Zhu v. Taronis Technologies Incorporated

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided November 23, 2020·No. 2:19-cv-04529·Unknown

Opinion

WO

Kui Zhu, et al., No. CV-19-04529-PHX-GMS

Plaintiffs, ORDER

v.

Taronis Technologies Incorporated, et al.,

Defendants. Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of a Class Action Settlement. (Doc. 67.) For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is approved. This matter concerns an alleged fraudulent scheme to artificially inflate the market price of Taronis common stock by deceiving the investing public about the existence of a material contract between Taronis and the City of San Diego. Taronis is an energy company that offers technology solutions to create, process, and produce hydrogen-based fuel. On January 28, 2019 Taronis disclosed in an SEC filing and related press release (“Press Release”) that the City of San Diego (the “City”) elected to use Taronis’s MagneGas2 as its fuel of choice. (Doc. 36 at 8.) Plaintiffs allege that the market price of Taronis common stock promptly increased over 25% after news of the San Diego contract was published. However, the day after the Press Release was published, the City’s Senior Public Information Officer requested that the Press Release be immediately removed. The City Officer explained, “while the product has been tested the City of San Diego does not have any procurement contract or any agreement with [Taronis] to purchase any of its products.” (Doc. 36 at 15.) Plaintiffs also cite internal emails from the City stating that “[t]he [Taronis] news release . . . is incorrect. The City of San Diego does NOT have a contract with this company. . . . This is appalling that they’d get this so wrong.” (Doc. 36 at 14.) Pursuant to the City’s request, the Press Release was later removed from Taronis’s website, but no corrective disclosure was filed with the SEC. Plaintiffs allege that the Company’s disclosure about the contract with the City of San Diego was entirely false. (Doc. 36 at 2-3.) Plaintiffs claim that Defendants knew the Press Release was false but released it to artificially inflate the common stock price. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants waited until February 12, 2019 to clarify the Press Release in an attempt to obtain compliance with NASDAQ’s minimum $1.00 bid price for the required ten consecutive business days. Plaintiffs’ federal securities action is brought on behalf of all persons or entities who purchased or otherwise acquired Taronis common stock between January 28, 2019 and February 12, 2019 (“Plaintiffs”) when the stock prices were allegedly artificially inflated. Plaintiff defines the proposed class members as:

all persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired Taronis Technologies, Inc. (“Taronis”) common stock between January 28, 2019, and February 12, 2019, both dates inclusive (the “Class Period”), and were damaged thereby. Excluded from the Class by definition are: Defendants, current and former officers and directors of Taronis, members of their Immediate Families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns, and any entity in which Defendants have or had a controlling interest. Also excluded from the Class are those Persons who are found by the Court to have timely and validly requested exclusion from the Class. (Doc. 67-1 at 5.) The parties have now reached an agreement and have moved for preliminary approval of their proposed class action settlement. Where “the parties reach a settlement agreement prior to class certification, courts must peruse the proposed compromise to ratify both the propriety of the certification and the fairness of the settlement.” Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003); see Manual for Complex Litigation (4th Ed. 2004) § 21.632. I. Preliminary Class Certification A class may not be certified unless it meets each of the four requirements of Rule 23(a), typically referred to as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The party seeking certification bears the burden of demonstrating that it has met all of these requirements, and “the trial court must conduct a ‘rigorous analysis’ to determine whether” it has met that burden. Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 1996)). Additionally, a movant for class certification must demonstrate at least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Plaintiff seeks certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), which permits certification where “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members” and “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). When a court is evaluating the certification question in the context of a proposed settlement class, questions regarding the manageability of the case for trial purposes are not considered. See Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 620 (1997). However, the Ninth Circuit has long held courts must be particularly careful when approving classes for settlement purposes. Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e must pay ‘undiluted, even heightened, attention’ to class certification requirements in a settlement context.”). a. Rule 23(a) i. Numerosity Under Rule 23(a)(1), a plaintiff must demonstrate that the proposed “class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Here, the parties assert that the “members of the Settlement Class number in the thousands.” Although numerosity is not tied to a strict numeric threshold, “[a] proposed class generally satisfies the numerosity requirement if the class has 40 or more members.” Horton v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 266 F.R.D. 360, 365 (D. Ariz. 2009); see Californians for Disability Rights, Inc. v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 249 F.R.D. 334, 346 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (citing Consol. Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir. 1995)); William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 3:12 (5th ed. 2014). The Court therefore finds that numerosity is satisfied because joinder of all class members would be impracticable. ii. Commonality To establish commonality, a plaintiff is required to show that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23(a)(2). Commonality thus “requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members ‘have suffered the same injury.’” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349–50 (2011) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)). “This does not mean merely that they have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law.” Id. at 350. Rather, the claim must be based on a common contention capable of classwide resolution. Id. Common questions must therefore be accompanied by common answers sufficient to drive the resolution of the litigation. Id. Here, the class presents a common question: whether Defendant’s statements to the public misrepresented material facts about the Company and ultimately led to a decline in the value of the Company’s common stock. Therefore, there are questions of law or fact c

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Zhu v. Taronis Technologies Incorporated, (D. Ariz. 2020).

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