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SHAWNA ZITO-HANNAN v. ELECTRIC BOAT CORPORATION
(AC 48801)
Suarez, Clark and Westbrook, Js.*
Syllabus
The plaintiff, the surviving spouse of the decedent, who had been employed by the defendant, E Co., at the time of his death, appealed from the Compensation Review Board’s decision affirming the decision of the administrative law judge dismissing her claim for survivors’ benefits. The plaintiff claimed that the decedent sustained work induced stress that was a contributing factor to his heart disease and death, and that the administrative law judge applied an incorrect legal standard that improperly required her to show evidence of a “sudden or unusual work stressor.” Held:
This court declined to disturb the administrative law judge’s finding that the decedent did not have work induced stress that was a substantial factor in causing his death, as that finding was supported by evidence in the record, the administrative law judge did not misapply the law or draw improper inferences from the subordinate facts, and the administrative law judge’s finding that there was no causal connection between the decedent’s work and his underlying heart disease sufficiently addressed the plaintiff’s repetitive trauma claim, as the administrative law judge considered the evidence before it and ultimately credited the opinions of E Co.’s medical experts that the cause of the decedent’s death was his underlying, progressive heart disease and that his work was not a substantial factor, whether in the form of an accidental injury or repetitive trauma injury, in causing his death.
Argued April 20—officially released September 1, 2026
Procedural History
Appeal from the decision of the administrative law judge for the Second District of the Workers’ Compensation Commission dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for survivor’s benefits, brought to the Compensation Review Board, which affirmed the decision of the administrative law judge, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Kyle J. Zrenda, for the appellant (plaintiff). Peter D. Quay, for the appellee (defendant).
*
The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.
Opinion
SUAREZ, J. In this workers’ compensation action, the plaintiff, Shawna Zito-Hannan, the surviving spouse of the deceased employee, Michael Joseph Hannan (decedent ), who was employed by the defendant, Electric Boat Corporation, appeals from the decision of the Compensation Review Board (board) affirming the decision of the administrative law judge for the Second District of the Workers’ Compensation Commission (commission), who had dismissed the claim for benefits filed by the plaintiff pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act (act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the decedent sustained work induced stress that was a contributing factor to his heart disease and death and that the administrative law judge applied an incorrect legal standard that improperly required her to show evidence of a “sudden or unusual work stressor.” We affirm the decision of the board.
The following facts, as found by the administrative law judge or otherwise undisputed in the record, and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff and the decedent married in 2006. The decedent began working for the defendant in 1980 and, except for a brief separation from his employment in 1981, worked there continuously until his death on February 27, 2020. Beginning in 2013, the decedent was seen by Brian Ehrlich and Jon Gaudio, cardiologists with Lawrence + Memorial Cardiology, for his heart related conditions. Ehrlich diagnosed the decedent with “hypertension, heart disease, aortic insufficiency, and [a] moderate at most dilated aortic root.” Gaudio and Ehrlich did not note work stress as a factor in the development of the decedent’s cardiac condition, nor did they note a history of stress or stressors at work.
In August 2019, the decedent “began traveling to Cape Canaveral, Florida, for work. . . . [The decedent] would fly to Florida for two weeks at a time and return home for one week. . . . While working in Florida, [the decedent] would work six days [per] week.” (Citations omitted.) In
November 2019, Pradnya Velankar, a cardiologist, also of Lawrence + Memorial Cardiology, saw the decedent and “noted obesity and recommended a healthy diet.” In December 2019, the decedent saw his primary care physician, who noted that the decedent had gained ten pounds due to traveling and lack of exercise. His primary care physician noted that the decedent’s blood pressure had increased, and his prescription for Lisinopril1 was increased. The December 2019 report from his primary care physician, which was admitted into evidence before the administrative law judge, indicates that the decedent stated that “things have been good in general. His [mother] passed in [November]. So, that was a tough time.”
