[Cite as 2222 Internatl., L.L.C. v. Law Search, L.L.C., 2026-Ohio-125.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
2222 INTERNATIONAL LLC, ET AL., :
Plaintiffs-Appellees, : No. 115220 v. :
LAW SEARCH LLC, ET AL., :
Defendants-Appellants. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 15, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-23-989937
Appearances:
McMillan & Sobel, LLC, and Jonathan F. Sobel, for appellee Refab Design & Renovations, LLC.
Wachter Kurant, LLC, and Mark I. Wachter, for appellee 2222 International LLC.
The Lindner Law Firm LLC, and Daniel F. Lindner, for appellants.
LISA B. FORBES, P.J.:
Defendant, cross-plaintiff, and now appellant Law Search LLC (“Law
Search”) appeals from a decision of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court overruling its objections to the magistrate’s decision and adopting the magistrate’s
summary-judgment determination that the statute of limitations had passed on its
foreclosure claim against property titled to plaintiff-appellee, 2222 International
LLC (“International”). Following a careful review of the law and the facts, we affirm
the decision of the trial court.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. The Pleadings
On December 12, 2023, International filed a complaint against Law
Search and another defendant, Refab Designs and Innovations, LLC (“Refab”),
seeking to quiet title to property located at 2222 St. Clair Ave, Cleveland, Ohio (“the
Property”). International alleged in the complaint that it owned and was in current
possession of the Property.
International alleged that it had acquired ownership of the Property
from an entity known as GXIX, LLC on June 22, 2022. According to the complaint,
GXIX, LLC had acquired ownership of the property from “Gee How Oak Tin
Association by instrument number 201107130030 recorded on July 13, 2011, in the
Cuyahoga County Recorder’s Office.” On July 14, 2011, a mortgage was recorded in
the Cuyahoga County Recorder’s Office (“the mortgage”), listing GXIX as the
mortgagor and Chuck Chin (“Chin”) as mortgagee.
As alleged in International’s complaint, on February 23, 2023, Chin
assigned the mortgage to Law Search and the assignment was recorded in the
Cuyahoga County Recorder’s Office. International stated in its complaint that “[it] believes, and therefore avers, that [the] loan secured by the Mortgage has been paid
and, therefore, the Mortgage should be released.” International also stated that the
defendant “Refab Design and Renovations, LLC may claim an interest in the
Property and should be compelled to set forth that interest, if any, or be forever
barred from asserting the same.”
International requested that it be declared the true and lawful owner
of 2222 St. Clair Ave., Cleveland, Ohio and that its title be quieted against any claim
or interest asserted by the defendants or any others claiming an interest in the
property under them and that defendants be required to assert their interests as part
of the quiet-title suit.
On February 26, 2024, Law Search answered International’s
complaint and filed a counterclaim. Law Search generally denied having knowledge
of the assertions made in the complaint. It also denied the allegation that the debt
secured by its mortgage on the Property had been paid, stating that “no payments
on the mortgage have ever been made.”
In Count 1 of its counterclaim against International, Law Search
alleged that it “is the holder in due course of the promissory note [] and mortgage []
recorded as AFN 201107140101 in the Cuyahoga County Records against the real
property commonly known as 2222 St. Clair Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio . . . .” Law
Search further alleged that it had been assigned the note and mortgage by virtue of
a written assignment that was recorded with the county recorder. Law Search also alleged that the note had been lost and that, as a result, an affidavit of a lost-
promissory note had been recorded with the county recorder’s office.
Law Search asserted in its counterclaim that, at no time prior to the
assignment of the note and mortgage, had International or any of its predecessors
in interest made any payment on the note and mortgage, nor had any payment been
made since Law Search acquired its assignment of the note and mortgage. Law
Search sought a money judgment on the note in the amount of the unpaid balance
of $250,000 plus interest at the statutory rate from July 12, 2011, when repayment
in full on the note allegedly came due, court costs and attorney fees.
