3Com Corp. v. D-Link Systems, Inc.

473 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 2007 WL 205064
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedJanuary 26, 2007
DocketC 03-2177 VRW, C 05-0098 VRW
StatusPublished

This text of 473 F. Supp. 2d 1001 (3Com Corp. v. D-Link Systems, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
3Com Corp. v. D-Link Systems, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 2007 WL 205064 (N.D. Cal. 2007).

Opinion

ORDER

WALKER, Chief Judge.

On April 14, 2006, the court held a claim construction hearing pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). Based on the parties’ arguments at the hearing and their submissions, the court issues the following claim construction order, which applies to both of the above-captioned matters.

In the 03-2177 action, plaintiff 3Com Corporation (3Com) originally asserted six network-interface-technology patents against defendant D-Link Systems, Inc (D-Link) and intervening-defendant Real-tek Semiconductor Corporation (Realtek): United States patents 5,307,459, 5,434,872, 5,732,094, 6,327,625, 6,526,446 and 6,570,-884. 3Com and D-Link have since settled claims in the 03-2177 action, leaving as the Realtek sole defendant in that action. In the 05-0098 action, 3Com asserts the '625 and '884 patents against D-Link. Claims in the '625 patent were construed in conjunction with summary judgement in a prior order. Doc # 206 (05-0098) at 6-15.

As the court writes principally for the parties, it will not discuss the details of the inventions or define terms well-known to those skilled in the art, except as is necessary to construe the claims of the patents.

I

The construction of patent claims is a question of law to be determined by the court. Markman, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384. The goal of claim construction is “to interpret what the patentee meant by a particular term or phrase in a claim.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249 (Fed.Cir.1998). In determining what a patentee meant by a term or phrase, the court looks first to the claim itself:

The claims of the patent provide the concise formal definition of the invention. They are the numbered paragraphs which “particularly [point] out and distinctly [claim] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” 35 USC § 112. It is to these *1005 wordings that one must look to determine whether there has been infringement. Courts can neither broaden nor narrow the claims to give the patentee something different [from] what he has set forth. No matter how great the temptations of fairness or policy making, courts do not rework claims. They only interpret them.

E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1433 (Fed.Cir.1988).

“[T]he claims define the scope of the right to exclude; the claim construction inquiry, therefore, begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of the claim.” Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1248. “The words used in the claims are examined through the viewing glass of a person skilled in the art.” Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 326 F.3d 1215, 1220 (Fed.Cir.2003). The court may, if necessary, consult a variety of sources to determine the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term, including “the words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the prosecution history and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms and the state of the art.” Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Systems, Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed.Cir.2004).

The court begins its construction of claim terms by consulting intrinsic evidence of the meaning of disputed claim terms, which includes the claims, other portions of the specification and the prosecution history. Lacks Industries, Inc. v. McKechnie Vehicle Components USA, Inc., 322 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed.Cir.2003). “If upon examination of this intrinsic evidence the meaning of the claim language is sufficiently clear, resort to ‘extrinsic’ evidence, such as treatises and technical references, as well as expert testimony when appropriate, should not be necessary.” Digital Biometrics, Inc., v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed.Cir.1998). “[I]f after consideration of the intrinsic evidence there remains doubt as to the exact meaning of the claim terms, consideration of extrinsic evidence may be necessary to determine the proper construction.” Id. Although extrinsic evidence such as expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries and learned treatises can shed useful light on the relevant art, extrinsic evidence is “less significant than the intrinsic record in determining ‘the legally operative meaning of claim language.’ ” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed.Cir.2005) (en banc), quoting C R Bard, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed.Cir.2004).

“[A] court may constrict the ordinary meaning of a claim term in at least one of four ways”: (1) “if the patentee acted as his own lexicographer and clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim in either the specification or prosecution history;” (2) “if the intrinsic evidence shows that the patentee distinguished that term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject matter or described a particular embodiment as important to the invention;” (3) “if the term chosen by the patentee so deprives the claim of clarity as to require resort to other intrinsic evidence for a definite meaning;” and (4) “if the patentee phrased the claim in step- or means-plus-function format,” then “a claim term will cover nothing more than the corresponding structure or step disclosed in the specification, as well as equivalents thereto.” CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366-67 (Fed.Cir. 2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Limitations from the specification, such as from the preferred embodiment, cannot be read into the claims *1006 absent an express intention to do so. Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp., 299 F.3d 1313

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473 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 2007 WL 205064, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/3com-corp-v-d-link-systems-inc-cand-2007.