Zhang v. Great Sichuan On 3rd Ave., Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedFebruary 7, 2025
Docket1:15-cv-04558
StatusUnknown

This text of Zhang v. Great Sichuan On 3rd Ave., Inc. (Zhang v. Great Sichuan On 3rd Ave., Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Zhang v. Great Sichuan On 3rd Ave., Inc., (S.D.N.Y. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----------------------------------------------------------------X JIAN XIN ZHANG, et al.,

Plaintiffs, REPORT & RECOMMENDATION -against- 15-CV-4558 (JGK) (JW) GREAT SICHUAN ON 3RD AVE. INC. D/B/A “GREAT SICHUAN”, GREAT SICHUAN 363 INC., D/B/A “GREAT SICHUAN”, RUN LU ZHUAI, CHANG GUO YANG, PETER HE, RUO PENG WANG, CHAO YANG YIN, JOHN DOE, AND JANE DOE # 1-10,

Defendants. -----------------------------------------------------------------X

JENNIFER E. WILLIS, United States Magistrate Judge to the Honorable John G. Koeltl, United States District Judge: BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Jian Xin Zhang, Hua Long Yang, Rui Sen Zhao, Cheng Min Yang, Jian Qiang Du, Yu Bao Zhao, Guo Yue He (collectively “Plaintiffs”) initiated the instant case on June 11, 2015. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and its New York state counterpart, New York Labor Law (“NYLL”). Dkt. No. 1, at 1. On February 2, 2024, this Court issued a report and recommendation recommending the granting of Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment against the Defendants. Dkt. No. 196. Judge Koeltl adopted the report and recommendation and informed plaintiffs that they “may apply for attorney's fees and costs after entry of judgment in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d).” Dkt. No. 197, at 2. Now, Plaintiffs ask the Court to grant their motion for attorneys’ fees and costs as the prevailing party in accordance with the FLSA. Dkt. No. 200. The Plaintiffs request $113,590.00, pursuant to the lodestar

method of fee calculation, plus expenses of $1,225.30. Dkt. No. 206, at 2. LEGAL STANDARD

“Under both the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”), prevailing Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs.” Martinenko v. 212 Steakhouse, Inc., No. 22-CV-00518 (JLR), 2024 WL 5199792 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2024) (quoting Solano v. Andiamo Café Corp.,

No. 19-CV-03264 (SN), 2021 WL 2201372, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2021)). The Second Circuit applies the lodestar analysis to determine whether the attorneys’ fees sought are reasonable. Millea v. Metro-N. R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, at *166 (2d Cir. 2011). “The lodestar method determines a ‘presumptively reasonable fee’ that is the ‘product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of hours required by the case.’” Id. (citation omitted). Martinenko, 2024 WL 5199792, at *7. To determine a reasonably hourly rate, courts consider a number of factors known

as the Johnson factors which include: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the skill required to properly perform the relevant services; (4) the preclusion of other employment attendant to counsel’s acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) fee awards in similar cases. Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-719 (5th Cir. 1974).

“A district court need not recite and make separate findings as to all twelve Johnson factors, provided that it takes each into account in setting the attorneys' fee award.” S.C. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 2024 WL 3518522, No. 23-CV-. 1266 (LGS), at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2024); S.W. ex rel. A.W., 2023 WL 5803415 at *4; see, e.g., Alston as Tr. Of Loc. 272 Lab. Mgmt. Pension Fund v. Nagle Parking Inc., No. 23-CV-1739 (PAE), 2023 WL 4157186, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2023). Finally, “When evaluating the reasonableness of hours billed, courts must make a ‘conscientious and detailed inquiry into the validity of the representations that a certain number of hours were usefully and reasonably expended.’” Martinenko v. 212 Steakhouse, Inc., No. 22-CV-00518 (JLR), 2024 WL 5199792 at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2024) (quoting Haley v. Pataki, 106 F.3d 478, 484 (2d Cir. 1997)

