Zoila Rosa Ruiz Erick Jose Rosales-Ruiz Yader Alezander Rosales-Ruiz v. Immigration and Naturalization Service

86 F.3d 1163, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 41977, 1996 WL 266459
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMay 17, 1996
Docket94-70826
StatusUnpublished

This text of 86 F.3d 1163 (Zoila Rosa Ruiz Erick Jose Rosales-Ruiz Yader Alezander Rosales-Ruiz v. Immigration and Naturalization Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Zoila Rosa Ruiz Erick Jose Rosales-Ruiz Yader Alezander Rosales-Ruiz v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 86 F.3d 1163, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 41977, 1996 WL 266459 (9th Cir. 1996).

Opinion

86 F.3d 1163

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Zoila Rosa RUIZ; Erick Jose Rosales-Ruiz; Yader Alezander
Rosales-Ruiz, Petitioners,
v.
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.

No. 94-70826.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 10, 1996.*
Decided May 17, 1996.

Before: NORRIS and WIGGINS, Circuit Judges, JONES,** District Judge.

MEMORANDUM***

Zoila Rosa Ruiz ("petitioner") and her two minor-age sons, Yader Alezander Rosales-Ruiz and Erick Jose Rosales-Ruiz, are natives and citizens of Nicaragua.1 She petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") dismissal of her appeal of the Immigration Judge's ("IJ") denial of her application for asylum and withholding of deportation. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), and we deny the petition.

DISCUSSION

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the BIA's denial of asylum for abuse of discretion. Ramos-Vasquez v. INS, 57 F.3d 857, 861 (9th Cir.1995). The BIA's denial of asylum must be upheld if "supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole." 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4); INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 815 (1992). Factual findings underlying the decision are reviewed for substantial evidence. Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir.1995). This review is extremely deferential, and petitioner "must demonstrate 'that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.' " Id. (quoting Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483, 112 S.Ct. at 816). We also review the BIA's decision to deny the withholding of deportation for substantial evidence. Berroteran-Melendez v. INS, 955 F.2d 1251, 1255 (9th Cir.1992).

II. SCOPE OF REVIEW

The BIA reviewed the IJ's decision de novo, and affirmed that decision "based upon and for the reasons set forth therein." We therefore "treat the IJ's statement of reasons as the BIA's and review the IJ's decision for abuse of discretion." Alaelua v. INS, 45 F.3d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir.1995).2

III. DENIAL OF APPLICATION FOR ASYLUM

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), the Attorney General has discretion to grant political asylum to any alien she determines to be a "refugee" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). A "refugee" is defined as any alien "who is unable or unwilling to return to ... [her native] country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (emphasis added).

Petitioner testified in support of her family's application. Neither the IJ nor the BIA questioned petitioner's credibility. Thus, we accept the truth of her testimony and examine only whether it is sufficient to establish statutory grounds for asylum. Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir.1995). We conclude that petitioner's allegations, considered together, do not demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution to warrant asylum relief. We will discuss petitioner's allegations in turn.

First, petitioner's refusal to work at the Nicaraguan/Honduran border was based on her desire not to be separated from her children, rather than a disagreement with the Sandinistas' politics. Her belief that she was given this assignment because of her refusal to join the Sandinista union is unsubstantiated speculation in light of the hospital's policy of routinely assigning nurses to work in different locations depending on the need for medical care. See Ubau-Marenco v. INS, 67 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir.1995) (undesirable and demeaning assignments do not constitute persecution), vacated on other grounds, Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir.1996).

Second, petitioner's loss of her food ration coupon or alleged inability to obtain a business license do not substantiate her claim of persecution. See Sballo-Cortez v. INS, 761 F.2d 1259, 1264 (9th Cir.1985) (denial of "such perquisites as discounts on food and a special work permit" is not persecution); Raass v. INS, 692 F.2d 596 (9th Cir.1982) (asylum relief requires a showing of more than generalized economic disadvantage). Moreover, there is no evidence that petitioner was unable to find any other nursing position or obtain a business license because she never applied for another nursing position or a business license. Even if she could not have obtained another nursing job or a business license, petitioner has not shown that she was unable to obtain any reasonably comparable employment. We conclude that she has not established that she suffered substantial economic disadvantage. See Kovac v. INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir.1969). Cf. Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 727 (9th Cir.1988) (persecution shown where alien's ability to earn livelihood was severely impaired by threats and attempts on his life).

Third, petitioner has not shown how the surveillance and search of her home for her husband in 1983 and 1988, and the disappearance and death of her nephew after he came to live with her in 1986, constitute a pattern of persecution tied to her. See Prasad, 47 F.3d at 340 ("[A]ttacks on family members do not necessarily establish a well-founded fear of persecution absent a pattern of persecution tied to the petitioner[ ]."); Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS, 937 F.2d 411

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