In Count 2 of its counterclaim, Law Search sought foreclosure on the
property due to the allegedly defaulted mortgage loan. Specifically, Law Search
stated it was
entitled to foreclose upon the Mortgage perfected against the Real Property, to have the Real Property sold as if on execution, and to recover payment in the amount of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000.00) plus interest at the statutory rate from July 12, 2011, plus costs and legal fees from the proceeds of the sale of the Real Property.
International answered Law Search’s counterclaims by denying the
allegations and raising the defenses of waiver, estoppel, and laches. International
filed an amended answer in which it raised the statute of limitations as a bar to the
counterclaims. B. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
On February 17, 2025, the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. Law Search asked the court to grant summary judgment on its
counterclaim for foreclosure, arguing that there was no genuine dispute that it had
been assigned the note and mortgage encumbering the Property and that the note
was in default, thereby entitling Law Search to foreclose.
In its motion for summary judgment, International asked the court to
enter judgment in its favor on Law Search’s counterclaims. International argued
that it had no involvement with the promissory note executed by a prior owner of
the Property before International took title and, therefore, bore no liability on the
note. In the alternative, International argued that even if it could somehow be
deemed liable for the debt, the statute of limitations for enforcement of the note had
expired.
In its opposition to International’s motion for summary judgment,
Law Search acknowledged that International was not a party to the note executed
by the Property’s previous owner, GXIX, LLC, and explained it was not seeking
judgment on the note itself, but rather the equitable remedy of foreclosure based on
the underlying mortgage. Law Search argued that International took title to the
Property by way of a quitclaim deed executed by GXIX, LLC, which was recorded in
2022. According to Law Search, its assigned mortgage on the Property had been
recorded in 2011, thereby encumbering the property years before International
acquired title making International’s property interest subject to the mortgage lien. Law Search contended that although International may not be liable on the
defaulted note, the Property it owned remained subject to foreclosure pursuant to
the recorded and outstanding mortgage.
Law Search further argued that its foreclosure action was timely
because it fell within the applicable statute of limitations. Specifically, Law Search
asserted that R.C. 2305.06 governs the statute of limitations for foreclosure actions
on mortgages. At the time the mortgage was executed and recorded in 2011,
R.C. 2305.06 provided that “[e]xcept as provided in sections 126.301 and 1302.98
of the Revised Code, an action upon a specialty or an agreement, contract, or
promise in writing shall be brought within fifteen years after the cause of action
accrued.” Law Search maintained that because the mortgage was created and
recorded less than 15 years prior to the filing of the foreclosure action, the statute of
limitations had not expired.
Law Search also asserted in its opposition that “a facial review of the
purported quitclaim deed [to International] demonstrates that it is a forgery — a
fraud — and no forgery may ever be ratified to give it legitimacy under Ohio law.”
Law Search further stated “[i]f this court deems it a forgery, Plaintiff has no standing
to bring the present lawsuit or challenge anything in this litigation, and the
foreclosure would proceed upon [Law Search’s] counterclaim.”
On April 10, 2025, the magistrate issued its decision on the cross-
motions for summary judgment. The magistrate granted International’s motion for
summary judgment as to Law Search’s foreclosure claim, and denied Law Search’s motion as to the same, finding that the statute of limitations had expired on the
foreclosure action.
The magistrate explained that, although R.C. 2305.06 provided a 15-
year statute of limitations for foreclosure actions when the mortgage was executed
in 2011, the statute was amended effective June 26, 2012, to reduce the limitations
period to eight years. Relying on the legislative notes accompanying the amendment
and relevant case law, the magistrate explained that the amendment applies as
follows: “For claims accruing prior to June 26, 2012, the limitations period is either
15 years from accrual or eight years from June 26, 2012, whichever comes first.”
The magistrate further explained that a cause of action on a mortgage
accrues on the date of maturity. In this case, the mortgage matured on January 12,
2012, the date payment on the note was due. Because this date preceded the
amendment to R.C. 2305.06, the applicable statute of limitations was either 15 years
from January 12, 2012, or eight years from June 26, 2012, whichever occurred first.
The magistrate found that the eight-year period came first and would have expired
on June 26, 2020, rendering Law Search’s foreclosure action untimely.
