of Commrs.,
245 Ga. App. 190, 192 (1) (537 SE2d 435) (2000) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Although at least one board meeting has occurred subsequent to the court’s February
12 2020 order, the order itself was not limited to one meeting, and appears to govern all
meetings going forward. Indeed, the Church specifically requested that the trial court
grant the motion to compel based on the Church’s assumption that the defendant
board members would continue to refuse to attend board meetings to prevent quorum
from being established, and the “Church [did] not want to burden [the trial] [c]ourt
with repeated motions to compel the [d]efendant [b]oard [m]embers to attend future
[a]dministrative [b]oard [m]eetings.” This language implies that the Church was
aware that its request potentially covered more than one board meeting. The motion,
coupled with the order itself, which is not limited to a single board meeting,
demonstrates that the trial court’s order granting the motion to compel contemplates
ongoing meetings. Thus, the order is not moot, and the appeal is not subject to
dismissal on that ground.5 We now turn to the Defendants’ specific claims of error.
2. Subject matter jurisdiction. The Defendants argue that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the issues in this case, citing a decision the
5 Under OCGA § 5-6-34 (d), we have jurisdiction to consider appeals of the April 2017 injunction, which modified the consent interlocutory injunction, and the portion of the February 2020 order that denied the Defendants’ motion to modify the April 2017 injunction.
13 Synod issued in June 2019.6 This decision by the Synod purports to ecclesiastically
resolve the issues between the parties, thus leaving nothing for the trial court to
decide.
The jurisdiction of the court to entertain the complaint, as well as the theory upon which relief is sought, are matters dependent upon the main and material allegations of the pleadings. With specific regard to church disputes, a court of equity will not interfere with the internal affairs of a religious organization, when no property rights are involved, for the reason that civil courts have no jurisdiction of such matters and cannot take jurisdiction of them.
Bolden v. Barton, 278 Ga. 831, 831 (1) (607 SE2d 889) (2005) (citations and
punctuation omitted). But, “[t]he fact that neutral principles cannot be used to redress
one issue . . . does not present a general jurisdictional bar.” Waverly Hall Baptist
Church, Inc. v. Branham, 276 Ga. App. 818, 823 (1) (c) (625 SE2d 23) (2005). We
do not reach issues such as excommunication, doctrine, or church discipline because
doing so “would bring the Georgia courts into the heart of an ecclesiastical dispute,
a position we are eminently unqualified to take and are forbidden to take by the
6 The Church’s motion to exclude the Synod’s June 2019 decision and other evidence upon which the Defendants rely remains pending in the trial court.
14 constitutional safeguard of separation of church and state.” Kim v. Lim, 254 Ga. App.
627, 632 (2) (563 SE2d 485) (2002) (citation and punctuation omitted).
The Church’s complaint, as amended, seeks a dispossessory writ against
Yakob; temporary injunctive relief prohibiting the Defendants from “acting as the
[i]mproper [b]oard or otherwise interfering with the orderly administration of the
Church”; and (3) declaratory relief proving direction as to the conduct of the
extraordinary meeting of the Church’s general assembly. Because the matters set forth
in the Church’s petition involve a dispute over the control of church property and
procedural governance matters under the Georgia’s Nonprofit Corporation Code, the
court had authority to exercise jurisdiction consistent with the Church’s hybrid
organization. See Smith v. Mount Salem Missionary Baptist Church, 289 Ga. App.
578, 579-580 (1) (657 SE2d 642) (2008) (holding principle of separation of church
and state did not preclude court from exercising jurisdiction over action by deacons
against pastor of church because action involved a dispute over church property and
enforcement of church’s bylaws); Srisovana v. Cambodian Buddhist Society, Inc.,
269 Ga. App. 600, 602 (1) (604 SE2d 637) (2004) (finding court had jurisdiction over
dispute involving nonprofit temple’s board of directors and disposition of temple
property because court did not involve itself in question of who temple members
15 were); Members of Calvary Mission Baptist Church v. Jackson, 259 Ga. App. 647,
647-648 (578 SE2d 275) (2003) (approving court’s exercise of jurisdiction over board
of director’s election dispute).