“In February 2020, [the decedent] ended two weeks of work in Florida on the fourteenth. The [plaintiff] joined him in Florida on that day to celebrate an anniversary. The [plaintiff] and [the decedent] flew back from Florida to Connecticut on February 17, 2020. . . . [The decedent] flew back to Florida on February 24, 2020, for a three day work trip. . . . [The decedent] returned home on February 26, 2020, between 7:30 p.m. and [8] p.m. He then had dinner with the [plaintiff] and retired to bed early. . . . [The decedent] died in his sleep of a cardiac event on February 27, 2020.” (Citations omitted.)
The plaintiff filed with the commission a workers’ compensation claim for survivors’ benefits. The plaintiff claimed that physical and emotional stress from work contributed to the decedent’s death.
The administrative law judge held formal hearings on the issue of compensability on November 7, 2022, and February 23 and May 15, 2023, and held a pro forma hearing2 on November 20, 2023, to close the record.
1 Lisinopril is a medication that was prescribed to treat the decedent for high blood pressure.
2 “A pro forma hearing is one where a hearing is noticed for the submission of briefs and proposed findings of fact, but no party need appear.” Melendez v. Fresh Start General Remodeling & Contracting, LLC, 180 Conn. App. 355, 368 n.7, 183 A.3d 670 (2018).
At the hearing, the plaintiff and two employees of the defendant, Lawrence Jarbeau and Alan Blay, testified. The plaintiff testified, inter alia, that the decedent had gained weight and was seeing a cardiologist. She further testified that the decedent was stressed due to working six days per week, that he was exhausted and his stress was “getting to him . . . .” Blay, a program manager with the defendant, testified that he assigned the decedent to a project in Florida, and that the decedent was offered an extended work assignment that would have allowed him to stay in Florida, but the decedent declined and requested normal business travel. Jarbeau, an engineering supervisor and project lead, testified that the decedent had concerns regarding his mother’s health and wanted to be able to get back home when necessary.
Both parties also submitted documentary evidence, including medical reports and deposition testimony. Specifically, Peter Milstein, a cardiologist, reviewed the case on behalf of the plaintiff and concluded that “the cause of [the decedent’s] cardiac event and death was psychological and physical stress.” Milstein testified during his deposition that, “[a]ssuming [the decedent] was under significant stress from the travel and the long hours, that would increase his risk, his cardiac risks.” Milstein stated that, although the decedent’s work duties did not themselves lead to the development of his cardiac disease, it was his opinion that the decedent’s employment with the defendant led to the stress that caused his cardiac event and death.
William Bradbury, a cardiologist, reviewed the case on behalf of the defendant and concluded that the cause of death was “a sudden [cardiac] event while sleeping . . . .” Bradbury opined that it is difficult to prove or quantify emotional stress and its effect on the decedent’s disease, but that a trigger event could cause a cardiac event. Bradbury further noted that he did not know if low grade stress translates into a worsening of disease or triggers decompensation. He then opined that “[the decedent’s] heart disease was not caused by his work at the [defendant].”
Marc Rubenstein, a psychiatrist, also reviewed the decedent’s medical records on behalf of the defendant and concluded that “he could not say within reasonable medical certainty if [the decedent’s] work and/or travel stress was or was not a substantial contributing factor to his death.” He further opined that “it was possible or probable that [the decedent’s] stress from work was a contributing factor.” Merrill Mathew, a psychiatrist, also reviewed records on the defendant’s behalf and opined that “there was no evidence of work-related stress.”
On March 14, 2024, the administrative law judge issued a memorandum of decision titled Finding and Dismissal. The administrative law judge found, on the basis of the evidence submitted at the formal hearing, that the decedent “did not have any sudden or unusual work stressors leading up to his death.” The administrative law judge found that the decedent had preexisting heart related issues and was overweight. The administrative law judge also found that Gaudio and Ehrlich did not list stress from work as a factor in the development of the decedent’s cardiac condition, and that neither cardiologist noted a history of stress or stressors at work. The administrative law judge further found that the decedent’s primary care physician did not note a history of any stress or stressors at work. The administrative law judge credited the testimony of Jarbeau and Blay and concluded that the decedent did not have high demand physical responsibilities while working at the Florida project, and that he did not have any sudden or unusual work stressors leading up to his death.