Law Search filed objections to the magistrate’s decision arguing that
the foreclosure action was not time-barred because a 15-year statute of limitations
applied and that applying the amended version of R.C. 2305.06 would constitute an
unconstitutional retroactive application of the law.
The trial court overruled Law Search’s objections and adopted the
magistrate’s decision in full. Law Search raises the following two assignments of error on appeal:
I. The trial court erred by holding that appellant’s right to foreclosure upon the mortgage is time-barred. The trial court erred by applying the amended limitations statute retroactively.
II. The trial court did not have jurisdiction to make any rulings, as the appellees failed to add the defrauded property owner as a necessary party to this lawsuit. The appealed decisions are void ab initio due to the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction.
II. LAW AND ARGUMENT
A. Standard of Review
Appellate courts typically review a trial court’s adoption, rejection, or
modification of a magistrate’s decision for an abuse of discretion. See N. Royalton
Ct. Condo. Owners’ Assn. v. Stadul, 2024-Ohio-1280, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.). However,
when an appeal challenges the trial court’s adoption of a magistrate’s summary-
judgment decision, appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review. See
Branson v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 2025-Ohio-4396, ¶ 28 (1st Dist.). “De novo
review means that this court independently ‘examine[s] the evidence to determine
if as a matter of law no genuine issues exist for trial.’” Thomas v. PSC Metals, Inc.,
2018-Ohio-1630, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), quoting Brewer v. Cleveland Bd. of Edn., 122 Ohio
App.3d 378, 383 (8th Dist. 1997).
Summary judgment is governed by the standard set forth in Civ.R. 56.
Argabrite v. Neer, 2016-Ohio-8374, ¶ 14. Summary judgment is appropriate only
when “[1] no genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated, [2] the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and [3] viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can reach a conclusion only in favor of the moving party.” Id., citing M.H. v. Cuyahoga Falls,
2012-Ohio-5336, ¶ 12.
B. Second Assignment of Error — Alleged Lack of Jurisdiction
We begin our analysis with Law Search’s second assignment of error
because it purports to raise a jurisdictional challenge to the trial court’s authority to
enter a judgment in this case. Specifically, Law Search alleges that the deed
conveying International title to the Property is a forgery. Law Search, therefore,
asserts that “[t]he Estate of the decedent/alleged grantor/alleged contracting party
is a necessary party to [the] action.” Law Search also asserts that Hillcrest Egg &
Cheeses Co. has a recorded mortgage against the Property and, therefore, was a
necessary party to the quiet-title action but was never named as a party defendant
in the quiet-title action.
Law Search cites to R.C. 2721.12, the declaratory-judgment statute, in
support of its assignment of error. In relevant part, this statue states: “When
declaratory relief is sought under this chapter in an action or proceeding, all persons
who have or claim any interest that would be affected by the declaration shall be
made parties to the action or proceeding.” Law Search points out that Ohio Supreme
Court has determined that “that the failure to join a necessary party in an action for
declaratory judgment constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be waived.” See
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union 83 v. Union Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn.,
86 Ohio St.3d 318, 323 (1999). Law Search argues that the estate of the alleged
grantor conveying property to Law Search and Hillcrest Egg & Cheeses Co. were necessary parties to the quiet-title action because they also have an interest in the
outcome of the judgment and since they were not named parties the trial court had
no jurisdiction to enter a judgment in this matter.
We find no merit to Law Search’s argument because Law Search
focuses on the wrong statute. An action to quiet title is a statutory cause of action
under R.C. 5303.01, not 2721.12. R.C. 5303.01 provides that “[a]n action may be
brought by a person in possession of real property, by himself or tenant, against any
person who claims an interest therein adverse to him, for the purpose of
determining such adverse interest.” “The burden of proof in a quiet-title action
[under R.C. 5303.01] . . . rests with the complainant as to all issues which arise upon
essential allegations of his complaint.” Duramax, Inc. v. Geauga Cty Bd. Of
Commrs., 106 Ohio App.3d 795, 799 (11th Dist. 1995).