3. The trial court’s February 14, 2020 order granting the Church’s motion to
compel. In relevant part, the Defendants argue that the trial court erred by granting
the motion to compel because the order operated as an impermissible mandatory
injunction by altering the status quo. We agree.
Regarding a trial court’s decision to issue an interlocutory injunction, our
Supreme Court has held that
[a]n interlocutory injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and the power to grant it must be prudently and cautiously exercised. However, to be effective, the decision to grant an interlocutory injunction must often be made under time constraints that do not allow for the careful deliberation and reflection that accompany a full trial on the merits. Thus, the trial court must make a judgment call regarding the equities presented, and the court is vested with broad discretion in making that decision. . . . The grant or denial of an interlocutory injunction will not be reversed on appeal unless the trial court made an error of law that contributed to the decision, there was no evidence on an element essential to relief, or the court manifestly abused its discretion.
16 City of Waycross v. Pierce County Bd. of Commrs., 300 Ga. 109, 110-111 (1) (793
SE2d 389) (2016) (citations and punctuation omitted).
[I]t is axiomatic that the sole purpose of a temporary or interlocutory injunction is to maintain the status quo pending a final adjudication on the merits of the case. The status quo is not defined by the parties’ existing legal rights; it is defined by the reality of the existing status and relationships between the parties, regardless of whether the existing status and relationships may ultimately be found to be in accord or not in accord with the parties’ legal rights.
Hampton Island Founders v. Liberty Capital, 283 Ga. 289, 293 (1) (658 SE2d 619)
(2008) (citations and punctuation omitted). “The party seeking an interlocutory
injunction must present evidence that the status quo was endangered and in need of
preservation, and a trial court abuses its discretion if it grants the injunction without
such showing.” Hipster, Inc. v. Augusta Mall Partnership, 291 Ga. App. 273, 274 (1)
(661 SE2d 652) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, there was no such
showing by the Church.
In support of the motion to compel, the Church argued that the defendant board
members refused to appear for scheduled board meetings in July and October 2019,
and these refusals prevented the board from taking action because it could not reach
a quorum without these members’ attendance. Specifically, the Church claimed it had
17 received an offer from the Decatur Housing Authority to purchase a piece of real
property owned by the Church, and the Church could not consider the offer without
a quorum. It further claimed that the Church’s bylaws needed to be amended, and this
action could not take place due to the absence of certain members from board
meetings. Citing the TRO’s and consent interlocutory injunction’s identification of
the composition of the board, the Church argued that those prior orders required
board action, and asked the court to “compel compliance” with its previous orders.
However, as discussed above in Division 1 (a), contrary to the Church’s argument,
the February 2020 order did not simply modify or compel compliance with the
previous orders.
In its complaint, the Church sought to preserve the status quo by prohibiting
the Defendants from blocking the entrance to the church building or taking other
actions which would disrupt worship services. Additionally, the Church pursued an
injunction to prohibit the replacement board from acting “pending resolution of the
question as to the [replacement]’s authority to act on behalf of the Church.” The TRO
and consent interlocutory injunction addressed these very issues by barring the
Defendants from disrupting Church services and identifying the board members as
those individuals named in the Church’s complaint.
18 The Church failed to submit evidence or argue that the status quo was in
jeopardy or that it would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted.
Indeed, the court made no finding that the status quo was endangered or in need of
preserving. Rather than maintaining the status quo as established in the TRO and
consent interlocutory injunction, by granting the motion to compel, the trial court
required the defendant board members to attend meetings, and permitted a group of
board members to act without the defendant board members’ input.
