Z.S. v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Z.S. v. State

579 So. 2d 865, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 4754, 1991 WL 85537

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedMay 22, 1991

DocketNo. 89-02921

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 579 So. 2d 865 (Z.S. v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Z.S. v. State, 579 So. 2d 865, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 4754, 1991 WL 85537 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991).

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Opinion

SCHEB, Acting Chief Judge.

Z.S., a juvenile, challenges an order adjudicating him delinquent based on the trial judge’s finding that he committed grand theft of a motor vehicle, a violation of section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1989). Z.S. argues the court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. We agree.

The evidence at the adjudicatory hearing revealed that on the evening of June 26, 1989, Sgt. Alan Howard found a dark maroon 1989 Jeep Cherokee alongside a roadway. The vehicle was identified as one [866]*866that had been stolen. About three and one-half hours later Howard arrested Z.S., a black male whom he had seen pumping gas into a black Jeep Cherokee at a Circle K store earlier that evening. A clerk from Circle K testified that “a bunch of boys” had been at the store’s gasoline pumps on that same evening. They arrived in two vehicles, one of which she described as a “black Jeep, Bronco-type vehicle.” She described two of the youths, one white and one black, who came into the store to pay for the gas. She could not, however, identify Z.S. as the black male who came into the store.

On appeal, Z.S. posits that the state’s case is based on an inference of guilt that can arise from an accused’s possession of recently stolen property.¹ He points out, however, that there was no evidence that he operated, was a passenger in, or exercised any control over the vehicle in question. He argues that the state failed to prove possession and the trial court should have granted his motion for a judgment of acquittal. The state counters that Sgt. Howard’s testimony identifying Z.S. as the person who had pumped gasoline into the stolen vehicle is sufficient to link him with the offense.

Laying aside a conflict in the evidence as to the color of the vehicle in question, there was insufficient evidence to establish that Z.S. was guilty of theft of the vehicle. The most the evidence showed was that Z.S. pumped gas into a stolen Jeep. Consequently, there was no proof of either possession or intent. See A.E. v. State, 549 So.2d 774 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); E.L.S. v. State, 547 So.2d 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).

Accordingly, we reverse and order Z.S. discharged.

LEHAN and HALL, JJ., concur.

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SCHEB, Acting Chief Judge.

Z.S., a juvenile, challenges an order adjudicating him delinquent based on the trial judge’s finding that he committed grand theft of a motor vehicle, a violation of section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1989). Z.S. argues the court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. We agree.

The evidence at the adjudicatory hearing revealed that on the evening of June 26, 1989, Sgt. Alan Howard found a dark maroon 1989 Jeep Cherokee alongside a roadway. The vehicle was identified as one [866]*866that had been stolen. About three and one-half hours later Howard arrested Z.S., a black male whom he had seen pumping gas into a black Jeep Cherokee at a Circle K store earlier that evening. A clerk from Circle K testified that “a bunch of boys” had been at the store’s gasoline pumps on that same evening. They arrived in two vehicles, one of which she described as a “black Jeep, Bronco-type vehicle.” She described two of the youths, one white and one black, who came into the store to pay for the gas. She could not, however, identify Z.S. as the black male who came into the store.

On appeal, Z.S. posits that the state’s case is based on an inference of guilt that can arise from an accused’s possession of recently stolen property.¹ He points out, however, that there was no evidence that he operated, was a passenger in, or exercised any control over the vehicle in question. He argues that the state failed to prove possession and the trial court should have granted his motion for a judgment of acquittal. The state counters that Sgt. Howard’s testimony identifying Z.S. as the person who had pumped gasoline into the stolen vehicle is sufficient to link him with the offense.

Laying aside a conflict in the evidence as to the color of the vehicle in question, there was insufficient evidence to establish that Z.S. was guilty of theft of the vehicle. The most the evidence showed was that Z.S. pumped gas into a stolen Jeep. Consequently, there was no proof of either possession or intent. See A.E. v. State, 549 So.2d 774 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); E.L.S. v. State, 547 So.2d 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).

Accordingly, we reverse and order Z.S. discharged.

LEHAN and HALL, JJ., concur.

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579 So. 2d 865, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 4754, 1991 WL 85537, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/zs-v-state-fladistctapp-1991.

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