(a)(1) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated.
(2)“Automated software audit” means an audit of electronic images of ballots cast in an election using software that is independent of the voting system.
(3)“Electronic count” means the vote totals produced by the voting system.
(4)“Local contest” means a contest that:
(i)is not a statewide contest; and
(ii)appears on the ballot in all or part of a county, including a contest to represent a district that includes more than one county.
(5)“Manual count” means inspection of voter–verifiable paper records by hand and eye to obtain vote totals in a contest.
(6)“Risk limit” means the small, predetermined maximum chance
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(a) (1) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated.
(2) “Automated software audit” means an audit of electronic images of ballots cast in an election using software that is independent of the voting system.
(3) “Electronic count” means the vote totals produced by the voting system.
(4) “Local contest” means a contest that:
(i) is not a statewide contest; and
(ii) appears on the ballot in all or part of a county, including a contest to represent a district that includes more than one county.
(5) “Manual count” means inspection of voter–verifiable paper records by hand and eye to obtain vote totals in a contest.
(6) “Risk limit” means the small, predetermined maximum chance that a risk–limiting audit will not require a full manual count of voter–verifiable paper records in an audited contest if a full manual count of the voter–verifiable paper records would find a different outcome than the outcome determined by the electronic count.
(7) “Risk–limiting audit” means a postelection audit procedure that employs statistical methods to ensure a large, predetermined minimum chance of requiring a full manual count of voter–verifiable paper records in an audited contest if a full manual count of the voter–verifiable paper records would find a different outcome than the outcome determined by the electronic count.
(8) “Voter–verifiable paper record” has the meaning stated in § 9–102 of this article.
(b) (1) Following each statewide election, the State Board, in collaboration with each local board, shall audit the accuracy of the voting system’s tabulation of votes in each county by conducting a risk–limiting audit of:
(i) at least one statewide contest; and
(ii) any other contests selected for audit by the State Board.
(2) Following a special general election, the State Board, in collaboration with the local boards, may conduct a risk–limiting audit.
(3) (i) Subject to subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph, the State Board shall select the specific contests to be audited under paragraph (1) of this subsection.
(ii) A contest for an office for which the term begins in the month of December may not be selected for audit unless the election director for the county agrees to audit the contest.
(4) A risk–limiting audit shall:
(i) manually examine randomly chosen individual voter–verifiable paper records or batches of voter–verifiable paper records until the risk limit is met or the correct election outcome is established;
(ii) be completed before the Board of State Canvassers transmits a certified statement of the election results to the State Board under § 11–503(a) of this title; and
(iii) be observable by the public to the maximum extent practicable.
(5) (i) If a risk–limiting audit finds that the election outcome determined by the electronic count is inaccurate, the State Administrator, in consultation with the State Board, shall direct the relevant board of canvassers to immediately investigate the matter to determine an accurate election result.
(ii) The board of canvassers shall conclude the investigation within 3 days.
(iii) The board of canvassers shall correct the election result in accordance with regulations adopted by the State Board.
(6) The State Administrator shall report the results of the risk–limiting audit to the Board of State Canvassers and the State Board.
(c) In addition to the risk–limiting audit required under subsection (b) of this section, the State Board, in collaboration with the local boards, may conduct an automated software audit after a statewide election.
(d) A local board may conduct a risk–limiting audit of a local contest at the discretion of the local board.
(e) (1) The State Board shall adopt regulations to carry out this section.
(2) The regulations adopted under paragraph (1) of this subsection to carry out risk–limiting audits in accordance with subsection (b) of this section shall include:
(i) criteria for determining the contests to be audited;
(ii) the risk limit; and
(iii) the audit method.