Accordingly, because the injunction does not in fact preserve the status quo,
we find the trial court abused its discretion by granting the interlocutory injunction
compelling the defendant board members’ attendance at administrative board
meetings and deeming the quorum requirement satisfied under the terms set forth in
the order. See Hipster, Inc., 291 Ga. App. at 274-275 (1) (finding that trial court
abused its discretion by issuing interlocutory injunction requiring mall’s tenant, a
clothing store, to vacate its current space and relocate to smaller space located within
the mall because interlocutory injunction did not preserve the status quo, and mall
failed to make showing of vital necessity or that mall would suffer irreparable harm
if trial court denied motion for interlocutory injunction); Hampton Island Founders,
283 Ga. at 293-294 (1) (a)-(b) (reversing trial court’s grant of interlocutory injunction
19 that prohibited LLC from contesting investors’ voting rights in LLC’s member
entities; injunction changed status quo by enabling investors to vote, although they
possibly were not entitled to vote, and trial court failed to balance equities properly
as “there was no ‘vital necessity’ for the issuance of the . . . injunction”) (citation and
punctuation omitted); Green v. Waddleton, 288 Ga. App. 369, 371 (1) (654 SE2d
204) (2007) (concluding that trial court abused its discretion by granting interlocutory
injunction requiring kennel owner to cease operating kennel and remove animals from
property because, among other factors, there was no evidence or finding by trial court
that status quo was endangered or in need of preservation, and injunction did not
actually preserve status quo).
4. The April 2017 injunction. The Defendants next challenge the trial court’s
April 2017 injunction on the ground that the order constitutes an unconstitutional
restraint on Yakob exercising his religious role as Archishop.
The Defendants moved to modify the consent interlocutory injunction to, in
relevant part, alter the access schedule for Holy Week ceremonies. As noted above,
the TRO and consent interlocutory injunction set forth alternating schedules for the
parties to access the church building. Specifically, the TRO granted the Defendants
“access to the Church building from 1:00 p.m. until 5 p.m. on Sundays for peaceful
20 worship services.” In its orders, the court noted its intention “that worshipers at the
Church may enter upon the premises to engage in worship services in peace as they
are normally conducted consistent with this [o]rder.” With respect to Yakob’s access
to the property, the court allowed him to continue to reside in the parsonage and
utilize “the Church building from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on Sundays for peaceful
worship[.]” The consent interlocutory injunction granted the Church afternoon and
evening access to the Church, and granted the Defendants access from 6:00 a.m. to
12:00 p.m. “for peaceful worship services[.]” Neither order limited Yakob’s activities
during the time periods when the Defendants had access to the church building or
dictated what his role should be. And, the parties already had agreed to scheduling
and access constraints as part of the consent interlocutory injunction.
Neither the Defendants’ request to modify the April 2017 injunction nor the
Church’s response thereto appear in the record, but the parties presented argument on
the request at a hearing. Specifically, the Defendants requested that the court issue a
decision on (1) Holy week access; (2) Saturday access; and (3) computer access. At
the hearing held on the motion to modify, the Defendants noted that the parties
disagreed as to who could conduct the liturgy on Easter Saturday, with the Church
having the liturgy performed by a priest appointed by the administrative board, and
21 the Defendants seeking to have Yakob perform the liturgy via his position as
Archbishop. The Church responded that: “The only real issue at this point and the
only real issue on access to the church [building] is, whether it’s on alternating
Saturdays or whether it’s during Holy Week, is that the access that [the Defendants]
seek is for [Yakob].” According to the Church, “[Yakob] is a terminated employee
of the [C]hurch in his capacity as the priest,” and the status quo would be upset if
Yakob were permitted additional access.
The Defendants challenge the portion of the April 17 injunction that states:
Defendant Yakob may attend the Church’s services as a parishioner, but he is prohibited from presiding over, controlling, or attempting to preside over or control the Church’s services in any way. Defendant Yakob may enjoy the Church’s services from the pew, but he may not enter areas of the Church’s sanctuary for which access to parishioners is prohibited and may not participate in those services in any role other than as a parishioner.