The administrative law judge credited the opinions of Milstein and Bradbury that “there was no sudden physical component that led to [the decedent’s] death” and that “[the decedent’s] heart disease was not caused by his employment at [the defendant].” The administrative law judge further credited the opinions of Rubenstein and Mathew. The administrative law judge ultimately concluded that the decedent “did not have work induced stress that was a substantial contributing factor to his heart disease and death.”
On March 28, 2024, the plaintiff filed a petition for review of the administrative law judge’s finding and dismissal with the board. On appeal to the board, “[t]he [plaintiff] contend[ed] that the conclusions reached by the administrative law judge resulted from illegal or unreasonable inferences drawn from the subordinate facts. The [plaintiff] also argue[d] that the trier, in ‘[substituting] his own judgment for that of the medical professionals’ . . . incorrectly applied the law to the subordinate facts, thereby rendering a conclusion which was ‘arbitrary and capricious.’ ” (Citation omitted.)
On April 4, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion to correct the administrative law judge’s March 14, 2024 finding and dismissal. In her motion to correct, the plaintiff proposed corrections to the March 14, 2024 finding and dismissal, including that “[the decedent’s] employment at [the defendant] up through and including the date of his passing was a significant contributing factor in bringing about his sudden death,” and that “[the decedent] was subject to cumulative stress based on his long hours of work and travel.” The administrative law judge denied the motion to correct in its entirety.
On May 20, 2025, the board issued a memorandum of decision affirming the decision of the administrative law judge. The board noted that, during his deposition, Bradbury “discounted the role cumulative emotional stress might have played in the decedent’s death” and testified that “the only triggers that we do know are things like sudden exertion” or “a highly emotional interaction . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The board noted that “the record is devoid of any evidence that the decedent experienced such a stressful encounter either immediately prior to his death or at any other time relevant to this appeal.” The board further noted that “the administrative law judge was not persuaded, on the basis of the evidentiary record as presented, that the decedent’s purported work-related stressors constituted a substantial contributing factor to his death.” The board concluded that, on the basis of the administrative law judge’s credibility determinations, there was “no error in the [administrative law judge’s] rejection of the [plaintiff’s] premise that ‘the cumulative effect of long hours, travel and the stress those activities created, superimposed over an already compromised heart . . . was the cause of [the decedent’s] death.’ ”
The board also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the administrative law judge “misconstrue[d] and/or misstate[d] the claims [asserted] by the [plaintiff].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The board noted that the plaintiff “seem[ed] to argue that, because the [administrative law judge] made a finding that the employment did not cause the underlying heart condition, he must have misunderstood the [plaintiff’s] true argument: that the preexisting cardiac disease made the decedent more susceptible to a fatal cardiac event and it was travel related stress that triggered the fatal event.” The board noted that the administrative law judge “credited the opinion that the cause of death was the underlying, progressive heart disease. Had [the administrative law judge] believed that work and/or travel stress was a substantial factor in causing that underlying disease, the outcome of the case would necessarily have been different. As such, the fact that there was no causal connection between work and the underlying disease—even if not alleged by the [plaintiff]—can be seen as simply a pertinent negative finding.”
The board concluded that “it is clear the administrative law judge understood that compensability turned on whether work-related stress existed and, if so, whether it triggered the fatal cardiac event. [The administrative law judge] simply did not believe there was credible evidence of underlying work stress that substantially contributed to the fatal event. . . . Neither the heart disease nor the progression of that disease is claimed to be work-related. In addition, the [administrative law judge] determined that there were ‘no sudden unusual work stressors leading up to his death’ . . . and further concluded that the decedent’s treating cardiologists had made no notation of work-related stress. . . . [H]aving reviewed the evidentiary record in the present matter in its entirety, we are unpersuaded that the administrative law judge misapplied the law or drew improper inferences from the subordinate facts.” (Citations omitted.) This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.
On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claims that the administrative law judge and the board improperly required her to demonstrate a “sudden or unusual work stressor” in order to find her claim compensable. We are not persuaded.
