Zolotarevsky v. General Electric Co.

862 F. Supp. 659, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13062, 1994 WL 508175
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedSeptember 13, 1994
DocketCiv.A. No. 91-40078-NMG
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 862 F. Supp. 659 (Zolotarevsky v. General Electric Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Zolotarevsky v. General Electric Co., 862 F. Supp. 659, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13062, 1994 WL 508175 (D. Mass. 1994).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GORTON, District Judge.

The plaintiff, Victor A. Zolotarevsky (“Zolotarevsky”), commenced this action against the defendant, General Electric Company (“GE”), alleging that GE has rejected his several applications for employment because of his age and national origin, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“the ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Pending before this Court is GE’s motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

The relevant facts are recited in the light most favorable to Zolotarevsky. O’Connor v. Steeves, 994 F.2d 905, 907 (1st Cir.1993).1 Zolotarevsky was bom in 1932 in what was formerly the Soviet Union. He and his family immigrated to the United States in 1974 and he became a citizen in 1980. Zolotarev[662]*662sky has worked as a mechanical engineer in both the Soviet Union and the United States. From 1984 to February 1989, Zolotarevsky worked as a test evaluation engineer at Honeywell Information Systems in Billerica, Massachusetts. He was laid off in February 1989 and remained unemployed until June 1991, when he secured an engineering job at General Dynamic Corporation in Groton, Connecticut.

After his layoff in February 1989, Zolotarevsky “mailed over 4000 resumes and applications” to various employers. Receiving no offers of employment, Zolotarevsky filed “over 90 charges of discrimination in employment” with various state and federal agencies. (Complaint at para. 17.) Zolotarevsky testified by deposition that approximately 90 to 95 percent of those discrimination charges were filed on photocopied forms in which only the name of the alleged corporate offender and the date of the alleged discrimination were changed.

Throughout 1989 and 1990, Zolotarevsky filed seven separate discrimination charges against GE with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging unlawful refusal to hire.2 The seven EEOC charges are the substance of Zolotarevsky’s Complaint in this action. Zolotarevsky was 57 years old when he was denied employment by GE.

THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

GE has moved for summary judgment on each of the seven “counts” in Zolotarevsky’s Complaint. The role of summary judgment is to pierce the formal pleadings and evaluate the proof to determine whether there is a genuine need for trial. Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir.1991), cert. denied,—U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2965, 119 L.Ed.2d 586 (1992). The burden is upon the moving party to show, based upon the pleadings, discovery on file and affidavits, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

If the moving party demonstrates that “there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case,” the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. FDIC v. Municipality of Ponce, 904 F.2d 740, 742 (1st Cir.1990), quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The nonmovant, however, may not rest upon mere allegation or denial of the pleadings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the non-moving parties and indulge all reasonable inferences in their favor. O’Connor, 994 F.2d at 907.

DISCUSSION

Absent direct evidence of discrimination, and Zolotarevsky has not come forward with any, the Court analyzes GE’s motion for summary judgment in accordance with the burden-shifting framework established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The essence of GE’s motion is that, under the criteria established in McDonnell Douglas, Zolotarevsky has failed to meet his initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. To establish a prima facie case of age or national origin discrimination, Zolotarevsky must show:

(i) that he belongs to a [protected class]; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applications from persons of complainants qualifications.

Id. at 802. GE argues that all seven of Zolotarevsky’s charges lack one or more elements of the requisite prima facie case.

[663]*663GE contends, in addition, that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for rejecting Zolotarevsky’s applications for employment and that Zolotarevsky has produced no evidence from which to infer that those reasons were pretexts for discrimination. See Oliver v. Digital Equipment Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 108-110 (1st Cir.1988).

A. EEOC Charge Numbers 161900520, 161900722, 161900356 and 1619007233

GE contends that Zolotarevsky has failed to establish his prima facie case with respect to four of the EEOC charges.

1. EEOC Charge No. 161900520 (“Charge 520”)

In January-February 1990, approximately 300 to 400 applicants, including Zolotarevsky, submitted resumes in response to GE’s, advertisements for Manufacturing Engineers for its engine parts manufacturing facility in Rutland, Vermont. By letter dated February 26, 1990, GE notified Zolotarevsky that he would not be included in their “interviewing slate.” Zolotarevsky alleges in Charge 520 that GE rejected his application because of his age and/or national origin.

GE has submitted the Affidavit of Glen A. Hobbes (“the Hobbes Affidavit”), an Employee Relations Representative at GE’s Rutland, Vermont facility. Hobbes was responsible for evaluating and screening resumes and choosing acceptable candidates to be interviewed for the position of Manufacturing Engineer. Hobbes reviewed ail of the applications, including Zolotarevsky’s, and ultimately chose thirty other applicants to be interviewed for the advertised position. According to the Hobbes Affidavit, GE, however, “never filled or even interviewed for the job described in the advertisement to which Mr.

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Bluebook (online)
862 F. Supp. 659, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13062, 1994 WL 508175, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/zolotarevsky-v-general-electric-co-mad-1994.