One Main Fin. Group, L.L.C. v. Knight

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 7, 2026
• Docket: 115883
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as One Main Fin. Group, L.L.C. v. Knight, 2026-Ohio-1660.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

ONE MAIN FINANCIAL GROUP, LLC, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115883 v. :

ALEXANDRIA L. KNIGHT, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 7, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Rocky River Municipal Court Case No. 25 CVF 0640

Appearances:

Alexandria L. Knight, pro se.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.:

Defendant-appellant Alexandria L. Knight (“Knight”), pro se, appeals

the denial of her motion for relief from judgment. She claims the following errors:

1. The trial court erred as a matter of law by entering a default judgment where service of process was sent to an incorrect address and failed to comply with Civ.R. 4 and Civ.R. 4.1, depriving the court of personal jurisdiction. 2. The trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant’s motion to vacate judgment where the judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction.

3. The trial court erred by adopting the magistrate’s decision without addressing the jurisdictional defect caused by improper service of process.

We find that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction to render

judgment against Knight and that the default judgment entered against her is void.

We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s judgment denying the motion to vacate the

default judgment and remand the case to the trial court to vacate the default

judgment.

I. Facts and Procedural History

In March 2025, plaintiff-appellee One Main Financial Group, L.L.C.

(“One Main”), filed a complaint against Knight in the Rocky River Municipal Court,

alleging that she defaulted on a personal loan. The complaint listed Knight’s address

as 4205 West 214th Street in Fairview Park, Ohio (the “Fairview Park address”), and

One Main’s counsel requested service of the complaint at that address via FedEx.

No signature was required for return service.

On May 16, 2025, the court issued a notice scheduling the case for

mediation on June 18, 2025. The notice indicates it was sent to the Fairview Park

address. On June 18, 2025, the court called the case for mediation, and Knight failed

to appear. The trial court entered a default judgment against Knight and in favor of

One Main in the amount of $13,251.77, that same day. The magistrate’s decision,

which was sent to the Fairview Park address, provides notice, pursuant to Civ.R. 53(3)(b)(ii) that “[a] party may file written objections to a Magistrate’s Decision

within fourteen (14) days of the filing of the decision. . . .” Knight did not file

objections to the magistrate’s decision.

On August 29, 2025, Knight filed a pro se motion to vacate the default

judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), arguing that the trial court lacked personal

jurisdiction to render judgment against her because she was never served with the

complaint. She supported the motion with an affidavit wherein she swore under

oath that she never received service of the complaint. On both signature lines of the

motion and on the certificate of service, Knight provided a Cleveland address as her

mailing address.

On September 16, 2025, a magistrate journalized a decision denying

Knight’s motion to vacate. The magistrate’s decision denying the motion to vacate

the default judgment provided the following notice:

A party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of any finding of fact or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civil Rule 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically objects to that factual finding or legal conclusions as required by Civil Rule 53(D)(3)(b).

Knight did not file objections to the magistrate’s decision, and the trial

court adopted the magistrate’s decision on October 2, 2025. Knight now appeals the

trial court’s judgment denying her motion to vacate the default judgment. II. Law and Analysis

In the first assignment of error, Knight argues the trial court erred in

granting the default judgment where service of process was sent to the wrong

address and the trial court lacked the personal jurisdiction needed to render

judgment against her. In the second assignment of error, Knight argues the trial

court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to vacate where the judgment

entered against her was void for lack of personal jurisdiction. In the third

assignment of error, Knight argues the trial court erred in adopting the magistrate’s

decision denying the motion to vacate without addressing the jurisdictional defect

that rendered the default judgment void. We discuss these assigned errors together

because they all relate to the trial court’s personal jurisdiction.

A. Standard of Review

Whether a trial court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a

question of law subject to de novo review. Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v.

Roberts, 2010-Ohio-2551, ¶ 27. In a de novo review, we afford no deference to the

trial court’s decision. State v. Buehner, 2021-Ohio-4435, ¶ 43 (8th Dist.).

B. Personal Jurisdiction

“[T]o enter a valid judgment, a court must have personal jurisdiction

over the defendant.” Mayfran Internatl., Inc. v. Eco-Modity, L.L.C., 2019-Ohio-

4350,¶ 9 (8th Dist.). A judgment rendered without personal jurisdiction is void.