We begin with our standard of review and the following legal principles applicable to workers’ compensation appeals. “[T]he principles [governing] our standard of review in workers’ compensation appeals are well established . . . . The board sits as an appellate tribunal reviewing the decision of the [administrative law judge]. . . . [T]he review . . . of an appeal from the [administrative law judge] is not a de novo hearing of the facts. . . . [Rather, the] power and duty of determining the facts rests on the [administrative law judge and] . . . [t]he [administrative law judge] is the sole arbiter of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses . . . . [When] the subordinate facts allow for diverse inferences , the [administrative law judge’s] selection of the inference to be drawn must stand unless it is based on an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them. . . . It matters not that the basic facts from which the [administrative law judge] draws this inference are undisputed rather than controverted. . . . It is likewise immaterial that the facts permit the drawing of diverse inferences. The [administrative law judge] alone is charged with the duty of initially selecting the inference [that] seems most reasonable and [the administrative law judge’s] choice, if otherwise sustainable, may not be disturbed by a reviewing court. . . . This court’s review of [the board’s] decisions . . . is similarly limited. . . . [W]e must interpret [findings of the administrative law judge] with the goal of sustaining that conclusion in light of all of the other supporting evidence. . . . Once the [administrative law judge] makes a factual finding, [we are] bound by that finding if there is evidence in the record to support it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted .) Buchanan v. East Hartford, 233 Conn. App. 698, 709, 341 A.3d 284, cert. granted, 353 Conn. 922, 345 A.3d 810 (2025). To the extent that the plaintiff’s claim requires us to construe the administrative law judge’s decision to determine whether he applied an improper legal standard, this presents a question of law over which our review is plenary. See, e.g., Cable v. Bic Corp., 270 Conn. 433, 440, 854 A.2d 1057 (2004) (plenary review is applied to issue of whether administrative law judge employed correct legal standard).
This court previously has stated that an administrative law judge “is not required to explain . . . how he has arrived at a final decision after culling through the evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Valdes v. Yankee Casting Co., 94 Conn. App. 140, 147, 891 A.2d 994 (2006). Section 31-301-3 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides: “The finding of the commissioner should contain only the ultimate relevant and material facts essential to the case in hand and found by him, together with a statement of his conclusions and the claims of law made by the parties. It should not contain excerpts from evidence or merely evidential facts, nor the reasons for his conclusions. The opinions, beliefs, reasons and argument of the commissioner should be expressed in the memorandum of decision, if any be filed, so far as they may be helpful in the decision of the case.”
It is well established that, “[u]nder the [act], a repetitive trauma injury, like occupational disease, requires proof of a causal connection to employment.3 See General 3 It is undisputed that the plaintiff is not claiming the decedent sustained an accidental injury pursuant to § 31-275 (16) (A).
Statutes § 31-275 (16) (A) (defining ‘personal injury’ or ‘injury’ to include ‘an injury to an employee that is causally connected with the employee’s employment and is the direct result of repetitive trauma or repetitive acts incident to such employment . . . .” (Emphasis omitted; footnote added.) Ciarlelli v. Hamden, 299 Conn. 265, 284–85, 8 A.3d 1093 (2010). In contrast to repetitive trauma injuries, accidental injuries are those injuries “that may be definitely located as to the time when and the place where the accident occurred . . . . General Statutes § 31-275 (16) (A). Therefore, as . . . our courts have recognized, the process of injury from a repetitive trauma is ongoing until [the last date of exposure] . . . and, in many cases involving repetitive trauma, the very nature of the injury will make it impossible to demarcate a specific date of injury. . . . [S]ee also Chase v. State, 45 Conn. App. 499, 506, 696 A.2d 1299 (1997) ([a] repetitive trauma, by definition, necessarily occurs over a period of time) . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Russell v. Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc., 252 Conn. 596, 613, 748 A.2d 278 (2000).
