Zhu v. Taronis Technologies Incorporated

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedMarch 9, 2021
Docket2:19-cv-04529
StatusUnknown

This text of Zhu v. Taronis Technologies Incorporated (Zhu v. Taronis Technologies Incorporated) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Zhu v. Taronis Technologies Incorporated, (D. Ariz. 2021).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Kui Zhu, et al., No. CV-19-04529-PHX-GMS

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 Taronis Technologies Incorporated, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 16 Before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion and Memorandum in Support of 17 Final Approval of Class Action Settlement and Plan of Allocation (Doc. 76) and Plaintiffs’ 18 Unopposed Motion and Memorandum in Support of Attorney’s Fees, Expenses and Award 19 to Plaintiffs, (Doc. 77). For the reasons set forth below, the Motions are granted. 20 BACKGROUND 21 This matter concerns an alleged fraudulent scheme to artificially inflate the market 22 price of Taronis common stock by deceiving the investing public about the existence of a 23 material contract between Taronis and the City of San Diego. Taronis is an energy company 24 that offers technology solutions to create, process, and produce hydrogen-based fuel. On 25 January 28, 2019 Taronis disclosed in an SEC filing and related press release (“Press 26 Release”) that the City of San Diego (the “City”) elected to use Taronis’s MagneGas2 as 27 its fuel of choice. (Doc. 36 at 8.) Plaintiffs allege that the market price of Taronis common 28 stock promptly increased over 25% after news of the San Diego contract was published. 1 However, the day after the Press Release was published, the City’s Senior Public 2 Information Officer requested that the Press Release be immediately removed. The City 3 Officer explained, “while the product has been tested the City of San Diego does not have 4 any procurement contract or any agreement with [Taronis] to purchase any of its products.” 5 (Doc. 36 at 15.) Plaintiffs also cite internal emails from the City stating that “[t]he [Taronis] 6 news release . . . is incorrect. The City of San Diego does NOT have a contract with this 7 company. . . . This is appalling that they’d get this so wrong.” (Doc. 36 at 14.) Pursuant to 8 the City’s request, the Press Release was later removed from Taronis’s website, but no 9 corrective disclosure was filed with the SEC. 10 Plaintiffs allege that the Company’s disclosure about the contract with the City of 11 San Diego was entirely false. (Doc. 36 at 2-3.) Plaintiffs claim that Defendants knew the 12 Press Release was false but released it to artificially inflate the common stock price. 13 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants waited until February 12, 2019 to clarify the Press Release 14 in an attempt to obtain compliance with NASDAQ’s minimum $1.00 bid price for the 15 required ten consecutive business days. 16 Plaintiffs’ federal securities action is brought on behalf of all persons or entities who 17 purchased or otherwise acquired Taronis common stock between January 28, 2019 and 18 February 12, 2019 (“Plaintiffs”) when the stock prices were allegedly artificially inflated. 19 (Doc. 67-1 at 5.) The parties have now reached an agreement. The Court granted 20 preliminary approval of their agreement on November 23, 2020. Plaintiffs now move for 21 final approval of the proposed class action settlement. 22 DISCUSSION 23 I. Class Certification and Settlement Approval 24 Courts apply “a three-step procedure for approval of class action settlements: (1) 25 preliminary approval of the proposed settlement at an informal hearing; (2) dissemination 26 of mailed and/or published notice of the settlement to all affected class members; and (3) 27 a “formal fairness hearing” or final settlement approval hearing, at which class members 28 may be heard regarding the settlement, and at which evidence and argument concerning 1 the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of the settlement may be presented.” See, e.g., 2 Harris v. U.S. Physical Therapy, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-01508-JCM, 2012 WL 6900931, at *4 3 (D. Nev. Dec. 26, 2012). 4 Where “the parties reach a settlement agreement prior to class certification, courts 5 must peruse the proposed compromise to ratify both the propriety of the certification and 6 the fairness of the settlement.” Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003); see 7 Manual for Complex Litigation (4th Ed. 2004) § 21.632. A class may not be certified unless 8 it meets each of the four requirements of Rule 23(a), typically referred to as numerosity, 9 commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The Court 10 analyzed these factors in its Preliminary Approval Order and finds no reason to disturb its 11 earlier conclusions. The requirements of Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3) were satisfied then 12 and they remain so now. (Doc. 74 at 3–7.) Thus, certification of the Settlement Class is 13 appropriate. 14 Given the proposed settlement satisfies Rules 23(a) and (b), the Court must then 15 evaluate the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the proposed settlement. Fed. R. 16 Civ. P. 23(e)(2). In preliminarily approving the Settlement, the Court analyzed the Rule 17 23(e)(2) factors and concluded that the Settlement was “fair, adequate, and reasonable.” 18 (Doc. 74 at 7–8.) Those conclusions weigh equally in favor of final approval now. 19 Adequate notice was sent to the settlement class members as required in the Order granting 20 preliminary approval and no members objected. (Doc. 78 at 4); (Doc. 79-1). The Court has 21 reviewed the motion for final approval (Doc. 76) and supporting documents and has heard 22 from the parties at the final approval hearing on March 5, 2021. The Court thus finds the 23 settlement is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interests of the settlement class. 24 II. Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs 25 “[A] litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons 26 other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee from the fund as a 27 whole.” Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980). The common fund doctrine 28 permits the award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to be based on a percentage of the funds 1 awarded to the class. Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 2 1989). The reasonableness of an award is a function of context. Id. “Ordinarily, however, 3 such fee awards range from 20 percent to 30 percent of the fund created.” Id. (“We note 4 with approval that one court has concluded that the ‘bench mark’ percentage for the fee 5 award should be 25 percent.”). 6 Here, the Court finds that Class Counsel is entitled to an award of reasonable 7 attorneys’ fees and expenses in connection with the approved settlement. Plaintiffs’ 8 Counsel seeks attorneys’ fees for 25% of the settlement ($425,000), reimbursement for 9 expenses of $30,303.42, and an award to Lead Plaintiff Zhu of $2,600 to be paid from the 10 settlement. 11 The Court has reviewed the Motion, and the documents submitted in support 12 thereof, including Class Counsel’s itemized expenses and its affidavit regarding its fees 13 and reimbursement. (Doc. 78.) The 25% allocation is within the range the Ninth Circuit 14 has indicated is acceptable, Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt, 886 F.2d at 272, and the 15 corresponding lodestar calculation also supports finding the figure reasonable. (Doc. 78 at 16 9) (explaining that Plaintiffs’ Counsel worked a total of 619.3 hours at rates of $700, $615, 17 $355, $475, and $335). Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s expense request is also reasonable in light of 18 its itemized expenses and the fact that the figure is significantly below the $40,000 19 estimated in the class notice. Id. at 12. 20 Finally, Lead Plaintiff Zhu may properly receive $2,600 from the settlement.

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Related

Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert
444 U.S. 472 (Supreme Court, 1980)
Staton v. Boeing Co.
327 F.3d 938 (Ninth Circuit, 2003)
Rodriguez v. West Publishing Corp.
563 F.3d 948 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty
886 F.2d 268 (Ninth Circuit, 1989)

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Zhu v. Taronis Technologies Incorporated, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/zhu-v-taronis-technologies-incorporated-azd-2021.