Zhu v. Taronis Technologies Incorporated

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided November 23, 2020·No. 2:19-cv-04529·Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Kui Zhu, et al., No. CV-19-04529-PHX-GMS

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 Taronis Technologies Incorporated, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 16 Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of a 17 Class Action Settlement. (Doc. 67.) For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is 18 approved. 19 BACKGROUND 20 This matter concerns an alleged fraudulent scheme to artificially inflate the market 21 price of Taronis common stock by deceiving the investing public about the existence of a 22 material contract between Taronis and the City of San Diego. Taronis is an energy company 23 that offers technology solutions to create, process, and produce hydrogen-based fuel. 24 On January 28, 2019 Taronis disclosed in an SEC filing and related press release 25 (“Press Release”) that the City of San Diego (the “City”) elected to use Taronis’s 26 MagneGas2 as its fuel of choice. (Doc. 36 at 8.) Plaintiffs allege that the market price of 27 Taronis common stock promptly increased over 25% after news of the San Diego contract 28 was published. 1 However, the day after the Press Release was published, the City’s Senior Public 2 Information Officer requested that the Press Release be immediately removed. The City 3 Officer explained, “while the product has been tested the City of San Diego does not have 4 any procurement contract or any agreement with [Taronis] to purchase any of its products.” 5 (Doc. 36 at 15.) Plaintiffs also cite internal emails from the City stating that “[t]he [Taronis] 6 news release . . . is incorrect. The City of San Diego does NOT have a contract with this 7 company. . . . This is appalling that they’d get this so wrong.” (Doc. 36 at 14.) Pursuant to 8 the City’s request, the Press Release was later removed from Taronis’s website, but no 9 corrective disclosure was filed with the SEC. 10 Plaintiffs allege that the Company’s disclosure about the contract with the City of 11 San Diego was entirely false. (Doc. 36 at 2-3.) Plaintiffs claim that Defendants knew the 12 Press Release was false but released it to artificially inflate the common stock price. 13 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants waited until February 12, 2019 to clarify the Press Release 14 in an attempt to obtain compliance with NASDAQ’s minimum $1.00 bid price for the 15 required ten consecutive business days. 16 Plaintiffs’ federal securities action is brought on behalf of all persons or entities who 17 purchased or otherwise acquired Taronis common stock between January 28, 2019 and 18 February 12, 2019 (“Plaintiffs”) when the stock prices were allegedly artificially inflated. 19 Plaintiff defines the proposed class members as:

20 all persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired Taronis Technologies, Inc. (“Taronis”) common stock between January 28, 2019, and 21 February 12, 2019, both dates inclusive (the “Class Period”), and were damaged thereby. Excluded from the Class by definition are: Defendants, 22 current and former officers and directors of Taronis, members of their Immediate Families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or 23 assigns, and any entity in which Defendants have or had a controlling interest. Also excluded from the Class are those Persons who are found by 24 the Court to have timely and validly requested exclusion from the Class. 25 (Doc. 67-1 at 5.) The parties have now reached an agreement and have moved for 26 preliminary approval of their proposed class action settlement. 27 ANALYSIS 28 Where “the parties reach a settlement agreement prior to class certification, courts 1 must peruse the proposed compromise to ratify both the propriety of the certification and 2 the fairness of the settlement.” Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003); see 3 Manual for Complex Litigation (4th Ed. 2004) § 21.632. 4 I. Preliminary Class Certification 5 A class may not be certified unless it meets each of the four requirements of Rule 6 23(a), typically referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of 7 representation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The party seeking certification bears the burden of 8 demonstrating that it has met all of these requirements, and “the trial court must conduct a 9 ‘rigorous analysis’ to determine whether” it has met that burden. Zinser v. Accufix Research 10 Inst., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 11 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 1996)). Additionally, a movant for class certification must 12 demonstrate at least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Plaintiff 13 seeks certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), which permits certification where “questions 14 of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only 15 individual members” and “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly 16 and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 17 When a court is evaluating the certification question in the context of a proposed 18 settlement class, questions regarding the manageability of the case for trial purposes are 19 not considered. See Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 620 20 (1997). However, the Ninth Circuit has long held courts must be particularly careful when 21 approving classes for settlement purposes. Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 22 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e must pay ‘undiluted, even heightened, attention’ to class 23 certification requirements in a settlement context.”). 24 a. Rule 23(a) 25 i. Numerosity 26 Under Rule 23(a)(1), a plaintiff must demonstrate that the proposed “class is so 27 numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Here, the 28 parties assert that the “members of the Settlement Class number in the thousands.” 1 Although numerosity is not tied to a strict numeric threshold, “[a] proposed class generally 2 satisfies the numerosity requirement if the class has 40 or more members.” Horton v. USAA 3 Cas. Ins. Co., 266 F.R.D. 360, 365 (D. Ariz. 2009); see Californians for Disability Rights, 4 Inc. v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 249 F.R.D. 334, 346 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (citing Consol. Rail 5 Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir. 1995)); William B. Rubenstein, 6 Newberg on Class Actions § 3:12 (5th ed. 2014). The Court therefore finds that numerosity 7 is satisfied because joinder of all class members would be impracticable. 8 ii. Commonality 9 To establish commonality, a plaintiff is required to show that “there are questions 10 of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23(a)(2). Commonality thus 11 “requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members ‘have suffered the same 12 injury.’” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349–50 (2011) (quoting Gen. Tel. 13 Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)). “This does not mean merely that they 14 have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law.” Id. at 350. Rather, the claim 15 must be based on a common contention capable of classwide resolution. Id.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Zhu v. Taronis Technologies Incorporated, (D. Ariz. 2020).

Zhu v. Taronis Technologies Incorporated (Zhu v. Taronis Technologies Incorporated) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon
457 U.S. 147 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor
521 U.S. 591 (Supreme Court, 1997)
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes
131 S. Ct. 2541 (Supreme Court, 2011)
Staton v. Boeing Co.
327 F.3d 938 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)
Syncor Erisa Litigation v. Cardinal Health, Inc.
516 F.3d 1095 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo
577 U.S. 442 (Supreme Court, 2016)
Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp.
109 F.3d 338 (Seventh Circuit, 1997)
Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp.
150 F.3d 1011 (Ninth Circuit, 1998)
Horton v. Usaa Casualty Insurance
266 F.R.D. 360 (D. Arizona, 2009)
In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation
176 F.R.D. 99 (S.D. New York, 1997)