To establish causation, “the plaintiff must prove that the injury (1) arose out of the employment, and (2) occurred in the course of the employment. . . . This two part test derives from § 31-275, which provides in relevant part: (1) Arising out of and in the course of his employment means an accidental injury happening to an employee or an occupational disease of an employee originating while the employee has been engaged in the line of the employee’s duty in the business or affairs of the employer . . . .
“An injury is said to arise out of the employment when (a) it occurs in the course of the employment and (b) is the result of a risk involved in the employment or incident to it or to the conditions under which it is required to be performed. . . . The . . . requirement [that the injury must arise out of the employment] relates to the origin and cause of the accident, [whereas] the . . . requirement [that the injury must occur in the course of employment]
relates to the time, place and [circumstance] of the accident .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted .) Clements v. Aramark Corp., 339 Conn. 402, 411–12, 261 A.3d 665 (2021).
The plaintiff contends that, although “an unexpected mishap, event, or condition” is required to prove that an accidental injury is compensable, such a showing is not required for a “repetitive trauma” stress related heart claim. The plaintiff argues that the administrative law judge improperly required her to show evidence of such a sudden, unexpected stressor. Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that the administrative law judge’s finding that the decedent “did not have any sudden or unusual work stressors leading up to his death” was wholly irrelevant to her claim. According to the plaintiff, this finding “demonstrates that [the administrative law judge] . . . misconstrue[s] this repetitive trauma claim as an accidental injury claim” and shows that the administrative law judge “inappropriately required a showing of a sudden and unexpected event as an element of causation.” We are not persuaded.
In the present case, the findings of the administrative law judge included an adequate recitation of the relevant and material facts that he found. The administrative law judge found that “there was no sudden physical component that led to [the decedent’s] death” and that “[the decedent’s] heart disease was not caused by his employment at [the defendant],” before concluding that “[the decedent] did not have work induced stress that was a substantial contributing factor to his heart disease and death.”
We agree with the board that the administrative law judge did not misapply the law or draw improper inferences from the subordinate facts. Read as a whole, the administrative law judge “understood that compensability turned on whether work-related stress existed and, if so, whether it triggered the fatal cardiac event. [The administrative law judge] simply did not believe there was credible evidence of underlying work stress that substantially contributed to the fatal event.” A fair reading of the administrative law judge’s decision leads us to conclude that the administrative law judge’s determination that the decedent’s heart disease was not caused by his employment with the defendant sufficiently reflects that the administrative law judge understood and considered the plaintiff’s repetitive trauma claim and rejected it. The fact that the administrative law judge found that there was no sudden work stressor that caused the event does not necessarily mean that the administrative law judge did not consider the decedent’s repetitive trauma claim, as the plaintiff argues. The plaintiff interprets the administrative law judge’s finding in isolation. The plaintiff does not consider the evidence that the administrative law judge heard, which clearly demonstrated that the plaintiff had asserted a repetitive trauma claim. The plaintiff does not examine that finding in the context of the administrative law judge’s memorandum of decision as a whole. As the defendant asserts in its brief to this court, the administrative law judge’s findings “did indeed note that the decedent did not suffer a sudden, unusual or unexpected event because both Milstein and Bradbury agreed that, had the decedent suffered such an event, his death could have been work-related. Failing any ‘triggering event,’ [the plaintiff] was left to prove that repetitive stress from the job was the cause of [the decedent’s] death.”
The plaintiff argued before the administrative law judge that she “[did] not allege that the employment caused [the decedent’s] aortic stenosis. What is being claimed is that the cumulative stress over time led to his death.” Indeed, in the plaintiff’s proposed findings of fact and in her brief before the administrative law judge, the plaintiff outlined the decedent’s history of preexisting heart related issues. Although the plaintiff stated in her brief to the administrative law judge that the decedent suffered a “sudden cardiac death,” the plaintiff clearly claimed before the administrative law judge that the repetitive, cumulative trauma of stress related to the decedent’s employment was a substantial factor in causing his death. As noted previously in this opinion, a fair reading of the administrative law judge’s memorandum of decision reveals that the administrative law judge considered and rejected that claim. We therefore reject the plaintiff’s argument that the administrative law judge improperly required the plaintiff, as part of her burden of proof, to show that there was a sudden, unexpected event in order to prevail on her repetitive trauma claim. See In re Denzel W., 225 Conn. App. 354, 376, 315 A.3d 346 (“an opinion must be read as a whole, without particular portions read in isolation, to discern the parameters of its holding” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 349 Conn. 918, 317 A.3d 1 (2024); see also, e.g., id. (in reading memorandum of decision as whole, this court concluded that trial court applied proper burden of proof).
