§ 9-16-30 — Delegation of functions by commission; standard of care; agent's duty and submission to jurisdiction.

(A) The commission may delegate functions that a prudent person acting in a like capacity and familiar with those matters could properly delegate under the circumstances but final authority to invest cannot be delegated. (B) The commission shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution in: (1) selecting an agent; (2) establishing the scope and terms of the delegation, consistent with the purposes and terms of the retirement program; and (3) periodically reviewing the agent's performance and compliance with the terms of the delegation. (C) In performing a delegated function, an agent owes a duty to the retirement system and to its participants and beneficiaries to comply with the terms of the delegation and, if a fiduciary, to comply with the duties imposed by Section 9-16-40. (D) A commission member who complies with subsections (A) and (B) is not liable to the retirement system or to its participants or beneficiaries for the decisions or actions of the agent to whom the function was delegated. (E) By accepting the delegation of a function from the commission, an agent submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State. (F) The commission may limit the authority of an agent to delegate functions under this section. (G)(1) The commission shall cast shareholder proxy votes that are in keeping with its fiduciary duties that are consistent with the best interest of the trust fund, based on pecuniary factors, and most likely to maximize shareholder value over an appropriate investment horizon consistent with a retirement system's investment objectives and funding policy. Any commission engagement with a company regarding the exercise of shareholder proxy votes or the proposal of a proxy question must be based solely on pecuniary factors and for the sole purpose of maximizing shareholder value, except that the commission may engage with a company to express opposition to the proposal of or the merits of a proxy question that does not have a pecuniary impact. (2) To the extent that it is economically practicable, the commission must retain the authority to exercise shareholder proxy rights for shares that are owned directly or indirectly on behalf of a system. The commission may retain a proxy firm or advisory service to assist the commission in exercising shareholder proxy rights, but only if the proxy advisor has a practice of and commits in writing to follow proxy guidelines that are consistent with the requirements of item (1). (3) The commission only may allocate capital to a public equity investment strategy if the manager of the investment strategy has a practice of and commits in writing to meet the requirements of item (1) and Section 9-16-50(A)(5), unless it is not economically practicable for the commission to do so, or it is necessary for the commission to avoid the concentration of assets with any one or more investment managers. For any public equity investment strategy for which the manager does not have a practice of and does not commit in writing to meet the requirements of item (1), the commission must include a summary of the terms, fees, and performance of the investment in the commission's annual investment report and publish the summary in a conspicuous location on the commission's website.

Legislative History

HISTORY: 1998 Act No. 371, SECTION 2, eff May 26, 1998; 2005 Act No. 153, Pt IV, SECTION 2, eff July 1, 2005; 2017 Act No. 13 (H.3726), Pt. III, SECTION 8, eff July 1, 2017; 2024 Act No. 103 (H.3690), SECTION 3, eff February 5, 2024. Editor's Note 2024 Act No. 103, SECTION 1, provides as follows: "SECTION 1. This act may be cited as the 'ESG Pension Protection Act'." Effect of Amendment 2024 Act No. 103, SECTION 3, rewrote (G).