GGNSC Lima, L.L.C. v. LMOP, L.L.C., 2018-Ohio-1298, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), citing

Patton v. Diemer, 35 Ohio St.3d 68 (1988), paragraph three of the syllabus. “The authority to vacate a void judgment is not derived from

Civ.R. 60(B), but rather constitutes an inherent power possessed by Ohio courts.”

Patton at paragraph four of the syllabus. The proper procedure for challenging a

void judgment is to file a common-law motion to vacate the judgment. Shiftmed,

L.L.C. v. Westchester Parkway Consulting, L.L.C., 2025-Ohio-1554, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.),

citing Kassouf v. Barylak, 2023-Ohio-314, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.). Therefore, the

requirements for relief from judgment set forth in Civ.R. 60(B) are inapplicable and

need not be satisfied by a defendant seeking relief from a default judgment rendered

by a trial court lacking personal jurisdiction. Id.

A court acquires personal jurisdiction over a defendant when (1) the

defendant is properly served with the complaint and summons, (2) the defendant

makes a voluntary appearance in the case, or (3) “limited acts by the party or his

counsel that involuntarily submit him to the court’s jurisdiction.” GGNSC Lima at

¶ 14; Maryhew v. Yova, 11 Ohio St.3d 154, 156 (1984).

In this case, Knight did not appear nor did she undertake any limited

acts by which she involuntarily submitted to the court’s jurisdiction. Therefore, it

was incumbent on One Main, as the plaintiff, to properly serve Knight with the

complaint and summons in order to establish personal jurisdiction.

“To be effective, service of process must comport with the

requirements of due process.” King v. Water’s Edge Condominium Unit Owners’

Assn., 2021-Ohio-1717, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.), citing Akron-Canton Regional Airport

Auth. v. Swinehart, 62 Ohio St.2d 403 (1980), syllabus. “‘“Service of process is consistent with due process standards where it is reasonably calculated, under the

circumstances, to give interested parties notice of a pending action and an

opportunity to appear.”’” Id., quoting Lauver v. Ohio Valley Selective Harvesting,

L.L.C., 2017-Ohio-5777, ¶ 17 (12th Dist.), quoting Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts,

2014-Ohio-1893, ¶ 32 (12th Dist.).

Civ.R. 4(A) provides that “[u]pon the filing of the complaint the clerk

shall forthwith issue a summons for service upon each defendant listed in the

caption.” The clerk in this case sent service of the complaint to the Fairview Park

address via FedEx, a commercial carrier service. Civ.R. 4.1 governs service of

process, and Civ.R. 4.1(A)(2) specifically governs service by commercial carrier

service. Civ.R. 4.1(A)(2) states, in relevant part:

Unless the serving party furnishes written instructions to the clerk that service be made pursuant to Civ.R. 4.1 (A)(1)(a), the clerk may make service of any process by a commercial carrier service utilizing any form of delivery requiring a signed receipt. The clerk shall deliver a copy of the process and complaint or other document to be served to a commercial carrier service for delivery at the address set forth in the caption or at the address set forth in written instructions furnished to the clerk, with instructions to the carrier to return a signed receipt showing to whom delivered, date of delivery, and address where delivered.

(Emphasis added.)

As indicated in Civ.R. 4.1, the preferred method for serving a party in

Ohio is by certified mail or commercial carrier, evidenced by a signed return receipt.

Hook v. Collins, 2017-Ohio-976, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). “‘A signed receipt returned to the

sender establishes a prima facie case of delivery to the addressee.’” Water’s Edge Condominium Unit Owners’ Assn., 2021-Ohio-1717, at ¶ 23, quoting TCC Mgt. v.

Clapp, 2005-Ohio-4357, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.). And, where the plaintiff follows the civil

rules governing service of process, proper service is presumed unless the defendant

rebuts this presumption with sufficient evidence of nonservice. Hook at ¶ 13.

To rebut the presumption of proper service, the opposing party must

produce evidentiary-quality information demonstrating that he or she did not

receive service. McWilliams v. Schumacher, 2013-Ohio-29, ¶ 51 (8th Dist.), citing

Thompson v. Bayer, 2011-Ohio-5897, ¶ 23 (5th Dist.). We have held that “[t]he

rebuttable presumption of proper service may be rebutted by evidence that the

defendant did not reside, nor received mail, at the address to which such ordinary

mail service was addressed.” Hook at ¶ 15.

Service of the complaint in this case was sent via FedEx, a commercial

carrier, to the Fairview Park address noted on the complaint. However, no signature

was required for the delivery, and no one at the residence signed a return receipt.