For similar reasons, we disagree with the plaintiff that “[t]he administrative law judge did not make the requisite findings to support dismissal.” The plaintiff asserts in her principal appellate brief before this court that, “[h]aving found that the plaintiff did not meet [her] burden of production in showing the existence of a sudden and unexpected triggering work event that substantially contributed to the decedent’s cardiac injury, the administrative law judge did not make findings as to the ultimate relevant and material facts in a repetitive trauma claim.” According to the plaintiff, in ruling on her repetitive trauma claim, the administrative law judge was required to explicitly make findings as to (1) whether the decedent experienced repetitive trauma related to his employment, and (2) if so, whether that repetitive trauma was a substantial factor in his cardiac event and death.4 The plaintiff maintains that “a finding on the existence 4 The plaintiff also asserts that “[a] finding that there was no work stress that was a substantial contributing factor is distinct from finding that there was no work stress at all.” We disagree with this assertion because the administrative law judge was not required to make a finding as to whether the decedent had any work stress but, rather, was required to determine whether the plaintiff had established causation, namely, that the decedent’s alleged work stress was a substantial factor in causing his death.
of prolonged stress and repetitive trauma was required to determine compensability.” The defendant counters that the administrative law judge’s analysis “squarely address[ed] repetitive job stress” and that “neither the [administrative law judge] nor the [board] required [a showing of a sudden and unexpected event].” We agree with the defendant.
As stated previously in this opinion, we agree with the board that the finding of the administrative law judge that there was no causal connection between the decedent’s work and his underlying disease sufficiently addresses the plaintiff’s repetitive trauma claim. The administrative law judge found that the cause of death was the decedent’s underlying, progressive heart disease. As the board noted, “[h]ad [the administrative law judge] believed that work and/or travel stress was a substantial factor in causing that underlying disease, the outcome of the case would necessarily have been different.” Contrary to the plaintiff’s argument, the administrative law judge’s findings do not reflect the application of an incorrect legal standard. Instead, our review leads us to conclude that the administrative law judge considered the evidence before him and ultimately credited the opinions of the defendant’s medical experts that the cause of the decedent’s death was his underlying, progressive heart disease, and that his work was not a substantial factor, whether in the form of an accidental injury or repetitive trauma injury, in causing his death.5 As to the administrative law judge’s weighing of the evidence before him, it is well settled that, on appeal, “[n]either the . . . board nor this court has the power to retry facts.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dubrosky v. Boehringer 5 We note that the plaintiff does not appear to challenge the findings and/or credibility determinations of the administrative law judge as clearly erroneous but, rather, claims only that the administrative law judge and the board applied an improper legal standard with respect to her claims.
Ingelheim Corp., 145 Conn. App. 261, 268, 76 A.3d 657, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 935, 78 A.3d 859 (2013).
We also disagree with the plaintiff’s argument that the administrative law judge was required to make an express credibility determination with respect to the plaintiff’s testimony to determine causation. The plaintiff argues that “[t]here was certainly evidence of such stress, in the long hours the decedent worked, his frequent travel, the fatigue and lethargy testified to by the plaintiff, and the acknowledgment of both . . . Milstein and Bradbury that such things would cause stress.” We conclude that this argument is merely an invitation for this court to reweigh the evidence and draw a different conclusion. As stated previously, the weighing of evidence and testimony lies exclusively within the province of the administrative law judge as the fact finder.