(quoting Lunday v. City of Albany, 42 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam)). DISCUSSION I. Prevailing Party The FLSA and NYLL allows prevailing employees to collect a reasonable attorney’s fee. See Kahlil v. Original Old Homestead Rest., Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 470,

473 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) In their Amended Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion, Plaintiffs state that they, “are the prevailing party by virtue of Defendants’ default.” Dkt. No. 206, at 2.; See Cabrera v. City Scrap Metal, Inc., No. 21-CV-5601 (RPK) (CLP), 2022 WL 17779151 at *22-23 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2022) (holding that “because defendants have defaulted, plaintiff is a prevailing party and therefore should receive an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs.”). Default judgment was entered on March 15, 2024. Dkt. No. 197. Thus, Plaintiffs are the prevailing party and are entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees.

II. Reasonableness of the Hourly Rates a. Overview of Hours and Rates Sought Plaintiffs state numerous grounds to support their requested fee amount. First, they argue that counsel expended a reasonable amount of time. Dkt. No. 206, at 3. Second, that the requested hourly rates are reasonable in light of counsel’s

significant experience, good reputation, and proven ability in FLSA cases. Dkt. No. 206, at 5-7. Third, that public policy favors compensating Plaintiffs’ counsel adequately. Dkt. No. 206, at 8-9. Lastly, that attorney’s fee award need not be proportional to damages. Dkt. No. 206, at 10. In sum, they argue the hourly rate for an attorney should reflect “what a reasonable, paying client would be willing to pay.” Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at *184.

Plaintiff relies on the lodestar method to calculate total attorneys’ fees in the amount of $113,590.00 and costs of $1,225.30. Dkt. No. 206, at 2. In the Declaration of Attorney Ge Qu In Support of Motion for Attorney’s Fees (“Declaration”), Plaintiff documents that from June 2016 to March 2024, a team of eleven attorneys and two law clerks from, Hang & Associates, PLLC billed 372.00 hours. Dkt. No. 201, at 2. Jian Hang billed 50.30 hours at a rate of $350 per hour, Ge Qu billed 4.10 hours at a rate of $325 per hour, Guofeng Li billed 95.50 hours at a rate of $300, Keli Liu billed

94.30 hours at a rate of $300, Paul Mendez billed 41.50 hours at a rate of $300, Zhangyuxi Wang billed 30.40 hours at a rate of $300, Shan Zhu billed 20.50 hours at a rate of $300, Ken H. Maeng billed 11.90 hours at a rate of $300, William Brown billed 7.40 hours at a rate of $300, Ziyi Gao billed 0.9 hours at a rate of $300, Sidney

Li billed 0.9 hours at a rate of $30, Yu Zhang billed 11.70 at a rate of $200, and finally Ge Yan billed 2.60 hours at a rate of $150. Dkt. No. 201, at 2. The Memorandum provides a detailed account not only of the billable hours and rates for each lawyer, but also includes biographical backgrounds for each attorney, explaining their expertise relating to the specifics they billed for. b. Reasonable Hourly Rates

“A court may determine the reasonable hourly rate by relying both on ‘its own knowledge of comparable rates charged by lawyers in the district,’ as well as on ‘evidence proffered by the parties.’” Martinenko v.

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Related

Thomas v. Arn
474 U.S. 140 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Millea v. Metro-North Railroad
658 F.3d 154 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Albert Farbotko v. Clinton County Of New York
433 F.3d 204 (Second Circuit, 2005)
Kahlil v. Original Old Homestead Restaurant, Inc.
657 F. Supp. 2d 470 (S.D. New York, 2009)
Lunday v. City of Albany
42 F.3d 131 (Second Circuit, 1994)
Haley v. Pataki
106 F.3d 478 (Second Circuit, 1997)
Grant v. Martinez
973 F.2d 96 (Second Circuit, 1992)

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