As a result, service of process at the Fairview Park residence failed to comply with

Civ.R. 4.1(A)(2), and proper service cannot be presumed. See, e.g., Grimm Scientific

Industries, Inc. v. Foam Supplies, Inc., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199251 (S.D. Ohio

Nov. 1, 2022) (holding that a return receipt signed by a post office delivery agent was

not sufficient to establish proper service because the return receipt was not signed

by someone at the defendant’s residence).

Knight supported her motion to vacate the default judgment with a

sworn affidavit wherein she averred, in relevant part: 2. I did not receive proper service of the Summons and Complaint.

3. Because I did not receive proper service, I had no notice of the lawsuit and was unable to defend myself.

4. I only learned of the judgment after it was entered.

A plaintiff bears the burden of establishing proper service on a

defendant. Shiftmed, 2025-Ohio-1554 at ¶ 23. Not only did One Main fail to obtain

a signed receipt of service, but Knight swore under oath that she never received

service of the complaint. She also indicated on the signature line of her motion and

on the certificate of service that her home is located in Cleveland and not in Fairview

Park, where the summons and complaint were sent. The trial court never placed the

burden on One Main to establish that it obtained proper service on Knight. And yet,

it summarily denied the motion to vacate despite insufficient evidence of proper

service.

“A default judgment rendered without effective service of process is a

nullity and void for lack of personal jurisdiction.” Shiftmed, L.L.C., 2025-Ohio-1554,

at ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), citing Kassouf, 2023-Ohio-314, at ¶ 19. Without sufficient

evidence of proper service, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction to enter a

default judgment against Knight and the default judgment entered against her is

void, and she is entitled to have the judgment vacated. Id.

We note, however, that the magistrate’s decision denying the motion

to vacate the default judgment provided the following notice:

A party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of any finding of fact or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civil Rule 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically objects to that factual finding or legal conclusions as required by Civil Rule 53(D)(3)(b).

Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv) itself provides:

Except for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).

Knight did not file objections to the magistrate’s decision. She,

therefore, forfeited all but plain error. 2222 Internatl. L.L.C. v. Law Search L.L.C.,

2026-Ohio-125, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.) (“Pursuant to Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv), a party waives

all but plain-error review of an assigned error that was not first raised as an objection

to the magistrate’s decision.”).

Appellate courts may, in their discretion, notice plain error. See, e.g.,

State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-3051, ¶ 17 (“An appellate court has discretion to notice

plain error.”); Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129 (2018) (holding that

court has discretion to recognize plain error). However, civil plain error is limited

to “those extremely rare cases where exceptional circumstances require its

application to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice, and where the error

complained of, if left uncorrected, would have a material adverse effect on the

character of, and public confidence in, judicial proceedings.” Goldfuss v. Davidson,

79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121 (1997). For the plain error doctrine to apply, the party claiming error must establish (1) that “‘an error, i.e., a deviation from a legal rule” occurred, (2) that the error was “‘an “obvious” defect in the trial proceedings,’” and (3) that this obvious error affected substantial rights, i.e., the error “‘must have affected the outcome of the trial.’” . . . For an error to be “plain” or “obvious,” the error must be plain “under current law” “at the time of appellate consideration.”

(Citations omitted.) In re E.A.G., 2024-Ohio-315, ¶ 81 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 22, and quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467, 468 (1997). See also Schade v. Carnegie Body Co., 70 Ohio St.2d 207, 209 (1982) (holding that courts may notice plain error in civil cases even though it originates in criminal law).

Civ.R. 4.1 sets forth the method for providing proper service on

Knight. The prescribed method was not followed because service was delivered to

the Fairview Park address without requiring a signature receipt, in violation of

Civ.R. 4.1(A)(2). Knight has, therefore, demonstrated an obvious deviation from a

legal rule. Moreover, the obvious error affected Knight’s substantial rights because

she was deprived of the opportunity to appear and defend herself in the action.

Knight’s right to due process of law was violated when the trial court entered a

default judgment against her despite insufficient evidence of proper service and

despite the court’s lack of personal jurisdiction. We, therefore, find that the

prerequisites necessary for finding plain error have been established in this case.

Accordingly, Knight’s assigned errors are sustained. The trial court’s

denial of Knight’s motion to vacate the default judgment is reversed. We remand

the case to the trial court to vacate the default judgment.

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Rocky

River Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., and TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J., CONCUR