Moreover, the administrative law judge made the requisite findings to support the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim on the basis that she did not prove causation.6 The administrative law judge explicitly found that the decedent “did not have work induced stress that was a substantial contributing factor to his heart disease and death.” This conclusion was amply supported by evidence in the record. The administrative law judge found that the decedent had preexisting heart related issues and was overweight, and that his treating primary care physician and his treating cardiologists did not note work stress as a factor in the development of his cardiac condition and also did not note a history of stressors at work. The administrative law judge also found that the decedent did not have high demand physical responsibilities while working at the Florida project, and that he did not have 6 Although the plaintiff filed a motion to correct certain of the administrative law judge’s factual findings, we note that the record does not reveal that the plaintiff ever filed a motion for articulation. See, e.g., Cable v. Bic Corp., supra, 270 Conn. 444–45 (concluding that defendants should have sought to amplify record by way of motion requesting memorandum of decision or motion for articulation and noting that motions for articulation have been both considered and granted by administrative adjudicators and board).
any sudden or unusual work stressors leading up to his death.
As the administrative law judge found, Bradbury opined that the decedent’s heart disease was not caused by his work with the defendant, and, instead, opined that the decedent’s death was caused by progressive aortic stenosis, and not psychological or physical stress. The administrative law judge was not required to credit Milstein’s opinion that the decedent’s employment with the defendant “led to the stress that caused his cardiac event and death.” The administrative law judge found Bradbury’s opinions credible and persuasive that (1) there was no sudden physical component that led to the decedent’s death, and (2) the decedent’s heart disease was not caused by his employment with the defendant. The administrative law judge credited the opinions of Rubenstein, who opined that he could not say within reasonable medical certainty if the decedent’s work and/or travel stress was or was not a substantial contributing factor to his death. Finally, the administrative law judge also found credible and persuasive the opinions of Mathew, a psychiatrist, who opined that there was no evidence of work-related stress, and that the medical documentation did not note any stressors but for the death of the decedent’s mother.
The plaintiff challenges the board’s statement that the administrative law judge “credited the opinion advanced by Bradbury, who opined that, although a sudden overexertion or a highly emotional encounter could trigger a cardiac episode in patients suffering from aortic stenosis, there is no evidence that chronic stress either worsens the progression of the disease or can cause a decompensated cardiac event.” The plaintiff asserts that the administrative law judge declined to endorse Bradbury’s opinion on causation, “chiefly, that the effect of prolonged physical and emotional work stress, superimposed on aortic stenosis, could not be quantified.” The administrative law judge, however, did credit Bradbury’s opinion that the decedent’s heart disease was not caused by his employment with the defendant. Moreover, although Bradbury indicated in his report that, “[a]s cardiologists , we don’t know the exact physiologic mechanism of progressive aortic stenosis,” Bradbury stated: “I do not see a causal relationship between aortic stenosis progression and [the decedent’s] employment. This would have happened had he not worked at [the defendant].” Bradbury’s opinions reasonably could have been relied on by the administrative law judge in concluding that the decedent did not have work-related stress that was a substantial contributing factor to his heart disease and death.
To the extent that the administrative law judge was faced with conflicting medical evidence on the issue of causation, we do not retry that issue on appeal. See, e.g., Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd., 114 Conn. App. 822, 844, 970 A.2d 834 (“Our role is to determine whether the [board’s] decision results from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts or from an inference illegally or unreasonably drawn from them. . . . This standard clearly applies to conflicting expert medical testimony. It [is] the province of the [administrative law judge] to accept the evidence which impress[es] him as being credible and the more weighty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 293 Conn. 907, 978 A.2d 1109 (2009). “The question of proximate causation is essentially a factual issue. . . . It becomes a conclusion of law only when the mind of a fair and reasonable [person] could reach only one conclusion; if there is room for a reasonable disagreement the question is one to be determined by the trier as a matter of fact.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Buchanan v. East Hartford, supra, 233 Conn. App. 727. Thus, because the administrative law judge’s finding that the decedent did not have work induced stress that was a substantial factor in causing his death is supported by evidence in the record, we decline to disturb that finding on appeal. See id., 709. We therefore reject the plaintiff’s claim.
The decision of the Compensation Review Board is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.