Unlike R.C. 2721.12(A), the declaratory-judgment statute,
“R.C. 5303.01 does not have the jurisdictional requirement that ‘all persons who
have or claim any interest that would be affected by the declaration shall be made
parties to the action or proceeding.’” Williams v. Stillion, 2017-Ohio-714, ¶ 22 (7th
Dist.), citing R.C. 2721.12(A). Rather, by its terms, R.C. 5303.01, quiets title as to a
specific party or parties asserting an adverse interest. In this case, International
sought to quiet title against two defendants — Law Search and Refab and those two
parties were named in its action. Accordingly, International’s alleged failure to join
an alleged mortgagee, or the estate of the prior conveyor, is not a jurisdictional flaw prohibiting the court from proceeding to judgment in the case. The parties against
which redress was sought were, in fact, named in the action.
Although Law Search did raise the affirmative defense of failure to
join necessary parties in its answer to International’s quiet-title claim, it did not
advance the defense in its summary-judgment briefing, nor did it object to the
magistrate’s decision on that basis. Pursuant to Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv), a party
waives all but plain-error review of an assigned error that was not first raised as an
objection to the magistrate’s decision. “Plain error exists only in the ‘extremely rare
case involving exceptional circumstances’ where an unobjected-to error ‘seriously
affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process.’”
Mikra LLC v. Taylor, 2025-Ohio-5630, ¶ 15, fn. 2 (8th Dist.), quoting Goldfuss v.
Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 122-123 (1997). In this case, Law Search has not made
any argument that failure to join the prior owner’s estate and Hillcrest Egg &
Cheeses Co. constituted plain error, and we will not make it for them.
Accordingly, we overrule Law Search’s second assignment of error
and find that the trial court did have jurisdiction to enter its decision in this case.
C. First Assignment of Error — Statute of Limitations
In its first assignment of error, Law Search contends that the trial
court erred in concluding that the foreclosure action was time-barred under the
statute of limitations set forth in amended R.C. 2305.06. Specifically, Law Search
argues that the court impermissibly applied the amended, shortened statute of
limitations retroactively, in violation of its constitutional rights. We disagree. The Ohio Const., art. II, § 28 provides, in relevant part, that “The
general assembly shall have no power to pass retroactive laws, or laws impairing the
obligation of contracts . . . .” A statute is unconstitutionally retroactive under Ohio
Const. art. II, § 28 when the legislature has expressly made the law retroactive and
its application reaches back in time to impair a vested, substantial right or to impose
new burdens, duties, obligations, or liabilities with respect to a past transaction. See
State v. Hubbard, 2021-Ohio-3710, ¶ 2. Moreover, pursuant to R.C. 1.48, “A statute
is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless expressly made retrospective.”
Law Search agrees with the trial court’s determination that the
maturity date of the subject mortgage loan was January 12, 2012, and that the
statute of limitations for a foreclosure action begins to accrue on the loan’s maturity
date. At the time of the mortgage’s maturity in 2012, R.C. 2305.06 provided:
“Except as provided in sections 126.301 and 1302.98 of the Revised Code, an action
upon a specialty or an agreement, contract, or promise in writing shall be brought
within fifteen years after the cause thereof accrued.” Had this version of the statute
applied, Law Search would have had until January 12, 2027, to commence its
Law Search argues that the trial court erred by applying the eight-year
statute of limitations enacted by 2011 Ohio S.B. No. 224, which became effective on
September 28, 2012 (the “Act”). As amended, R.C. 2305.06 states: “Except as
provided in sections 126.301 and 1302.98 of the Revised Code, an action upon a
specialty or an agreement, contract, or promise in writing shall be brought within eight years after the cause thereof of action accrued.”1 Section 4 of the Act explained:
“For causes of action that are governed by section 2305.06 of the Revised Code and
accrued prior to the effective date of this act, the period of limitations shall be eight
years from the effective date of this act or the expiration of the period of limitations
in effect prior to the effective date of this act, whichever occurs first.”
Law Search contends that the trial court improperly gave this
amendment retroactive effect by applying the eight-year statute of limitations from
the effective date of the Act. We disagree. Nothing in the statutory language makes
the eight-year statute of limitations retroactive to the mortgage’s maturity date.