According to the Defendants, the trial court erred by circumscribing Yakob’s
activities as Archbishop by relegating him to the pews and limiting his role to that of
parishioner.
The First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes. It is obvious,
22 however, that not every civil court decision as to property claimed by a religious organization jeopardizes values protected by the First Amendment. Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by opening their doors to disputes involving church property.
Howard v. Johnson, 264 Ga. App. 660, 662 (1) (592 SE2d 93) (2003) (citations and
punctuation omitted).
In the instant case, there is no dispute that the church building is wholly owned
by the Church. And, the complaint addresses itself to matters outside of First
Amendment jurisprudence, such as issues of Church property and board governance
issues. Given the Church’s hybrid form of governance, as first recognized in Kidist
I, those property and governance issues are capable of resolution by reference to
neutral principles of law. Importantly, nothing in the April 2017 injunction relates to
the propriety or validity of Yakob’s termination as priest, or his role as Archbishop.
A minimal intrusion by the government into religious affairs may be constitutionally
permissible. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602 (91 SCt 2105, 29 LE2d 745)
(1971) (setting forth a three-part test for evaluating establishment clause questions;
to wit: (1) any governmental action affecting religion must have a secular purpose;
(2) the primary effect of that governmental action must be one that neither advances
one religion nor inhibits another religion; and (3) the governmental action must not
23 constitute an excessive entanglement of government with religion). Here, the April
2017 injunction is a temporary measure, limited to the property dispute, which is
properly before the civil court, and it is narrowly and neutrally drafted to continue the
basic elements already agreed to by the parties in the consent interlocutory
injunction.7 See generally Hargrett v. Dickey, 304 Ga. App. 387, 389 (2) (696 SE2d
335) (2010) (“In the absence of fraud or mistake, a party cannot complain of a
judgment, order, or ruling that his own conduct produced or aided in causing.”)
(citation and punctuation omitted). Significantly, the April 2017 injunction does not
interfere with Yakob’s ability to lead the service during the times agreed upon by the
parties in the consent interlocutory injunction.
According to the Defendants, the Synod rendered a pronouncement and the
patriarch issued a directive that Yakob is to “assume his duties and seat of power at
Kidist St. Mariam Church,” and this mandate required the trial court to rule in the
Defendants’ favor by allowing Yakob to preside over church services. We disagree
that this outcome is required, or even permissible in civil court. The trial court is
7 To the extent that the Defendants argue in their reply brief that they were attempting to withdraw their consent to the consent interlocutory injunction, they did not raise this argument in the trial court, and we will not consider it for the first time on appeal. Shelley v. Town of Tyrone, 302 Ga. 297, 308 (3) (806 SE2d 535) (2017).
24 without authority to intervene in the nonsecular dispute between the Church and the
Synod concerning Yakob’s religious role within the Church. But, instead of
impermissibly delving into ecclesiastical matters concerning Yakob’s dual role as
priest and Archbishop, or the Archbishop’s function during Holy Week festivities, the
trial court’s order does just the opposite. The April 2017 injunction maintains the
status quo by continuing the narrow limitations imposed in the TRO and agreed to by
the parties in the consent interlocutory injunction pending the resolution of the
underlying issues. Accordingly, under the circumstances present here, the First
Amendment does not prohibit the trial court’s exercise of judicial authority in the
property dispute. See Kim, 254 Ga. App. at 632 (2) (First Amendment did not bar trial
court’s consideration of claims relating to disposition of church property); Kidist I,
219 Ga. App. at 473 (1) (holding that dispute over ownership of certificate of deposit
owned by church was capable of resolution by reference to church’s articles of
incorporation and bylaws and Nonprofit Corporation Code, and thus First
Amendment values did not preclude trial court from exercising judicial authority).
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Barnes, P. J., and Pipkin, J.,
concur.