Rather, as explained in Section 4 of the Act, the statute operates prospectively. It
applies an eight-year limitations period beginning on the effective date of the
amendment, or the remainder of the limitations period under the prior statute,
whichever is shorter.
Additionally, Law Search did not possess a vested, substantial right in
the 15-year statute of limitations that existed at the time the foreclosure action
accrued because of default on the mortgage loan. The Ohio Supreme Court has
addressed and rejected arguments similar to those raised by Law Search,
recognizing that while the right to bring a cause of action is vested as of the date of
accrual, the right to pursue that action within a particular limitations period is not.
In Cook v. Matvejs, 56 Ohio St.2d 234, 237 (1978), the Court explained the
1 Neither R.C. 126.301 nor R.C. 1302.98 has any application to this matter. R.C. 126.301 addresses actions against the state for failure to make payment and R.C. 1302.98 establishes a statute of limitations for contracts for sale. distinction between “an amended statute of limitations which totally obliterates an
existing substantive right and one which merely shortens the period of time in which
the remedy can be realized.” The Court held that “[t]he latter application of an
amended statute is not unlawful as long as a prospective claimant or litigant [] is still
afforded a reasonable time in which to enforce” the right. (Cleaned up.) Id. The
Court has since reaffirmed this principle. See Antoon v. Cleveland Clinic Found.,
2016-Ohio-7432, ¶ 28, citing Gregory v. Flowers, 32 Ohio St.2d 48, 54 (1972) (“On
the theory that a right to sue once existing becomes a vested right, and cannot be
taken away altogether, it does not conclusively follow that the time within which the
right may be asserted and maintained may not be limited to a shorter period than
that which prevailed at the time the right arose, provided such limitation still leaves
the claimant a reasonable time within which to enforce the right”). In light of this
precedent, we find that the dispositive question here is whether the amended eight-
year statute of limitations — applied from the amendment’s effective date to a
previously accrued foreclosure claim — is reasonable amount of time in which to
bring a claim in foreclosure. We conclude that it is. Allowing a party either eight
years from the effective date of the amendment or the remaining time under the
prior statute of limitations, whichever occurs first, provides a reasonable period
within which to initiate a foreclosure action.
Finally, we note that this court and courts throughout Ohio have
applied R.C. 2305.06 in a manner consistent with what was done in this case. “For
claims that accrued prior to September 28, 2012, the effective date of [the Act], the statute of limitations is the lesser of 15 years from the date of accrual or 8 years from
September 28, 2012.” Brook Park v. Cleveland, 2023-Ohio-3365, ¶ 42 (8th Dist.),
citing Agrawal v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 2017-Ohio-8644, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.). See also
Rudolph v. Viking Internatl. Resources Co., Inc., 2017-Ohio-7369, ¶ 59 (4th Dist.).
We note that the magistrate correctly stated that the note came due on January 12,
2012, a date that preceded the amendment to R.C. 2305.06. In assessing the
applicable statute of limitations, the magistrate incorrectly stated that it was either
15 years from January 12, 2012, or eight years from June 26, 2012, whichever
occurred first. In fact, the correct analysis would have been to determine whether
the foreclosure action was brought within 15 years of January 12, 2012, or 8 years of
September 28, 2012 — the effective date of the Act — whichever was shorter. Despite
the trial court’s reliance on incorrect dates for the statute of limitations, we agree
with the court’s ultimate conclusion that the statute of limitation had expired prior
to the filing of Law Search’s foreclosure action. Law Search filed its counterclaim
for foreclosure on February 26, 2024. Applying the correct dates, the statute of
limitations had expired on September 28, 2020 (eight years after the effective date
of the Act).
Accordingly, we overrule Law Search’s first assignment of error and
affirm the trial court’s judgment adopting the magistrate’s decision granting
summary judgment in favor of International on Law Search’s counterclaim for
foreclosure. III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons we affirm the decision of the trial court
adopting the magistrate’s decision entering summary judgment in favor of appellee
on appellant’s foreclosure action.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellees recover from appellants costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
____________________________ LISA B. FORBES, PRESIDING JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, J., and MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR